THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


Date  Due 


THE 

PRINCIPLES  OF  EDUCATION 


BY 


JESSE  H.  COURSAULT,  PH.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  THE  HISTORY  AND  PHILOSOPHY  OF  EDUCATION 
AND  DEAN  OF  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  SCHOOL  OF  EDU- 
CATION IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  MISSOURI 


SILVER,   BURDETT  AND  COMPANY 

BOSTON        NEW  YORK         CHICAGO        SAN  FRANCISCO 


COPYRIGHT,  1920,  BY 
JESSE  H.  COURSAULT 

All  rights  reserved 


3-70.1 

Education 
CO  Library 


C$3 
EDITOR'S  PREFACE 

DURING  the  later  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century  phi- 
losophy and  psychology  dominated  the  theory  of  educa- 
tion. From  the  principles  of  these  two  fields  methods 
were  deduced  for  which  the  claim  was  made  that  they 
produced  the  best  results  in  instructional  practice. 

During  the  twentieth  century,  however,  experimental 
science  has  been  the  dominant  method.  Without  regard 
for  the  philosophical  point  of  view,  specific  methods 
of  teaching,  of  supervision,  and  of  administration  have 
been  studied  in  localized  situations  to  discover  the  better 
practice.  During  these  two  latter  decades  a  very  con- 
siderable body  of  technique  has  been  collected  and  to  this 
constant  accretions  are  being  made.  The  force  of  the 
scientific  impulse  is,  fortunately,  not  yet  expended  and 
it  is  confidently  expected  to  continue  indefinitely  with 
increasing  value. 

But  since  the  tendency  of  science  is  to  produce  a  body 
of  technique,  particle  by  particle,  as  investigators  study 
small  individual  and  relatively  isolated  problems,  cen- 
tral attitudes  and  principles  are  temporarily  ignored. 
The  result  of  this  is  that  the  orientation  of  the  whole 
mass  of  technique  is  lost  sight  of  and  those  who  practice 
do  so  without  clear  ultimate  purposes  in  mind. 

With  some  subjects,  such  as  the  physical  sciences, 
this  tendency  takes  care  of  itself  but  in  those  sciences 
which  treat  of  mind  and  men,  so  many  uncontrolled 
factors  enter  into  the  direction  and  execution  of  practice 
that  some  guiding  objectives  are  necessary  in  the  pres- 
ent incomplete  condition  of  knowledge  and,  in  all  prob- 


vi  Editor's  Preface 

ability,  will  always  be  necessary  no  matter  how  far  the 
scientific  development  of  the  field  may  be  carried. 

Moreover,  the  scientific  attitude  toward  education 
which  has  substituted  facts  for  opinions  so  satisfactorily 
in  many  cases,  produces  in  the  mind  of  the  scientist 
and  his  followers  a  disesteem  for  philosophy.  A  fact  is  a 
fact,  but  a  philosophical  principle  is  an  opinion  and  as 
such  is  treated  as  being  neither  trustworthy  nor  neces- 
sary. Consequently  there  is  a  distinct  tendency  among 
the  less  thoughtful  educators  at  the  present  time  to  ig- 
nore principles  of  education. 

If,  however,  we  look  upon  philosophy  as  an  activity 
of  the  human  mind  which  seeks  to  take  stock  of  what 
has  been  accomplished  and  to  determine  its  meaning, 
to  disentangle  the  important  from  the  unimportant, 
and  to  set  all  the  items  in  some  perspective,  it  is  evident 
that  it  has  a  very  definite  place  in  education. 

Into  such  a  conflict  between  a  mental  science  with 
uncontrolled  factors  and  scientific  laboratory  investi- 
gation wherein  scant  patience  is  frequently  shown  toward 
those  who  pause  to  get  a  perspective  in  the  presence  of  a 
great  body  of  unorganized  facts,  the  appearance  of  this 
book,  which  deals  with  the  principles  of  education,  is 
timely.  The  author  has  accepted  a  point  of  view  which 
he  believes,  and  which  to  the  editor  appears  to  be,  a 
useful  interpretation  of  the  tendencies  of  educational 
thought  and  effort  in  this  generation,  and  has  endeavored 
to  organize  the  isolated  facts  and  practices  into  an  or- 
ganic unit.  It  will  not  only  help  the  college  student  to 
orient  himself  in  the  midst  of  the  complexities  of  such  an 
unorganized  field  but  will  also  provide  the  investigator 
and  college  teacher  with,  at  least,  a  point  of  departure 
in  his  thinking. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

THIS  book  is  the  outgrowth  of  twelve  years  of  class- 
room instruction,  supplemented  by  other  work  in  the  train- 
ing of  teachers.  It  is  an  attempt  to  present  with  logical 
cogency  a  simple  and  definite  system  of  principles  for 
guiding  educational  thought  and  practice.  Elaboration 
useless  for  this  practical  purpose  has  been  avoided. 

Attention  should  be  called  especially  to  two  character- 
istics of  this  discussion  of  the  principles  of  education. 
(1)  Man  is  here  regarded  as  a  person  who  seeks  to  attain 
purposes  through  means  of  control  and  also  as  a  psycho- 
physical  organism  in  a  process  of  adjustment  to  environ- 
ment through  stimuli  and  responses;  but  these  two 
points  of  view,  the  confusion  of  which  has  led  to  much 
erratic  thinking  in  the  field  of  education,  have  been  kept 
distinct.  (2)  The  importance  in  the  educative  process 
of  the  appreciation  of  values  is  here  emphasized  as  much 
as  is  the  importance  of  the  knowledge  of  facts,  by  which 
appreciated  values  may  be  attained.  In  this  connection, 
the  essential  nature  and  function  of  history  and  of  liter- 
ature and  the  other  fine  arts  are  explained,  and  the  methods 
in  accordance  with  which  this  subject  matter  should  be 
taught  are  definitely  presented. 

Quotations  used  in  this  book  are  evidence  of  my  in- 
debtedness to  various  authors.  I  should  acknowledge 
especial  indebtedness  to  my  former  teachers,  including 
Professors  Paul  H.  Hanus,  Hugo  Miinsterberg,  and 
Josiah  Royce  at  Harvard  University;  Professors  John 


viii  Author's  Preface 

Dewey,  John  Angus  MacVannel,  Frank  M.  McMurry, 
and  Edward  L.  Thorndike  at  Teachers  College,  Columbia 
University;  and  Professor  John  P.  Gordy  at  Ohio  State 
University.  My  former  colleague  Professor  W.  W.  Char- 
ters of  the  Carnegie  Institute  of  Technology  has  read  the 
entire  manuscript  and  has  made  valuable  suggestions  for 
its  improvement.  Dean  Frank  Thilly  of  Cornell  Uni- 
versity and  my  colleagues  Professors  Max  F.  Meyer  and 
George  H.  Sabine  have  given  helpful  criticisms  of  parts 
of  the  discussion.  I  am  indebted  to  my  colleagues  Pro- 
fessors Frederick  M.  Tisdel  and  Robert  M.  Dewey,  who 
have  read  the  manuscript  and  are  responsible  for  much 
improvement  in  the  matter  of  expression.  Acknowledg- 
ment is  due  my  former  colleague  Dean  Frank  P.  Graves 
of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania  and  his  wife,  Helen 
Wadsworth  Graves,  who  have  reviewed  the  proof  of  the 
entire  book.  Acknowledgment  for  helpful  criticism  of 
the  manuscript  and  proof  is  due  my  wife,  Edith  Logan 
Coursault.  A  final  indebtedness  I  owe  to  my  parents,  who 
encouraged  me  to  prepare  for  the  profession  of  teaching. 

JESSE  H.  COURSAULT. 

COLUMBIA,  MISSOTTBI, 
July,  1920. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.    THE  PURPOSE  AND  PLAN  OF  THIS  BOOK  i 

II.    THE  LARGER  FACTORS  IN  HUMAN  DEVELOPMENT  25 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  PROCESS 

III.  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL  PROCESS       ...  51 

IV.  How  NEW  PURPOSES  ARE  MADE        ....  69 
V.    How  NEW  MEANS  OF  CONTROL  ARE  MADE       .        .  100 

VI.    PERSONAL  DEVELOPMENT 129 

THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

VII.    ANALYSIS  OF  THE  SOCIAL  PROCESS      ....  161 
VIII.    THE  NATURE  OF  PATTERNS  FOR  PURPOSES  —  HISTORY 

AND  THE  FINE  ARTS 198 

IX.    THE    NATURE    OF    PATTERNS    FOR    CONTROL  —  THE 

SCIENCES 243 

X.    SOCIAL  DEVELOPMENT 279 

THE  EDUCATIONAL  PROCESS 

XI.    ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EDUCATIONAL  PROCESS    .        .        .  317 
XII.    THE  PRINCIPLES  UNDERLYING  THE  MAKING  OF  THE 

CURRICULUM 350 

XIII.  THE    PRINCIPLES    UNDERLYING    THE    METHODS    OF 

TEACHING 388 

XIV.  EDUCATIONAL  DEVELOPMENT 446 

BIBLIOGRAPHY .  461 

INDEX  465 


SUGGESTIONS  FOR  USING  THIS  BOOK  AS 
A  TEXTBOOK 

THIS  book  is  adaptable  to  students  in  various  stages  of 
advancement.  The  student  unacquainted  with  psy- 
chology may  omit  the  sections  in  which  the  principles  of 
education  are  discussed  from  the  point  of  view  of  natural 
science  and  still  find  a  complete  connected  account  of 
these  principles  presented  from  the  point  of  view  to 
which  he  has  been  accustomed  in  everyday  life.  Other 
omissions  that  may  be  made  in  the  case  of  students  whose 
knowledge  of  education  is  very  limited  will  be  evident  to 
the  teacher. 

The  introductory  chapter,  which  explains  the  purpose 
and  plan  of  this  book,  is  necessarily  more  abstract  than 
are  the  subsequent  chapters.  As  shown  on  pages  21  and 
22,  the  systematic  presentation  of  the  principles  of  edu- 
cation begins  with  Chapter  II.  The  student  whose  pre- 
vious experience  has  not  prepared  him  to  understand 
fully  the  introductory  chapter  should,  therefore,  study 
it  at  first  not  for  complete  mastery,  but  for  whatever 
insight  into  the  purpose  and  plan  of  the  subsequent  dis- 
cussion he  can  gain  by  the  careful  reading  of  it.  After 
he  has  studied  the  rest  of  the  book,  he  will  be  prepared 
to  understand  fully  this  chapter  and  should  then  re-read  it. 

Each  chapter  and  section  is  prefaced  by  a  brief  state- 
ment of  the  essential  ideas  contained  in  it.  At  first  the 
student  should  regard  these  statements  tentatively  as 
propositions  to  be  explained  and  verified.  After  he  has 


Using  this  Book  as  a  Textbook  xi 

read  the  discussion,  he  may  regard  them  as  the  conclusions 
of  the  chapters  or  of  the  sections  to  which  they  belong. 

A  few  references  for  further  study l  with  comment  upon 
each  and  a  few  problems  for  solution  are  given  at  the  end 
of  each  chapter.  The  student  himself  should  find  other 
readings  and  problems;  for  when  he  has  acquired  the 
subject  matter  here  presented,  he  should  be  able  to  rec- 
ognize important  discussions  of  principles  of  education  as 
well  as  to  review  these  discussions  critically,  and  to  recog- 
nize important  educational  problems  as  well  as  to  apply 
the  principles  in  solving  them.  Since  one  learns  by  doing, 
the  importance  of  applying  the  principles  in  the  criticism 
of  educational  thought  and  practice  and  in  the  solution 
of  educational  problems  cannot  be  overestimated.  Fur- 
thermore, the  only  adequate  evidence  that  the  student 
understands  these  principles  is  his  ability  to  use  them. 

In  order  to  be  most  useful  to  the  student,  the  principles 
of  education  must  be  logically  organized  in  his  experience. 
For  this  reason  the  subject  matter  is  here  presented  in 
logical  form.  It  is  desirable,  however,  that  the  teacher 
in  using  this  book  as  a  textbook  do  not  follow  too  closely 
the  logical  order  of  topics.  It  would  be  well,  for  example, 
in  teaching  the  chapter  entitled  How  New  Purposes  Are 
Made,2  to  show  briefly  the  application  of  the  conclusions 
reached  to  the  explanation  of  the  nature  of  some  poem  or 
picture,  such  as  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm  or  The  Slave 
Ship,3  and  to  the  explanation  of  the  method  of  teaching 
this  poem  or  picture.4  The  principles  developed  in  the 
chapter  entitled  How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made* 

1  For  class  work,  it  itt  desirable  that  one  ropy  of  enrh  important  refer- 
ence lx>ok  l>c  reserved  in  the  library  for  each  four  students  in  the  class. 
»Ch.  IV.  *  See  pp.  397-400, 402-404,  and  404-400. 

'  See  pp.  219-221  and  230 -231.     »  Ch.  V. 


xii  Using  this  Book  as  a  Textbook 

could  likewise  be  connected  with  some  of  the  important 
facts  given  in  the  discussion  of  the  general  nature  of  the 
sciences,1  and  in  the  discussion  of  the  method  of  teaching 
control  subject  matter.2  Such  cross  references  would 
add  to  the  practical  interest  of  the  student  in  the  study 
of  the  principles  and  would  help  him  to  carry  over  the 
earlier  formulations  of  principles  to  their  applications 
when  later  he  takes  up  systematically  the  study  of  these 
applications. 

1  Ch.  IX.  2  See  pp.  416-427. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  EDUCATION 

a.55 

CHAPTER   I 
THE  PURPOSE  AND  PLAN  OF  THIS  BOOK 

In  educational  thought  and  practice,  there  is  need  of  guiding 
principles  which  conform  to  the  truths  established  by  modern 
science  and  philosophy.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this  book  to  make 
these  principles  simple,  definite,  and  clear.  The  truths  established 
by  science  and  philosophy  are  revealed  from  two  points  of  view,  — 
that  of  natural  science,  which  describes  and  explains  man  in  the 
light  of  physical  causation  as  an  organism  responding  to  stimuli 
from  the  environment ;  and  that  of  teleology,  which  regards  him 
in  the  light  of  final  causation  as  a  person  controlled  by  pur- 
poses and  ideas.  The  principles  of  education  derived  from 
these  two  points  of  view  may  be  made  more  easily  available 
by  reducing  them  to  a  single  system  through  the  translation 
of  those  derived  from  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science, 
which  is  more  accurate,  into  the  terms  of  teleology,  which  is 
easier.  The  method  adopted  here  for  presenting  the  principles 
of  education  is  to  analyze  into  its  factors  the  process  of  human 
development  which  education  is  to  control,  and  to  find  how 
these  factors  unite  in  doing  their  work. 


Every  student  of  education  should  critically  revise,  in  tho  light 
of  modern  science  and  philosophy,  tho  principles  which  guide  his 
judgments  of  educational  thought  and  practice. 

The  purpose  of  this  book  is  to  make  simple,  definite, 
and  clear,  a  body  of  principles  which  should  puide  in 
educational  thought  and  practice.  Every  student  of 

1 


2  The  Principles  of  Education 

education  has  certain  fundamental  beliefs,  or  principles, 
which  he  uses  as  standards  in  judging  the  truth  or  falsity 
of  educational  ideas  and  practices,  upon  which,  as  an 
explanatory  basis,  he  organizes  his  knowledge  of  educa- 
tional matters,  and  in  the  light  of  which  he  sees  new 
difficulties  to  be  overcome  and  new  problems  to  be  solved. 
He  may  not  be  able  to  state  these  principles  in  systematic 
form;  indeed,  he  may  not  even  recognize  them  as  prin- 
ciples. But  he  has  them  nevertheless.  He  must  have 
them  in  order  to  know  what  else  in  education  is  worth 
while.  To  call  them  to  mind,  he  need  only  consider  such 
questions  as  whether  the  state  should  establish  separate 
agricultural  or  trades  schools ;  whether  state  aid  to  schools 
in  poorer  localities  is  just  to  taxpayers  in  wealthier 
localities;  whether  Latin,  industrial  arts,  or  some  other 
subject  matter  should  be  included  in  the  common  school 
curriculum;  what  subjects  in  the  curriculum  should  be 
elective  and  what  subjects  should  be  required;  how 
science,  history,  or  literature  should  be  taught ;  to  what 
extent  "  telling  "  should  enter  into  teaching ;  what  the 
values  of  interest  and  effort  in  school  work  are ;  whether 
there  should  be  a  difference  between  preparation  for 
college  and  preparation  for  life.  To  deal  intelligently 
with  these  educational  problems,  to  deal  intelligently  with 
any  educational  problems,  even  where  scientific  measure- 
ment is  made  use  of,  one  must  have  some  fundamental 
ideas  as  to  the  nature  of  education  and  the  part  which 
education  plays  in  the  drama  of  life. 

The  ordinary  source  of  these  principles  is  a  more  or 
less  faulty  popular  tradition.  Many  of  them  have  grown 
up  in  the  popular  mind  and  have  become  embalmed  in 
the  common  expressions  of  the  language.  From  time  to 
time  they  have  appeared  as  new  ideas,  but  with  the  pass- 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book         3 

ing  of  generations  they  became  common  habits  of  thought 
and  now  appear  with  the  cloak  of  authority  as  "common 
sense."  Just  as  people  speak  of  the  sun's  "rising" 
and  "setting"  as  if  by  its  own  motion,  although  for 
three  hundred  years  science  has  taught  differently,  so 
they  entertain  with  regard  to  the  fundamentals  of  edu- 
cation many  ideas  that  are  antiquated  and  untrue.  In- 
deed, even  persons  who  have  made  some  progress  in  the 
study  of  education  are  often  handicapped  by  the  in- 
adequate popular  ideas  to  which  they  have  been  accus- 
tomed since  childhood  and  which  are  as  much  a  part  of 
their  mental  equipment  as  the  language  they  speak. 
Among  these  popular  fallacies,  some  of  which  are  in 
conflict  one  with  another,  are  the  beliefs  that  our  ideas 
of  things  jn  the  external  world  are  copies  of  the  things 
themselves;  that  these  copies  are  impressed  upon  the 
mind  through  the  senses;  that  the  mind  is  composed  of 
general  powers,  or  faculties,  which  can  be  developed  by 
special  exercise ;  that  the  chief  aim  of  education  is  knowl- 
edge ;  that  the  most  valuable  effect  of  literature  and  music 
is  refined  pleasure;  that  the  child's  undirected  interests 
are  the  only  guides  to  what  he  should  study;  that  the 
most  valuable  result  of  education  is  mental  discipline 
and  strength  gained  through  effort  in  learning. 

Because  the  principles  of  education  are  of  such  funda- 
mental importance,  and  because  the  popular  "  common 
sense "  beliefs  are  so  often  untrue,  every  student  of 
education  should  revise  critically  his  basic  ideas  of  the 
subject  and  make  them  conform  to  the  truths  established 
by  modern  science  and  philosophy.  Failure  to  do  this 
abandons  him  to  the  fallacies  of  popular  judgment  in 
educational  matters ;  it  leaves  him  with  an  inadequate 
basis  for  explaining  and  organizing  modern  educational 


4  The  Principles  of  Education 

truths,  and  consequently  without  easily  available  guides 
for  educational  practice ;  and  it  consigns  him  to  the  futile 
task  of  trying  to  solve  false  problems  which  arise  in  any 
attempt  to  carry  out  principles  that  are  not  true.  Illus- 
trations will  make  this  statement  plainer.  The  erroneous 
popular  belief  that  literature  is  merely  for  refined  pleasure 
would  lead  one  to  misjudge  the  importance  of  this  sub- 
ject in  the  course  of  study.  The  belief  that  ideas  of 
things  in  the  external  world  are  copies  of  those  things 
acquired  through  the  senses  would  be  an  inadequate 
basis  for  explaining,  and  therefore  an  inadequate  basis  for 
organizing  for  use,  the  steps  by  which  a  person  acquires 
knowledge  through  solving  problems  by  means  of  hy- 
potheses. The  erroneous  popular  belief  that  the  most 
valuable  result  of  education  is  mental  discipline  and 
strength  gamed  through  effort  in  learning,  and  the  con- 
flicting, but  equally  erroneous,  belief  that  the  child's 
undirected  interests  are  the  only  guides  to  what  he  should 
study,  would  lead  respectively  to  the  one-sided  problems 
of  what  should  be  in  the  curriculum  merely  because  it 
requires  effort  and  furnishes  discipline,  and  what  should 
be  in  merely  because  it  excites  interest. 

Special  studies  in  the  field  of  education,  such  as  educa- 
tional psychology,  the  theory  of  teaching,  and  school 
administration,  as  well  as  more  general  subject  matter, 
such  as  ethics,  sociology,  biology,  general  psychology, 
history,  logic,  epistemology,  and  metaphysics,  reveal 
valid  principles  of  education.  None  of  them,  however, 
covers  the  whole  field  of  education.  Each  reveals  prin- 
ciples of  education  from  a  special  angle.  All  are  more 
or  less  isolated  and  lack  that  organization  which  includes 
all  points  of  view,  which  comprehends  all  of  the  funda- 
mental principles,  and  which  closely  unites  them  into  a 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book         5 

logical  system.  To  learn  the  fundamental  truths  of 
education  through  a  direct,  comprehensive,  systematic 
study  of  them  and  thereby  to  satisfy  a  serious  need  for 
which  other  subject  matter  does  not  provide,  —  this  is 
the  essential  reason  for  the  study  of  the  principles  of 
education. 

II 

Since  human  development  is  explained  in  terms  of  both  efficient 
and  final  causation,  a  simple  basis  for  organizing  the  principles  of 
education  is  possible  only  when  the  principles  of  education  revealed 
from  these  two  points  of  view  are  reduced  to  a  common  denomina- 
tor. 

In  seeking  a  simple  basis  on  which  to  organize  the 
principles  of  education  for  systematic  study,  we  meet  a 
difficulty  in  the  fact  that  a  human  being  may  be  regarded 
in  two  very  different  ways,  and  that  various  special 
studies  of  human  life,  whatever  the  minor  differences 
among  them  may  be,  take  one  or  the  other  of  these  general 
points  of  view.  Since  man  has  a  body  and  is,  therefore, 
a  part  of  the  physical  world,  such  natural  sciences  as 
biology  undertake  to  describe  and  explain  his  nature  and 
behavior  in  a  materialistic  way  as  controlled  by  physical 
causes  only;  since  he  has  a  spirit  and  is,  therefore,  a 
free  moral  personality,  teleological  studies,  such  as  logic, 
ethics,  and  history,  regard  him  as  controlled  by  purposes 
and  ideas.  A  simple  basis  on  which  to  organize  the 
principles  of  education  apparent  from  these  two  widely 
different  points  of  view,  which  we  shall  explain  more 
fully,  is  possible  only  if  the  principles  can  be  reduced  to  a 
common  denominator.  In  order  to  find  this  common 
denominator,  this  simple  basis  for  bringing  together  and 
organizing  educational  principles,  it  will  be  necessary 
first  to  consider  more  fully  the  point  of  view  of  natural 


6  The  Principles  of  Education 

science,  which  may  be  called  physical,  or  materialistic, 
and  the  point  of  view  of  teleology,  which  may  be  called 
ethical,  or  idealistic. 

Ill 

Natural  science  describes  and  explains  man  as  a  psychophysical 
organism  controlled  by  physical  causation  only,  and  accounts  for 
purposes  and  ideas  as  mere  accompaniments  of  changes  in  the 
brain,  thus  making  the  body  appear  to  be  master  of  the  mind. 

Natural  science,  since  it  is  the  science  of  the  physical 
world,  must  base  its  explanations  upon  physical  causes. 
This  method  of  explanation  is  the  only  one  that  it  ever 
uses,  the  only  one  that  it  knows  anything  about.  Primi- 
tive man,  with  his  superstitious  belief  in  animism,  attempted 
to  explain  changes  in  the  physical  world  by  attributing 
them  to  spiritual  forces ;  the  modern  scientist  —  never ! 
Imagine  the  futility  of  trying  to  convince  a  physicist  that, 
when  the  throttle  is  open,  the  steam  locomotive  moves 
as  the  result  of  some  spirit  inherent  in  the  mechanism! 
The  physical  structure  of  the  locomotive  and  the  physical 
conditions  under  which  it  is  placed  are  sufficient  for  a 
complete  explanation.  These,  in  turn,  are  traced  to  their 
physical  causes.  The  locomotive  was  produced  by  whir- 
ring machinery  in  the  factory,  and  the  machinery  was 
the  product  of  previous  mechanical  action.  One  condi- 
tion for  the  movement  of  the  engine  is  coal,  which  was 
made  by  physical  forces  geological  ages  ago.  Indeed, 
every  factor  in  the  movement  of  the  locomotive  may  be 
traced  backward,  theoretically  at  least,  from  physical 
effect  to  physical  cause,  until  the  chain  of  connection  is 
lost  in  primeval  chaos.  Nowhere,  absolutely  nowhere, 
does  natural  science  recognize  a  spirit  link  in  this  chain. 

But  did  not  men  work  in  making  the  locomotive? 
Did  they  not  with  physical  hands  guide  the  iron  and  steel 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book         7 

through  the  machines  and  swing  the  hammers  in  assem- 
bling the  parts?  And  did  they  not  do  this  because  they 
had  desires  to  earn  wages  and  to  construct,  and  had  ideas 
that  guided  their  movements?  According  to  the  view  of 
natural  science,  they  did  not  do  this  because  they  had 
desires  and  ideas.  Natural  science  cannot  recognize 
feelings  and  ideas  as  having  any  part  whatever  in  the 
causal  chain.  Conservation  of  energy,  a  fundamental 
assumption  of  science,  forbids  it,  because  force  can  be 
attributed  with  scientific  accuracy  to  physical  objects 
only.  According  to  this  assumption,  the  total  amount 
of  force  in  the  universe  is  always  the  same;  it  never 
increases  or  diminishes.  If  this  assumption  is  true, 
energy,  when  not  manifesting  itself,  must  be  considered  as 
latent,  or  stored  away.  For  example,  when  a  clock  spring 
is  wound,  energy  is  stored  in  it  to  be  given  off  gradually 
in  the  running  of  the  clock  during  the  flight  of  hours. 
When  a  wagon  is  drawn  up  hill,  the  force  applied  to  it 
that  is  not  turned  into  heat  by  the  friction  of  the  running 
parts,  is  stored  up  in  it  and  is  given  out  again  when  the 
wagon  runs  down  hill.  Energy  from  the  sun  is  stored  in 
the  coal  and  may  be  released  to  warm  our  houses,  cook 
our  food,  or  run  our  factories.  But  how  could  energy 
be  stored  in  a  mere  idea  or  feeling,  neither  of  which  has  a 
body  or,  except  during  its  momentary  appearance  in  con- 
sciousness, even  exists?  When  the  workman  is  asleep, 
when  on  a  holiday  he  is  thinking  about  social  pleasures, 
the  ideas  and  feelings  that  appear  in  the  factory  are  not 
in  his  consciousness;  they  do  not  exist.  How,  then, 
could  there  be  stored  in  them  forces  which  contribute  to 
the  construction  of  the  locomotive?  How  could  there 
be  stored  in  them  the  force  necessary  even  to  modify  the 
engineer's  brain  and  nerves  so  as  to  make  his  muscles 


8  The  Principles  of  Education 

open  the  throttle,  when  the  locomotive,  under  a  full 
head  of  steam,  is  ready  to  run?  According  to  natural 
science,  so  long  as  it  holds  to  the  fundamental  assumption 
of  the  conservation  of  energy,  purposes  and  ideas  cannot 
have  even  an  infinitesimal  amount  of  force ;  they  cannot 
add  to  or  in  any  way  change  physical  forces. 

It  is  true  that  feelings  and  ideas  may  with  correctness 
be  spoken  of  as  causes  of  physical  actions.  We  may  say 
that  a  man  eats  because  he  feels  hungry  or  because  he  has 
the  idea  of  strengthening  his  body.  But  in  this  case  the 
materialistic  point  of  view  is  not  taken,  and  physical,  or 
efficient,  cause  is  not  meant.  What  is  meant  is  explained 
in  the  discussion  of  the  teleological  view  of  man.  So  far 
as  natural  science  is  concerned,  to  speak  of  feelings  and 
ideas  as  causes  of  physical  action  is  to  use  a  metaphor  that 
has  no  foundation  in  fact.  The  idea  of  the  locomotive  and 
the  warmth  of  constructive  interest,  according  to  the  ex- 
planation of  natural  science,  can  no  more  cause  move- 
ments of  the  physical  body  of  the  workman  than  a  bright 
idea  can  reflect  sunshine  into  the  factory,  sharp  wit  cut 
the  tempered  steel,  or  the  heat  of  desire  kindle  the  forge. 

Since  man's  body  is  a  part  of  the  physical  world,  natural 
science  has  a  right  to  explain  his  actions  in  its  own  way  as 
the  result  of  physical  causes.  Just  as  the  movements  of 
the  locomotive  are  considered  the  result  of  its  structure 
and  of  the  physical  environment,  such  as  coal,  air,  and 
water,  acting  upon  it,  so  the  actions  of  man,  whether  they 
be  breathing,  walking,  painting  a  picture,  or  composing 
a  poem,  may  be  explained  as  the  result  of  his  bodily  struc- 
ture and  of  the  stimuli  coming  from  its  physical  environ- 
ment. And  just  as  the  structure  of  the  locomotive  is  the 
result  of  physical  causes,  so  the  structure  of  the  human 
being  is  the  result  of  physical  heredity,  variation,  and 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book         9 

natural  selection  in  the  great  factory  of  the  material 
world. 

Natural  science,  equipped  with  its  materialistic  methods 
of  description  and  explanation,  did  not  stop  with  the 
conquest  of  the  physical  world.  Flushed  with  victory 
in  this  conquest,  it  invaded  the  realm  of  mind  and  at- 
tempted to  explain  the  nature  of  consciousness.  But 
here,  at  the  very  outset,  it  met  a  serious  difficulty,  because 
natural  science  was  developed  to  explain  the  physical 
world  and  knows  of  no  basis  for  explanation  except  physi- 
cal causation.  Since,  as  has  been  shown,  physical  energy 
cannot  be  stored  in  ideas  and  feelings,  the  mind  is  not 
subject  to  the  kind  of  causal  relations  to  which  natural 
science  is  limited  in  its  explanations.  A  way  to  overcome 
this  difficulty,  however,  was  invented.  It  was  known 
that  lesions  in  the  brain  are  accompanied  by  changes  in 
the  character  of  consciousness,  that  certain  drugs  taken 
into  the  body  affect  the  ideas  and  feelings,  that  stimuli 
applied  to  nerves  leading  to  the  brain  are  followed  by 
corresponding  sensations.  These  and  many  other  similar 
facts  were  made  the  basis  for  the  assumption  that  every 
mental  change  is  paralleled  by  a  corresponding  physical 
change  in  the  brain.  This  assumption,  which  is  called 
psychophysical  parallelism,  opened  the  way  for  natural 
science  in  the  explanation  and  control  of  mental  life.  If 
every  idea  and  feeling  is  chained  in  some  mysterious  way 
to  a  physical  partner  in  the  brain,  natural  science,  although 
it  cannot  lay  hands  directly  upon  ideas  and  feelings,  can 
do  what  is  for  practical  purposes  the  same  thing ;  it  can 
substitute  for  the  direct  explanation  of  ideas  and  feelings 
an  explanation  of  the  physical  partners  which  they  in- 
variably accompany.  It  can  account  for  the  sensation  of 
light  as  the  accompaniment  of  the  stimulation  of  certain 


10  The  Principles  of  Education 

brain  cells,  through  the  medium  of  the  optic  nerve,  and 
for  the  variation  in  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  as  the 
accompaniment  of  the  variation  in  the  intensity  of  the 
stimulation;  it  can  account  for  the  consciousness  of  a 
purpose  as  the  accompaniment  of  a  check  in  some  habitual 
reaction  to  stimuli.  We  can  find  here  an  analogy  between 
the  way  of  controlling  the  feelings  and  ideas  of  a  man  and 
the  way  of  controlling  the  music  of  a  piano.  The  music 
itself  is  intangible,  but  accompanies  the  vibrations  of  the 
strings,  which  can  be  controlled  by  means  of  the  physical 
keys.  So  with  the  intangible  ideas  and  feelings  of  a  man ; 
they  accompany  the  brain  processes  which  can  be  con- 
trolled by  means  of  the  physical  sense  organs. 

Although  a  natural  science  must  logically  explain 
mental  changes  indirectly  through  explaining  physical 
changes  in  the  brain,  these  physical  changes  need  not  be 
known  directly  through  microscopic  or  other  examina- 
tion. It  may  be  assumed  that  the  changes  which  cannot 
be  observed  are  like  those  which,  in  the  physical  world, 
take  place  on  so  large  a  scale  that  they  can  be  observed. 
Natural  science  often  makes  use  of  such  analogies  where 
direct  observation  fails.  Nobody,  for  instance,  ever  saw 
an  atom  or  a  molecule,  but  explanations  of  chemistry  are, 
with  scientific  accuracy,  based  upon  the  actions  of  these 
analogical  constructs.  Nobody  ever  saw  ether,  but  this 
does  not  in  the  least  interfere  with  the  value  of  the  physi- 
cist's explanation  of  the  transmission  of  light.  Other 
kinds  of  waves  have  been  seen,  and  the  ether  waves  may 
be  imagined  to  be  like  these.  So  in  the  explanation  of 
the  physical  counterparts  of  mental  facts,  the  natural 
scientist  may  assume  that  the  changes,  where  he  cannot 
see  them,  resemble  those  which  he  has  seen  elsewhere  in 
the  physical  world;  and  thus,  if  his  assumptions  are 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book       11 

consistent  with  the  facts  so  far  as  the  facts  are  known, 
he  may  rest  assured  that  in  making  these  assumptions 
he  has  not  compromised  the  dignity  of  natural  science. 

When  the  ideas  and  feelings  of  the  mental  world  are 
accounted  for  materialistically  as  the  associates,  or 
parallels,  of  changes  in  the  physical  brain,  sensations  are 
explained  as  the  accompaniments  of  brain  changes  started 
by  physical  action  upon  the  in-going  nerves;  original 
desires  are  viewed  as  the  accompaniments  of  checks  in 
the  expressions  of  instincts,  or  inborn  nervous  connec- 
tions, created  through  a  long  process  of  interaction  between 
organisms  and  environment,  and  conserved  by  heredity  ; 
and  acquired  desires  are  similarly  explained  as  the  ac- 
companiments of  checks  in  the  functioning  of  nervous 
connections  made,  according  to  the  laws  of  habit  forma- 
tion, in  the  lifetime  of  the  organism.  So,  too,  a  vivid 
memory  of  an  experience  is  accounted  for  as  going  hand 
in  hand  with  a  deep  impression  upon  the  brain;  the 
association  of  ideas  is  regarded  as  the  parallel  of  a  path  in 
the  brain ;  and  the  emotions  are  explained  as  due  to  bodily 
conditions  affecting  the  brain  through  the  nervous  system. 
The  meanings  of  ideas  are  likewise  said  to  be  the  parallels 
of  brain  changes  produced  by  reaction  in  the  adjustment 
of  the  physical  body  to  its  environment ;  growth  of  mental 
life  is  considered  the  accompaniment  of  changes  in  the 
brain  resulting  from  continued  interaction  of  organism 
and  environment  through  stimuli  and  responses ;  and  the 
fact  that  one  can  learn  more  easily  in  youth  than  in  old 
age  is  attributed  to  the  plasticity  of  the  brain  during 
youth.  Thus  is  natural  law  made  to  rule  in  the  spiritual 
world,  to  the  end  that  man  may  get  scientific  control  of 
his  thoughts  and  feelings,  and  in  this  way  control  the 
behavior  which  they  indicate. 


12  The  Principles  of  Education 


IV 

Teleologically  man  is  regarded  as  a  person  controlled  by  pur- 
poses and  ideas,  the  mind  thus  appearing  to  be  master  of  the  body. 
Purposes  and  ideas  are  directly  interconnected  through  final  causa- 
tion by  bonds  of  meaning. 

When  man  is  regarded  as  an  essentially  spiritual  being, 
his  conduct  is  no  longer  the  result  of  blind  force  exerted 
through  physical  interaction  which  modifies  the  brain, 
but  is  rather  the  result  of  purposes  which  he  has  in  mind 
and  ideas  which  guide  him  in  carrying  out  these  purposes. 
In  order  to  explain  his  action,  we  seek  to  find  what  he  is 
trying  to  do  and  how  he  is  trying  to  do  it.  We  acknowl- 
edge him  to  be  a  person  having  inner  experiences,  and  seek 
to  understand  his  actions  by  reproducing  in  our  imagina- 
tion his  feelings  and  thoughts,  his  purposes  and  ideas. 
The  physical  body  is  not  regarded  as  the  basis  for  describ- 
ing and  explaining  his  thoughts  and  feelings,  but  as  an 
instrument  under  the  control  of  his  mind  and  used  by  his 
mind  to  accomplish  its  purposes.  Instead  of  being  master 
of  the  spiritual  life,  the  body  now  becomes  its  servant. 

Here,  from  this  point  of  view,  to  be  sure,  purposes  and 
ideas  are  considered  the  causes  of  action.  A  man's  pur- 
pose to  write  a  letter  is  the  cause  for  his  walking  to  the 
typewriter;  his  idea  that  oil  makes  a  machine  run  more 
easily  is  the  cause  for  his  putting  oil  on  the  bearings. 
These  causes  are  not,  however,  the  kind  recognized  by 
natural  science.  In  the  case  of  natural  science,  the  cause, 
which  is  physical,  is  a  real  thing  preceding  an  effect.  A 
billiard  ball,  for  instance,  must  move  before  by  impact  it 
can  move  another  ball.  This  kind  of  cause  is  called 
efficient.  In  the  case  of  teleological  explanations,  where 
purposes  and  ideas  are  said  to  be  the  causes,  the  cause  is 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book       13 

not  a  real  thing  until  the  effect  is  complete,  until  the  end 
of  the  action.  For  this  reason  it  is  called  a  final  cause. 
A  man,  for  example,  is  running  towards  a  moving  car. 
What  makes  him  run  is  the  purpose  of  getting  a  seat  in 
the  car  and  the  idea  that  he  can  do  this  by  running,  but 
he  does  not  get  the  seat  until  the  running  is  ended.  In 
accounting  from  the  teleological  point  of  view  for  the 
appearance  of  purposes  and  ideas,  no  reference  whatever 
to  their  physical  counterparts  in  the  brain  is  needed ; 
they  are  interconnected  and  controlled  by  meanings 
which  we  can  directly  experience  when  they  appear  in 
our  consciousness.  This  is  the  common  way  of  regarding 
persons  in  our  daily  relations  with  them.  With  no  thought 
of  brain  changes,  we  can  reproduce  in  our  imagination 
and  thereby  directly  understand  and  appreciate  the  man's 
purpose  of  getting  a  seat  in  the  moving  car,  and  we  can 
understand  in  connection  with  this  purpose  the  meaning 
of  the  man's  running. 


In  order  to  take  advantage  of  the  stronger  features  of  both  ma- 
terialistic and  ideological  points  of  view,  in  reducing  the  principles 
of  education  to  a  single  bjusw  for  organization,  principles  derived 
from  natural  science,  which  within  certain  limitations  is  more  ac- 
curate and  authoritative,  should  I  *•  translated  into  the  more  familiar 
and  more  easily  understood  terms  of  teleology. 

The  two  general  ways  in  which  human  life  is  viewed 
have  now  been  set  forth.  One  uses  as  the  basis  for  its 
explanations  blind  force  transmitted  through  physical 
interaction,  or,  in  other  words,  efficient  causation  ;  the 
other  uses  as  the  basis  for  its  explanations  purposes  to  be 
attained,  or,  in  other  words,  final  causation.  The  vistas 
of  causation  revealed  from  these  two  general  points  of 


14  The  Principles  of  Education 

view  lie  in  opposite  directions.  The  one  looks  towards 
the  past,  retracing  the  chain  of  physical  cause  and  effect 
until  it  is  led  ultimately  to  the  forces  emanating  from 
primeval  chaos;  the  other  looks  towards  the  future, 
accounting  for  each  purpose  by  one  farther  ahead,  until 
it  is  led  ultimately  in  the  explanation  of  things  to  that 
"one,  far-off,  divine  event  to  which  the  whole  creation 
moves."  Our  next  problem  is  to  find  how  these  two  gen- 
eral points  of  view  may  be  related  so  that  the  principles 
of  education  learned  from  the  various  special  studies 
which  represent  them  may  be  unified. 

Since  only  the  realm  of  mind  and  the  realm  of  matter 
are  known,1  the  idealistic  and  the  materialistic  are  the 
only  points  of  view  which  studies  of  human  life  may  take; 
there  is  no  other  point  of  view  which  includes  the  two  and 
could  bear  the  burden  of  reconciliation.  The  problem  of 
reconciliation  becomes,  therefore,  the  problem  of  translating 
truths  learned  from  one  of  these  points  of  view  into  the 
terms  of  the  other.  In  undertaking  this  task,  the  first 
question  that  arises  is :  Into  which  set  of  terms,  the  ma- 
terialistic or  the  teleological,  should  the  translation  be 
made  and  the  educational  principles  collected  for  or- 
ganization? 

In  the  statements  of  the  principles  of  education,  as 
an  examination  of  textbooks  in  this  subject  reveals,  a 
decided  preference  has  been  shown  for  the  language  and 
technique  of  natural  science.  This  preference  has  been 
shown  because  natural  science  speaks  with  accuracy  and 
authority.  It  can  speak  thus,  because  the  things  with 
which  it  deals,  stimuli  and  reactions  through  the  medium 

1  For  those  interested  in  metaphysics,  it  may  be  said  that  this 
statement  is  not  intended  to  imply  metaphysical  dualism,  since 
mind  and  matter  are  mere  abstractions  from  a  unitary  experience. 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book       15 

of  the  brain,  are  manifestations  of  physical  things  known 
in  common  by  all  observers,  either  directly  or  through 
analogy  with  other  things  which  are  known  directly, 
and  which  can  be  analyzed,  accurately  measured,  and 
reduced  to  a  mathematical  basis.  Experimental  psy- 
chology furnishes  abundant  illustrations  of  this.  On  the 
other  hand,  from  the  point  of  view  of  teleology,  the  rela- 
tions of  thoughts  and  feelings  can  be  determined  only 
by  the  rule-of-thumb  method  of  trying  them  in  one's  own 
mind,  because  they  are  connected  by  bonds  of  meaning, 
which  can  be  understood  only  by  being  felt,  and  because 
the  price  paid  for  individuality  is  that  one  can  feel  only 
the  content  of  his  own  mind  and  can  never  become 
directly  conscious  of  that  which  is  in  the  mind  of  another. 
The  public  speaker,  for  example,  tries  his  arguments 
upon  himself  to  determine  what  effect  they  will  have 
upon  his  audience ;  the  writer  of  advertisements  imagines 
himself  in  the  place  of  his  readers  and  includes  in  the 
advertisement  the  ideas  that  would  have  the  desired 
effect  upon  him ;  the  teacher  sympathetically  puts  him- 
self in  the  place  of  his  pupils,  tries  his  lesson  plan  in 
imagination,  and  thus  judges  from  what  takes  place  in 
his  mind  what  experience  his  pupils  will  have.  Yet, 
although  in  general  this  method  is  practically  valuable, 
as  the  successful  efforts  of  orators,  advertisers,  and 
teachers  who  use  it  bear  witness,  the  address  may  not 
lead  to  the  convictions  intended,  the  advertisement  may 
not  excite  a  desire  for  the  articles  offered  for  sale,  and  the 
ideas  and  feelings  which  the  pupils  do  actually  get  may 
differ  from  the  ones  expected.  Indeed,  those  who  use 
this  rule-of-thumb  method  may  differ  one  from  another 
in  their  conclusions.  It  is  to  overcome  just  such  difii- 
culties  as  these  that  natural  science  has  been  called  upon 


16  The  Principles  of  Education 

to  adapt  its  accurate  and  authoritative  methods  to  the 
realm  of  mind.  In  the  psychological  laboratory,  mechani- 
cal descriptions  and  explanations,  objective  measurements 
and  mathematical  technique  have  begun  to  replace  with 
scientifically  tested  truths  the  inaccurate  and  conflicting 
opinions  which  individuals  have  formed  about  mental 
phenomena  by  examining  subjectively  their  own  ex- 
perience. 

Compared  with  that  of  natural  science,  the  teleological 
way  of  regarding  people  has  the  advantage  of  being  easier 
to  use.  It  is  the  common  way  of  everyday  life,  used  by 
children  as  well  as  by  grown-ups,  by  the  illiterate  as  well 
as  by  the  most  learned.  But  although  a  little  child  can 
know  meaningful  connections  between  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings, many  a  university  student  finds  difficulty  in  under- 
standing the  efficient  causal  connections  paralleling  these 
mental  phenomena,  when  the  mind  is  regarded  from  the 
point  of  view  of  natural  science ;  and  although  an  igno- 
rant beggar  may  control  the  ideas  and  feelings  of  another 
person  regarded  teleologically  so  as  to  get  food  and  cloth- 
ing, the  most  capable  psychologists  are  still  puzzled  with 
regard  to  the  materialistic  explanation  of  this  persuasion. 
Indeed,  the  contrast  need  not  be  so  marked.  How  many 
teachers  now  in  our  schools  would  have  been  excluded 
from  educational  work  if  there  were  no  simpler  guide  for 
teaching  than  the  principles  of  biology  and  psychophysics ! 

Each  point  of  view,  therefore,  is  found  to  be  strong 
where  the  other  is  weak.  In  order  to  take  advantage  of 
the  strong  features  of  each,  it  is  necessary  to  translate  the 
accurate  and  authoritative  educational  principles  of 
natural  science  into  the  familiar  language  of  the  teleologi- 
cal view  of  life,  so  that  these  principles  can  be  understood 
and  used  more  easily. 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book       17 

But  this  is  not  all.  The  point  of  view  of  teleology  has 
further  claim  to  be  the  basis  for  the  unification  of  the 
principles  of  education ;  namely,  that  it  is  more  compre- 
hensive and  more  fundamental  than  that  of  natural 
science. 

In  the  case  of  primitive  man,  the  teleological  view  alone 
was  taken.  Tribes  separated  by  mountain  and  ocean  all 
believed  in  animism,  which  represents  the  actions  of 
things  as  controlled  by  final  rather  than  by  efficient 
causation.  When,  after  many  centuries,  natural  science 
became  triumphant  in  the  physical  world,  it  began  a 
conquest  of  the  mind ;  but,  although  it  has  made  rapid 
progress  and  notable  achievement  in  explaining  the  spirit- 
ual world  according  to  natural  law,  this  work  has  only 
begun,  and  where  it  has  not  advanced,  we  are  still  depend- 
ent for  guidance  upon  the  teleological  view  alone.  For 
this  reason,  psychology,  which  first  came  to  its  conclusions 
through  introspection  and  which  has  since  substituted 
psychophysical  for  teleological  explanations,  has  now 
taken  on  a  hybrid  character.  In  view  of  these  facts,  it 
is  evident  that,  owing  to  the  youth  of  the  latter,  idealism 
has  a  broader  vision  than  natural  science. 

But  even  when  natural  science  has  come  into  its  own, 
it  will  not  be  able  to  catch  all  things  in  experience  with 
its  net  of  physical  description  and  explanation.  It  was 
called  into  existence  in  the  service  of  man's  purposes 
understood  and  appreciated,  not  mechanically  explained  ; 
it  will  always  remain  in  this  service.  The  scientist  never 
makes  any  investigation  except  when  led  to  do  so  by  some 
purpose.  Science  has  no  value  and  cannot  even  be 
defined  without  reference  to  the  purpose  which  it  serves. 
Its  expression  in  book  and  lecture  is  addressed  to  man 
regarded  ideologically.  However  mechanical  human  life 


18  The  Principles  of  Education 

may  be  made  to  appear,  the  fact  still  remains  that  purpose 
teleologically  felt,  not  mechanically  explained,  is  the  pillar 
of  cloud  by  day  and  the  pillar  of  fire  by  night  that  leads 
natural  science  through  the  wilderness  of  investigation 
and  gives  value  and  meaning  to  its  activities. 

In  the  most  intimate  and  fundamental  relations  of 
life,  moreover,  our  fathers  and  mothers,  our  brothers  and 
sisters,  our  friends  and  our  enemies  are  not  looked  upon, 
will  never  be  looked  upon,  as  mere  psychophysical  organ- 
isms, the  products  of  heredity,  variation,  and  natural 
selection,  fated  to  a  continuous  adjustment  to  environ- 
ment through  stimuli  and  responses.  They  are  acknowl- 
edged, and  always  will  be  acknowledged,  as  persons  who 
have  feelings  of  ideal  values,  hi  the  light  of  which  they 
affirm  and  deny,  choose  and  reject,  like  and  dislike,  love 
and  hate.  There  is  something  more  significant  in  the 
mother's  love  for  her  child  and  in  the  holy  aspiration  of 
the  saint  than  can  be  revealed  by  accounting  for  these 
emotions  as  we  account  for  squirming  when  one  is  tickled 
and  gasping  when  one  is  hit  in  the  stomach.  This  deeper 
significance  is  revealed  only  from  the  teleological  point 
of  view,  through  sympathetic  understanding  and  apprecia- 
tion in  terms  of  one's  own  experience.  So  long  as  a  halo 
of  worth  is  worn  by  love  and  duty,  so  long,  indeed,  as  any 
value  whatever  remains  in  life,  the  language  of  natural 
science  will  never  be  the  language  hi  which  man  expresses 
his  deepest  convictions.  It  is  not  an  accident  that  the 
great  religions  recognize  a  divine  purpose  in  the  universe ; 
it  is  not  an  accident  that  the  great  philosophies  are 
idealistic. 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book       19 
VI 

The  method  here  adopted  for  presenting  the  principles  of  educa- 
tion in  a  systematic  form  is  to  analyze  into  its  factors  the  process 
of  human  development,  which  education  is  to  control,  and  to  find 
how  these  factors  unite  in  doing  their  work,  the  teleological  view 
being  given  first  and  then  supported  by  natural  science. 

Before  undertaking  to  present  the  principles  of  educa- 
tion in  terms  of  the  language  of  teleology,  one  more 
problem  must  be  solved.  A  plan  of  procedure,  a  method 
of  organization,  must  be  found  which  will  present  these 
principles  in  the  most  economical  and  effective  way. 

Since  ideas  come  into  the  mind  when  they  are  called 
for  in  the  solution  of  problems,  it  is  desirable  to  get  a 
series  of  problems  which  will  bring  the  principles  of  edu- 
cation to  mind  in  a  systematic  way.  The  best  series  of 
problems  is  undoubtedly  that  which  appears  when  one 
follows  the  steps  ordinarily  taken  in  the  investigation  of 
any  complex  thing.  When  a  youth  successfully  investi- 
gates the  nature  of  a  mechanical  toy,  he  takes  the  toy 
apart  and  puts  it  together  again;  to  understand  the 
constitution  of  the  material  world,  the  chemist  has  sepa- 
rated material  objects  into  their  chemical  elements,  and 
then  has  found  and  stated  as  laws  the  uniform  ways  in 
which  these  elements  unite  to  make  the  objects;  to 
understand  the  nature  of  language,  the  grammarian  has 
analyzed  language  into  the  elementary  parts  of  speech 
and  then  has  discovered  and  stated  as  rules  of  grammar 
the  uniform  ways  in  which  these  parts  of  speech  combine ; 
to  understand  our  institutions,  the  historian  seeks  through 
historical  analysis  to  find  the  purposes  which  gave  rise  to 
them  and  the  way  in  which  these  purposes  and  the  solu- 
tions of  attendant  problems  have  combined  to  make  them 
what  they  are.  Analysis  and  synthesis  are  the  steps  that 


20  The  Principles  of  Education 

mark  the  problems  through  which  one  proceeds  ordinarily 
in  his  investigations. 

Since  education  is  an  important  factor  in  the  process  of 
human  development,  and  since  the  principles  of  educa- 
tion are  the  principles  which  control  this  process,  the 
best  plan  of  procedure  in  getting  the  principles  of  educa- 
tion in  a  systematic  form  is  to  analyze  the  process  of  human 
development  into  its  elementary  factors  and  then  to  find 
how  these  factors  unite  in  doing  their  work. 

In  making  this  analysis,  the  larger  factors,  which  are 
themselves  complex  processes,  will  naturally  be  distin- 
guished first ;  and  then,  in  turn,  these  will  be  analyzed  into 
the  simpler  factors  of  which  they  are  composed.  It  is  to 
be  expected,  therefore,  that  the  first  ideas  presented  will 
of  necessity  be  general  in  nature  and  not  sharply  defined 
in  content;  but,  as  the  analysis  proceeds  and  becomes 
more  specific  by  reducing  more  complex  processes  into 
the  simpler  factors  of  which  they  are  composed,  these 
ideas  will  become  more  sharply  defined  in  content  and 
correspondingly  more  definite  and  clear. 

In  order  to  avoid  a  confusion  of  the  two  points  of  view 
from  which  human  development  may  be  studied,  the 
principles,  in  the  case  of  each  larger  problem,  will  first 
be  presented  from  the  teleological  point  of  view,  and  will 
then  be  supported  by  the  conclusions  of  natural  science. 

Because  of  the  incompleteness  of  thoroughly-tested 
materialistic  explanations  of  experience,  an  incomplete- 
ness due  to  the  newness  of  this  venture,  materialistic 
explanations  given  in  this  book  must  often  go  beyond  the 
bounds  of  verified  fact  and  depend  for  authority  upon 
analogical  reasoning.  When  the  narrow  limits  of  verified 
facts  have  been  reached,  the  only  further  evidence  avail- 
able from  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science  must  be 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book       21 

based  upon  certain  similarities  that  have  been  proved 
to  exist  between  the  brain  and  other  physical  things  of 
which  we  have  a  better  understanding.  Knowing,  for 
instance,  that  in  some  fundamental  particulars  the  brain 
is  like  a  "  telephonic  switchboard "  or  "  interrelated 
channels,"  we  are  well  justified  in  assuming  that  probably 
this  similarity  extends  to  other  particulars.  Conclusions 
reached  by  analogical  reasoning  have,  therefore,  some 
authority;  and  the  use  of  them  is  justifiable  in  securing 
from  the  materialistic  point  of  view  evidence  corrobora- 
tive of  conclusions  reached  from  the  teleological  point  of 
view.  They  should  be  accepted,  however,  only  tenta- 
tively, because  scientific  investigation  at  some  future  time 
may  invalidate  the  arguments  upon  which  such  conclu- 
sions have  been  based. 

ORGANIZATION  OF   CHAPTERS 

The  organization  of  the  subsequent  chapters  of  this  book  is 
graphically  represented  on  page  22.  Human  development  is  analyzed 
into  three  processes,  —  the  individual,  the  social,  and  the  educational. 
The  discussions  of  these  three  processes  constitute  the  three  main  di- 
visions of  this  book.  The  individual  process  is  analyzed  into  its 
factors,  purposes  and  means  of  control,  which  combine  in  making 
personal  development.  The  social  process  is  analyzed  into  its 
factors,  the  patterns  for  purposes  and  the  patterns  for  means  of 
control,  which  combine  in  making  social  development.  The  edu- 
cational process,  which  unites  the  individual  and  the  social  processes, 
is  analyzed  into  its  factors,  the  making  of  the  curriculum  and  the 
methods  of  teaching,  which  combine  in  making  educational  de- 
velopment. The  Roman  numerals  indicate  the  respective  chapters 
in  which  the  several  topics  are  discussed. 


22 


The  Principles  of  Education 

II.    The  Larger  Factors 

in  Human  Development 

(The  individual,  social, 

and  educational  processes) 


III.   Analysis 

of  the  Individual 

Process 


VII.   Analysis 

of  the  Social 

Process 


/        \ 

/               \ 

IV.   How  New    V.   How  New 

VIII.  TheNa-      IX.    The   Na- 

Purposes Are        Means  of 

ture  of  Patterns     ture  of  Patterns 

Made              Control  Are 

for  Purposes  —     for  Control  — 

\                    Made 

History  and  the     The  Sciences 

\                     / 

Fine  Arts                   / 

\              / 

\              / 

\/ 

\       / 

\/ 
VI.   Personal 

X.   Social 

Development 

Development 

XI.   Analysis  of  the 
Educational  Process 


XIII.   The  Principles 

Underlying  the 
Methods  of  Teaching 


XII.   The  Principles 

Underlying  the 

Making  of  the 

Curriculum 


XIV.   Educational 
Development 


REFERENCES 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  1-3. 
value  of  the  principles  of  education.) 


(Shows  the 


The  Purpose  and  Plan  of  this  Book       23 

MOORE,  E.  C.,  What  Is  Education?  1915,  pp.  1-15.  (Discusses  the 
importance  of  the  study  of  the  principles  of  education.) 

MUNSTERBERG,  H.f  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  1910,  pp.  34-40. 
(Gives  a  simple  statement  of  the  teleological  point  of  view.) 

CHARTERS,  W.  W.,  Methods  of  Teaching,  1912,  pp.  9-25.  (An  ex- 
ample of  the  teleological  point  of  view  in  the  discussion  of  the 
function  of  teaching.) 

McMuRRY,  F.  M.,  How  to  Study  and  Teaching  How  to  Study,  1909, 
pp.  12-27.  (An  example  of  the  teleological  point  of  view  in  the 
discussion  of  the  nature  of  study  and  of  its  principal  factors.) 

MUNSTERBERG,  H.,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  1910,  pp.  99-127. 
(Explains  briefly  and  clearly  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science.) 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  1-22.  (An  example 
of  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science  in  the  discussion  of  educa- 
tion reduced  to  its  lowest  terms.) 

HORNE,  H.  H.,  The  Philosophy  of  Education,  1905,  pp.  18-56.  (An 
example  of  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science  in  the  discussion 
of  the  biological  aspect  of  education.) 

RUEDIGER,  W.  C.,  The  Principles  of  Education,  1910,  pp.  20-36.  (An 
example  of  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science  in  the  discussion 
of  the  biological  bases  of  education.) 

PYLE,  W.  H.,  The  Outlines  of  Educational  Psychology,  1911,  pp.  13-20. 
(Gives  a  brief  and  simple  statement  of  the  relation  between  the 
mind  and  body  from  the  point  of  view  of  psychology.) 

ANGELL,  J.  R.,  Chapters  from  Modern  Psychology,  1912,  pp.  45-71. 
(Discusses  the  relation  between  the  mind  and  the  body.) 

ANGELL,  J.  R.,  Psyctiology,  1908,  pp.  13-58.  (Describes  the  psycho- 
physical  organism  and  the  nervous  system,  upon  which  natural 
science  bases  its  descriptions  and  explanations  of  human  nature.) 

MUNSTERBERG,  H.,  Psychology  and  Life,  1899,  pp.  1-34.  (This 
reading,  which  is  more  difficult  for  immature  students  than 
those  given  above,  shows  that  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science 
is  not  the  fundamental  one  with  regard  to  human  nature.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Answer  the  questions  on  page  2  and  indicate  in  each  case  the 
general  principle  you  have  assumed  in  answering  the  question.  (For 
example,  if  you  say  that  Latin  should  not  be  taught  in  the  common 


24  The  Principles  of  Education 

schools  because  it  is  not  practical,  you  assume  as  a  principle  that  all 
subject  matter  taught  in  such  schools  should  be  practical.) 

2.  a.  Do  you  hold  any  belief  specified  on  page  3  as  erroneous? 
6.  If  so,  how  did  you  acquire  this  belief  ? 

3.  a.  Make  a  list  of  five  acts  you  do  habitually  and  indicate  in 
each  case  the  stimulus  and  response.     6.  Indicate  in  each  case  the 
purpose  of  the  act.     c.  Distinguish  between  the  two  points  of  view 
from  which  you  have  regarded  yourself  in  this  exercise. 

4.  Select  from  the  books  noted  above  as  references  for  class 
reading  five  statements  that  represent  the  materialistic  point  of  view 
and  five  statements  that  represent  the  point  of  view  of  teleology. 

5.  Show  how  a  small  amount  of  scientific  experimentation  proved 
authoritatively  the  fallacy  in  the  doctrine  of  formal  discipline  as 
accepted  for  centuries  by  educational  thinkers  who  did  not  use  this 
method  of  investigation. 

6.  From  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science,  does  a  man  appear 
to  be  morally  free  in  choosing  what  he  will  do  ? 

7.  What  is  the  best  reason  you  can  give  for  believing  that,  with 
reference  to  man,  the  point  of  view  of  teleology  is  more  fundamental 
than  the  point  of  view  of  natural  science? 


CHAPTER   II 
THE  LARGER  FACTORS  IN  HUMAN  DEVELOPMENT 

The  larger  factors  in  human  development  are  (1)  the  social 
factor,  which  determines  the  purposes  and  ideas  available  for 
controlling  conduct ;  (2)  the  individual  factor,  in  which  these 
purposes  and  ideas  are  realized;  and  (3)  the  educational  factor, 
which  unites  the  other  two  by  providing  conditions  favorable 
to  the  development  of  social  purposes  and  ideas  in  the  individual 
life. 

I 

The    social    and    individual    factors    are   revealed    superficially 
through  opposition  between  them. 

"  Civilized  man  is  born,  lives,  and  dies  in  a  state  of 
slavery ;  at  his  birth  he  is  sewed  up  in  swaddling  clothes, 
and  at  his  death  he  is  nailed  in  a  coffin ;  so  long  as  he  pre- 
serves the  human  form,  he  is  fettered  by  various  institu- 
tions." This  extreme  statement  by  Rousseau,  provoked  by 
conditions  preceding  the  French  Revolution,  calls  attention 
to  the  individual  and  the  social  factors  in  human  develop- 
ment by  showing  them  in  opposition  to  each  other. 
Since  the  dramatic  element  of  strife  commands  attention, 
the  prevalent  ideas  of  these  factors  have  been  developed 
largely  out  of  opposition  between  them.  The  maxim 
"  Spare  the  rod  and  spoil  the  child,"  would  make  it  appear 
that  the  individual  should  be  whipped  into  lines  of  activity 
approved  by  society.  The  business  man  who  violates  the 
generally  accepted  ideas  of  fair  dealing  and  the  husband 
whose  treatment  of  his  family  does  not  accord  with  his 

25 


26  The  Principles  of  Education 

neighbors'  standards  of  kindness,  are  made  to  feel  the 
indignation  of  the  community.  Because  not  controlled 
by  ideas  commonly  accepted,  the  polygamist  is  imprisoned 
and  the  murderer  is  put  to  death.  Socrates,  accused  of 
denying  the  gods  recognized  by  the  state  and  of  teaching 
the  youth  ideas  which  Athenians  generally  did  not  accept, 
was  compelled  to  drink  the  fatal  hemlock.  Giordano 
Bruno  asserted  that  the  world  moves,  and  a  society  with 
whose  fundamental  beliefs  this  idea  conflicted  burned 
him  at  the  stake;  while,  shortly  afterwards,  Galileo  also 
would  have  been  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  social  regulation, 
had  he  not  recanted  a  similar  belief.  John  Huss  suffered 
martyrdom  for  his  religious  ideas  and  Martin  Luther 
probably  escaped  a  similar  fate  by  concealment  in  the 
castle  of  Wartburg.  Truly  did  the  three  crosses  on 
Calvary  symbolize  the  fact  that  both  the  reformer  and 
the  criminal  are  transgressors  of  social  beliefs  and  customs, 
and  that,  in  exercising  a  regulative  influence  to  enforce  its 
own  standards,  society  has  made  the  way  of  the  trans- 
gressor hard. 

II 

The  social  factor  determines  the  purposes  and  ideas  essential 
to  the  development  of  men  ;  this  social  regulation  varies  in  different 
groups  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  group  at  different  times ; 
and  the  story  of  the  changes  of  this  social  regulation  is  the  history 
of  civilization. 

In  the  contrast  between  the  individual  and  society 
made  apparent  by  such  instances  as  those  noted  above, 
society  seems  to  regulate  in  an  arbitrary  way  the  ideas 
and  purposes  of  the  individual ;  it  seems  artificially  to 
impose  man-made  restrictions  upon  him.  Rousseau  ex- 
presses this  idea  very  well  in  his  "  social  contract " 
theory,  which  holds  that  men,  having  lived  only  as  inde- 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    27 

pendent  individuals,  made  a  contract  to  live  together  as 
a  society,  because  they  saw  that  selfish  advantages  could 
thereby  be  gained.  A  ruler  was  then  provided  for  and 
the  machinery  of  state  established  to  enforce  the  regula- 
tions of  the  contract  upon  those  who  would  seek  to  evade 
them. 

By  placing  authority  thus  with  the  masses  and  by 
making  the  king  and  his  officers  appear  to  be  merely 
agents  of  the  masses  in  enforcing  the  social  contract, 
Rousseau's  theory  exercised  a  strong  influence  in  over- 
coming the  belief  in  the  divine  right  of  kings.  In  this 
way  it  played  a  prominent  part  in  opening  the  flood- 
gates of  human  passion  so  that  outgrown  and  pernicious 
social  regulations  were  swept  away  in  the  French  Revolu- 
tion. But  however  valuable  these  results  may  have  been, 
Rousseau's  theory  of  the  nature  of  the  social  factor  in 
human  development  is  superficial. 

Man,  to  translate  the  words  of  Aristotle,  is  a  "  social 
animal."  Indeed,  even  lower  animals,  down  to  the  bees 
and  the  ants,  have  forms  of  social  organization,  though 
they  certainly  know  nothing  about  contracts  and  do  not 
understand  that  advantages  come  from  social  organiza- 
tion. A  human  being  becomes  a  member  of  society  for 
the  same  reason  that  he  breathes  air  and  eats  food,  —  it 
is  his  nature  to  do  so.  Development  of  the  purposes  and 
ideas  which  control  his  conduct  is  as  much  dependent 
upon  life  in  society  as  his  physical  development  is  depend- 
ent upon  air  and  food.  Every  worthy  purpose  and  every 
valuable  idea  which  the  individual  acquires  is  social  in 
its  origin  and  is  acquired  by  him  from  society.  Indeed, 
the  idea  of  a  contract,  the  ideas  of  advantages  comine; 
from  social  organization,  although  assumed  by  the  "  social 
contract "  theory  to  antedate  social  relations,  would 


28  The  Principles  of  Education 

never  have  been  known,  had  not  man  been  living  a  social 
life  for  countless  generations.  As  Professor  Baldwin 
says :  "  Man  is  not  a  person  who  stands  up  in  his  isolated 
majesty,  meanness,  passion,  or  humility,  and  sees,  hits, 
worships,  fights,  or  overcomes,  another  man,  who  does 
the  opposite  things  to  him,  each  preserving  his  isolated 
majesty,  meanness,  passion,  humility,  all  the  while,  so 
that  he  can  be  considered  a  '  unit '  for  the  compounding 
processes  of  social  speculation.  On  the  contrary,  a  man 
is  a  social  outcome  rather  than  a  social  unit.  He  is 
always,  in  his  greatest  part,  also  someone  else.  Social 
acts  of  his  —  that  is,  acts  which  may  not  prove  anti-social 
—  are  his  because  they  are  society's  first;  otherwise  he 
would  not  have  learned  them  nor  have  had  any  tendency 
to  do  them.  Everything  that  he  learns  is  copied,  repro- 
duced, assimilated,  from  his  fellows;  and  what  all  of 
them,  including  him,  —  all  the  social  fellows,  —  do  and 
think,  they  do  and  think  because  they  have  each  been 
through  the  same  course  of  copying,  reproducing,  assimi- 
lating, that  he  has."  : 

In  the  light  of  this  explanation  of  man  as  a  "  social 
animal,"  it  becomes  evident  that  the  headsman's  axe 
and  the  hangman's  noose,  the  prison  and  the  whipping 
post,  and  popular  disapproval  and  indignation,  are  inci- 
dental in  social  regulation.  For  the  most  part,  since  it 
is  his  nature  to  do  so,  the  individual  willingly  acquires 
from  society  the  purposes  and  ideas  that  control  his 
action.  He  cannot  get  in  any  other  way  the  purposes 
and  ideas  that  are  necessary  to  satisfy  his  own  needs  and 
to  promote  his  own  personal  development.  Only  after 
thousands  of  generations  of  cooperative  struggle  has 

1  Baldwin,  James  Mark,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  1906, 
p.  96. 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    29 

society  attained  these  purposes  and  ideas;  they  have 
been  bought  with  the  sweat  and  blood  of  centuries.  But 
they  are  free  to  the  individual  for  the  taking.  If  he  were 
denied  the  advantage  of  this  vicarious  struggle  of  society, 
his  puny  mind  and  short  life  span  would  make  personal 
development  impossible.  Without  this  social  inheritance 
he  could  never  be  a  man. 

Different  nations  at  the  same  time  and  the  same  nations 
at  different  times  have  varied  greatly  in  their  accumulated 
store  of  purposes  and  ideas  available  to  individuals  within 
the  social  group.  In  this  respect,  the  Spartans  differed 
from  the  Athenians,  the  Germans  from  the  French,  and 
the  subjects  of  Queen  Elizabeth  from  those  of  George  V. 
Volumes  have  been  filled  with  records  of  the  important 
changes  which  the  Roman  invasion  brought  about  in 
the  purposes  and  ideas  of  western  Europe,  and  within  a 
half  century  Japanese  purposes  and  ideas  have  been 
remade. 

The  history  of  civilization  is  but  the  record  of  the 
changes  in  social  regulation  brought  about  by  the  develop- 
ment of  new  purposes  and  ideas  which  control  men's 
conduct.  In  primitive  times,  human  beings  under  social 
guidance  found  their  highest  satisfaction  in  the  mere 
gaining  of  food,  shelter,  and  protection  against  enemies, 
used  the  crudest  of  tools,  saw  spirit  doubles  in  stones  and 
trees,  and  regarded  fire  with  superstitious  awe.  When 
the  forces  of  nature  were  harnessed,  and,  with  the  use  of 
fire,  better  tools  were  made,  when  habitations  became 
settled  and  division  of  labor  more  complex,  individuals 
were  brought  to  the  realization  of  higher,  more  complex 
purposes  and  ideas.  In  the  Western  World,  the  religious 
development  of  the  Hebrews,  the  literary,  artistic,  and 
philosophical  development  of  the  Greeks,  and  the 


30  The  Principles  of  Education 

institutional  development  of  the  Romans  made  further 
changes  in  the  kind  of  regulation  effected  by  society. 
Though  men  have  come  and  men  have  gone,  the  char- 
acter of  social  regulation  has  continued  to  develop  through 
the  making  of  new  purposes  and  ideas  to  the  present  age 
with  its  industrial  factories  and  governmental  institutions, 
its  schools,  libraries,  art  galleries,  and  churches. 


Ill 

The  individual  factor  is  the  medium  in  which  purposes  and  ideas 
are  produced  under  social  guidance,  but  individuals  vary  greatly 
in  their  abilities  to  profit  by  this  guidance. 

What  is  the  nature  of  the  individual  factor  in  human 
development?  If,  under  conditions  in  which  only  the 
individual  and  the  social  factors  are  involved,  we  can  in 
imagination  take  away  the  social,  we  have  left  the  indi- 
vidual factor  alone.  For  example,  the  human  being 
known  as  Martin  Luther  may  be  imagined  to  have  grown 
up  in  civilizations  different  from  that  in  which  he  actually 
lived.  If  he  had  grown  up  among  the  Chinese,  he  would 
have  eaten  with  chop  sticks,  and,  having  grown  a  cue, 
would  have  felt  humiliation  at  the  thought  of  losing  it. 
Also,  he  would  have  thought  in  the  Chinese  language, 
understood  only  primitive  methods  of  agriculture,  if 
any,  and  would  have  entertained  oriental  religious  ideas. 
In  Athens  at  the  time  of  Pericles,  in  Rome  at  the  time  of 
Caesar  Augustus,  in  France  at  the  time  of  the  Crusades, 
he  would  have  had  different  purposes  and  ideas,  and 
therefore  would  have  acted  differently.  That  which 
would  have  been  present  in  Luther  under  one  civilization 
and  not  under  another  is  obviously  social  in  its  nature, 
since  it  would  have  depended  entirely  upon  the  society 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    31 

in  which  he  lived ;  that  which  would  have  been  present 
in  him  under  any  civilization  is  obviously  individual  in 
its  nature,  since  it  would  not  have  depended  upon  the 
society  in  which  he  lived.  Eliminating,  then,  the  pur- 
poses and  ideas  which  he  might  have  acquired  in  any 
particular  civilization,  there  is  left  a  being  capable  of 
producing  purposes  and  ideas  in  accordance  with  pat- 
terns set  by  society.  The  individual  as  thus  distin- 
guished is  the  factor  through  which  purposes  and  ideas 
are  produced  under  social  guidance.  In  this  way,  the 
individual  is  seen  to  be  the  agent  through  which  society 
functions,  the  medium  in  which  social  purposes  and 
ideas  are  realized. 

Individuals  vary  greatly  in  their  abilities  to  appro- 
priate social  purposes  and  ideas  by  reproducing  them  in 
their  own  experience  and  thus  making  them  guides  for 
conduct.  Idiots  and  insane  persons  are  largely  wanting 
in  this  ability,  whereas  geniuses  possess  it  to  a  conspicuous 
degree.  Some  individuals,  furthermore,  are  more  capable 
of  appropriating  social  purposes  and  ideas  in  one  field 
than  in  another.  Consequently,  one  excels  in  manual 
arts,  commerce,  or  politics,  while  another  excels  in  science, 
music,  or  religion.  The  individuals  of  one  race  may  differ 
from  those  of  another  in  the  ability  to  appropriate  social 
purposes  and  ideas. 

IV 

An  understanding  of  both  the  social  nnd  the  individual  factors, 
alt  hough  they  arc  attractions,  is  necessary  to  the  control  of  human 
development. 

The  individual  and  society  are  two  abstractions;  i.e. 
things  that  can  be  separated  in  imagination,  but  not  in 
reality,  as  in  the  case  of  whiteness  and  the  substance 


32  The  Principles  of  Education 

which  is  white.  There  can  be  no  society  without  indi- 
vidual human  beings,  and  there  can  be  no  individual 
human  beings  without  society.  Even  when  some  anchor- 
ite monk  retires  to  his  solitary  life  in  the  desert  and  when 
some  Robinson  Crusoe  is  lost  on  a  far-away  island,  they 
cannot  get  rid  of  the  social  factor  in  experience,  but 
take  with  them  purposes  and  ideas  which,  before  their 
isolation,  they  got  from  society  and  could  never  have 
acquired  in  any  other  way. 

Although  the  social  and  the  individual  factors  are 
known  only  as  abstractions,  the  recognition  of  both  of 
them  is  essential  to  the  understanding  and  control  of 
human  development,  and  has,  therefore,  important  prac- 
tical consequences.  The  law  of  gravitation,  too,  is  an 
abstraction ;  but  the  builder  of  air  ships  who  neglects  it 
is  bound  to  meet  failure  or  even  disaster  in  the  world  of 
practical  affairs. 

Two  illustrations  may  be  given  which  show  serious 
consequences  in  the  control  of  human  development  that 
have  come  from  a  failure  to  recognize  the  full  importance 
of  one  or  the  other  of  these  factors. 


The  neglect  of  the  individual  factor,  as  exemplified  in  the  thought 
of  Plato,  led  to  a  separation  of  theory  and  practice,  which  retarded 
human  development. 

In  his  study  of  human  nature,  Plato  neglected  the  indi- 
vidual factor  in  human  development.  He  lived  at  a 
time  when  loss  of  faith  in  social  tradition  had  in  a  con- 
spicuous measure  abandoned  men  to  the  guidance  of 
undisciplined  and  capricious  individual  desires.  Dis- 
integration of  the  state  and  degeneration  of  the  individual 
were  resulting.  Some  authoritative  regulator  of  human 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    33 

action  was  needed.  Under  such  conditions,  it  was  a  very 
natural  mistake  for  Plato,  in  seeking  this,  to  turn  from  a 
direct  study  of  the  more  or  less  undisciplined,  capricious, 
and  therefore  chaotic  nature  of  the  individual,  and  to 
center  his  attention  upon  only  the  regulative  or  social 
factor  in  human  life. 

Plato  said  that  the  nature  of  the  individual  appeared 
to  be  so  small  and  intricate  that  direct  study  of  it  was 
difficult.  With  the  thought  that  one  who  sees  something 
written  in  large  letters  can  afterwards  read  more  easily 
the  same  thing  written  in  small  letters,  because  he  knows 
what  to  look  for,  Plato  assumed  that  society  is  the  in- 
dividual written  large ;  and  that  by  studying  the  nature 
of  society,  he  could  read  in  big  letters  the  nature  of  the 
individual  man.  Thus  he  failed  to  make  a  direct  study 
of  the  individual  process  and  based  his  understanding 
of  human  nature  upon  the  study  of  the  social  factor 
alone. 

The  study  of  the  social  factor  does  not  reveal  how 
ideas  come  into  being.  This  is  true,  because,  as  we  have 
learned,  the  process  for  making  ideas  in  accordance  with 
social  patterns  is  peculiarly  individual ;  the  individual  is 
the  agent  through  which  society  functions,  the  medium 
in  which  social  purposes  and  ideas  are  realized.  Plato 
could  not,  therefore,  understand  how  ideas  are  made; 
and,  not  understanding  this,  he  naturally  assumed  that 
they  were  not  made  at  all,  but  always  existed.  Having 
decided  that  ideas  are  eternal,  he  found  an  easy  step  to  the 
conclusion  that  eternal  ideas  are  more  valuable  than  the 
changing,  perishing  things  of  the  world,  and  consequently 
that  in  order  to  secure  the  highest  development,  man 
should  turn  away  from  temporal  things  of  the  world  and 
look  with  the  "  eye  of  the  soul  "  upon  eternal  ideas. 


34  The  Principles  of  Education 

This  conclusion  means  that  ideas  are  purer  and  more 
divine  in  nature  in  the  degree  that  they  are  free  from 
connection  with  the  temporal  practical  affairs  of  life, 
which  are  supposed  to  contaminate  them.  According  to 
Plato's  philosophy,  the  highest  development  of  men 
required,  therefore,  that  they  live  as  much  as  possible  in 
a  realm  of  pure  abstract  thought  rather  than  in  the  world 
of  practical  action.  The  heavenly  halos  of  these  ideas, 
as  seen  in  his  poetic  fancy,  had  blinded  him  to  the  impor- 
tance of  the  very  world  of  practical  affairs  in  which,  as 
shown  above,  his  problem  originated.  In  a  word,  because 
Plato,  through  a  failure  to  find  the  true  nature  of  the 
individual  process,  failed  to  understand  how  ideas  are 
actually  made,  he  was  led  logically  to  separate  the  realm 
of  thought  from  the  world  of  practical  action;  or,  to 
state  it  more  briefly,  to  separate  theory  and  practice. 

Plato  believed,  it  is  true,  that  ideas  should  control 
the  practical  affairs  of  life,  but  he  separated  ideas  from 
these  affairs  by  attributing  to  them  (1)  a  noble  origin 
independent  of  the  practical  world,  and  (2)  an  intrinsic 
value  that  made  the  pursuit  of  them  preeminently  worth 
while,  apart  from  their  practical  application.  He  says 
that  the  ideal  men,  the  philosophers,  who  have  been 
trained  by  years  of  abstract  thinking,  "  must  be  con- 
strained to  lift  up  the  eye  of  the  soul,  and  fix  it  upon  that 
which  gives  light  to  all  things ;  and  having  surveyed  the 
essence  of  good,  they  must  take  it  as  a  pattern,  to  be 
copied  in  that  work  of  regulating  their  country  and  their 
fellow-citizens  and  themselves,  which  is  to  occupy  each 
in  turn  during  the  rest  of  life ;  —  and  though  they  are  to 
pass  most  of  their  time  in  philosophical  pursuits,  yet 
each,  when  his  turn  conies,  is  to  devote  himself  to  the 
hard  duties  of  public  life,  and  hold  office  for  his 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    35 

country's  sake,  not  as  a  desirable,  but  as  an  unavoidable, 
occupation."  l 

Plato's  theory  of  the  origin  of  ideas  would  lead  thought 
to  commit  suicide;  for,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the  very 
ideas  upon  which  thought  feeds  are  not  gifts  from  heaven, 
but  are  worked  out  by  human  beings  in  the  solution  of 
problems  created  by  difficulties  in  the  practical  life. 
Without  the  practical,  changing  world  with  its  difficulties 
and  consequent  problems,  there  would  be  no  ideas  and 
thought  would  perish. 

Let  Plato's  emphasis  upon  the  value  of  thought  for 
its  own  sake,  an  emphasis  mistaken  because  the  direct 
study  of  the  individual  was  neglected,  be  tested  by  the 
effect  which  the  ideal  of  mere  theoretical  study  has  had 
upon  human  development.  Only  a  few  conspicuous 
examples  need  be  mentioned.  Descendants  of  virile 
Greeks  who  helped  to  save  Europe  from  oriental  invasion 
ignored  great  vital  problems  upon  the  solution  of  which 
human  advancement  depended,  and  consumed  their  time 
in  quibbles  over  formal  doctrines  in  the  philosophical 
schools.  When  all  western  Europe  was  crying  out  for 
guidance  to  escape  superstition,  injustice,  crime,  poverty, 
and  disease,  thousands  of  the  most  capable  men  were 
turned  from  the  study  demanded  by  the  best  interests  of 
humanity  and  were  led  to  devote  their  lives  to  a  vain 
attempt  to  get  nourishment  from  the  dry  husks  of 
scholasticism,  long  after  the  juices  had  been  extracted. 
Even  to-day,  the  school,  which  should  start  the  indi- 
vidual aright  in  this  practical  world,  is  tending  too  much 
to  force  the  pupil,  distracted  by  effort,  to  seek  knowledge 
merely  for  its  own  sake.  When  such  is  the  case,  the 
pupil,  as  we  shall  explain  definitely  later,  does  not  get 
1  Plato,  The  Republic,  Bk.  VII. 


36  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  true  meanings  and  values  of  the  facts  learned,  because 
he  does  not  recognize  the  practical  service  of  these  facts 
in  human  life.  Verily,  whenever  thought  is  separated 
from  practice,  thought  itself  loses  both  its  true  meaning 
and  its  true  worth. 

A  general  estimate  of  the  value  of  Plato's  influence 
should  not  be  based  merely  upon  the  mistake  he  made 
by  not  giving  adequate  recognition  to  the  individual 
factor  in  experience.  His  name,  as  we  shall  explain 
later,  is  written  large  in  the  history  of  the  development  of 
civilization.1 

Our  purpose  here  is  only  to  see  that  the  individual 
factor  must  be  taken  into  consideration  in  getting  a  true 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  human  development; 
and  that,  if  this  is  neglected,  the  consequences  may  be 
serious. 

VI 

The  neglect  of  the  social  factor,  as  exemplified  in  the  thought  of 
Rousseau,  led  to  making  caprice  the  guide  of  conduct. 

Many  centuries  after  Plato,  Rousseau  attempted  to 
find  the  nature  of  human  development  by  studying  the 
individual  alone.  Social  practices  developed  by  earlier 
generations  had  been  outgrown  so  that  they  no  longer 
met  the  needs. of  the  times,  and  were,  therefore,  oppres- 
sive. The  government  had  become  tyrannical;  the 
church,  arbitrary;  the  school,  formal.  Rousseau,  with 
his  strong  hatred  of  restriction  and  with  his  erratic  judg- 
ment, came  to  the  conclusion  that  "  the  whole  sum  of 
human  wisdom  consists  in  servile  prejudices  " ;  and  that 
"  our  customs  are  nothing  more  than  subjection,  worry,  and 
restraint." 

1  See  pp.  304-305. 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    37 

According  to  him,  the  individual  human  being  is 
naturally  good  and  in  isolation  from  social  influence 
would  grow  into  the  highest  type  of  manhood ;  but,  like 
a  plant  trampled  in  the  highway,  the  individual  is  turned 
away  from  a  natural  development,  and  therefore  cor- 
rupted, by  social  regulation.  Society  was  represented, 
as  has  been  said,  to  be  the  result  of  a  deliberate  agreement, 
a  "  social  contract,"  entered  upon  by  independent  human 
beings,  each  having  in  mind  his  own  advantage.  Men, 
accordingly,  were  supposed  to  have  developed  their  judg- 
ments of  what  things  were  worth  while  and  their  ideas 
of  how  to  attain  these  before  society  existed ;  for  these 
judgments  of  worth,  these  ideas  of  method,  according  to 
Rousseau,  were  the  guides  which  led  men  to  form  a 
society.  If  men  were  developed  before  society  existed, 
the  latter  was  not  a  factor  in  that  development. 

Rousseau's  position,  if  carried  out  logically,  would  make 
impossible  the  very  individual  growth  which  he  sought. 
Only  under  social  guidance  can  the  individual  get  the 
purposes  and  ideas  which  constitute  his  development,— 
purposes  and  ideas  which  are  the  result  of  the  cooperative 
work  of  the  brightest  minds  of  the  race  during  thousands 
of  generations.  Without  social  regulation,  human  nature 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  caprice. 

Rousseau,  consistent  only  in  his  inconsistency,  ignored 
even  logical  regulation.  In  one  place  he  says  that  the 
child  should  receive  nothing  from  others,  and  should  dis- 
cover the  truth  for  himself ;  but  in  another  he  advises 
that  the  child  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  a  tutor. 
To  the  extent  to  which  the  tutor  guides  him,  the  child 
obviously  learns  from  another  and  is  thus  brought  under 
the  social  regulation  which  has  been  imposed  by  society 
upon  the  tutor. 


38  The  Principles  of  Education 

Rousseau's  theory,  mistaken  because  he  neglected  the 
social  factor,  may  be  tested  by  the  effect  which  such 
ignoring  of  social  regulation  has  had  upon  human  develop- 
ment. Politically  the  criticism  of  Rousseau's  mistake  is 
written  in  the  blood  of  the  French  Revolution,  in  so  far 
as  the  Revolution  was  a  blind  destructive  fury  against 
social  regulation.  This  destruction  of  social  authority 
meant  anarchy.  Educationally  the  criticism  of  Rous- 
seau's mistake  is  written  in  the  erroneous  practices  of 
those  who  give  undue  emphasis  to  the  spontaneous  in- 
terests of  the  child  by  ignoring  the  fact  that  these  interests 
can  neither  be  understood  nor  profitably  guided  without 
the  light  of  social  purposes  and  ideas.  Such  persons  are 
liable  to  mistake  amusement  for  study  and  merely  to 
indulge  the  child  on  his  own  level  without  promoting  his 
development. 

Rousseau's  theory  was  in  a  large  measure  beneficial 
to  human  development,  because  generally  in  the  institu- 
tional life  of  his  time  too  little  attention  was  given  to  the 
individual,  and  his  one-sided  theory  tended  to  correct 
this  condition.  In  education,  for  instance,  he  called 
attention  to  the  importance  of  the  interests  of  the  child, 
which  were  neglected.  Taken  alone,  Rousseau's  theory 
is  nevertheless  illogical  and  injurious,  because  by  neglect- 
ing the  social  factor  he  leaves  man  without  regulation. 

VII 

The  third  factor,  the  educational,  unites  the  individual  and  the  social. 

Human  development  may  be  examined  under  two  con- 
ditions, either  as  completed  or  as  progressing.  In  the 
analysis  given  above,  attention  was  centered  upon  it  as 
completed.  In  finding  the  nature  of  the  social  factor, 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    39 

we  considered  man  as  a  "  social  animal,"  a  member  of 
society,  "  a  social  outcome  rather  than  a  social  unit ;  " 
in  finding  the  nature  of  the  individual  factor,  we  imagined 
the  human  being  known  as  Martin  Luther  to  have  ex- 
perience acquired  in  different  nations  and  at  different 
times.  Here  only  the  social  and  individual  factors  are 
revealed.  When,  however,  we  study  human  develop- 
ment in  the  process  of  making,  we  find  a  third  factor, 
which  does  not  appear  as  a  part  of  the  completed  product. 
This  is  the  process  through  which  social  guidance  is 
exercised,  through  which  social  purposes  and  ideas  are 
selected  and  made  available  for  the  individual.  It  is 
the  process  that  unites  the  individual  human  being  and 
society. 

Individual  development  under  social  guidance  begins 
at  infancy.  Although  the  infant  may  be  in  the  midst  of 
the  busy  scene  of  social  action,  rich  with  its  purposes  and 
ideas,  he  is  as  helpless  to  make  use  of  these  purposes  and 
ideas  in  promoting  his  development  as  he  is  helpless  to 
make  use  of  the  food  which  society  has  in  store  for  him,  - 
and  for  the  same  reason.  In  either  case,  that  which  is 
best  for  him  at  the  time  must  be  selected  and  presented 
in  a  way  adapted  to  his  nature. 

This  selection  and  presentation  of  social  patterns  is 
done  through  the  various  forms  of  institutions,  which 
may  be  classified  as  the  home,  industry  and  commerce, 
the  state,  the  church,  and  the  school.  In  the  case  of  the 
school,  the  selection  and  presentation  are  done  deliber- 
ately ;  but  in  the  cases  of  the  other  institutions,  they 
take  place  more  or  less  incidentally  in  connection  with 
the  doing  of  other  things.  The  main  purpose  of  a  shoe 
factory,  for  example,  is  to  make  shoes;  but  as  the  indi- 
vidual is  promoted  from  easier  to  more  difficult  work,  he 


40  The  Principles  of  Education 

finds  the  best  ways  of  making  shoes  selected  for  his 
acquisition  and  adapted  to  his  ability  to  appropriate  the 
purposes  and  ideas  necessary  to  do  the  work.  In  like 
manner  his  growth  is  provided  for  in  the  home,  the 
church,  and  the  state.  The  more  these  institutions 
deliberately  concern  themselves  with  his  development, 
the  more  effectual  are  they  in  promoting  his  acquisition 
of  social  purposes  and  ideas.  In  the  selection  of  the 
curriculum  and  in  the  processes  of  teaching,  the  school 
deliberately  undertakes  to  socialize  the  individual  by 
giving  him  the  best  purposes  and  ideas  which  society 
has  in  store  for  him. 

The  greater  the  number  and  complexity  of  the  purposes 
and  ideas  necessary  for  full  participation  in  social  life, 
the  longer  is  the  period  of  infancy,  or  dependence,  during 
which  they  are  acquired  by  the  individual.  In  the  com- 
paratively simple  life  of  primitive  man,  it  lasted  only  to 
the  earlier  teens ;  in  the  complex  civilization  of  the  present, 
it  is  half  again,  if  not  twice,  as  long.  Step  by  step  in  this 
advance,  institutions  have  increased  in  educational 
importance. 

That  which  brings  the  individual  and  the  social  factors 
together,  uniting  them  in  the  development  of  a  social 
person,  by  selecting  purposes  and  ideas  and  by  adapting 
them  for  acquisition  by  the  individual,  is  the  educational 
factor  in  human  development. 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    41 


VIII 

Natural  science  explains  human  development  as  the  acquiring  of 
nerve  connections  which  promote  adjustment  of  the  human  or- 
ganism to  environment ;  and  the  three  factors  of  this  develop- 
ment as  (1)  the  incomplete  organism  in  which  new  connections 
between  stimuli  and  responses  can  be  made,  (2)  the  racial  inherit- 
ance of  forms  of  response  to  stimuli,  and  (3)  certain  systems  of 
group  habits,  such  as  education  and  government,  which  select 
racial  forms  of  response  and  cause  the  developing  organism  to 
acquire  them.  These  three  factors  are  the  physical  counterparts 
of  the  individual,  the  social,  and  the  educational  factors,  which  we 
have  considered  from  the  teleological  point  of  view. 

Let  us  see  how  the  conclusions  which  we  have  now 
reached  from  the  teleological  point  of  view  are  supported 
by  the  authoritative  and  accurate  conclusions  of  natural 
science.  The  physical  counterparts  of  the  individual, 
the  social,  and  the  educational  factors  in  human  develop- 
ment are  revealed  by  natural  science  in  the  explanation 
of  this  development  as  the  acquiring  of  nerve  connections 
which  promote  the  adjustment  of  the  human  organism  to 
the  environment. 

As  the  result  of  a  long  process  of  variation,  natural 
.selection,  and  heredity,  the  lower  animal  organisms  are 
born  with  ready-made  connections  in  the  nervous  system 
that  equip  them  for  an  adjustment  to  environment.  It 
is  due  to  such  inborn  connections,  which  are  the  physical 
basis  of  instincts,  that  the  spider  spins  its  web,  the  bee 
stores  its  honey,  and  the  bird  builds  its  nest.  But  the 
advantage  of  being  fully  equipped  at  birth  for  the  battle 
of  life  is  dearly  paid  for,  because  this  equipment  can  be 
improved  only  through  the  slow  evolutionary  process  by 
which  it  was  made.  Its  possibilities  for  variation,  the 
first  step  towards  improvement,  are  extremely  limited ; 
and  any  improvement  can  be  made  a  permanent  acquisi- 


42  The  Principles  of  Education 

tion  of  the  species  only  by  being  fixed  through  physical 
heredity  in  the  nervous  structure  of  succeeding  generations. 

Spiders,  bees,  and  birds  have  made  no  change  in  abili- 
ties and  in  ways  of  acting  since  the  days  of  primitive  man ; 
but  during  this  time  men  have  increased  their  abilities 
and  improved  their  ways  of  doing  things  to  an  astonishing 
degree.  They  have  bettered  their  vision  with  the  tele- 
scope and  microscope,  their  hearing  with  the  telephone, 
and  their  locomotion  with  the  automobile.  In  spinning, 
men  have  advanced  from  the  hand  loom  to  the  marvel- 
ously  effective  machinery  of  great  factories ;  in  providing 
food,  they  have  advanced  from  the  precarious  methods 
used  by  savages  to  the  scientific  methods  of  the  farm, 
the  factory,  and  the  world  of  commerce;  they  have 
abandoned  the  tent  of  skins  and  the  mud  hut  for  elaborate, 
luxurious  homes. 

How  does  natural  science  explain  this  advance?  There 
comes  a  time  when  evolutionary  forces,  instead  of  fixing 
all  connections  in  the  nervous  system  during  the  prenatal 
period,  form  only  those  which  are  absolutely  necessary  for 
life,  such  as  those  which  control  breathing,  crying,  swal- 
lowing, and  digesting.  The  completion  of  other  connec- 
tions between  stimuli  and  responses  takes  place  in  the 
intricate  automatic  "  switchboard  "  of  the  brain  after  the 
child  is  born.  These  acquired  connections  are  formed  in 
accordance  with  racial  models,  selected  by  the  group  and 
adapted  to  the  nature  of  the  organism.  Thus  to  the  slow 
process  of  direct  physical  inheritance  is  added  a  process 
of  racial  inheritance,  through  which  the  organism  may 
profit  by  successful  forms  of  adjustment  made  at  any 
time  in  the  race,  whether  by  the  physical  ancestors  of 
the  organism  or  not.  Furthermore,  an  incomplete  nerv- 
ous system,  such  as  that  of  man,  makes  possible  greater 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    43 

variation  in  reactions  than  does  the  complete  nervous 
system,  such  as  that  of  the  bee  or  the  spider.  Greater 
variation  makes  for  rapid  progress  by  giving  a  greater 
variety  of  reactions  and  therefore  a  larger  possibility  for 
successful  ones,  which  may  be  fixed  through  the  influence 
of  natural  selection. 

This  materialistic  explanation  points  clearly  to  three 
essential  factors  in  human  development:  (1)  an  incom- 
plete organism,  (2)  a  racial  inheritance  of  forms  of  reaction, 
and  (3)  certain  systems  of  group  habits  which  select  racial 
models  for  adjustment  and  cause  the  developing  organism 
to  acquire  them.  Let  us  examine  each  of  these  three 
factors.  First,  the  incomplete  organism  passes  through 
a  period  of  infancy,  during  which  it  acquires  new  nerve 
connections  needed  for  adjustment.  As  Fiske  says : 

It  is  babyhood  that  has  made  man  what  he  is.  The  simple 
unaided  operation  of  natural  selection  could  never  have  resulted  in 
the  origination  of  the  human  race.  Natural  selection  might  have 
gone  on  forever  improving  the  breed  of  the  highest  animal  in  many 
ways,  but  it  could  never  unaided  have  started  the  process  of  civiliza- 
tion or  have  given  to  man  those  peculiar  attributes  in  virtue  of  which 
it  has  been  well  said  that  the  difference  between  him  and  the  highest 
apes  immeasurably  transcends  in  value  the  difference  between  an 
ape  and  a  blade  of  grass.  In  order  to  bring  about  that  wonderful 
event,  the  Creation  of  Man,  natural  selection  had  to  call  in  the  aid 
of  other  agencies,  and  the  chief  of  these  agencies  was  the  gradual 
lengthening  of  babyhood.1 

Second,  environmental  influences  guide  the  formation  of 
the  new  nerve  connections  in  the  developing  organism. 
With  its  inborn  equipment  for  imitation,  the  immature 
organism  acquires  effective  reactions  under  the  guidance 
of  more  mature  organisms,  as  when  an  apprentice  reacts 

1  Fiske,  John,  The  Meaning  of  Infancy,  1909,  page  2. 


44  The  Principles  of  Education 

more  effectively  in  his  work  through  imitating  his  master. 
It  acquires  useful  reactions  also  as  a  result  of  the  influence 
of  tools,  books,  and  all  sorts  of  things  that  have  been 
made  by  other  organisms.  The  connections  between 
stimuli  and  responses  gained  under  such  environmental 
influences,  which  are  the  result  of  many  generations  of 
progressive  racial  adjustment,  may  appropriately  be  called 
a  racial  inheritance.  As  Professor  Baldwin  says : 

The  child,  apart  from  the  defective  in  mind  or  body,  learns  to  speak, 
write,  read,  play,  combine  force  with  others,  build  structures,  do 
bookkeeping,  shoot  firearms,  address  meetings,  teach  classes,  con- 
duct business,  practice  law  and  medicine  —  or  whatever  his  line  of 
further  development  may  be  away  from  the  three  Vs'  of  usual 
attainment  —  just  as  well  as  if  he  had  received  an  instinct  for  that 
activity  at  birth  from  his  father  and  mother.  His  father  or  mother 
may  have  the  accomplishment  in  question ;  and  he  may  learn  it 
from  him  or  her.  But  then  both  the  father  and  mother  may  not 
have  it,  and  he  then  learns  it  from  someone  else.  It  is  inheritance ; 
for  it  shows  the  attainments  of  the  fathers  handed  on  to  the  children ; 
but  it  is  not  physical  heredity,  since  it  is  not  transmitted  physically 
at  birth.  ...  It  is  hereditary  in  that  the  child  cannot  escape  it.  It  is 
as  inexorably  his  as  the  color  of  his  eyes  and  the  shape  of  his  nose.1 

Third,  various  systems  of  group  habits,  such  as  those  of 
school  and  state,  select  racial  models  for  adjustment  and 
adapt  them  to  the  immature  organism  in  such  manner 
that  nerve  connections  guiding  effective  responses  to 
stimuli  are  made  in  the  organism.  These  systems  of 
group  habits  have  been  developed  through  a  long  process 
of  evolution.  This  factor  becomes  more  prominent  in 
promoting  human  development  as  the  racial  inheritance 
becomes  more  complex.  Without  it  environmental  forces 
impinging  upon  the  organism  would  be  so  multifarious  and 

1  Baldwin,  James  Mark,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations,  1906, 
pp.  69-70. 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    45 

unrelated  that  no  consistent  growth  of  the  nervous  system 
could  result  from  them. 

We  can  now  see  how  natural  science  clearly  supports 
the  conclusions  we  have  reached  from  the  teleological  point 
of  view.  Since  the  same  human  development  considered 
from  the  materialistic  side  consists  of  the  forming  of  new 
nerve  connections,  and  considered  from  the  mental  side 
consists  of  the  acquiring  of  new  purposes  and  ideas,  (1)  the 
organism  capable  of  forming  new  nerve  connections  is 
the  physical  counterpart  of  the  individual  capable  of 
acquiring  new  purposes  and  ideas ;  (2)  the  racial  inherit- 
ance of  models  for  adjustment  which  guide  the  forming  of 
nerve  connections  corresponds  to  the  social  inheritance  of 
patterns  for  purposes  and  ideas ;  and  (3)  the  systems  of 
group  habits  which  select  racial  models  and  adapt  them 
to  the  organism  correspond  to  institutions,  which  select 
social  purposes  and  ideas  and  adapt  them  to  the  indi- 
vidual mind.  Natural  science  supports,  therefore,  the 
conclusion  that  the  individual,  the  social,  and  the  educa- 
tional are  the  three  larger  factors  of  human  development. 


IX 

A  more  definite  study  of  each  of  the  three  factors  marks  the  further 
main  divisions  of  this  book. 

The  three  larger  factors  in  human  development  have 
been  differentiated  in  a  general  way.  We  have  found, 
also,  that  the  individual  and  the  social  factors  are  united 
by  the  educational.  Each  of  these  factors  is  itself  a 
complex  process.  In  order  to  understand  more  definitely 
the  nature  of  human  development,  we  must,  therefore, 
make  a  special  study  of  each  factor  by  separating  it  into 
the  elements  of  which  it  is  composed  and  by  discovering 


46  The  Principles  of  Education 

how  these  elements  combine  to  make  it.  We  shall, 
therefore,  make  a  more  intensive  study  of  (1)  the  indi- 
vidual process,  (2)  the  social  process,  and  (3)  the  educa- 
tional process.  These  topics  indicate  the  further  main 
divisions  of  this  book. 

REFERENCES 

ELLWOOD,  C.  A.,  Sociology  in  Us  Psychological  Aspects,  1912,  pp.  124- 
142.  (Discusses  the  nature  of  society  in  the  light  of  its  origin.) 

BETTS,  G.  H.,  Social  Principles  of  Education,  1913,  pp.  5-30.  (Dis- 
cusses the  relation  between  the  individual  and  society.) 

BALDWIN,  J.  M.,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Develop- 
ment, 190G,  pp.  66-98.  (Shows  the  relation  between  the  indi- 
vidual and  society  in  a  discussion  of  the  social  person.  Each 
student  should  read  this  discussion.) 

MACVANNEL,  J.  A.,  Outline  of  a  Course  in  tlie  Philosophy  of  Educa- 
tion, 1912,  pp.  99-115,  29-31.  (Gives  a  statement  of  typical 
conceptions  of  the  relation  between  the  individual  and  society, 
of  the  factors  in  the  educational  process,  and  of  the  function  of 
education  as  a  human  institution.  Suitable  for  advanced 
students.) 

HENDERSON,  E.  N.,  A  Text-Book  in  the  Principles  of  Education,  1910, 
pp.  109-136.  (An  account  of  the  relation  between  the  indi- 
vidual and  society.) 

THORNDIKE,  E.  L.,  Principles  of  Teaching,  1906,  pp.  68-104.  (Dis- 
cusses individual  differences.) 

SCCTT,  C.  A.,  Social  Education,  1908,  pp.  1-22.  (Deals  with  the 
social  relationships  of  the  school.) 

PLATO,  The  Republic,  Bk.  VII.  (Plato's  ideal  of  seeking  knowledge 
for  its  own  sake  becomes  evident  in  this  book,  the  reading  of 
which  would  be  of  advantage  especially  to  mature  students.) 

DAVIDSON,  T.,  The  Education  of  the  Greek  People,  1900,  pp.  128-151. 
(Criticizes  Plato's  social  theory.) 

JAMES,  W.,  Talks  to  Teachers,  1905,  pp.  22-27.  (Shows  in  a  simple 
manner  that  the  essential  function  of  consciousness  is  practical 
rather  than  theoretical.) 


The  Larger  Factors  in  Human  Development    47 

ROUSSEAU,  J.  J.,  The  Social  Contract,  Tr.  by  H.  T.  Tozer,  1905,  pp. 

99-117.     (Suitable  for  advanced  students  who  wish  a  direct 

introduction  into  Rousseau's  social  theory.) 
DAVIDSON,  T.,  Rousseau  and  Education  According  to  Nature,  1907, 

pp.  77-96.     (Criticizes  Rousseau's  social  theories.) 
FISKE,  J.,  The  Meaning  of  Infancy,  1909,  pp.  1-43.     (Shows  clearly 

the  meaning  of  infancy  and  the  part  played  by  infancy  in  the 

evolution  of  man.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  What  change  must  foreigners  undergo  in  order  to  become  true 
Americans  ? 

2.  Why  do  persons  who  have  lived  approximately  all  of  their 
lives  in  the  same  American  city  differ  in  religious  belief? 

3.  Explain  the  following :   "  Morally  I  am  as  much  a  part  of  so- 
ciety as  physically  I  am  a  part  of  the  world's  fauna ;  and  as  my  body 
gets  its  best  explanation  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  place  in  a 
zoological  scale,  so  morally  I  occupy  a  place   in   the  social  order; 
and  an  important  factor  in  the  understanding  of  me  is  the  under- 
standing of  it."  •—  Baldwin,  J.  M.,  Mental  Development,  1898,  p.  488. 

4.  What  evidence  can  you  give  in  support  of  the  statement  that 
as  the  education  of  a  people  increases  coercive  methods   of  social 
control  decrease? 

5.  What  concrete  evidence  can  you  give  of  the  fact  that  in  the 
case  of  human  beings  the  period  of  infancy  tends  to  become  longer? 

6.  What  is  meant  by  educability? 

7.  Why  under  the  same  educational  influences  in  the  home  and 
school  do  pupils  of  the  same  age  attain  various  degrees  of  develop- 
ment? 

8.  How  does  the  inheritance  with  which  a  human  being  is  born 
differ  from  his  social  inheritance? 


THE   INDIVIDUAL  PROCESS 


CHAPTER   III 
ANALYSIS  OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL  PROCESS 

The  factors  of  the  individual  process  are  purposes  and  means  of 
control.  A  purpose,  in  its  fullest  sense,  is  a  possible  con- 
dition of  the  self  which  the  individual  feels  to  be  better  than 
the  present  condition  of  the  self,  and  to  the  realization  of  which 
his  activity  is  directed.  A  means  of  control  is  a  thing  through 
the  use  of  which  a  purpose  may  be  attained ;  it  has  significance 
only  because,  in  the  light  of  reason,  it  is  seen  to  be  the  means 
to  some  end. 

I 

The  factors  of  the  individual  process  are  purposes  and  means 
of  control,  both  of  which  appear  when  the  individual  is  in  action, 
and  work  together  in  forming  now  purposes  and  new  means  of  con- 
trol. 

Having  found  that  the  individual  process  is  one  of  the 
three  larger  factors  in  human  development,  let  us  now 
analyze  this  process  in  order  to  find  how  it  makes,  in 
accordance  with  patterns  given  by  society,  new  purposes 
and  new  ideas,  which  control  the  conduct  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  constitute  his  personal  development. 

It  is  conducive  to  clearer  thinking  to  substitute  for  the 
word  idea  the  expression  means  of  control.  The  word  idea 
has  been  used  historically  with  such  varied  meanings  that 
its  significance  has  become  more  or  less  indefinite.  In  the 
previous  chapters,  where  sharp  discrimination  was  un- 
necessary, this  word  could  be  used  advantageously  with- 
out exact  definition ;  but,  as  our  analysis  becomes  more 

51 


52  The  Principles  of  Education 

detailed,  the  meaning  intended  must  be  stated  more 
precisely.  The  development  of  the  individual  requires 
that  he  see  in  the  things  about  him,  such  as  a  drinking 
cup,  a  pencil,  a  law  of  physics,  or  a  rule  of  grammar,  the 
means  of  control  through  which  his  purposes  can  be 
attained.  By  ideas  we  mean  the  recognition  of  these 
things  as  means  of  control.  It  is  better,  therefore,  to 
use  in  place  of  the  indefinite  term  idea  the  more  definite 
expression  means  of  control,  which  represents  the  idea 
embodied  in  physical  form,  as  in  the  form  of  a  drinking 
cup,  a  pencil,  a  law  of  physics,  or  a  rule  of  grammar.  It 
may  be  added  that  a  law  of  physics  and  a  rule  of  grammar 
are  just  as  truly  physical  things  as  a  drinking  cup  and  a 
pencil ;  one  can  see  them  when  they  are  printed  in  a  book 
or  hear  them  when  they  are  spoken. 

When  the  individual  process  is  examined  in  order  to 
analyze  it,  two  sets  of  factors  appear,  —  one  when  the 
individual  is  apparently  at  rest,  because  no  difficulty 
challenges  his  effort,  and  the  other  when  he  is  in  action, 
grappling  with  difficulties.  This  may  be  made  plain  by 
illustration.  If  I  lean  back  leisurely  in  my  chair  and 
merely  look  at  the  pen  with  which  I  have  been  writing, 
I  am  apparently  at  rest;  no  problem  disturbs  me.  Of 
this  experience,  there  seem  to  be  two  essential  factors,  —  I 
at  one  end  of  the  experience  and  the  pen  at  the  other. 
Both  appear  to  play  essential  parts  in  the  experience,  for 
it  could  not  exist  without  both.  These  apparent  factors 
are  called  subject  and  object.  However,  when  I  take  up 
the  pen  and  begin  work,  the  scene  changes.  No  longer 
do  I  simply  contemplate  the  pen.  The  purpose  of  writing 
an  analysis  of  the  individual  factor  in  human  develop- 
ment looms  before  me ;  and,  confronted  by  difficulties,  I 
strive  through  various  means  of  control  to  carry  it  out. 


The  Individual  Process  53 

The  pen,  which  a  moment  ago  was  a  mere  object  of  con- 
sciousness, now  begins  to  play  a  new  role ;  it  has  become 
one  of  the  instruments  or  means  used  in  carrying  out  my 
purpose.  Whenever  the  individual  is  thus  in  action,  the 
essential  factors  of  his  experience  are  (1)  purposes  and 
(2)  the  means  of  control  used  for  attaining  them. 

In  the  analysis  of  the  individual  process,  we  are  con- 
cerned primarily  with  the  individual  in  action,  because 
only  when  he  is  in  action  are  new  purposes  and  new  means 
of  control  acquired.  This  may  be  seen  more  clearly 
through  illustration.  The  new-born  child,  looking  out 
into  the  world,  is  not  conscious  of  the  purposes  felt  by 
the  adult ;  nor  does  he  see  in  the  things  used  in  the  realiza- 
tion of  these  purposes  the  meanings  which  they  have  for 
his  elders.  Moreover,  if  he  does  no  more  than  passively 
to  look  and  to  listen,  the  world  about  him  will  continue 
to  appear  the  same ;  he  will  remain  unconscious  of  worthy 
purposes  and  meaningful  things.  Not  until  desires  have 
awakened  within  him  and  he  has  striven  to  attain  their 
objects  can  he  become  directly  conscious  of  what  the 
adult  feels  and  understands  as  he  looks  upon  the  world. 
That  the  child  must  learn  by  doing  is  a  commonplace. 
In  the  Book  of  Genesis  it  is  recorded  that  God,  in  carrying 
out  His  divine  purpose,  created  heaven  and  earth  and  the 
things  that  in  them  dwell,  and  then  "  saw  everything 
that  He  had  made."  So  with  man ;  he  must  actually 
create  the  things  in  his  experience  through  the  process 
of  working  in  the  realizing  of  his  purposes,  before  he  can 
passively  contemplate  these  things  as  mere  objects. 

It  is  a  fallacy  of  popular  thought  to  believe  that  knowl- 
edge of  the  world  is  made  by  the  interaction  of  subject 
and  object,  the  factors  of  the  individual  process  when  the 
individual  is  apparently  at  rest.  This  is  a  very  natural 


54  The  Principles  of  Education 

mistake,  because  when  a  person  stops  to  examine  his 
experience,  he  finds  it  in  a  static  condition  for  the  very 
reason  that  he  has  stopped.  He  passively  looks  at  the 
pen  or  tablet,  or  merely  gazes  at  the  distant  church 
steeple,  and  asks  himself  the  question,  How  do  I  know 
this  thing?  There  is  activity,  of  course,  in  the  attempt 
to  answer  the  question,  but  this  activity  is  engaged  in 
making  an  analysis  of  the  experience  of  himself  looking 
at  the  object;  this  activity  is  not  the  experience  that  is 
being  analyzed.  The  subject  and  object,  which  appear 
under  these  circumstances,  seem  to  claim  responsibility 
for  the  making  of  the  experience  analyzed. 

Not  a  few  great  philosophers,  indeed,  have  been  misled 
in  their  theories  of  how  knowledge  is  acquired  by  making 
this  same  mistake  of  confining  their  analysis  to  the  mind 
in  the  passive  condition  of  contemplation,  in  which  the 
real  factors  of  knowledge  do  not  appear.  Locke,  for 
instance,  took  this  view  and  thought  that  the  subjective 
mind  is  like  a  blank  tablet  upon  which  the  objective 
things  of  the  world  make  their  impressions  through  the 
medium  of  the  senses.  Another  example  is  that  of  Kant, 
who  with  his  keen  logic  analyzed  the  passive  experience 
of  the  individual  at  rest,  showing  that  the  subject  con- 
tributed such  forms  as  time,  space,  and  relation,  which 
are  always  present,  no  matter  what  the  content  of  ex- 
perience may  be,  and  that  the  objective  things  of  the 
world  contributed  the  "  matter  of  sense,"  which  is  respon- 
sible for  the  differences  in  the  various  objects  that  are 
known.  He  assumed  that,  in  the  making  of  experience, 
the  object  began  the  interaction  with  the  subject. 

In  both  cases,  these  philosophers  examined  experience, 
not  in  the  process  of  making,  but  after  it  had  been  made, 
and  when,  therefore,  it  could  be  an  object  of  contempla- 


The  Individual  Process  55 

tion;  and  since  the  only  factors  apparent  to  them  in 
experience  as  a  completed  product  were  the  subject  and 
object,  it  was  very  natural  for  them  to  assume  that  in 
some  way  these  were  responsible  for  the  origin  of  the 
knowledge  of  things.  Having  made  this  erroneous  as- 
sumption, they  undertook  to  solve  the  false  problem  of 
how  the  subject  and  object  interact  to  create  knowledge,  — 
a  thing  that  these  phases  of  experience  never  interact  to 
do.  It  is  obvious  that  there  can  be  no  point  of  contact 
for  interaction  between  the  physical  world  and  a  spirit, 
which  is  immaterial.  No  more  effectual  criticism  of  such 
theories  can  be  found  than  the  irony  of  their  conclusions, 
which  attempt  to  explain  how  the  subject  and  object  in- 
teract to  make  new  knowledge ;  and  which,  at  the  same 
time,  having  the  defect  of  metaphysical  dualism,  rep- 
resent the  subject  and  object,  mind  and  matter,  to  be 
realities  absolutely  incapable  of  interacting. 

Fortunately,  however,  it  is  not  necessary  to  trace  the 
shortcomings  of  popular  thought  or  to  point  out  the 
inconsistencies  of  the  intricate  metaphysical  discussions 
of  this  matter  by  philosophers.  Conclusions  have  no 
more  truth  than  the  assumptions  upon  which  they  are 
based.  All  the  fine-spun  logic  that  any  philosopher  may 
devise  to  show  how  knowledge  is  made  through  the  inter- 
action of  subject  and  object  may  be  cast  aside  as  ineffectual 
if  only  we  know  that  knowledge  is  not  made  through  such 
interaction.  And  we  do  know  that  neither  new  knowl- 
edge nor  new  purposes  are  made  through  the  interaction 
of  subject  and  object,  because  a  product  is  one  thing  and 
the  process  through  which  it  is  made  is  another;  and, 
therefore,  when  the  product  is  separated  into  its  com- 
ponent parts,  the  result  is  simply  the  parts  of  the  product, 
not  the  parts  of  the  process  through  which  it  was  made. 


56  The  Principles  of  Education 

For  example,  separating  an  automobile  into  the  parts  of 
which  it  is  composed  does  not  give  the  instruments  with 
which  the  automobile  was  made.  In  the  factory  the  heat 
of  the  forges,  the  power  of  the  engines,  and  the  shaping 
force  of  the  machines  have  done  their  work  and  do  not 
appear  as  parts  of  the  completed  automobile.  Likewise, 
separating  an  experience  of  a  pen,  or  of  anything  else, 
into  its  subjective  and  objective  phases  does  not  give  the 
parts  of  the  process  through  which  it  was  made.  Purpose 
with  its  heat  of  desire  and  power  of  will,  and  the  shaping 
force  of  ideas  in  the  form  of  means  of  control,  which  were 
necessary  to  make  this  experience,  have  done  their  work 
and  do  not  appear  as  parts  of  the  intellectual  product. 
When,  on  the  other  hand,  we  examine  the  individual 
process  in  action,  we  find  that  as  truly  as  the  fire  of  one 
forge  can  kindle  another  fire  and  one  machine  can  form 
another  machine,  so  existing  purposes  and  means  of  con- 
trol can  be  factors  in  the  making  of  new  ones.  How  this 
is  done  will  appear  later,  and  then  our  understanding  of 
the  matter  will  be  more  clear. 

II 

A  purpose,  in  its  fullest  sense,  is  an  apparently  possible  condition  of 
the  self  which  the  individual  feels  to  be  better  than  the  present  condi- 
tion of  the  self,  and  to  the  realization  of  which  his  activity  is  directed. 
Its  realization  may  be  near  or  remote,  and  its  value  is  known  only 
through  feeling,  the  judgments  of  which  are  absolute.  A  means  of 
control  is  a  thing  through  the  use  of  which  a  purpose  may  be  at- 
tained. It  is  known  through  reason,  which  sees  causal  connections 
among  things,  but  which  is  blind  to  all  value. 

Before  placing  in  the  court  of  natural  science  for  its 
authoritative  judgment  the  conclusion  that  new  purposes 
and  means  of  control  are  made  by  other  purposes  and 
means  of  control  already  in  experience,  we  should  state 


The  Individual  Process  57 

more  definitely  the  nature  of  these  two  factors  in  the 
individual  process. 

Purpose,  in  its  various  aspects,  is  termed  thing  desired, 
value  to  be  controlled,  value  appreciated,  thing  worth  while, 
end  in  view,  good,  ideal,  intention,  motive.  In  every  in- 
stance, it  is  marked  by  a  feeling  of  value  and  by  activity 
intended  to  bring  this  value  into  realization,  both  of  which 
attributes  are  indispensable.  In  its  fullest  sense,  a  pur- 
pose is  an  apparently  possible  condition  of  the  self  which 
the  individual  feels  to  be  better  than  the  present  condition 
of  the  self,  and  to  the  realization  of  which  his  activity  is 
directed.  This  does  not  mean  that  it  must  be  selfish. 
A  mother  may  have  for  her  purpose  herself  ministering 
to  a  sick  child,  a  condition  that  she  values  as  more  worthful 
than  her  present  condition,  despite  the  fact  that  it  may 
include  wearisome  work  and  loss  of  sleep.  A  missionary 
may  have  in  view  himself  teaching  religious  beliefs  to  a 
foreign  people,  although  this  condition  means  the  sacrifice 
of  many  of  the  comforts  of  life.  A  soldier  may  feel  a  better 
condition  of  himself  to  be  that  of  fighting  at  the  front  in 
defense  of  human  rights,  even  though  this  may  include 
painful  hardships  and  even  death.  Thus  we  may  see 
that  the  total  situation  is  included  in  the  condition  of  the 
self.  However,  although  a  purpose  in  its  fullest  sense  is 
felt  to  be  a  better  condition  of  the  self,  some  feature  is 
usually  singled  out  to  stand  for  the  whole  condition,  as 
when  a  man  is  said  to  desire  a  glass  of  water,  a  chair,  or  a 
political  office,  although  the  complete  object  of  his  desire 
is  himself  drinking  the  water,  resting  in  the  chair,  or  en- 
joying the  emoluments  of  the  office.  So  in  the  other 
illustrations  cited,  the  purposes  may  be  said  to  be  the 
comfort  of  the  child,  the  conversion  of  the  heathen,  and 
the  vindication  of  human  rights. 


58  The  Principles  of  Education 

Purposes  vary  greatly  in  the  amount  of  time  and 
activity  necessary  for  their  realization.  Sometimes  they 
are  projected  far  into  the  future  and  require  years  for 
their  attainment,  as  when  a  youth  on  entering  college  has 
the  purpose  of  becoming  a  teacher,  an  engineer,  or  a 
physician;  or  when,  under  the  inspiration  of  religious 
hope,  a  man  places  his  purpose  beyond  the  grave  and 
works  to  make  himself  worthy  of  happiness  in  the  world 
hereafter.  At  other  times  the  purpose  may  be  of  a  kind 
quickly  realized,  such  as  that  of  getting  a  drink  of  water 
or  one's  slippers  and  an  easy  chair,  or  even  of  continuing 
an  act  which  is  enjoyable  in  itself,  such  as  riding  on  a 
merry-go-round  or  listening  to  an  orchestra. 

The  expression  means  of  control  is  self-explanatory.  It 
refers  to  whatever  is  used  to  attain  an  object  of  desire, 
or,  in  other  words,  to  realize  a  purpose.  If  the  purpose 
is  to  get  an  apple  growing  high  in  a  tree,  the  means  of 
control  may  be  a  ladder ;  if  the  purpose  is  to  speak  cor- 
rectly, the  means  of  control  may  be  the  rules  of  grammar ; 
if  the  purpose  is  to  be  a  physician,  the  means  of  control 
may  be  a  college  course,  followed  by  several  years'  work 
in  a  medical  school,  and  a  year's  experience  in  a  hospital. 

The  difference  between  a  purpose  and  a  means  of 
control  is  not  inherent  in  the  things  themselves,  but 
depends  upon  the  attitude  of  the  person  concerned 
towards  these  things.  The  same  thing  may  be  regarded 
by  an  individual  at  one  time  as  a  purpose  and  at  another 
as  a  means ;  or,  at  the  same  time,  it  may  appear  to  one 
individual  as  a  purpose  and  to  another  as  a  means.  A 
child  may  climb  a  ladder  at  one  time  merely  because  he 
has  an  immediate  desire  to  climb  it,  and  at  another  time 
for  the  sake  of  using  it  as  a  means  for  getting  apples  from 
a  tree.  A  student  who  enjoys  mathematics  may  at  one 


The  Individual  Process  59 

time  have  as  the  direct  object  of  his  desire  the  solution 
of  a  problem  in  arithmetic  and  at  another  time  he  may  use 
the  problem  in  arithmetic  as  a  means  in  the  purchase 
of  apples  or  oranges,  which  are  the  things  desired.  Or, 
again,  a  miser  seeks  gold  for  the  love  of  it,  while  his 
neighbor  may  regard  gold  as  the  means  of  buying  bread. 
In  a  word,  when  the  individual  seeks  a  thing  which  he 
feels  valuable  in  itself  and  beyond  which  he  does  not  look, 
his  personal  attitude  makes  it  appear  to  him  as  a  pur- 
pose; when  he  sees  that  a  thing  bears  significance  and 
value  because  of  something  else  to  which  it  leads,  his 
personal  attitude  makes  it  appear  as  a  means  of  control. 

The  essential  characteristic  of  the  personal  attitude 
which  makes  a  thing  appear  as  a  means  of  control  is 
reason.  Reason  sees  the  causal  connections  among  things, 
but  is  blind  —  absolutely  blind  —  to  all  worth  whatsoever. 
The  only  way,  therefore,  in  which  it  can  be  of  assistance 
in  determining  the  value  of  a  thing  is  to  reveal  the  fact 
that  this  thing  leads  to  something  else  otherwise  recog- 
nized as  worth  while.  If  a  person  is  asked  to  show  by 
reason  why  anything  in  the  world  is  valuable,  he  must 
always  reply  by  showing  its  connection  as  a  means  of 
control  with  something  else  the  value  of  which  is  not 
apparent  through  reason  but  through  feeling.  A  railroad 
time  table  is  valuable  to  a  vacation  excursionist,  not  in 
itself,  but  because  it  is  seen  through  reason  to  be  a  means 
for  arranging  an  enjoyable  trip.  Richard  III  exclaimed 
"  A  horse !  A  horse !  My  kingdom  for  a  horse !  "  because 
reason  revealed  to  him  that  a  horse  was  a  necessary  means 
to  the  realization  of  his  purpose  in  battle,  the  worth  of 
which  purpose  he  strongly  felt. 

The  fact  that  reason,  although  it  can  see  the  causal 
connections  of  things  as  means  to  ends,  is  blind  to  all 


60  The  Principles  of  Education 

value,  is  evident  when  two  persons  who  differ  in  their 
evaluation  of  the  same  thing  appeal  to  reason  to  support 
their  judgments  of  worth.  To  one  man  a  tariff  on  wool 
appears  to  be  a  good  thing  because  it  leads  to  larger  re- 
ceipts for  the  product  of  his  farm ;  to  another  it  appears 
to  be  a  bad  thing  because  it  leads  to  a  larger  expenditure 
for  his  clothing.  Two  persons  can  through  the  use  of 
reason  agree  as  to  the  worth  of  anything,  whether  impor- 
tant or  unimportant,  only  when  reason  enables  them  to 
connect  the  things  as  means  exclusively  with  some  value 
or  values  which  they  both  feel  to  be  the  same.  A  person 
explaining  why  he  values  a  thing  usually  does  not  give  a 
full  explanation,  because  he  does  not  recognize  the  con- 
nection of  a  thing  with  all  the  values  that  influence  his 
appreciation  of  it. 

The  essential  characteristic  of  the  personal  attitude 
that  indicates  a  purpose,  is  feeling.  Feeling  pronounces 
a  thing  to  be  worth  while  without  reference  to  its  connec- 
tion with  anything  else,  and  its  judgments  are  categorical, 
or  absolute.  If  a  person  is  asked  why  he  values  a  certain 
purpose,  and  the  purpose  still  remains  as  such,  not  being 
transformed  by  reason  into  a  means  of  control  in  the 
service  of  something  else,  he  can  reply  only  "  Because 
I  do !  "  On  the  other  hand,  should  he  transform  the 
purpose  into  a  means  of  control  by  explaining  its  value 
as  borrowed  from  something  else,  he  must,  if  the  ques- 
tioning is  pushed  far  enough,  come  eventually  to  the  point 
where  there  is  nothing  with  which  to  connect  the  thing 
as  a  means  of  control ;  that  is,  to  a  judgment  of  feeling. 
Were  it  not  for  this  fact,  no  value  whatever  could  be 
known.  Aristotle  explained  why  this  must  be  true,  when 
he  said :  "  We  ...  do  not  choose  everything  for  the 
sake  of  something  else,  for  thus  we  should  go  on  to  infin- 


The  Individual  Process  61 

ity,  so  that  desire  should  be  empty  and  vain."  l  Suppos- 
ing, now,  we  were  to  meet  a  student  on  his  way  to  the 
library  to  study  a  problem  in  the  history  of  education. 
We  might  question  him  regarding  his  purpose  somewhat 
as  follows : 

"  Why  do  you  go  to  the  library?  " 

"  To  solve  a  problem  in  the  history  of  education." 

"  But  why  do  you  desire  to  solve  this  problem?  " 

Since  the  only  way  in  which  the  object  of  his  desire  may 
be  justified  rationally  is  to  show  it  to  be  the  means  to 
something  else  felt  to  be  worth  while,  he  replies,  "  Because 
it  is  valuable  in  getting  an  understanding  of  the  history 
of  education." 

"  But  why  do  you  wish  to  understand  the  history  of 
education?  " 

"  Because  it  gives  an  appreciative  insight  into  the 
present  educational  situation." 

"  And  why  do  you  wish  to  get  this  insight?  " 

"  Because  I  desire  to  become  a  teacher." 

"  Why  do  you  desire  to  become  a  teacher?  " 

"  Because  I  desire  to  help  in  the  development  of  human 
life  and  at  the  same  time  to  earn  a  livelihood." 

"  Why  do  you  believe  that  it  is  valuable  to  help  in  the 
development  of  human  life?  " 

"  Because  I  do !     I  feel  that  it  is !  " 

Taking  the  other  purpose  assigned,  we  ask,  "And  why 
do  you  wish  to  earn  a  livelihood?  " 

"  In  order  to  enjoy  life." 

"  Why  do  you  desire  to  enjoy  life?  " 

Again  comes  the  categorical  answer,  "  I  feel  that  I  do ! " 

Any  line  of  reasoning  will  lead  to  a  similar  result,  if 
continued  far  enough.  Whether  a  purpose  remains  as 
lNicvmachcan  Ethics,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  II. 


62  The  Principles  of  Education 

such  or  is  pursued  by  reason  to  the  limits  of  experience, 
its  value  is  always  known  through  feeling. 

Ill 

Natural  science  shows  that  (1)  checks  in  the  functioning  of  in- 
stincts or  habits  and  (2)  old  responses  which  become  incorporated 
with  the  checked  instincts  or  habits  so  as  to  overcome  the  checks, 
are  the  factors  of  the  process  through  which  the  organism  adjusts 
itself  to  the  environment.  These  are  the  physical  parallels 
respectively  of  purposes  and  of  means  of  control  as  the  conscious 
factors  of  the  individual  process  in  its  development. 

Is  the  analysis  that  has  been  made  of  the  individual 
process  from  the  point  of  view  of  teleology  supported  by 
the  conclusions  of  natural  science?  From  the  point  of 
view  of  teleology,  individual  development  takes  place 
when  a  person,  through  the  process  of  projecting  pur- 
poses and  working  to  realize  them,  acquires  new  purposes 
and  new  means  of  control,  which  together  improve  the 
guidance  for  his  activity.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
natural  science,  individual  development  takes  place  when 
the  psychophysical  organism  acquires,  in  response  to 
stimuli,  new  reactions  which  more  adequately  adjust  it 
to  the  environment.  Let  us  now  see  whether  the  mental 
factors  which  teleologically  appear  to  make  new  purposes 
and  new  means  of  control  are  the  counterparts  of  the 
physical  factors  which,  according  to  natural  science,  make 
new  reactions  to  stimuli. 

Natural  science  teaches  that  the  first  factor  in  making 
a  new  reaction  is  a  check  or  obstruction  in  the  functioning 
of  an  instinct  or  of  a  habit  of  response  to  stimuli.  Just 
as  an  obstruction  in  a  river  channel  diverts  the  water 
through  another  course,  so  a  check  in  the  pathway  of  a 
habit  of  response  diverts  the  energy  released  by  the  stimuli 
into  a  pathway  leading  to  a  new  reaction  to  the  situation. 


The  Individual  Process  63 

To  illustrate,  let  us  imagine  an  organism  in  which  the 
visual  stimulus  of  candy  habitually  passes  over  into  the 
response  of  putting  the  candy  into  the  mouth  and  eating 
it.  If  now  the  organism  is  subjected  to  the  stimulus  of 
candy  in  a  wrapping  of  transparent  waxed  paper,  this 
stimulus  begins  to  pass  over  into  the  habitual  pathway  of 
reaction;  but  the  eating  is  checked  because  the  paper 
sets  up  in  the  mouth  a  stimulus  which  habitually  passes 
over  into  the  conflicting  response  of  expectorating.  The 
second  factor  now  appears.  Energy,  blocked  in  the  old 
pathway  of  the  response  of  eating,  is  now  diverted  into 
a  new  one,  and  a  corresponding  new  reaction  is  made. 
This  may  be  tearing  the  paper.  When  the  paper  has  been 
torn  away,  the  stimulus  of  the  candy  can  pass  along  the 
channel  of  the  habit  of  eating,  since  the  obstruction  has 
been  removed.  Thus  a  new  reaction  has  been  developed 
in  the  situation  involving  the  stimulus  of  candy  in  trans- 
parent waxed  paper;  namely,  the  reaction  of  removing 
the  paper  before  putting  the  candy  into  the  mouth.  The 
organism  is  thereby  better  adjusted  to  its  environment. 
To  carry  the  illustration  further,  when  the  organism  is 
subjected  to  the  stimulus  of  candy  in  a  shop  window,  the 
passing  of  the  stimulus  over  into  the  habitual  response 
may  be  checked  by  conflicting  reactions  started  by  the 
auditory  stimulus  of  the  sounds  "  Hands  off!  "  and  the 
visual  stimulus  of  the  approaching  shopkeeper.  As  a 
result,  the  response  may  be  checked  until  a  new  reaction, 
such  as  giving  money  to  the  shopkeeper,  is  formed. 
Again,  if  there  is  an  habitual  reaction  of  getting  the 
money  by  asking  the  parents,  and  if  through  any  cause 
this  reaction  becomes  ineffectual,  there  may  be  formed, 
in  circumventing  the  check,  some  new  response,  such  as 
wiping  dishes  or  running  errands. 


64  The  Principles  of  Education 

A  check  in  the  functioning  of  an  instinct  or  habit  of 
reaction  to  a  stimulus,  which  is  the  first  physical  factor 
in  the  process  of  adjustment,  is  the  physical  parallel  of  a 
purpose.  If  one's  breathing  is  checked,  he  at  once  feels 
a  desire  to  breathe,  at  once  has  in  mind  the  purpose  of 
breathing.  When,  as  in  the  illustrations  given  above,  the 
habit  of  eating  candy  is  delayed  in  any  way,  the  purpose 
of  eating  candy  appears  in  the  mind  of  the  individual. 
Natural  science,  therefore,  supports  the  teleological  ac- 
count of  the  first  factor  in  the  making  of  new  experience. 

The  pathway  of  reaction  incorporated  with  the  ob- 
structed response  in  such  a  manner  that  the  obstruction 
is  overcome,  the  second  physical  factor  in  the  process  of 
adjustment,  is  the  physical  counterpart  of  means  of 
control,  which  appears  in  consciousness.  When  eating 
candy  is  checked  as  described  above  by  the  presence  of  a 
paper  wrapping,  the  organism  responds  by  tearing  the 
paper.  The  response  of  tearing,  which  obtains  under 
other  situations,  is  here  modified  in  such  manner  as  to 
become  a  part  of  the  reaction  to  the  stimulus  of  candy 
in  a  transparent  waxed  paper.  In  a  similar  way,  habits 
of  giving  pennies  to  the  shopkeeper,  of  wiping  dishes,  and 
of  running  errands  become  a  part  of  the  response  to  the 
stimulus  of  candy  in  a  shop  window.  Since  a  check  in 
the  expression  of  an  habitual  response  is  the  physical 
counterpart  of  a  purpose,  the  new  reaction  which  over- 
comes the  check  is  the  counterpart  of  a  means  of  control 
in  the  service  of  this  purpose.  Natural  science  supports, 
therefore,  the  teleological  account  of  the  second  factor  in 
the  making  of  a  new  experience. 

In  the  case  of  an  organism  acquiring  new  reactions 
through  imitation,  the  factors  are  the  same  as  those 
explained  above,  in  so  far  as  the  brain  activity  is  paralleled 


The  Individual  Process  65 

by  consciousness.  A  check  in  the  response  of  imitating 
is  paralleled  by  a  purpose  to  do  what  another  person  is 
doing.  Then  some  pathway  of  reaction  is  incorporated 
with  the  checked  response  in  such  manner  that  the  check 
is  overcome  and  the  imitating  is  realized.  This  pathway 
of  reaction  is  paralleled  by  a  means  of  control,  which 
appears  in  consciousness. 

From  the  physical  point  of  view,  it  is  plain  that  the 
individual  does  not  acquire  new  purposes  and  new  means 
of  control  when  he  is  apparently  at  rest,  a  condition  in 
which  the  factors  of  his  experience  appear  to  be  subject 
and  object.  When  the  organism  is  thus  responding  to  a 
stimulus  by  merely  looking  at  some  object  or  by  merely 
sensing  it  in  some  other  way,  no  new  response  is  made; 
the  energy  passes  over  a  pathway  of  response  already 
formed  in  the  brain.  It  is  only  when  the  pathways  of 
response  are  changed  that  new  purposes  and  new  means 
of  control  appear  in  consciousness. 

That  "  a  little  learning  is  a  dangerous  thing  "  is  some- 
times exemplified  by  a  loose  kind  of  thinking  which  makes 
psychology  seem  to  support  the  mistaken  theory  that 
new  experience  is  caused  by  the  interaction  of  subject  and 
object,  as  in  the  case  of  a  person  merely  looking  at  a 
pen.  Here  we  have  the  7  on  the  one  hand  and  the  pen 
on  the  other.  In  this  loose  thinking,  the  subject  is  con- 
fused with  the  psychophysical  organism  and  the  object 
with  the  environment.  It  is  true  that  the  organism  and 
the  environment  do  interact,  but  they  are  not  to  be 
identified  with  the  subject  and  the  object.  Both  natural 
science  and  teleology,  as  we  are  about  to  see,  pronounce 
against  this  mistaken  identity. 

Natural  science  tells  us  that  the  organism  is  affected  by 
stimuli  from  the  environment  and  reacts  to  these  stimuli, 


66  The  Principles  of  Education 

and  that  the  passing  of  stimuli  over  into  response  makes  a 
brain  activity  which  is  paralleled  in  consciousness  by  a 
single  experience  of  which  the  subject  is  one  aspect  and 
the  object  is  the  other.  Neither  subject  nor  object 
depends  upon  the  organism  more  than  the  other ;  neither 
depends  upon  the  environment  more  than  the  other; 
as  the  two  aspects  of  one  experience,  they  are  together 
the  mental  counterpart  of  a  change  in  the  physical  organ- 
ism produced  by  the  interaction  of  the  organism  and  the 
environment. 

Teleology  explains  that  the  organism,  instead  of  being 
identified  with  the  subject,  is  as  much  an  object  in  ex- 
perience as  is  the  environment ;  and  that  both  the  organ- 
ism and  the  environment  are  equally  physical  objects 
used  by  natural  science  in  explaining  mental  phenomena. 
The  subject  is  so  far  from  being  identified  with  the 
organism  that  it  is  distinguished  in  consciousness  through 
its  contrast  with  the  organism,  just  as  much  as  it  is  dis- 
tinguished through  its  contrast  with  what  natural  science 
terms  the  environment. 

IV 

Problems  for  further  study  are  (1)  how  new  purposes  are  made ; 
(2)  how  new  means  of  control  are  made ;  and  (3)  how  these  together 
constitute  personal  development. 

The  individual  process  has  now  been  analyzed  into  its 
factors,  which  have  been  found  to  be  purposes  and  means 
of  control.  Since  the  development  of  the  individual 
consists  in  acquiring  new  purposes  and  new  means  of 
control,  three  problems  at  once  appear:  (1)  How  do  the 
factors  of  the  individual  process  make  new  purposes? 
(2)  How  do  they  make  new  means  of  control?  and  (3)  How 
do  purposes  and  means  of  control,  which  are  both  the 


The  Individual  Process  67 

factors  and  the  products  of  the  individual  process,  to- 
gether constitute  personal  development?  The  answers 
to  these  three  problems  complete  the  taking  apart  and 
the  putting  together  of  the  individual  process,  or,  in  other 
words,  its  analysis  and  synthesis. 

REFERENCES 

CHARTERS,  W.  W.,  Methods  of  Teaching,  1912,  pp.  21-23.  (Dis- 
tinguishes briefly  between  appreciation  and  control  of  values. 
Cf.  purposes  and  means  of  control.) 

HOWERTH,  I.  W.,  The  Art  of  Education,  1912,  pp.  144-166.  (Dis- 
tinguishes between  ideas  and  ideals.  Cf.  means  of  control  and 
purposes.) 

MiJNSTERBERG,  H.,  Psychology  and  the  Teaclier,  1910,  pp.  196-201. 
(Gives  the  strict  scientific  use  of  the  term  feeling.)  •_- 

PAULSEN,  F.,  A  System  of  Ethics,  1906,  pp.  11-12.  (States  that 
"what  is  good  in  life  will  in  the  last  analysis  be  decided  by 
immediate,  incontrovertible  feeling.") 

PROBLEMS 

1.  a.  Name  five  purposes  you  have  attained  to-day.     6.  Name 
five  means  of  control  you  have  used  in  attaining  these  purposes. 
c.  What  is  the  essential  difference  between  these  purposes  and  means 
of  control? 

2.  Name  some  purpose  which  you  expect  to  attain  several  years 
from  now  and  some  of  the  more  important  means  of  control  you 
expect  to  use  for  the  realization  of  this  purpose. 

3.  Name  three  acts  that  at  various  times  you  have  performed 
both  as  ends  in  themselves  and  as  means  of  control. 

4.  Explain  what  corresponds  to  purposes  and  what  corresponds 
to  means  of  control  in  the  following :   "Consequently  the  educational 
values   of   different   subjects  .  .  .  consist    (a)    in   the   scope,   kind, 
strength,  and  permanence  of  the  incentives  to  activity ;    and  (6)  in 
the  kind,  degree,  and  permanence  of  the  power  to  think  and  to  exe- 
cute that  those  subjects  may  develop."  —  Hanus,   P.,   Educational 
Aims  and  Educational  Values,  p.  7. 


68  The  Principles  of  Education 

5.  a.  What   is   the   essential   function  of  feeling?     6.  Give   an 
illustration  of  the  function  of  feeling  taken  from  your  own  experience. 

6.  a.  What  is  the  essential  function  of  thought  ?     b.  Give  an  illus- 
tration of  the  function  of  thought  taken  from  your  own  experience. 

7.  Is  a  mere  knowledge  of  what  is  right  a  guarantee  that  the 
right  will  be  done  ?     Explain. 

8.  What  evidence  does  the  theory  of  evolution  give  in  support 
of  the  fact  that  knowledge  and  appreciation  are  for  the  sake  of  action  ? 

9.  What  justification  is  there  for  saying  that  an  idea  is  an  incipient 
action  ? 

10.  According  to  the  natural  science  explanation  of  the  basis  of 
consciousness,  would  a  human  being  perfectly  adjusted  to  his  environ- 
ment be  conscious?     Explain. 


CHAPTER  IV 
HOW  NEW  PURPOSES  ARE  MADE 

Acquired  purposes  are  originally  means  of  control  to  which 
feelings  of  value  have  been  transferred  from  the  ends  these  means 
served.  The  steps  in  the  process  through  which  a  means  of 
control  is  made  into  a  purpose  are  (1)  a  feeling  of  the  value  of 
some  purpose,  (2)  the  association  with  this  purpose  of  some 
means  for  its  realization,  and  (3)  the  use  of  the  means  in  realiz- 
ing the  purpose. 


The  fact  that  the  value  of  a  purpose  is  explained  by  transforming  the 
purpose  into  a  means  to  some  end,  suggests  the  way  in  which  the 
purpose  was  made. 

That  new  purposes  appear  in  the  life  of  the  individual 
is  a  matter  of  common  experience.  As  a  child  of  ten,  a 
youth  of  twenty,  and  a  man  of  forty,  he  has  a  change  of 
purposes  corresponding  to  the  change  in  his  activities, 
for  purposes  are  the  ends  towards  which  these  activities 
are  directed.  "  And  one  man  in  his  time  plays  many 
parts."  But  however  pronounced  the  change  in  pur- 
poses may  be,  the  process  through  which  it  takes  place 
is  not  directly  evident ;  for,  as  Athena  sprang  full-armed 
from  the  head  of  Zeus,  so  purposes  seem  to  spring  im- 
mediately into  consciousness,  fully  equipped  for  the 
leadership  of  activity.  To  find  how  purposes  and  means 
of  control  already  in  the  experience  of  the  individual  work 
together  to  make  new  purposes,  is  the  problem  of  this 
chapter. 


70  The  Principles  of  Education 

The  way  in  which  the  values  of  acquired  purposes  are 
explained  suggests  the  way  in  which  these  purposes  are 
made.  It  has  been  shown  l  that  the  only  method  by 
which  the  value  of  a  purpose  can  be  explained  is  that  of 
transforming  the  purpose  into  a  means  of  control  for 
attaining  something  else  felt  to  be  worth  while.  That 
which  was  at  first  felt  as  an  end  desired  then  appears,  in 
the  light  of  reason,  to  be  worthful  not  in  itself,  but  because 
it  serves  a  worthy  master.  The  fact  that  the  value  of  a 
purpose  can  be  explained  only  by  transforming  it  into  a 
means  of  control  suggests  that  the  purpose  was  originally 
a  means  of  control,  recognized  as  valuable  because  it 
led  to  something  else  worth  while,  and  that  in  time  the 
derived  nature  of  its  value  has  been  lost  sight  of,  so  that 
the  act  is  felt  to  be  worth  while  in  itself. 

II 

The  transforming  of  means  of  control  into  purposes  through  (1) 
a  feeling  of  the  value  of  some  purpose,  (2)  the  association  with  this 
purpose  of  some  means  of  control  for  its  realization,  and  (3)  the 
use  of  this  means  in  realizing  the  purpose,  is  a  common  and  neces- 
sary happening  in  everyday  life. 

The  change  of  means  of  control  into  purposes,  or  ends, 
is  a  common  happening  in  everyday  life.  A  man  in  the 
city  locks  his  house  at  night  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
the  valuable  contents.  Locking  the  house  has  therefore 
a  value  only  as  the  means  to  something  else.  But,  when 
the  act  has  been  repeated  regularly,  he  may  feel  at  night 
a  desire  to  lock  the  house,  although  he  does  not,  at  the 
moment,  call  to  mind  the  original  purpose  for  doing  so. 
Locking  the  house  has  now  become  an  end  in  itself ;  that 
is,  a  purpose.  Categorically  it  commands  his  activity. 

*  P.  59. 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  71 

Even  if  he  moves  to  the  country  where  there  is  no  danger 
from  thieves,  he  will  nevertheless  feel  at  night  a  desire  to 
lock  the  house,  and  may  do  so,  unless  he  tests  the  value 
of  this  purpose  by  reasoning  about  it  and  finds  that  the 
act,  when  viewed  as  means,  is  connected  with  an  end  no 
longer  worth  while.  At  first  the  housewife  washes  dishes, 
not  for  the  sake  of  the  process,  but  because  in  the  light  of 
reason  dish-washing  is  seen  to  be  the  means  to  other 
things  desired.  In  time,  however,  she  does  not  first  have 
in  mind  these  other  things,  but  rather  feels  directly  that 
dish-washing  itself  is  a  thing  worth  doing.  When  a  man 
is  accustomed  to  go  to  his  office  each  morning  for  the 
purpose  of  transacting  business,  going  to  the  office  may 
appear  to  him  as  an  end  in  itself.  A  person  who  would 
otherwise  be  indifferent  to  the  study  of  the  principles  of 
education  and  who  undertakes  such  study  only  as  one  of 
the  means  in  the  realization  of  his  purpose  to  become  a 
teacher,  may  later,  when  the  hour  for  study  arrives,  feel 
directly  that  he  should  resume  work  in  the  principles  of 
education,  without  thinking  of  the  end  which  originally 
made  him  conscious  of  its  value. 

In  the  same  way,  a  person  acquires  such  general  pur- 
poses as  being  industrious,  neat,  honest,  just,  and  temper- 
ate. He  is  indifferent  to  these  virtues  until  they  are 
found  to  be  the  means  of  securing  such  desirable  ends  as 
rewards,  freedom  from  punishment,  social  approval,  and 
values  promised  by  religion,  and  of  securing  many  other 
ends  with  which  in  everyday  life  they  are  connected  in  a 
natural  and  intrinsic  way.  The  child  may  feel  in  these 
general  purposes  only  worths  which  have  been  transferred 
to  them  because  he  has  found  them  to  be  means  to  free- 
dom from  punishment  and  means  to  approval  by  those 
dear  to  him;  the  adult  may  feel  in  these  purposes  rich 


72  The  Principles  of  Education 

composite  values  because  he  has  found  them  in  the  service 
of  many  worthy  consequences  with  which  they  are  in- 
trinsically connected. 

Acquired  purposes  may  become  endowed  with  great 
independent  authority.  Individuals  will  lay  down  their 
lives  for  country  and  home,  the  cherishing  of  both  of 
which  is  acquired.  They  will  make  the  greatest  sacrifices 
in  the  service  of  truth,  honor,  and  justice.  Indeed,  even 
when  the  value  is  a  false  one,  its  authority  may  not  easily 
be  surrendered.  Older  people,  under  the  influence  of 
feeling,  often  persist  in  holding  to  "  the  good  old  ways  " 
when  newer  ways  are  better.  How  many  persons  feel 
the  value  of  such  things  as  seeing  a  new  moon  over  the 
right  shoulder  or  avoiding  Friday  as  a  time  for  beginning 
important  enterprises,  even  after  these  felt  values  are 
known  to  have  sprung  from  childish  superstitions  no 
longer  believed !  The  fact  that  Friday  is  an  unpopular 
day  for  weddings  and  for  the  sailings  of  vessels  is  practical 
evidence  of  the  persistence  of  one  of  these  purposes. 

The  illustrations  that  have  been  given  reveal  three 
essential  steps  in  the  making  of  a  new  purpose:  (1)  the 
value  of  some  purpose  previously  acquired  must  be  felt, 
(2)  some  means  for  realizing  this  purpose  must  be  asso- 
ciated with  it,  and  (3)  this  means  must  be  used  in  realiz- 
ing the  purpose. 

The  more  strongly  the  value  of  the  original  purpose  is 
felt,  the  more  quickly  and  effectually  is  it  carried  over  to 
the  means.  A  young  woman  who  has  been  given  a  ring 
as  a  means  of  symbolizing  her  betrothal,  may  feel  at  once 
a  stronger  immediate  purpose  to  preserve  the  ring  than 
the  normal  value  of  the  ring  would  command.  A  child 
that  has  been  burnt  dreads  the  fire  as  soon  as  he  recog- 
nizes it  as  the  means  of  his  suffering.  A  man  who  has 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  73 

accidentally  shot  a  friend  may  by  this  one  experience 
acquire  a  desire  to  avoid  firearms,  the  very  sight  of  them 
arousing  in  him  a  feeling  of  revulsion.  Out  of  one  inci- 
dent may  be  born  a  purpose  to  foster  the  friendship  of  a 
person  whose  help  has  been  a  means  of  escape  from  dire 
distress.  A  person  who  has  found  religious  belief  a  means 
of  consolation  in  the  presence  of  death  may  feel  from  that 
moment  a  desire  to  cherish  this  belief. 

The  greater  the  variety  of  valuable  purposes  which  a 
means  is  seen  to  serve,  the  richer  and  more  composite  is 
the  worth  transferred  to  it.  For  this  reason  a  virtue  such 
as  honesty,  industry,  or  justice  appears  as  primarily  an 
end  to  be  desired  even  when  the  individual  is  conscious 
of  some  purpose  in  relation  to  which  it  is  a  means  of 
control.  The  value  transferred  to  it  from  many  other 
purposes  completely  overbalances  in  importance  the  value 
of  the  particular  end  with  relation  to  which  the  individual 
at  the  moment  regards  the  virtue  as  a  means.  A  thing 
such  as  a  pen  or  a  knife,  which  has  been  associated  mainly 
with  only  one  purpose,  appears  as  primarily  a  means  of 
control  if  consciously  connected  with  this  purpose.  The 
value  transferred  to  it  from  other  purposes  does  not  over- 
balance in  importance  the  value  of  the  purpose  with  rela- 
tion to  which  the  individual  regards  the  thing  as  instru- 
mental. If,  however,  an  individual  has  in  mind  a  pen 
or  a  knife  without  thinking  of  its  normal  use,  he  may 
regard  it  as  primarily  valuable  in  itself  rather  than  as 
instrumental  in  nature.  An  individual,  for  instance,  who 
reaches  for  his  fountain  pen  and  finds  that  it  is  lost,  may 
feel  its  value  without  being  conscious  of  the  important 
purpose  in  the  service  of  which  it  has  been  found  useful. 
Since  everything  is  connected  with  more  than  one  purpose, 
even  when  the  thing  is  regarded  as  a  means  of  control,  there 


74  The  Principles  of  Education 

is  an  accompanying  feeling  of  its  value  that  depends  upon 
purposes  with  which  it  has  been  connected,  but  which  are 
not  now  in  consciousness.  The  pen  with  which  one  in- 
tends to  write  may,  for  example,  seem  to  have  a  value 
immediately  appreciated  and  not  dependent  upon  his 
purpose  of  writing. 

A  purpose,  as  has  been  stated,1  is  dynamic ;  it  involves 
not  only  a  feeling  of  value,  but  also  activity  to  bring  this 
value  into  realization.  While  every  feeling  of  value  marks 
an  incipient  action,  this  action  may  be  very  weak,  so  that 
the  result  goes  no  farther  than  a  faint  desire  or  wish.  If 
the  original  purpose  is  so  feeble  that  action  for  its  realiza- 
tion does  not  persist,  whatever  feeling  of  value  may  be 
transferred  to  the  means  is  obviously  impotent  to  com- 
mand action,  and  the  means  cannot,  therefore,  receive 
from  the  abortive  purpose  the  strength  necessary  to  make 
it  an  end  in  itself.  Thus  it  is  that  individuals  acquire 
many  feelings  of  value  that  are  easily  recognized,  but  are 
too  feeble  to  command  conduct.  Such  feelings  of  value 
may  be  of  service,  however,  if  the  individual,  under  reli- 
gious or  some  other  ethical  influence,  acquires  a  purpose 
to  do  the  best  he  can,  as  in  the  case  of  a  person  who  in 
religious  conversion  acquires  the  desire  to  do  what  God 
would  have  him  do.  The  weak  appreciations  made  of 
the  values  of  many  acts  then  point  out  what  is  best  and 
are  transformed  into  purposes  through  serving  this  new 
ideal.  Religious  sanction  is  often  very  powerful  in  vital- 
izing in  this  manner  weak  appreciations  so  that  they 
become  strong  purposes,  as  the  change  in  conduct  that 
often  results  from  religious  conversion  gives  evidence. 

If  the  primary  purpose  is  strong,  and  therefore  marked 
by  persistent  activity,  the  means  used  in  its  service  may 

1P.  57. 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  75 

become  an  end  in  itself,  even  before  the  primary  purpose 
has  been  realized.  Instances  of  new  purposes  developed 
under  these  circumstances  may  be  found  when  individuals 
regard  great  social  practices,  such  as  equal  suffrage,  pro- 
hibition, and  international  arbitration,  as  ends  in  them- 
selves, although  they  have  only  begun  work  to  secure  the 
adoption  of  these  social  practices.  Even  in  cases  where 
the  means  sought  is  a  mistaken  one  and  the  welfare 
expected  cannot  be  secured  through  it,  if  the  primary 
purpose  is  marked  by  persistent  activity,  the  means  may 
be  crowned  with  a  halo  of  derived  value  as  an  end  in 
itself.  History  recounts  many  mistaken  causes  and  many 
lost  causes  that  through  values  acquired  from  ends 
unrealized  have  taken  direct  command  of  the  labor  and 
sacrifice  of  men.  An  illustration  of  a  cause  that  was 
felt  in  this  way  to  be  valuable,  although  both  mistaken 
and  lost,  is  the  persecution  of  early  scientists  as  a  means 
of  protecting  religious  faith. 

There  are  some  acts,  —  drinking,  lying,  and  stealing, 
for  example,  —  that  seem  to  have  negative  values ;  one 
feels  that  they  should  be  avoided  rather  than  performed. 
The  general  principle,  however,  applies  here  as  well.  To 
avoid  a  thing  in  order  to  attain  some  purpose  is  a  way 
of  acting  with  reference  to  it,  a  way  of  using  it  in  the 
service  of  a  purpose.  In  order  to  secure  business  and 
social  success,  and  to  avoid  ill  health,  poverty,  and  do- 
mestic unhappiness,  one  must  not  drink  intoxicants ;  in 
order  to  keep  one's  friends,  to  secure  success  in  business, 
to  be  respected,  and  to  attain  many  other  values,  one 
must  avoid  lying  and  stealing.  When  value  has  been 
transferred  from  the  end  originally  served,  avoiding  a 
thing  may  become  an  end  in  itself. 

The  change  of  means  into  ends  is  necessary  in  everyday 


76  The  Principles  of  Education 

life,  if  the  individual  is  to  carry  out  his  life's  work  effec- 
tually; for  otherwise,  in  deciding  what  should  be  done 
from  moment  to  moment,  his  mind  would  be  so  occupied 
with  following  the  complex  network  of  threads  connecting 
means  with  remote  purposes  that  there  would  be  no  time 
for  anything  else.  Imagine  a  man  about  to  be  run  down 
by  an  automobile  not  appreciating  the  fact  that  he  should 
get  out  of  the  way  until  he  thought  of  certain  remote 
values  and  discovered  by  a  process  of  reasoning  the  worth 
of  getting  out  of  the  way  as  a  means  of  attaining  them ! 
What  if  the  house-wife  or  the  business  man  had  to  begin 
with  remote  values  and  reason  out  the  worth  of  every 
other  act  as  means  to  these  ends  before  knowing  what 
should  be  done  from  moment  to  moment !  If  means  did 
not  become  purposes,  how  much  time  would  be  lost  every 
day  in  tracing  the  reasons  for  being  industrious  and 
honest ! 

Ill 

The  methods  commonly  used  to  create  new  purposes  give  prac- 
tical evidence  that  purposes  are  originally  means  of  control  to 
which  feelings  of  value  have  been  transferred  from  the  ends  these 
means  of  control  served. 

Since  purposes  command  the  conduct  of  the  individual, 
the  way  to  influence  his  behavior  is  to  control  the  making 
of  his  purposes.  Methods  commonly  used  to  do  this  give 
practical  evidence  in  support  of  our  conclusion  as  to  how 
purposes  are  acquired.  In  order  to  make  a  child  feel  the 
worth  of  industry,  he  is  placed  in  situations  where  indus- 
try is  a  means  of  avoiding  pain  and  of  securing  reward, 
even  if  the  parent  or  teacher  acts  arbitrarily  in  creating 
these  situations.  In  a  similar  way,  when  the  child  be- 
comes a  man,  society  may  regulate  his  feelings  of  value 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  77 

more  or  less  arbitrarily  by  making  certain  acts  the  means 
of  securing  approval  or  of  avoiding  disapproval  on  the 
part  of  those  with  whom  he  is  associated,  and  even  by 
making  certain  acts  the  means  of  avoiding  fines  and 
imprisonment  administered  by  authorized  representatives 
of  the  state.  To  lead  a  person  to  feel  the  true  value  of 
being  temperate,  he  is  shown  in  the  light  of  reason  the 
many  worthful  ends  that  are  served  by  temperance  and 
is  impressed  with  the  evils  of  intemperance.  In  this  way 
he  is  made  to  recognize  temperance  as  a  means  of  avoiding 
certain  evils  and  of  securing  certain  good  results.  For 
the  sake  of  creating  party  loyalty,  which  consists  of  a 
purpose  to  further  the  interests  of  the  party  as  an  end  in 
itself,  the  political  speaker  recounts  the  many  advantages 
his  party  has  been  the  means  of  securing  for  the  local 
community,  the  state,  and  the  nation.  References  to 
great  statesmen  may  be  added  to  this,  the  national  flag 
may  decorate  the  rostrum,  and  patriotic  music  may  be 
played,  so  that  the  individual  gets  the  impression  that 
support  of  this  particular  party  is  a  means  of  promoting 
the  welfare  of  society,  of  carrying  on  the  work  of  states- 
men who  are  appreciated  as  important  factors  in  shaping 
the  destinies  of  his  country,  and  of  being  patriotic. 

One  common  way  of  developing  purposes  is  through 
advertising  which  creates  in  the  individual  a  predilection 
for  that  which  is  advertised.  To  create  a  purpose  to  use 
a  certain  kind  of  breakfast  food,  the  pleasures  of  a  meal 
are  pictured.  A  dining  car  commanding  a  view  of  in- 
vigorating mountain  scenery  is  represented.  An  im- 
maculate waiter  has  placed  on  the  snowy  white  table, 
along  with  fresh  carnations  and  roses,  a  portion  of  the 
breakfast  food,  garnished  with  berries  or  other  fruit.  In 
connection  with  the  picture,  there  may  be  also  adjectives 


78  The  Principles  of  Education 

such  as  appetizing,  invigorating,  and  delicious.  The  ob- 
server is  made  to  feel  strongly  the  pleasurable  value  of 
eating  and  to  associate  with  this  value,  as  a  means  to  the 
enjoyment  of  it,  the  breakfast  food  advertised.  Adver- 
tisements of  guns  and  ammunition  picture  stimulating 
hunting  scenes,  suggesting  that  the  particular  kinds  of 
guns  and  ammunition  represented  are  means  to  enjoy- 
ments such  as  these.  An  advertiser  of  clothing  represents 
the  wearer  of  garments  of  his  make  as  enjoying  social 
pleasures  and  commanding  the  attention  of  men  of  affairs. 
To  put  a  halo  of  acquired  value  about  certain  brands  of 
silver-plated  tableware,  value  is  borrowed  from  the 
honeymoon  by  depicting  the  bride  in  her  attractive  new 
home  ecstatically  examining  the  articles  advertised. 
Makes  of  automobiles  are  pictured  amid  charming  sur- 
roundings to  the  enjoyment  of  which  the  machines  appear 
to  be  the  means. 

Even  where  the  true  value  of  the  thing  advertised  is 
doubtful,  a  purpose  to  use  it  may  be  created.  A  large 
signboard  pictures  a  throng  of  workmen  engaged  in  con- 
structing the  Panama  Canal.  The  observer  is  impressed 
by  the  wonders  accomplished.  Then  he  sees  the  repre- 
sentation of  a  plug  of  a  certain  brand  of  tobacco  together 
with  the  words,  "  The  men  who  chew  are  the  men  who 
do."  This  sentence  is  so  worded  that  it  will  not  only 
stick  in  the  mind  but  cling  with  surprising  tenacity  to 
the  picture  with  its  halo  of  value,  —  all  for  the  purpose 
of  transferring  some  of  the  appreciation  one  has  for  the 
construction  of  the  canal  to  the  chewing  of  the  tobacco 
advertised.  Again,  advertisers  draw  upon  the  popular 
admiration  for  baseball  heroes  to  create  feelings  of  worth 
about  their  several  brands  of  cigarettes,  and  suggest 
other  values  by  such  adjectives  as  pleasurable,  enjoyable, 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  79 

satisfactory,  and  invigorating,  and  by  slang  expressions 
that  appeal  even  more  vividly  to  the  imagination. 

In  these  instances  of  the  methods  commonly  used  in 
making  purposes  only  two  steps  have  been  presented, 
—  the  calling  forth  of  an  appreciation  of  value,  and  the 
associating  with  this  value  of  means  for  realizing  it. 
Whether  the  individual  takes  the  third  step,  that  of 
activity  in  realizing  the  value  appreciated,  depends  not 
only  upon  the  influence  of  this  value  but  also  upon  the 
freedom  of  the  pathway  of  activity  from  obstacles,  espe- 
cially at  its  beginning.  In  the  early  crusades  against 
intemperance,  a  drunkard,  after  he  had  been  led  to  appre- 
ciate the  value  of  temperance,  was  asked  to  begin  action 
by  merely  signing  a  pledge  card.  After  a  reader  has  been 
led  by  an  advertisement  to  desire  some  commodity,  he 
may  be  asked  merely  to  fill  out  and  mail  a  blank  or  to 
call  at  a  neighboring  store.  When  a  child  has  been 
impressed  by  the  value  of  industry,  he  is  more  likely  to 
try  to  realize  this  ideal  if  temptations  that  would  interfere 
with  industrious  action  have  been  removed. 

IV 

All   purposes  are  not  derived,   but  to    isolate    those    which    are 
original,  or  primary,  Ls  difficult. 

If  purposes  already  in  the  experience  of  the  individual 
are  factors  in  the  making  of  new  ones,  the  individual  must 
be  endowed  with  an  original  stock  of  these  to  begin  the 
process.  For  this  reason,  in  explaining  the  values  of  pur- 
poses by  reducing  them  to  means  of  control  in  the  service 
of  other  things  that  are  valuable,  one  must  sooner  or  later 
reach  a  purpose  the  worth  of  which  is  known  only  by  feel- 
ing and  for  the  value  of  which  no  reason  can  be  assigned. 
These  ultimate,  or  primary,  values  are  the  originals. 


80  The  Principles  of  Education 

It  is  difficult  to  isolate  them,  because  the  farther  the 
web  connecting  means  with  ends  is  unraveled  in  explain- 
ing the  values  of  purposes,  the  more  complex  it  is  found 
to  be.  Usually  the  value  of  an  acquired  purpose  is  very 
composite  because  it  has  been  derived  from  a  number  of 
worthful  ends  in  the  service  of  which  what  is  now  a  new 
purpose  formerly  appeared  as  a  means  of  control.  In 
turn,  each  of  these  more  remote  purposes  has  likewise  a 
composite  value.  Indeed,  even  original,  or  primary, 
purposes  are  caught  again  and  again  in  the  web  connecting 
means  with  ends,  so  that  they  themselves  acquire  a 
composite  worth  through  instrumental  connections  with 
other  ends,  either  ultimate  or  derived.  To  live  is  an 
ultimate  purpose,  since  it  is  desired  often  when  no  reason 
for  this  desire  can  be  given ;  yet,  at  other  times,  a  man 
may  desire  to  live  for  the  sake  of  providing  for  his  family, 
of  bringing  about  some  social  betterment,  or  of  accomplish- 
ing something  else  upon  which  his  heart  is  set.  In  ro- 
mantic love  wherein  the  lover  is  guided  only  by  feeling, 
the  desire  for  a  mate  is  felt  as  ultimate;  but  he  may 
desire  a  mate  also  as  a  means  for  providing  a  home  and 
family,  so  that  in  old  age  he  may  have  cherished 
companionship. 


The  fact  that  virtuous  acts  have  an  apparently  external  authority 
independent  of  the  ends  which  they  are  known  to  serve,  and  the  fact 
that  in  any  particular  situation  the  end  does  not  justify  the  means, 
do  not  conflict  with  the  conclusion  that  acquired  purposes  are 
originally  means  of  control  to  which  feelings  of  value  have  been 
transferred  from  the  ends  these  means  served. 

Two  facts  seem  to  conflict  with  the  conclusion  to  which 
common  experience  has  led  us.  One  is  that  virtuous 
acts,  the  worth  of  which  has  been  represented  as  acquired, 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  81 

have  an  apparently  external  authority  independent  of 
the  values  of  the  ends  which  they  may  be  known  to 
serve ;  the  other  is  the  generally  accepted  belief  that  the 
end  does  not  justify  the  means.  However,  if  the  con- 
clusion that  acquired  purposes  are  originally  means  of 
control  is  properly  understood,  neither  of  these  facts 
militates  against  it. 

Thousands  of  individuals,  it  is  true,  bow  before  the 
authority  of  such  virtues  as  truthfulness,  honesty,  justice, 
temperance,  without  ever  having  been  conscious  of  the 
connection  between  these  virtues  and  the  ultimate  values 
to  which  they  intrinsically  lead,  and  which,  according  to 
our  conclusion,  are  the  real  source  of  their  authority. 
But  the  web  of  connection  has  been  woven,  nevertheless. 
For  countless  generations  society  has  been  weaving  it  for 
individuals  and  recording  the  results  in  history,  literature, 
art,  customs,  and  institutions.  Society  approves  these 
virtues  because  it  has  discovered  their  intrinsic  connec- 
tions with  valuable  results,  and  the  individual  accepts 
them  upon  social  authority.  But  even  in  accepting  ideals 
upon  social  authority,  the  individual  does  so  only  because 
he  sees  them  as  means  to  a  worthy  end.  When  he  has 
understood  and  used  them  as  means  for  securing  social 
approval  and  for  avoiding  social  disapproval,  these  pur- 
poses transfer  to  them  rich  composite  values.  Even  in 
the  case  of  religious  sanction,  a  feeling  of  the  worth  of  a 
virtuous  act  is  acquired  by  the  individual  in  a  similar 
way  as  means  to  the  highly  valuable  purpose  of  securing 
divine  approval.  The  feeling  of  the  unworthiness  of 
vice  may  be  explained  likewise,  since,  as  we  have  learned, 
avoiding  a  thing  is  a  way  of  using  it  in  the  service  of  a 
purpose. 

With  regard  to  the  well-fixed  belief  that  the  end  does 


82  The  Principles  of  Education 

not  justify  the  means,  it  must  be  acknowledged  this 
belief  is  true  if  by  end  only  one  particular  end  is  meant. 
Stealing  cannot  be  justified  as  worthful  because  in  a 
particular  instance  it  is  connected  with  desirable  conse- 
quences. A  poverty-stricken  individual  may  satisfy  his 
immediate  needs  by  theft  while  the  wealthy  corporation 
from  which  the  property  is  taken  may  never  feel  the  loss, 
and  yet  the  act  of  theft  should  be  avoided  as  a  thing  of 
negative  worth.  This  is  true  because  the  evil  of  the 
act  of  stealing  depends  not  upon  one  consequence  but 
upon  many.  The  felt  values  of  these  many  consequences 
become  transferred  to  the  means  and  are  fused  into  the 
feeling  that  marks  the  negative  value  of  this  vice.  There- 
fore, although  stealing  may  be  the  means  to  a  particular 
end  which,  taken  in  an  isolated  way,  appears  as  good, 
still  it  has  a  great  residue  of  negative  value  derived  from 
other  consequences  that  are  evil ;  and  this  residue  of 
negative  value  marks  the  act  as  a  vice,  a  thing  to  be 
avoided,  irrespective  of  any  particular  end  to  which  it 
may  lead.  In  reality,  one  particular  act  of  theft  cannot 
be  isolated ;  it  has  many  consequences,  among  which  is 
the  tendency  to  make  the  individual  a  thief  under  other 
circumstances  when  the  immediate  results  may  be  de- 
cidedly harmful.  The  belief  that  any  particular  end 
does  not  justify  the  means  does  not  militate,  therefore, 
against  the  truth  that  ideals  get  their  values,  often  very 
composite  ones,  from  the  ends  which  they  originally  serve. 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  83 


VI 

Ethical  theory,  which  includes  a  critical  study  of  the  nature  of 
values,  supports  the  conclusion  that  acquired  purposes  are  orig- 
inally means  of  control  to  which  feelings  of  worth  have  been 
transferred  from  the  ends  these  means  served.  Even  the  two  ex- 
treme schools  of  moralists,  taken  together,  support  this  conclusion. 
The  utilitarian  emphasizes  the  fact  that  means  derive  value  from 
the  ends  they  serve,  while  the  intuitional ist  emphasizes  the  fact 
that  value  is  known  directly  only  through  feeling.  By  the  uniting 
of  these  fractional  truths,  the  whole  truth  is  revealed. 

Ethical  theory,  which  includes  a  critical  study  of  the 
nature  of  values,  supports  the  conclusions  to  which  com- 
mon experience  has  led  us  in  seeking  an  answer  to  the 
problem  of  how  new  purposes  are  made.  With  regard  to 
the  way  in  which  the  individual  comes  to  an  appreciation 
of  moral  distinctions,  ethical  theory  furnishes,  in  addition 
to  intermediate  schools,  two  extreme  groups  of  witnesses, 
who,  instead  of  agreeing  upon  a  definite  conclusion,  are 
often  opposed  to  each  other  in  their  testimony.  One 
group  is  called  the  utilitarian,  empirical,  or  teleological 
school,  and  the  other  is  called  the  intuitional,  formalistic, 
or  moral  sense  school.  The  utilitarian  lays  stress  upon 
the  fact  that  the  worth  of  many  purposes  is  derived  from 
some  ultimate  value  or  values  which  these  purposes 
serve ;  he  would  say  that  justice  is  good  because  it  pro- 
motes human  welfare,  happiness,  or  some  other  end. 
The  intuitionalist  lays  stress  upon  the  fact  that  the  ap- 
preciation of  value  is  always  immediate ;  he  would  say 
that  the  goodness  of  justice  is  recognized  directly  by  our 
moral  sense.  In  order  to  reach  a  true  conclusion,  it  is 
necessary  to  take  the  testimony  of  both  groups  and  sift 
in  each  the  true  from  the  false.  Fortunately,  we  are 
greatly  assisted  in  this  by  the  fact  that  ethical  discussions 


84  The  Principles  of  Education 

have  been,  as  a  rule,  very  controversial,  and  that  each 
school  has  given  much  attention  to  impeaching  the  testi- 
mony of  the  other  where  the  other  is  at  fault.  As  Socrates 
of  old  said,  men  differ  in  their  beliefs  with  regard  to  the 
same  thing  because  they  see  only  a  part  of  the  truth. 
If,  therefore,  the  testimony  of  each  group  is  taken,  and 
any  error  resulting  from  a  partial  point  of  view  which 
fails  to  reveal  the  full  nature  of  ethical  judgment  is 
eliminated,  the  remaining  testimony  when  put  together 
gives  the  whole  truth.  In  this  way  it  may  be  seen  that 
the  two  schools  of  ethical  thinkers  are  not  essentially 
antagonistic,  but  supplementary  to  each  other. 

Between  the  extreme  utilitarian  and  the  extreme  in- 
tuitionalist  there  are  many  types  of  ethical  theory  which 
are  not  so  one-sided ;  these  embody  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree  what  is  included  in  both  schools.  Since  these 
intermediate  views  are  true  to  the  extent  to  which  they 
embody  the  truth  revealed  by  the  two  extremes  and 
avoid  the  error  of  each,  it  is  necessary  to  find  the  truth 
only  in  the  extreme  theories  in  order  to  get  from  ethics 
conclusive  testimony  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  the 
judgment  of  value. 

The  extreme,  or  hedonistic,  utilitarian  has  his  eyes 
fixed  upon  the  fact  that  values  are  originally  means  of 
control.  For  this  group  we  may  let  Herbert  Spencer 
speak:  "From  whatever  basis  they  start,  all  theories  of 
morality  agree  in  considering  that  conduct  whose  total 
results,  immediate  and  remote,  are  beneficial,  is  good 
conduct;  while  conduct  whose  total  results,  immediate 
and  remote,  are  injurious,  is  bad  conduct.  The  happi- 
ness or  misery  caused  by  it  are  the  ultimate  standards  by 
which  all  men  judge  of  behavior.  We  consider  drunken- 
ness wrong  because  of  the  physical  degeneracy  and  accom- 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  85 

panying  moral  evils  entailed  on  the  transgressor  and  his 
dependents.  Did  theft  uniformly  give  pleasure  both  to 
taker  and  to  loser,  we  should  not  find  it  in  our  catalogue 
of  sins.  Were  it  conceivable  that  benevolent  actions  mul- 
tiplied human  pains,  we  should  condemn  them  —  should 
not  consider  them  benevolent."  *  By  such  argument  the 
extreme  utilitarian  makes  it  appear  that  the  only  thing  of 
absolute  value  is  pleasure,  and  that  acts  get  their  values 
only  because  they  are  in  the  service  of  pleasure. 

Even  the  extreme  utilitarian  cannot  ignore  the  fact 
that  there  must  be  some  value  which  is  not  utilitarian, 
but  absolute;  which  is  not  derived  as  means,  but  is 
known  immediately  through  being  felt.  Pleasure  may, 
in  truth,  be  a  purpose.  When  a  man  is  at  leisure,  he 
may  say  to  himself,  "  I  wish  to  have  an  enjoyable  time ; 
what  means  shall  I  use  to  get  pleasure?  "  Then  he  may 
decide  to  go  fishing,  to  play  golf  or  tennis,  to  ride  in  an 
automobile,  to  dance,  to  attend  a  banquet,  or  to  read  a 
book.  It  is  true  also  that  pleasure  enters  prominently 
into  the  worth  of  very  many  complex  values  when  men 
are  led  to  do  things  because  the  acts  are  agreeable  as 
well  as  otherwise  worthful.  Moreover,  it  is  true  that 
the  pursuit  of  pleasure  appears  to  be  an  original,  or 
primary,  purpose,  because  it  is  desired  when  no  possible 
explanation  of  why  it  is  valuable  can  be  made.  However, 
in  assuming  that  pleasure  is  the  only  philosopher's  stone 
which  turns  acts  into  gold,  the  utilitarian  has  overlooked 
many  other  absolute  values.  In  seeking  the  source  of 
value,  his  attention  is  drawn  into  the  wrong  direction 
and  centered  upon  pleasure,  because  when  one  desires 
a  thing,  there  is  a  feeling  of  pleasure  in  anticipating  it. 
His  mistake  becomes  apparent  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that 
1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Education,  1890,  pp.  161-162. 


86  The  Principles  of  Education 

one  cannot  get  pleasure  unless  one  is  capable  of  having  a 
desire  for  something  else.  This  may  be  made  clear  by 
the  following  anecdote.  An  Englishman  was  seated  on 
the  bank  of  a  stream,  fishing.  A  native  approached  him 
and  informed  him  that  there  were  no  fish  in  the  stream, 
whereupon  the  Englishman  replied  that  he  was  not  fish- 
ing for  fish,  but  for  pleasure.1  As  Professors  John  Dewey 
and  James  H.  Tufts  say :  "  The  fundamental  fallacy  of 
psychological  hedonism  has  been  well  stated  by  Green 
to  be  supposing  that  a  desire  can  be  aroused  or  created 
by  the  anticipation  of  its  own  satisfaction  —  i.e.,  in  sup- 
posing that  the  idea  of  the  pleasure  of  exercise  arouses 
desire  for  it,  when  in  fact  the  idea  of  exercise  is  pleasant 
only  if  there  is  already  some  desire  for  it.  Given  a 
desire  already  in  existence,  the  idea  of  an  object  which 
is  thought  of  as  satisfying  that  desire  will  always  arouse 
pleasure,  or  be  thought  of  as  pleasurable.  But  hedonism 
fails  to  consider  the  radical  difference  between  an  object's 
arousing  pleasure,  because  it  is  regarded  as  satisfying 
desire,  and  the  thought  of  a  pleasure  arousing  a  desire :  — 
although  the  feeling  of  agreeableness  may  intensify  the 
movement  towards  the  object.  A  hungry  man  thinks 
of  a  beefsteak  as  that  which  would  satisfy  his  appetite; 
his  thought  is  at  once  clothed  with  an  agreeable  tone  and 
the  conscious  force  of  the  appetite  is  correspondingly  in- 
tensified ;  the  miser  thinks  of  gold  in  a  similar  way ;  the 
benevolent  of  an  act  of  charity,  etc.  But  in  each  case  the 
presence  of  the  pleasurable  element  is  dependent  upon 
the  thought  of  an  object  which  is  not  pleasure  —  the 
beefsteak,  the  gold.  The  thought  of  the  object  precedes 
the  pleasure  and  excites  it  because  it  is  felt  to  promise  the 

1  Paulsen,  F.,  A  System  of  Ethics,  Tr.  by  Professor  Frank  Thilly, 
p.  255. 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  87 

satisfaction  of  a  desire."  l  In  brief,  the  extreme  utili- 
tarian, through  a  false  analysis,  mistakes  the  pleasure  in 
the  desire  for  the  object  of  the  desire,  whereas  the  pleasure 
exists  in  the  desire  only  when  something  else  is  the  object 
of  the  desire. 

There  is  an  overwhelming  array  of  witnesses  to  refute 
the  testimony  of  the  hedonistic  utilitarian  where  he  makes 
the  mistake  of  assuming  that  pleasure  is  the  only  ultimate 
source  of  worth.  The  self-indulgent  man  who  gives  him- 
self up  to  pleasure-seeking  soon  finds  that  in  order  to  get 
pleasure  he  must  stimulate  his  jaded  desires  for  other 
things,  and  that  the  more  strenuously  he  seeks  pleasure 
the  less  of  it  he  gets,  because  through  over-indulgence  he 
destroys  the  desires  for  other  things.  The  glutton,  for 
instance,  impairs  his  appetite  and  thereby  decreases  his 
pleasure  in  eating;  in  order  to  enjoy  eating,  he  must 
stimulate  his  desire  for  food.  Verily,  many  a  man  who 
has  drunk  the  bitter  dregs  of  life's  cup  can  testify  to  the 
truth  of  the  paradox  of  hedonism  that  to  aim  at  pleasure 
is  to  miss  it.  But  our  witnesses  do  not  come  only  from 
the  ranks  of  sinners.  The  goodness  of  an  act  is  greatly 
lessened  in  the  estimation  of  men  in  general  if  the  indi- 
vidual is  found  to  have  done  it  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
getting  pleasure.  History  has  demonstrated  that  the 
noblest  path  may  lead  through  the  Garden  of  Geth- 
semane  to  the  crown  of  thorns  and  the  cross,  where  the 
least  suggestion  that  the  motive  is  to  secure  pleasure, 
even  in  the  world  hereafter,  is  an  affront  to  our 
sensibilities. 

Hedonistic  sophistry  may  assert  that  a  good  act, 
though  painful  in  itself,  may  be  undertaken  because  the 
individual  desires  the  pleasure  which  comes  from  the 
1  Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  pp.  269-270. 


88  The  Principles  of  Education 

approval  of  conscience.  But  conscience  gives  the  pleasure 
of  its  approval  because  the  act  is  felt  to  be  worthy.  The 
pleasure  of  conscience  does  not  make  the  act  worthy; 
conscience  does  not  approve  a  good  act  because  it  is 
pleasurable  to  approve  it,  but  because  the  act  in  itself  is 
felt  to  be  good. 

Finally,  can  we  believe  that  value  depends  upon  pleas- 
ure alone  when,  in  doing  so,  we  must  admit  that  all  of 
the  great  characters  who  down  through  the  ages  have 
sacrificed  themselves  in  a  struggle  to  advance  civilization 
have  been  deceived  in  their  judgments  of  worth  and  have 
lived  in  vain?  As  Miinsterberg  says:  "  Has  mankind  at 
the  height  of  the  twentieth  century  really  more  pleasure 
than  the  savage  tribe  in  the  bushes?  Has  the  man  who 
is  burdened  with  the  responsibilities  of  highest  culture 
really  more  pleasure  than  the  shepherd  who  lies  in  the 
sun,  and  does  the  shepherd  have  more  fun  than  the  dumb 
beasts  around  him?  Has  not  every  step  in  civilization 
meant  new  difficulties  and  new  problems,  new  conflicts 
and  new  responsibilities,  new  labor  and  new  hardship? 
If  pleasure  is  the  goal,  let  us  escape  from  civilization,  let 
us  throw  off  our  proud  achievements  and  let  us  learn 
from  the  herds  of  the  meadow,  which  live  for  their  sensual 
instincts."  l 

Here  again,  the  hedonist  is  ready  with  his  sophistry  to 
assert  that,  although  the  pleasures  of  civilization  are  no 
more  in  quantity  than  those  of  savagery,  they  are  higher 
in  quality.  But  to  assert  that  value  depends  upon  any- 
thing else  than  the  amount  of  pleasurableness  is  to  deny 
the  hedonistic  standard,  by  recognizing  a  standard  of 
worth  that  is  not  based  upon  pleasure,  but  upon  something 
else  which  makes  one  pleasure  better  than  another.  This 
1  Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  p.  45. 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  89 

something  else  is  the  value  of  the  act  with  which  pleasure 
is  associated ;  and  the  worth  of  the  act,  therefore,  gives 
value  to  the  pleasure  rather  than  the  pleasure  giving  value 
to  it. 

In  contrast  with  the  utilitarian,  the  extreme  intuition- 
alist  has  his  eyes  fixed  upon  the  fact  that  worths  are 
immediately  appreciated.  His  belief  is  best  exemplified 
by  the  popular  idea  of  conscience,  or  the  moral  sense,  as 
an  infallible  guide,  which  is  supposed  to  know  immediately 
the  value  of  an  act  the  first  time  the  act  is  brought  before 
it.  "  This  theory  holds  that  Tightness  is  an  intrinsic, 
absolute  quality  of  special  acts,  and  as  such  is  immediately 
known  or  recognized  for  what  it  is.  Just  as  a  white  color 
is  known  as  white,  a  high  tone  as  high,  a  hard  body  as 
existent,  etc.,  so  an  act  which  is  right  is  known  as 
right.  In  each  case,  the  quality  and  the  fact  are  so  inti- 
mately and  inherently  bound  together  that  it  is  absurd 
to  think  of  one  and  not  know  the  other.  As  a  theory 
of  moral  judgment,  intuitionalism  is  thus  opposed  to  utili- 
tarianism, which  holds  that  Tightness  is  not  an  inherent 
quality  but  one  relative  to  and  borrowed  from  external 
and  more  or  less  remote  consequences."  ' 

It  is  true  that  ultimate  ends  are  known  only  intui- 
tively and  that  derived  values  are  recognized  by  the  indi- 
vidual through  immediate  appreciation.  However,  when 
the  intuitionalist  says  that  immediate  appreciation  is  the 
only  authority  for  the  worth  of  all  ideals,  he  does  not  look 
far  enough  to  see  that  many  values  are  not  original,  or 
primary,  but  derived. 

The  extreme  intuitionalist  points  to  human  experience 
in  support  of  his  statements,  but  the  very  witnesses  whom 
he  calls  to  support  his  position  make  it  clear  that  part 

1  Dewey  and  Tufts,  Ethics,  p.  318. 


90  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  his  theory  is  not  true.  What  a  motley  array  of  wit- 
nesses, —  liars,  thieves,  adulterers,  murderers,  together 
with  patriots,  reformers,  and  saints !  They  all  agree  that 
a  white  color  is  white,  but  do  they  all  agree  as  to  the 
moral  quality  of  the  same  act?  There  is  scarcely  a  crime 
which  was  not  at  some  time  in  the  history  of  the  race  felt 
by  individuals  as  a  worthy  act  in  the  light  of  conscience, 
and  the  conscientious  conflicts  of  the  present  day  show 
that  the  moral  sense  is  not  an  infallible  authority.  As 
soon  as  the  saints  attempt  to  reform  the  sinners,  to  create 
in  them  a  new  sense  of  what  is  worth  while,  they  must 
begin  to  reason  with  them,  and  the  moment  they  begin 
to  reason  about  values,  they  turn  their  backs  upon  the 
intuitional  doctrine,  for  to  show  the  reason  for  a  value  is 
to  show  it  to  be  worth  while,  not  in  itself,  but  rather  as  a 
means  to  some  end  upon  which  its  worth  depends.  In- 
deed, ethical  theory  came  into  existence  just  because  our 
immediate  feelings  of  the  values  of  acts  are  neither  uni- 
form nor  absolutely  reliable,  and  must,  therefore,  be 
supplemented  by  a  rational  attempt  to  find  the  values  of 
acts  in  the  light  of  the  ends  which  they  serve. 

To  sum  up  the  evidence,  the  utilitarian  has  given  unim- 
peachable testimony  that  many  values  are  derived,  but 
his  testimony  can  be  refuted  when  a  failure  to  see  that 
there  are  many  ultimate  ends  leads  him  to  say  that  only 
one  exists.  The  intuitionalist  has  given  unimpeachable 
testimony  that  some  values  are  ultimately  known  only 
through  immediate  appreciation,  but  his  testimony  can 
be  refuted  when  a  failure  to  see  the  derived  nature  of 
many  values  leads  him  to  say  that  intuition  is  the  only 
authority.  Putting  together  the  parts  of  this  testimony 
that  must  be  accepted,  we  have  the  view  of  the  matter 
which  this  chapter  attempts  to  make  clear ;  namely,  that 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  91 

some  purposes  are  original,  or  primary,  and  that  others 
are  means  of  control  to  which  feelings  of  value  have  been 
transferred  from  the  ends  that  they  serve. 

Thus  far,  it  must  be  understood,  we  have  permitted 
only  the  extremists  to  testify.  Many  ethical  thinkers 
who  have  taken  intermediate  positions  are  in  substantial 
agreement  with  the  conclusion  advocated  here.  Those 
utilitarians  who  do  not  select  some  one  special  value,  such 
as  pleasure,  for  the  ultimate  worth  from  which  all  other 
values  are  derived,  but  who  consider  the  ultimate  end  to 
be  human  welfare  or  perfection,  are  not  blind  to  a  part 
of  the  truth  if  they  recognize  the  fact  that  since  the  will 
aims  at  definite,  concrete  activities,  welfare  or  perfection 
is  an  empty  abstraction,  unless  filled  with  a  variety  of 
concrete  ultimate  values.  Those  intuitionalists  who  hold 
that  only  general  rules  or  classes  of  ends  are  known 
ultimately  through  immediate  appreciation,  are  not  blind 
to  a  part  of  the  truth  if  they  recognize  that  these  general 
rules  or  classes  of  ends  have  significance  only  in  that  they 
designate  groups  of  particular  values  each  of  which  is 
felt  to  have  absolute  worth. 


92  The  Principles  of  Education 


VII 

According  to  natural  science,  the  steps  in  the  physical  process 
which  parallels  the  forming  of  a  new  purpose  are :  (1)  a  response 
to  stimuli  checked  in  its  functioning ;  (2)  a  diversion  of  nervous 
energy  into  some  channel  of  response  not  previously  connected  with 
this  reaction,  —  a  physical  process  by  which  the  check  may  be 
removed ;  (3)  an  incorporation,  through  action,  of  the  new  response 
with  the  old  habit.  These  steps  are  the  physical  counterparts  of 
(1)  the  feeling  of  the  value  of  some  purpose,  (2)  the  association 
with  this  purpose  of  some  means  for  its  realization,  and  (3)  the  use 
of  the  means  in  realizing  the  purpose.  Natural  science  supports 
also  the  conclusion  that  some  feelings  of  value  are  not  derived  from 
others,  but  are  original,  or  primary. 

Let  us  now  see  how  natural  science  supports  with  its 
authoritative  evidence  the  conclusion  that  has  been  pre- 
sented from  the  teleological  point  of  view  with  regard  to 
how  a  new  purpose  is  made.  The  physical  counterpart 
of  a  purpose,  according  to  natural  science,  is  a  response 
to  stimuli  checked  in  its  functioning.  Just  as  changes  in 
the  nervous  system  due  to  the  stimuli  of  vibrating  air 
and  ether  are  accompanied  by  the  consciousness  of  sounds 
and  colors,  and  thus  give  "as  in  a  symbolic  language, 
news  of  the  external  world,"  so  changes  in  the  nervous 
system  due  to  the  reactions  to  these  stimuli  are  accom- 
panied, when  checked  in  their  functioning,  by  purposes, 
and  thus  give,  as  in  a  symbolic  language,  news  of  the 
responses  to  this  world  of  external  vibration.  The  light 
stimulus  of  an  apple  affects  the  nervous  system  of  a  child. 
As  the  result  of  nervous  connections  made  previously, 
this  stimulus  tends  to  pass  over  into  the  response  of  eat- 
ing. But  if  the  fruit  is  on  a  table  beyond  the  child's 
reach,  or  if  he  has  to  walk  across  the  room  or  is  otherwise 
delayed  in  getting  the  apple,  the  reaction  of  eating  is 
checked  in  its  functioning,  although  it  may  go  even  so 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  93 

far  as  to  make  his  mouth  "  water."  Under  these  physical 
conditions,  he  feels  a  desire  to  eat  the  apple,  he  appre- 
ciates the  worth  of  carrying  out  the  action  for  which  the 
nervous  system  has  been  set.  If  the  reaction  persists, 
if  it  is  not  abortive,  the  child  feels  a  purpose. 

Natural  science  would  explain  the  illustrations  given 
in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter  l  by  saying  that  in  such 
cases  brain  connections  have  been  established  between 
certain  stimuli  and  the  responses  of  locking  the  door, 
washing  dishes,  going  to  the  office,  and  studying  the 
principles  of  education;  and  that  when  evening  comes 
and  the  man  is  in  the  upper  part  of  the  house,  when  the 
meal  is  finished  and  the  housewife  is  engaged  in  con- 
versation, when  eight  o'clock  arrives  and  other  activities 
interfere  with  going  to  the  office,  and  when  the  hour  for 
the  study  of  the  principles  of  education  has  struck  and 
the  student  is  at  a  distance  from  the  library  or  is  invited 
to  go  walking,  the  reactions  for  which  the  nervous  systems 
of  the  respective  individuals  have  been  set,  although 
started  by  appropriate  stimuli,  are  checked,  because  the 
situations  in  which  the  individuals  are  at  the  time  do  not 
for  the  moment  permit  the  completion  of  the  reactions, 
or  give  stimuli  setting  off  also  other  reactions  .which 
interfere  with  them.  When  the  activity  is  obstructed, 
each  feels  a  desire  which  makes  him  conscious  of  the  end 
of  his  action  and  of  its  worth.  If  the  tendency  to  the 
activity  continues,  the  conscious  accompaniment  is  a 
purpose. 

Since  a  purpose  is  the  conscious  parallel  of  an  obstructed 
reaction,  a  new  purpose  must  be  the  accompaniment  of 
a  new  obstructed  reaction.  The  materialistic  explana- 
tion of  the  steps  in  the  making  of  a  new  reaction,  a  new 

'  Pp.  70-71. 


94  The  Principles  of  Education 

habit  of  response,  must  point,  therefore,  to  the  physical 
counterpart  of  the  making  of  a  new  purpose.  Let  us 
now  examine  the  steps  in  the  making  of  a  new  habit  of 
response  and  then  find  their  mental  counterparts. 

In  the  process  of  adjustment  to  environment,  new 
habits  of  response  are  made  as  modifications  in  the  nerv- 
ous system.  The  usual  steps  in  the  physical  process 
through  which  a  new  reaction  is  added  to  an  old  one  are : 
(1)  a  reaction  checked  in  its  functioning ;  (2)  a  diversion 
of  nervous  energy  into  some  channel  of  response  not 
previously  connected  with  this  reaction,  —  a  physical 
process  by  which  the  check  may  be  removed;  and  (3) 
an  incorporation,  through  action,  of  the  new  form  of 
response  with  the  old  habit.  The  experiences  of  which 
these  steps  are  the  physical  counterparts  may  now  be 
found.  (1)  A  reaction  checked  in  its  functioning  is  the 
physical  counterpart  of  a  purpose ;  (2)  new  reactions  to 
the  situation  which  may-  overcome  the  check  are  the 
physical  parallels  of  the  consciousness  of  means  of  con- 
trol in  the  service  of  the  purpose ;  and  (3)  the  incorpora- 
tion, through  action,  of  the  new  response  with  the  old 
habit  is  the  physical  parallel  of  the  use  of  the  means  in 
the  realization  of  the  purpose. 

Before  the  new  response  has  been  completely  incor- 
porated with  the  old  habit,  the  old  habit  will  be  checked, 
in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  in  the  situation  under  which 
the  new  response  first  appeared,  and  the  new  response, 
although  it  now  will  appear  more  easily,  will  still  have  as 
its  conscious  accompaniment  the  idea  of  a  means  of  con- 
trol. When,  however,  the  process  has  been  completed 
so  that  the  new  response  has  become  an  integral  part  of 
the  habit,  this  new  part  of  the  reaction,  when  checked,  may 
be  accompanied  by  a  purpose  which  parallels  it  alone. 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  95 

When  the  purpose  is  thus  the  accompaniment  of  only  a 
new  form  of  reaction,  it  appears  as  a  new  purpose.  Nat- 
ural science  supports,  in  this  way,  the  conclusion  pre- 
sented from  the  teleological  point  of  view  with  regard 
to  the  process  by  which  new  purposes  are  made. 

Interpretation  with  the  use  of  illustrations  may  make 
the  matter  plainer.  (1)  When  the  individual,  now  re- 
garded as  a  psychophysical  organism,  is  writing  and  the 
process  of  writing  is  interrupted  by  the  ink's  ceasing  to 
flow  from  his  fountain  pen,  there  appears  in  his  conscious- 
ness a  purpose  revealing  the  character  of  the  reaction 
somewhere  ahead  of  the  check.  This  purpose  may  be 
that  of  making  the  ink  resume  its  flow.  (2)  Owing  to 
certain  physical  conditions,  nervous  energy  may  be 
directed  into  channels  producing  the  response  of  jerking 
the  pen.  On  the  side  of  consciousness,  this  jerking  of  the 
pen  appears  first  as  a  means  of  control  for  carrying  out 
the  purpose.  (3)  The  reaction  of  jerking  the  pen  removes 
the  obstruction  and  the  original  reaction  of  writing  is 
continued.  This  process  is  paralleled  by  the  feeling  of 
an  act  of  will  in  realizing  the  purpose.  After  this  new 
reaction  of  jerking  the  pen  has  been  fixed  as  a  nervous 
connection,  if  it  is  called  forth  by  the  ink's  ceasing  to 
flow  under  conditions  noted  above  and  then  checked  in 
its  functioning,  because  the  stimuli  from  surrounding 
objects,  for  instance,  set  off  reactions  inhibitory  to  throw- 
ing ink,  the  purpose  of  jerking  the  pen  appears.  The 
acquired  reaction  has  now  become,  when  checked  in  its 
functioning,  the  physical  condition  for  a  new  purpose, 
since  there  is  an  immediate  feeling  that  jerking  the  pen 
is  the  thing  that  should  be  done. 

Again,  (1)  the  activity  of  a  teacher  may  be  checked  in 
guiding  a  class  from  short  to  long  division.  This  check 


96  The  Principles  of  Education 

is  paralleled  in  consciousness  by  a  purpose  along  the  line 
of  activity;  that  is,  to  make  the  class  understand  the 
arrangement  of  divisor  and  quotient  in  long  division. 

(2)  There  may  be,  under  these  conditions,  the  response 
of  putting  the  divisor  at  the  left  and  the  quotient  at  the 
right  in  some  examples  in  short  division,  instead  of  using 
the  usual   arrangement.     This  process   appears  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  teacher  as  a  new  means  of  control. 

(3)  The  difficulty  is  removed  and  the  original  reaction  of 
guiding  the  class  to  the  acquisition  of  long  division,  so  far 
as  the  arrangement  of  divisor  and  quotient  is  concerned,  is 
completed.     This  step  is  felt  as  an  act  of  will,  using  the 
means  of  control  in  the  realization  of  the  original  purpose. 
If  the  new  form  of  presentation  has  become  fixed  as  a 
connection  between  stimuli  and  response,  and  if,  per- 
chance, the  reaction  is  called  forth  by  appropriate  stimuli 
and  delayed  in  functioning  by  the  absence  of  a  piece  of 
chalk,  there  may  appear  in  the  mind  of  the  teacher  the 
purpose  of  writing  a  quotient  in  the  form  employed  in 
short  division.    The  new  reaction  has  now  become,  when 
checked  in  its  functioning,  the  physical  counterpart  of  a 
new  purpose. 

Natural  science  supports  also  the  conclusion  that  the 
individual  is  endowed  by  nature  with  certain  apprecia- 
tions of  worth,  as  well  as  with  the  ability  to  acquire  new 
appreciations.  Reactions  are  both  original  and  acquired. 
Original  reactions,  which  are  called  instincts,  are  nervous 
connections  with  which  the  individual  is  endowed  at 
birth  as  the  result  of  thousands  of  generations  of  evolu- 
tionary development.  Many,  however,  are  delayed  in 
their  functioning;  for  example,  those  which  appear  in 
adolescence ;  and  many  are  "  vague,  variable,  and  rough - 
hewn,"  so  that  it  is  possible  for  the  "  instinctive  tendency 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  97 

to  produce,  not  some  one  single  habitual  act,  a  replica  of 
itself,  but  a  number  of  different  habits,  each  fitted  to  some 
special  set  of  situations."  l  Acquired  reactions  are  called 
habits.  Now,  original,  or  primary,  values,  the  worth  of 
which  is  immediately  felt  but  cannot  be  explained  tele- 
ologically  by  reason,  are  the  accompaniments  of  instinctive 
reactions  checked  in  their  functioning ;  and  acquired  pur- 
poses are  the  mental  counterparts  of  acquired  reactions 
checked  in  their  functioning.  Furthermore,  the  trans- 
forming of  an  acquired  purpose  into  a  means  of  control 
for  the  purpose  of  explaining  its  value  corresponds  to  the 
relating  of  an  acquired  reaction  to  the  more  funda- 
mental response  with  which  it  was  incorporated  in  over- 
coming an  obstruction.  When  an  original  reaction  is 
reached,  obviously  it  cannot  be  viewed  thus  as  a  mere 
modification  of  a  more  fundamental  response,  and  cor- 
respondingly reason  finds  here  its  limit  in  the  explanation 
of  value.  The  crude  skeleton  of  an  example,  which  dis- 
regards many  connections,  may  be  given  for  the  sake  of 
simplicity  and  brevity.  A  teacher  is  endowed  by  nature 
with  an  instinct  to  eat ;  teaching  school  is  a  modification 
of  the  activity  of  getting  food ;  and  the  new  method  of 
going  from  short  to  long  division  is  a  modification  of  his 
activity  in  teaching  school.  If  he  explains  in  the  every- 
day terms  of  teleology  why  he  appreciates  the  value  of 
the  method  used  in  teaching  long  division,  he  looks  farther 
along  the  line  of  activity  and  shows  that  this  method  is 
justified  as  a  means  for  attaining  the  end  of  teaching. 
If  he  is  asked  why  he  desires  to  teach,  he  looks  farther 
along  the  line  of  activity  and  shows  that  this  is  a  means 
for  getting  food.  If  he  is  asked  why  he  feels  the  value  of 
getting  food,  he  explains  that  it  is  a  means  to  eating.  If 
1  Thorndike,  E.  L.,  The  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  189. 


98  The  Principles  of  Education 

he  is  asked  why  he  appreciates  the  value  of  eating,  and 
eating  appears  only  in  its  pure,  instinctive  form,  he  can 
make  no  further  explanation.  In  the  instinct,  the  physi- 
cal parallel  of  the  ultimate  or  original  value  has  been 
reached. 

REFERENCES 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  218-224.  (Discusses 
briefly  ideals  from  the  point  of  view  of  education.) 

SPENCER,  H.,  Education,  chapter  on  Moral  Education.  (Presents 
methods  of  moral  education  from  the  utilitarian  point  of  view.) 

PAULSEN,  F.,  A  System  of  Ethics,  Tr.  by  Frank  Thilly,  1906,  pp.  340- 
346,  233-239,  251-270.  (Presents  clearly  the  nature  of  judgments 
of  worth,  discusses  the  question  Does  the  end  justify  the  means  ? 
and  criticizes  the  ethics  of  pleasure  seeking.) 

MUNSTERBERG,  H.,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  1910,  pp.  41-46. 

(Criticizes  the  ethics  of  pleasure  seeking.) 
DEWEY  and  TUFTS,  Ethics,  1909,  pp.  269-275,  317-325.     (Criticizes 

hedonism  and  moral  sense  intuitionalism.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  What  does  a  person  lack  who  knows  the  right  but  does  not 
doit? 

2.  a.  Find  in  one  of  the  standard  magazines  five  advertisements 
each  of  which  tends  to  create  a  predilection  for  some  article  by 
representing  it  as  a  means  for  attaining  some  value  or  values  appre- 
ciated by  the  reader,     b.  Explain  concretely  how  each  advertisement 
creates  a  predilection  for  the  article  advertised. 

3.  Name  five  ideals  you  have  attained  because  you  have  asso- 
ciated the  acts  represented  by  them  with  the  securing  of  mere  social 
approval. 

4.  Name  five  purposes  you  have  attained  because  you  have  asso- 
ciated the  acts  represented  by  them  with  desirable  ends  other  than 
that  of  social  approval. 

5.  Ask  five  individuals  why  they  believe  that  a  person  should 
be  truthful  and  honest,  and  decide  from  the  answers  given  whether 


How  New  Purposes  Are  Made  99 

the  values  they  feel  for  these  virtues  were  derived  from  the  securing 
of  mere  social  approval  or  in  part  at  least  from  intrinsic  ends  which 
truthfulness  and  honesty  serve. 

6.  a.  Who  has  had  the  strongest  moral  influence  upon  you? 
6.  How  do  you  explain  this  influence? 

7.  Why  is  the  conscientious  explanation  we  make  of  our  reason 
for  doing  some  act  often  inadequate  ? 

8.  Why  is  our  immediate  feeling  that  an  act  is  wrong  usually  a 
better  guide  for  conduct  than  later  reasoning  which  makes  the  act 
appear  right? 

9.  If  children  do  not  cooperate  for  social  ends  in  the  home  and 
school,  should  we  expect  them  to  have  strong  social  ideals  when  they 
become  adults,  even  though  they  study  about  these  ideals?     Give 
the  reason  for  your  answer. 

10.  Explain  the  statement  that  the  best  way  to  get  pleasure  or 
happiness  is  to  forget  it. 


CHAPTER  V 
HOW  NEW  MEANS  OF  CONTROL  ARE  MADE 

New  means  of  control  are  made  through  finding  new  uses 
for  things  in  carrying  out  purposes.  The  essential  steps  in  the 
complete  process  by  which  a  new  means  of  control  is  made,  are 
(1)  experiencing  some  difficulty  in  realizing  a  purpose,  (2) 
defining  the  problem  which  must  be  solved  in  order  to  overcome 
the  difficulty,  (3)  solving  the  problem,  and  (4)  using  the  solu- 
tion in  overcoming  the  difficulty.  The  problem  is  defined  and 
solved  by  the  use  of  hypotheses  made  through  analogy  and  tested 
in  thought  or  in  action,  or  in  both.  The  uses  of  things  as  means 
of  control  constitute  the  meanings  of  the  things.  These  mean- 
ings become  so  closely  associated  with  the  things  as  to  appear 
inherent  in  them. 


New  means  of  control  are  made  through  finding  new  uses  for 
things  in  carrying  out  purposes.  The  essential  steps  in  the  com- 
plete process  by  which  a  new  means  of  control  is  made,  are  (1)  ex- 
periencing some  difficulty  in  realizing  a  purpose,  (2)  denning  the 
problem  which  must  be  solved  in  order  to  overcome  the  difficulty, 
(3)  solving  the  problem,  and  (4)  using  the  solution  in  overcoming  the 
difficulty.  The  problem  is  defined  and  solved  by  the  use  of  hy- 
potheses made  through  analogy  and  tested  in  thought  or  in  action,  or 
in  both. 

When  a  new  difficulty  arises  in  carrying  out  a  purpose, 
a  new  means  of  control  competent  to  overcome  this  diffi- 
culty is  sought.  As  a  rule,  this  new  means  does  not 
spring  into  consciousness  with  the  seeming  spontaneity 
that  marks  the  appearance  of  a  purpose,  but  is  the  result 
of  a  process  of  which  the  individual  may  be  directly  con- 

100 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  101 

scious.  To  find,  through  an  analysis  of  this  process-hew 
purposes  and  means  of  control  already  in  experience  work 
together  to  make  new  means  of  control,  is  the  problem  of 
this  chapter. 

Means  of  control,  as  we  have  learned,1  appear  in  the 
form  of  things;  for  example,  a  drinking  cup,  a  pencil, 
a  law  of  physics,  printed  in  a  book,  or  a  rule  of  grammar, 
likewise  evident.  Things  become  new  means  of  control, 
obviously,  when  new  uses  are  found  for  them  in  giving 
the  control  necessary  to  bring  about  the  realization  of 
purposes.  How  the  individual  finds  new  uses  for  things 
may  be  shown  by  illustrations. 

Imagine  the  case  of  a  person  who,  for  the  purpose  of 
writing  a  letter,  applies  his  fountain  pen  to  the  paper 
and  finds  that  the  pen  does  not  make  a  mark.  If  he 
knew  by  what  means  the  ink  could  be  made  to  flow  from 
the  pen,  he  would  use  this  means,  and  the  writing  would 
be  resumed.  But  he  does  not  know  what  means  to  use. 
(1)  He  has  thus  projected  a  purpose  and  met  with  a  diffi- 
culty in  realizing  it. 

The  individual  now  sets  about  to  locate  definitely  the 
difficulty.  Perhaps,  he  imagines,  there  is  no  ink  in  the 
penholder;  but  he  remembers  that  the  holder  was  filled 
only  a  half  hour  before.  Perhaps  the  tube  that  conducts 
the  ink  from  the  holder  to  the  pen  point  is  misadjusted ; 
but  examination  reveals  that  it  is  in  the  proper  position. 
Perhaps  this  feed  tube  is  clogged  with  dried  ink.  Let  us 
assume  that  all  evidence,  such  as  the  facts  that  the  pen 
has  not  been  used  for  a  long  time  and  that  the  tube 
appears  to  be  stopped  up,  points  to  this  as  the  location 
of  the  difficulty.  The  individual  then  becomes  conscious 
of  a  definite  problem  ;  namely,  What  means  may  be  used 

1  P.  52. 


102  The  Principles  of  Education 

to  remove  the  ink  from  the  feed  tube?     (2)  The  difficulty 
has  thus  been  located  and  given  the  form  of  a  definite  problem. 

A  problem  appears  when  the  individual  is  conscious  of 
a  purpose,  but  not  of  the  means  for  its  realization.  The 
purpose  marks,  or  defines,  the  problem,  which  appears  in 
the  form  of  the  question,  How  can  this  purpose  be  carried 
out?  When  the  means  of  writing  fails,  the  problem 
which  first  appears  may  be  expressed  by  the  question, 
How  "can  the  writing  be  done?  In  this  form,  however, 
the  problem  is  vague  and  general,  —  it  is  not  well  defined. 
In  order  to  define  it  better,  to  make  the  difficulty  more 
clear  and  specific,  the  individual  must  find  a  purpose 
which  lies  in  the  line  of  action  immediately  beyond  the 
difficulty.  In  the  illustration,  this  is  the  purpose  of  re- 
moving the  dried  ink  from  the  pen  tube.  It  marks 
definitely  what  must  be  accomplished  in  order  to  over- 
come the  difficulty;  and  for  the  time  being  it  takes  the 
place  of  the  purpose  of  writing  the  letter.  If  the  problem 
is  complex,  —  that  is,  if  several  means  of  control  must 
be  found  in  order  to  overcome  the  difficulty,  —  this 
complex  problem  must  be  subdivided  into  simpler  ones, 
each  of  which  is  defined  by  a  purpose  immediately  ahead 
of  each  means  of  control  needed. 

The  method  of  defining  the  problem,  as  can  be  seen 
from  the  illustration,  consists  of  making  hypotheses,  - 
that  is,  imagining  what  may  be  the  difficulty,  —  and 
testing  these  hypotheses  to  determine  whether  they  are 
true.  Hypotheses  are  suggested  through  similarity  of 
the  new  situation  in  which  a  difficulty  has  arisen  to  other 
situations  in  which  the  difficulties  have  been  defined. 
The  fact  that  one  cannot  drink  lemonade  through  a  straw 
tube  if  the  lemonade  has  been  exhausted  from  the  glass, 
or  if  the  straw  tube  is  misadjusted,  or  if  the  straw  tube  is 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  103 

clogged  by  pulp  or  by  a  seed,  may  suggest  the  hypotheses 
given  above  in  the  illustration;  or  generalizations  made 
from  a  number  of  similar  instances  where  the  passage  of 
some  substance  through  a  tube  is  concerned,  may  suggest 
them.  Hypotheses  may  be  tested  both  in  thought  and 
in  action.  Testing  in  thought  is  trying  the  hypotheses 
in  imagination  and  consists  in  calling  to  mind  facts  that 
agree  or  conflict  with  the  hypotheses.  When  the  indi- 
vidual in  the  illustration  calls  to  mind  the  fact  that  he 
has  filled  the  pen  only  a  half  hour  before,  he  tests  an 
hypothesis  in  thought  and  finds  it  untrue,  because  this 
fact  conflicts  with  it.  The  hypothesis  that  the  feed  tube 
is  misadjusted  is  tested  in  action  by  examining  the  tube. 
When  the  problem  has  been  defined,  the  individual 
may  have  in  his  stock  of  means  of  control  previously 
acquired  one  that  will  overcome  the  difficulty.  In  this 
case,  he  can  make  use  of  it  without  further  delay.  But 
if  he  does  not  know  how  to  overcome  the  difficulty,  he 
must  proceed  to  find  a  new  means  of  control.  In  other 
words,  (3)  he  must  solve  the  problem.  As  in  the  case  of 
defining  the  problem,  this  is  done  by  making  hypotheses, 
and  testing  them  in  thought  or  in  action,  or  in  both.  He 
has  used  a  pin  to  pick  lint  from  the  opening  in  the  end  of  a 
small  key  and,  because  of  the  similarity  of  the  two  situa- 
tions, imagines  that  the  obstruction  in  the  pen  tube  may 
be  removed  with  a  pin.  When  this  hypothesis  is  tested 
in  imagination,  he  sees  that  the  tube  is  so  small  that  the 
pin  cannot  be  inserted  into  it.  An  attempt  may  be  made 
actually  to  insert  the  pin  into  the  tube,  especially  if  the 
test  in  thought  is  doubtful.  Testing  the  hypothesis  in 
imagination,  if  conclusive,  is  better  than  testing  it  in 
action,  because  testing  in  imagination  saves  the  time 
and  energy  necessary  to  get  the  pin  and  avoids  the  danger 


104  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  injuring  the  tube  by  an  attempt  to  force  the  pin  through 
it.  The  removal  by  blowing  of  fruit  pulp  or  a  seed  ob- 
structing a  straw  may  now  suggest  through  the  similarity 
of  the  two  situations  that  the  dried  ink  may  be  removed 
by  blowing  through  the  feed  tube.  Trying  this  in  thought, 
the  individual  finds  the  hypothesis  useless,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  dried  ink  adheres  so  closely  that  it  cannot  be 
dislodged  by  blowing.  If  this  test  in  thought  is  not 
convincing,  he  may  test  the  hypothesis  actually  by  try- 
ing to  blow  through  the  feed  tube,  with  the  probable 
result  either  of  losing  time  in  washing  the  tube  or  of 
getting  ink  upon  his  lips.  The  fact  that  he  has  cleaned 
small  glass  bottles  and  other  things  with  water,  or  the 
generalization  from  such  experiences  that  water  is  a 
solvent,  suggests,  through  similarity  of  the  two  situa- 
tions, that  perhaps  water  may  be  the  means  of  removing 
the  clogged  ink.  This  hypothesis  is  tried  in  imagination 
and  found  apparently  to  work.  Testing  in  action  may 
be  done  by  putting  the  tube  into  water  and  finding  that 
the  ink  begins  to  dissolve. 

When  the  hypothesis  that  water  is  a  means  of  removing 
the  dried  ink  from  the  tube  has  been  tested  and  found  to 
solve  the  problem,  the  ink  is  removed  and  the  realization 
of  the  purpose  of  writing  the  letter  continued.  In  other 
words,  (4)  he  uses  the  solution  of  the  problem  in  overcoming 
the  difficulty.  This  fixes  the  new  means  of  control  in  the 
experience  of  the  individual  so  that,  when  the  same  kind 
of  difficulty  occurs  with  a  pen,  it  will  not  be  necessary  for 
him  to  go  through  the  process  of  inventing  a  means  of 
control  for  overcoming  the  difficulty;  for  he  will  have 
stored  in  memory  and  ready  for  use  the  fact  that  water 
is  a  means  of  removing  dried  ink  from  the  feed  tube. 
Also,  when  he  meets  a  new  kind  of  difficulty  that  bears 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  105 

some  resemblance  to  this  one,  his  experience  with  the 
clogged  feed  tube  may,  through  analogy,  suggest  hypoth- 
eses which  will  define  the  problem  or  become  the  basis 
of  solution  in  the  case  of  the  new  difficulty. 

Let  us  consider  next  an  illustration  where,  in  carrying 
out  the  purpose  of  writing,  the  individual  did  not  ex- 
perience a  mechanical  difficulty,  but  experienced  the 
difficulty  of  not  having  some  of  the  general  ideas  which 
the  writing  required.  This  illustration  has  been  selected 
in  view  of  the  facts  that  it  is  an  account  of  an  actual 
rather  than  of  an  imaginary  experience ;  that  a  first-hand 
knowledge  of  the  details  is  available;  that  it  may  be 
stated  briefly,  owing  to  the  reader's  familiarity  with  the 
contents  of  the  previous  chapter ;  and  that  it  will  afford, 
with  new  motivation,  a  review  of  the  essential  ideas  of 
the  previous  chapter. 

Some  years  ago,  when  the  author  began  to  teach  the 
principles  of  education,  he  had  the  purpose  of  writing  an 
outline  of  the  course.  It  was  evident  that  principles  for 
controlling  the  process  through  which  new  purposes  are 
made  should  be  included  in  the  outline,  because  the 
school,  in  order  to  make  the  pupils  socially  efficient,  must 
guide  the  development  of  their  purposes  as  well  as  the 
development  of  their  knowledge  of  the  means  through 
which  purposes  can  be  realized.  When,  however,  the 
place  was  reached  for  stating  these  principles,  a  difficulty 
was  met,  because  the  writer  had  not  in  his  previous  ex- 
perience acquired  them  in  definite  and  usable  form.  (1) 
Thus  a  difficulty  was  met  in  carrying  out  the  purpose  for 
which  the  writing  was  begun. 

An  hypothesis  was  made  that  perhaps  purposes  are 
given  by  nature  through  intuition,  that  they  spring 
spontaneously  into  consciousness,  and  that  the  way  in 


106  The  Principles  of  Education 

which  they  are  made  cannot,  therefore,  be  found.  This 
hypothesis  was  rejected  when  tested  in  the  light  of  several 
facts,  as  follows :  We  live,  according  to  natural  science, 
in  a  world  of  uniformity,  a  world  of  law,  and  if  new  pur- 
poses appear,  there  must  be  some  antecedents  necessary 
to  their  appearance.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  experience 
that  a  child  may  be  put  under  influences  which  will 
develop  in  him  good  purposes,  or  he  may  be  put  under 
influences  which  will  develop  in  him  bad  purposes.  The 
development  of  his  appreciations  of  value  may,  therefore, 
be  controlled.  Again,  since  literature  and  the  other  fine 
arts  lead  the  individual  to  form  new  purposes  by  develop- 
ing in  him  appreciations  of  value,  there  must  certainly 
be  some  principles  in  accordance  with  which  the  fine  arts 
do  this,  principles  which  not  only  reveal  the  essential 
nature  of  the  fine  arts,  but  also  may  guide  in  the  teaching 
of  them. 

It  was  known  that  the  steps  in  the  development  of  new 
means  of  control  could  be  found  through  an  analysis  of 
the  self -active  process  —  the  process  of  projecting  pur- 
poses and  realizing  them.  This  fact  suggested  the  hypoth- 
esis that  the  making  of  new  appreciations  of  value  could 
be  explained  with  relation  to  the  same  process.  The 
hypothesis  was  accepted  as  true,  because  individuals 
acquire  new  purposes  in  the  activities  of  everyday  life, 
where  they  are  concerned  with  realizing  values  through 
means  of  control.  This  was  the  first  step  in  narrowing 
the  problem. 

The  fact  that  difficulties  in  getting  other  ideas  had 
been  overcome  by  making  analyses  of  the  objects  under 
consideration,  and  the  fact  that  analyses  in  other  instances 
had  been  made  simpler  by  graphic  representation,  led 
to  the  hypothesis  that  analysis  through  the  use  of  graphic 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  107 

symbols  should  be  used  here.    This  was  tested  by  trying 
it.    The  self -active  process  was  represented  thus : 
P= present  condition  of  the  self 
M  =  means  of  control 
I  =  ideal  condition  of  the  self  (purpose) 

/  was  analyzed  and  found  to  consist  of  a  form  of  action 
plus  a  feeling  of  its  value  for  the  self.  M  was  examined 
and  found  to  consist  of  some  form  of  action.  Since  both 
M  and  I  are  ways  of  acting,  if  M  could  acquire  a  feeling 
of  value  so  that  it  would  be  felt  worth  while  in  itself,  it 
would  become  a  purpose.  Since  there  seemed  to  be  no  other 
way  for  the  new  purpose  to  appear,  (2)  the  problem  was  ten- 
tatively defined  as  follows :  How  can  a  means  of  control  get 
an  immediate  rather  than  an  instrumental  value? 

(3)  In  solving  the  problem,  the  hypothesis  that  a 
means  of  control  may  acquire  value  from  the  end  which 
it  serves,  appeared  as  the  result  of  analogous  situations  in 
which  things  acquire  values  from  objects  of  value  asso- 
ciated with  them.  Mere  clods  of  dirt,  to  which  a  person 
would  ordinarily  be  indifferent,  are  regarded  with  feeling, 
if  they  mark  the  grave  of  a  friend.  Numerous  things, 
such  as  relics,  incite  an  emotional  glow  from  the  fact 
that  they  have  been  associated  with  other  things  that 
appeal  to  the  emotions. 

This  hypothesis  was  tested  in  thought.  The  first  test 
was  made  in  the  light  of  psychology.  In  the  psychologi- 
cal explanation  of  desire,  which  involves  the  apprecia- 
tion of  the  value  of  some  object  for  the  self  and  is  essen- 
tial, therefore,  to  a  purpose,  it  was  found  that  desire 
arises  when  an  habitual  reaction,  called  forth  by  stimuli, 
is  obstructed  in  its  expression.  It  was  found  also  that 
new  habits,  which  form  the  physical  accompaniments 
of  new  purposes,  appear  first  as  means  of  getting  around 


108  The  Principles  of  Education 

obstructions  in  the  functioning  of  old  habits,  which  form 
the  physical  accompaniments  of  old  purposes.  New  pur- 
poses, consequently,  must  appear  first  as  means  of 
control  in  the  service  of  old  purposes. 

The  hypothesis  was  tested  also  hi  the  light  of  ethics, 
which  is  a  science  of  moral  values,  and  has  developed  as 
the  result  of  many  centuries  of  thought.  The  utilitarian 
theory  was  found  to  give  evidence  in  favor  of  the  hypoth- 
esis that  purposes  are  originally  means  of  control,  but 
this  evidence  was  apparently  nullified  by  the  fact  that  the 
intuitional  theory  did  not  support  this  hypothesis.  The 
authority  of  ethical  thinkers  could  not  be  accepted,  so  long 
as  their  testimony  conflicted  with  regard  to  the  matter 
under  consideration.  Here  arose  a  new  difficulty,  which 
was  overcome  through  finding  a  means  by  which  the 
testimony  of  the  utilitarians  and  intuitionalists  could  be 
harmonized.  When  this  had  been  done,  ethics  appeared 
to  support  the  hypothesis.  Overcoming  this  new  diffi- 
culty required  the  four  steps  in  the  process  for  making  a 
new  means  of  control.  In  taking  these  steps,  much 
assistance  was  received,  of  course,  from  books  on  ethics. 

After  the  hypothesis  had  been  tried  still  further  hi  the 
light  of  a  number  of  facts  of  common  experience,  a  final 
test  was  made  by  applying  it  to  the  explanation  of  the 
function  of  the  fine  arts  and  of  the  essential  steps  in  teach- 
ing them.  The  hypothesis  was  applied  first  in  making 
an  explanation  of  the  nature  of  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm 
and  of  the  methods  of  teaching  it.1  This  explanation 
was  verified  by  comparison  with  a  successful  attempt  to 
bring  out  the  value  of  this  psalm  in  a  booklet  entitled 
The  Song  of  Our  Syrian  Guest. 2  Facts  learned  about 

1  See  pp.  219-221. 

2  By  William  Allen  Knight ;  The  Pilgrim  Press,  Boston. 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made   109 

the  teaching  of  literature  through  practical  experience  in 
teaching  this  subject  in  a  high  school  seemed  to  support 
the  hypothesis.  After  further  apparently  satisfactory 
applications  to  the  fine  arts,1  the  hypothesis  was  accepted 
as  the  proper  solution  of  the  problem  and  (4)  was  used  in 
continuing  the  writing  of  the  outline. 

As  a  third  illustration,  let  us  consider  a  case  in  which 
the  difficulty  was  to  find  the  special  use  of  a  thing. 
Several  years  ago,  a  young  man  received  as  a  Christmas 
present  a  piece  of  cloth  which  was  a  yard  or  more  square, 
had  a  small  hole  in  the  center,  and  was  adorned  with 
needlework.  On  opening  the  package,  he  stared  inquir- 
ingly at  the  contents,  an  evidence  of  his  difficulty,  and 
then  said,  "  What  is  this  thing? "  (1)  He  had  ex- 
perienced a  difficulty  in  carrying  out  the  purpose  of  assign- 
ing to  the  decorated  cloth  some  special  use  for  which  the 
donor  evidently  intended  it.  (2)  He  then  reduced  the 
difficulty  to  the  definite  problem,  What  special  use  could  a 
man  make  of  the  cloth?  This  problem  was  suggested 
by  the  fact  that  other  presents  he  had  received  were  for 
his  personal  use,  and  the  suggestion  seemed  to  be  reason- 
able. (3)  In  his  attempt  to  solve  the  problem,  the  first 
hypothesis,  resulting  from  analogy,  was  that  the  cloth 
might  be  a  stand  cover,  but  this  hypothesis  was  set  aside 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  a  stand  cover  would  not  have  a 
hole  in  the  center.  The  analogy  which  gave  rise  to  the 
hypothesis  that  solved  the  problem  was  as  follows :  The 
young  man's  roommate  had  a  bag  to  cover  a  dress  suit 
when  hung  in  a  closet,  in  order  to  protect  the  suit  from 
dust.  After  the  suit  had  been  put  on  a  combined  coat 
and  trousers  hanger,  the  bag  was  slipped  over  it  from  the 
bottom  and  confined  about  the  hook  of  the  hanger  with 
>  See  pp.  227-236. 


110  The  Principles  of  Education 

a  draw  string.  The  shape  of  the  cloth  with  a  hole  in  the 
center  resembled  the  bag,  if  the  bottom  of  the  bag  were 
not  considered.  This  analogy  led  to  the  hypothesis  that 
the  purpose  of  the  cloth  might  be  to  protect  a  suit  of 
clothes  from  dust.  The  size  and  shape  of  the  cloth,  and 
the  hole  in  the  center  through  which  the  hook  might 
pass,  were  evidence  of  the  truth  of  this  hypothesis.  In 
other  ways,  the  hypothesis  was  tried  in  thought  and  found 
to  stand  the  test.  The  recipient  of  the  present  accepted 
this  meaning  as  a  fact,  and  (4)  thus  his  purpose  of  finding 
the  use  of  the  thing  was  realized. 

From  these  illustrations,  the  steps  in  the  making  of  a 
new  means  of  control  appear  to  be  as  follows : 

1.  Experiencing  a  difficulty  in  realizing  a  purpose 

2.  Defining  the  problem  which  must  be  solved  in  order 
to  overcome  the  difficulty 

(a)  by  making  hypotheses  based  upon  analogy 

f  in  thought 

(6)  by  testing  hypotheses     j        or 

{  in  action 

3.  Solving  the  problem 

(a)  by  making  hypotheses  based  upon  analogy 

f  in  thought 

(6)  by  testing  hypotheses  or 

[  in  action 

4.  Using  the  solution  in  realizing  the  purpose 

It  is  true  that  the  process  through  which  new  means 
of  control  are  made  is  often  abbreviated,  because  two  or 
more  of  the  steps  coalesce.  A  person  may  define  the 
problem  as  soon  as  he  has  felt  the  first  difficulty ;  he  may 
grasp  the  solution  as  soon  as  the  problem  has  been  defined. 
These  abbreviated  cases  do  not,  however,  concern  us 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  111 

here.  The  analysis  of  the  process  is  made,  as  we  shall 
learn  definitely  later,  for  the  sake  of  finding  how  it  can 
be  controlled.  So  long  as  the  process,  having  been 
started  aright,  runs  effectively  in  forming  a  new  means 
of  control,  there  is  no  occasion  for  interfering  with  it. 
Direction  is  necessary  only  when  there  is  a  difficulty  in 
the  process,  and  whatever  difficulty  appears  will  be  in 
taking  one  of  the  steps  given  above.  A  knowledge  of  all 
of  the  steps  in  the  complete  process  is  necessary  as  a  basis 
for  locating  quickly  and  accurately  whatever  difficulty 
there  may  be,  and  for  finding  what  kind  of  assistance 
would  be  most  effective. 

II 

The   method   of    scientific   investigation  supports  our  conclusion 
with  regard  to  the  essential  steps  in  making  a  new  means  of  control. 

Logical  method  as  expressed  in  the  method  of  scientific 
investigation  supports  the  conclusion  that  has  been 
reached  with  regard  to  the  essential  steps  in  making  a 
new  means  of  control.  Natural  science  is  concerned 
with  finding  efficient  causal  connections,  or,  in  other 
words,  the  uses  of  things.  In  creating  new  means  of 
control,  the  method  of  science  has  produced  remarkable 
results.  The  discovery  of  this  logical  method  was  noth- 
ing more  than  the  discovery  of  the  way  in  which  man's 
mind  has  always  worked  in  creating  new  means  of  con- 
trol. Knowing  the  way  in  which  mind  works,  one  is 
able  to  get  better  results  by  deliberately  and  precisely 
directing  the  steps  necessary  to  successful  investigation. 
The  steps  essential  to  scientific  investigation,  which  have 
been  found  through  the  study  of  logic  and  used  success- 
fully in  the  scientific  laboratory,  are  the  same  as  those 
given  above.  The  scientist  does  not  merely  look  about 


112  The  Principles  of  Education 

for  truths  and  pick  them  up  when  he  sees  them,  as  a 
botanist  in  field  work  adds  rare  plants  to  his  collection. 
He  must  have  some  purpose  in  his  investigation ;  he  must 
define  a  problem  which  marks  a  difficulty  in  attaining 
this  purpose ;  and  he  must  solve  this  problem  by  making 
and  testing  hypotheses,  which  come  to  his  mind  as  the 
result  of  analogies.  The  hypothesis  that  stands  the  test, 
that  overcomes  the  difficulty,  is  accepted  as  truth,  and 
the  world  learns  that  a  new  scientific  fact  has  been 
discovered. 

Ill 

The  process  through  which  a  new  means  of  control  is  made  gives 
emphasis  to  reason,  whereas  the  process  through  which  a  new  pur- 
pose is  made  gives  emphasis  to  feeling. 

Are  not  the  steps  in  the  complete  process  of  making  a 
new  means  of  control  a  mere  amplification  of  the  ones 
given  in  the  previous  chapter  as  essential  to  the  making 
of  a  new  purpose?  Is  not  the  value  of  the  purpose  felt 
in  the  first  step,  a  means  for  its  realization  associated 
with  it  in  the  second  and  third,  and  the  means  used  in 
the  realization  of  the  purpose  in  the  last  step?  This  is 
true;  but  the  effects  of  the  two  processes  are  quite 
different.  In  the  making  of  a  new  means  of  control, 
defining  and  solving  the  problem  require  nearly  all  of  the 
individual's  attention  and  put  him  in  a  reasoning  state 
of  mind.  Thought  and  feeling  are  more  or  less  exclusive ; 
they  cannot  both  occupy  the  center  of  the  stage  at  the 
same  time.  Thought  chills  feeling  and  feeling  confuses 
thought.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  process  of  making  a 
new  means  of  control,  the  rational  attitude  is  predominant, 
and  reason  gives  emphasis  to  the  instrumental  nature  of 
the  new  means  that  has  been  found.  On  the  other  hand, 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  113 

in  the  steps  for  the  making  of  a  new  purpose,  feeling  is 
predominant.  Only  a  flash  of  association  between  means 
and  end  gives  reason  a  very  minor  part  to  play.  The 
feeling  of  value  which  is  to  be  transferred  from  the  end 
to  the  means  occupies  the  center  of  the  stage.  The  one 
process  develops  a  new  means  of  control,  and  the  other 
adds  value  to  this  means  of  control  after  it  has  been 
developed. 

IV 

The  most  difficult  steps  in  the  process  of  making  a  new  means  of 
control  are  forming  the  hypothesis  which  defines  the  problem 
and  forming  the  hypothesis  which  solves  the  problem. 

In  the  process  of  making  a  new  means  of  control,  the 
most  difficult  steps  are  finding,  upon  the  basis  of  analogy, 
the  hypotheses  necessary  to  locate  the  problem  and  form 
the  solution.  The  ability  to  use  analogies  William 
James  calls  sagacity,  and  says  of  it  in  connection  with 
the  forming  of  new  means  of  scientific  control  created  by 
Newton  and  Darwin :  "  The  flash  of  similarity  between 
an  apple  and  the  moon,  between  the  rivalry  for  food  in 
nature  and  the  rivalry  for  man's  selection,  was  too 
recondite  to  have  occurred  to  any  but  exceptional  minds. 
Genius,  then,  .  .  .  is  identical  with  the  possession  of  similar 
association  to  an  extreme  degree.  Professor  Bain  says : 
'  This  I  count  the  leading  fact  of  genius.  I  consider  it 
quite  impossible  to  afford  any  explanation  of  intellectual 
originality  except  on  the  supposition  of  unusual  energy 
on  this  point.'  "  l  Every  one  has  this  ability,  of  course, 
to  some  degree.  As  James  brings  out,  the  genius  differs 
from  the  ordinary  man  by  having  such  ability  to  an 
extreme  degree. 

1  James,  William,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  p.  360. 


114  The  Principles  of  Education 

That  one  individual,  in  a  short  life  span,  can  acquire 
knowledge  which  has  been  developed  only  after  centuries 
of  thought  by  the  most  capable  men  of  the  race,  is  due  to 
the  fact  that  these  difficult  steps  in  acquiring  knowledge 
are  made  easy  for  him.  Forming  the  hypothesis  on  the 
basis  of  analogy  is  "  going  from  the  known  to  the  un- 
known." Uses  which  the  individual  knows  for  things 
are  thus  made  into  new  means  of  control,  which  were 
hitherto  unknown  to  him.  When  once  a  successful  hypoth- 
esis has  been  found,  the  basis  from  which  it  came  through 
analogy  can  be  pointed  out  easily  and  quickly  to  the 
learner.  The  bridge  to  the  new  knowledge  is  placed 
clearly  and  definitely  before  him.  It  may  require  the 
genius  of  a  Newton  to  see  the  "  similarity  between  an 
apple  and  the  moon,"  and  it  may  require  the  genius  of  a 
Darwin  to  see  the  "  similarity  between  the  rivalry  for 
food  in  nature  and  the  rivalry  for  man's  selection,"  but 
after  either  hypothesis  has  been  made,  it  is  easy  to  indi- 
cate the  analogy  to  the  common  man  in  such  manner  that 
he  can  see  it.  Since  only  hypotheses  that  have  borne  the 
test  are  pointed  out  to  the  learner,  he  is  saved,  moreover, 
the  enormous  amount  of  time  and  energy  necessary  to 
make  and  test  unsuccessful  hypotheses. 


The  use  of  a  thing  as  a  means  of  control  constitutes  the  meaning  of 
the  thing. 

The  use  of  a  thing  as  a  means  of  control  constitutes 
the  meaning  of  the  thing.  This  is  true  whether  the  thing 
is  a  pen,  a  chair,  a  table ;  or  whether  it  is  the  word  verte- 
brate, the  statement  of  the  law  of  gravitation,  or  an  ac- 
count of  the  theory  of  evolution.  Children's  definitions 
emphasize  the  fact  that  use  constitutes  meaning,  as,  for 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  115 

example :  "  nail  is  something  to  put  things  together ;  " 
"  pickle  is  something  green  to  eat ;  "  "  ring  is  what  you 
wear  on  your  finger ; "  "a  knife  is  to  cut  meat."  l  A 
thing  has  as  many  meanings  as  it  has  uses.  To  a  child, 
water  may  appear  both  as  something  to  drink  and  some- 
thing in  which  to  take  a  bath. 

Dictionary  definitions,  representing  the  experience  of 
mature  persons,  give  further  support  to  the  fact  that  use 
constitutes  meaning.  According  to  the  Standard  Dic- 
tionary, a  pen  is  "  an  instrument  for  writing  with  a  fluid 
ink ;  formerly  made  of  a  quill,  pointed  and  split,  but  now 
usually  of  metal  and  fitted  to  a  holder;  by  extension, 
both  pen  and  holder  united."  This  definition  includes 
both  the  function,  or  use,  and  the  structure  of  the  pen. 
The  structure  must  be  given  in  order  to  make  the  symbol 
of  the  thing  more  definite,  for  the  thing  involves  both  a 
symbol  and  a  meaning.  The  structure  gives  also  further 
uses,  in  so  far  as  the  individual  knows  uses  for  a  "  quill 
pointed  and  split,"  for  "  metal,"  and  for  "  handle." 

An  adult  has,  under  normal  conditions,  acquired  many 
more  meanings  for  a  pen  than  a  child  has  acquired  for  it. 
A  pen  may  be  used  to  prop  up  a  window,  to  pick  dirt  out 
of  a  crevice,  to  make  a  hole  in  a  paper,  to  hold  a  loop  in 
an  electric  wire  so  as  to  raise  the  light,  to  make  a  tapping 
sound  in  attracting  some  one's  attention,  to  hold  down  a 
person's  tongue  in  examining  his  throat  for  evidence  of 
inflammation,  etc.  It  is  obvious  that  a  dictionary  could 
not  practicably  mention  all  of  these  uses.  The  diction- 
ary gives,  therefore,  the  common  use  and  indicates  other 
uses,  as  well  as  the  symbol,  by  describing  the  structure. 
The  statement  of  structure  carries  with  it  as  many  mean- 
ings as  the  reader  has  found  for  that  kind  of  structure. 

1  See  Bagley,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  p.  79. 


116  The  Principles  of  Education 

When  the  meanings,  or  uses,  of  a  thing  are  manifold 
and  one  does  not  stand  out  more  prominently  than  others, 
the  dictionary  definition  cannot  be  other  than  structural. 
To  a  boy,  a  stone  is  something  to  throw,  but  the  important 
uses  to  which  men  put  stones  are  so  many  that  a  diction- 
ary could  not  practicably  record  all  of  them.  A  stone 
is  defined,  therefore,  as  "  a  small  piece  of  rock,  as  cobble 
or  pebble."  Rock  is  defined  as  "  the  consolidated  ma- 
terial forming  the  crust  of  the  earth  or  any  representative 
portion  of  it,"  etc.  In  the  terms  of  these  definitions,  the 
reader  recognizes  symbols  together  with  uses  which  he 
has  found  for  the  things  symbolized.  The  dictionary 
definition  of  water  is  "  a  colorless  limpid  liquid  compound 
of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  (H20)  in  the  proportion  of  two 
volumes  of  hydrogen  to  one  of  oxygen,  or  by  weight  2 
parts  of  hydrogen  to  16  of  oxygen."  Here  again,  "  limpid 
liquid,"  "  hydrogen,"  and  "  oxygen  "  convey  the  meaning 
of  water  only  to  the  extent  that  the  reader  knows  uses  for 
such  things.  Liquid,  hydrogen,  and  oxygen  have  mean- 
ing and  can  make  the  definition  significant  only  in  so  far 
as  the  reader  knows  what  they  do,  how  they  act,  and, 
therefore,  how  they  can  be  used  in  control.  The  experi- 
ments of  a  chemist  in  finding  meanings  for  these  sub- 
stances bear  witness  to  this  fact ;  for  he  seeks  to  find  how 
they  act. 

A  word  is  a  physical  thing ;  it  can  be  seen  in  a  book  or 
heard  in  conversation.  The  special  meaning  of  a  word 
is  the  special  use  people  make  of  it  as  a  symbol.  Words 
bear  meanings  in  definite  form  and  their  meanings  are 
kept  alive  by  frequent  use.  They  are  especially  valuable 
in  such  matters  as  solving  problems  and  communicating 
meanings,  because  they  can  be  produced  at  will.  The 
great  superiority  of  man  over  the  lower  animals  has  been 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  117 

attributed  in  a  large  measure  to  the  advantage  which  the 
use  of  words  has  given  to  him.  Because  he  can  use  such 
arbitrary  signs  of  meanings,  man  has  been  called  the 
symbol-making  animal. 

VI 

There  is  a  common  stock  of  original  meanings  for  things,  and  to 
these  original  meanings  acquired  meanings  are  added. 

Just  as  nature  supplies  the  individual  with  an  original 
stock  of  values,  which  are  the  bases  for  the  making  of  other 
values,  so  nature  supplies  the  individual  with  an  original 
stock  of  meanings,  which  are  the  bases  for  the  making  of 
other  meanings.  The  simplest  meaning  which  a  thing 
can  have,  and  one  which  is  common  to  all  individuals,  is 
that  of  something  to  be  looked  at,  listened  to,  smelled, 
touched,  or  sensed  in  some  other  way.  The  thing  is  thus 
recognized  as  a  means  for  giving  certain  sensations.  A 
child  and  an  adult,  a  savage  and  a  civilized  man,  all 
recognize  a  watch  as  a  thing  to  be  looked  at;  nature 
gives  this  meaning  to  them  all.  But  in  addition  to  this, 
the  watch  may  have  other  meanings  that  depend  upon 
other  uses  to  which  it  may  be  put.  In  addition  to  being 
a  mere  ornament,  a  mere  object  to  be  looked  at,  it  is  a 
means  for  telling  time,  a  means  for  testing  the  acuteness 
of  hearing,  etc. 

Although  a  thing  may  have  many  meanings  for  a  per- 
son, he  is  not  necessarily  conscious  of  them  all  when  he 
looks  at  the  thing.  Very  often  only  the  simple  meaning 
of  something-to-be-looked-at  is  prominent  in  conscious- 
ness, while  the  relations  of  the  thing  to  other  purposes 
for  which  it  has  been  found  serviceable  appear  only  as  a 
fusion  of  appreciations  transferred  from  the  ends  served, 
rather  than  as  definite  conscious  plans  of  action. 


118  The  Principles  of  Education 

VII 

A  thing  involves  sensations,  which  are  united  by  the  meaning  as 
sensations  of  the  same  thing. 

Besides  the  meaning,  a  thing  involves  sensations  with 
which  the  meaning  is  intimately  associated.  An  object 
appears  in  the  distance  silhouetted  against  the  sky  on 
the  horizon.  The  observer  says,  "  I  see  an  automobile." 
Reduced  to  its  lowest  terms,  what  he  really  does  see  is  a 
certain  contrast  of  light  and  shade,  which  bears  for  him 
the  meaning  of  automobile.  If  at  night,  a  bright  light 
appears  in  the  distance,  he  may  say  again,  "  I  see  an 
automobile."  What  he  really  sees  now  is  a  bright  light. 
Under  other  conditions,  he  may  say  that  he  hears  or  smells 
an  automobile,  when  he  hears  only  a  sound  and  smells 
only  an  odor.  That  a  person  should  recognize  anything 
more  than  the  sensation,  is  due  to  the  fact  that  he  has 
a  ready-made  meaning  which  he  associates  with  this 
sensation.  What  is  true  of  the  experience  of  an  auto- 
mobile is  true  of  the  experience  of  any  other  thing. 

Sensations  are  recognized  as  belonging  to  the  same  thing 
when  one  meaning  is  common  to  all  of  them.  A  certain 
form  and  color,  the  odor  of  gasoline,  the  chug  of  an 
engine,  the  noise  of  a  horn,  may  each  be  the  sensation 
symbol  of  an  automobile.  Because  all  of  these  sensa- 
tions have  a  common  meaning,  they  are  recognized  as 
belonging  together  as  sensations  of  the  same  thing. 

As  the  result  of  various  meanings  involved,  what  would 
otherwise  be  a  confusion  of  sensations  group  themselves 
into  various  orderly  units,  each  of  which  is  recognized  as 
a  thing,  such  as  a  chair,  steam  radiator,  piano,  table, 
clock,  doorknob,  vase.  As  this  paragraph  is  being  writ- 
ten, the  author  has  a  complex  of  sound  sensations.  Some 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  119 

of  them  group  themselves  as  meaning  a  unitary  thing 
called  a  piano ;  others  as  meaning  a  heavy  wagon  passing 
on  the  street ;  others,  people  talking ;  and  still  others,  a 
carpenter  hammering  nails.  Various  sounds  are  thus 
grouped  together  as  sounds  of  the  same  thing,  because 
they  have  the  same  meaning.  In  a  factory,  an  inexperi- 
enced visitor  may  hear  only  a  confusion  of  sounds,  while 
the  experienced  machinist,  accustomed  to  the  factory, 
hears  various  machines  or  parts  of  machines.  He  has 
attached  to  the  sounds  certain  meanings  other  than  the 
common  meaning  of  something  to  be  heard.  Likewise, 
when  a  person  listens  to  others  conversing  in  a  language 
unfamiliar  to  him,  he  hears  only  a  confusion  of  rapidly 
uttered  sounds,  because  for  him  these  sounds  are  not 
combined  in  meaningful  groups. 

Whatever  is  distinguished  as  having  a  unitary  meaning 
appears  as  a  thing,  no  matter  how  manifold  are  the  sensa- 
tions of  it.  A  whole  city,  a  house,  or  a  brick  in  the  house 
may  be  regarded  as  a  thing  when  it  involves  one  meaning. 
One  grain  of  sand  or  the  whole  world,  indeed,  may  each 
appear  as  a  thing  when  it  is  considered  to  have  a  unitary 
meaning. 

VIII 

There  is  a  mistaken  popular  belief  that  meaning  is  inherent  in 
the  thing. 

In  the  study  of  how  new  purposes  are  made,  it  was 
found  that  an  acquired  value  becomes  so  intimately  asso- 
ciated with  a  thing  that  a  person  seems  to  see  the  value 
as  in  inherent  quality  of  the  thing.1  A  person  first  finds 
honesty  valuable  because  it  is  a  means  to  valuable  results, 
but  later  the  value  of  the  results  becomes  so  intimately 
lSee  pp.  72-74. 


120  The  Principles  of  Education 

associated  with  the  means  that  he  seems  to  see  intuitively 
that  honesty  is  a  thing  worth  while.  After  a  person  has 
acquired  a  new  meaning  for  a  thing  by  finding  a  new  use 
for  it,  this  meaning  likewise  becomes  so  intimately  asso- 
ciated with  the  thing  that  he  seems  to  see  it  immediately, 
to  apprehend  it  intuitively,  as  inherent  in  the  thing  itself. 
As  in  the  case  of  a  word,  we  first  associate  intimately  the 
meaning  with  the  symbol  and  then  seem  to  recognize  this 
meaning  immediately  when  the  symbol  appears. 

Owing  to  this  fact,  it  is  natural  that  in  popular  tradi- 
tion there  should  be  not  only  the  mistaken  belief  that 
value  is  an  inherent  quality  of  the  thing,1  but  also  the 
mistaken  belief  that  meaning  is  inherent  in  the  thing. 
The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  if  the  individual  sees 
immediately  in  a  thing  any  other  meaning  than  would  be 
recognized  by  a  child  or  a  savage,  he  sees  this  meaning  in 
the  thing  because  he  himself  has  first  put  it  there.  Just 
as  truly  as  he  has  put  value  into  things  by  associating 
them  through  use  with  valuable  purposes,  he  has  put 
meanings  into  things  by  finding  new  uses  for  them  in  the 
service  of  purposes.  That  the  meaning  of  a  thing  is  not 
inherent  in  it,  but  is  derived  from  the  use  of  the  thing  as 
a  means  of  control,  is  a  basal  idea  of  modern  pragmatic 
philosophy. 

1  See  p.  89. 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made     121 


IX 

The  steps  recognized  by  natural  science  as  essential  to  the  making 
of  a  new  response,  which  is  the  counterpart  of  a  new  meaning,  are 
the  physical  parallels  of  the  steps  we  have  found  essential  to  the 
making  of  a  new  meaning.  According  to  natural  science,  the 
counterparts  of  meanings  with  which  the  individual  is  endowed  by 
nature  are  inborn  connections  between  stimuli  and  responses,  and 
the  appearance  of  acquired  meaning  as  inherent  in  the  thing  is  a 
manifestation  of  habit. 

Turning  now  to  natural  science,  we  shall  find  that  it 
supports  our  conclusions  about  the  making  of  a  new  means 
of  control.  A  knowledge  of  the  use,  or  meaning,  of  a 
thing  is  an  accompaniment,  according  to  natural  science, 
of  the  strain  sensations  involved  in  the  reaction  to  stimuli. 
As  Professor  Bagley  says :  "  The  use  to  which  sensations 
are  put  determines  their  significance  to  the  organism  - 
determines,  in  other  words,  their  meaning.  A  stimulus  is 
presented  to  an  infant  and  reaction  follows.  The  stimu- 
lus becomes  a  sensation ;  that  is,  the  infant  is  '  conscious  ' 
of  it  in  a  vague,  incoherent  fashion.  A  reaction  follows 
upon  the  stimulus,  but  the  initiation  of  the  reaction  is  un- 
conscious; that  is,  it  follows  instinctively  or  reflexly  upon 
the  stimulus  and  would  have  taken  place  even  though  the 
stimulus  had  not  entered  consciousness  as  sensation. 
But  this  instinctive  reaction  is  also  reported  to  conscious- 
ness through  the  agency  of  the  strain  sensations  arising 
in  the  tendons ;  the  muscular  adjustments  to  which  the 
stimulus  gave  rise  are  made  data  of  the  child's  conscious- 
ness and  become  fused  with  the  original  sensations  which 
the  stimulus  aroused.  Repetitions  follow,  and  this  asso- 
ciation between  the  sensation  occasioned  by  the  stimulus 
and  the  sensations  occasioned  by  the  instinctive  adjust- 
ment to  the  stimulus  becomes  firmly  fixed.  Gradually 


122  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  stimulus  loses  its  vague  and  incoherent  character.  It 
comes  to  '  mean  '  a  definite  sort  of  response,  the  satisfac- 
tion of  a  definite  need."  1 

If  knowledge  of  use,  or  meaning,  is  the  accompaniment 
of  a  response,  knowledge  of  a  new  use,  or  meaning,  is 
the  accompaniment  of  a  new  response.  In  its  account  of 
the  steps  through  which  a  new  response  is  made,  natural 
science  supports  our  conclusions,  for  the  steps  it  finds 
essential  to  the  complete  process  of  making  a  new  response 
are  the  physical  counterparts  of  the  steps  we  have  found 
essential  to  the  complete  process  of  making  a  new  means  of 
control.  According  to  the  materialistic  explanation,  the 
essential  steps  in  the  making  of  a  new  response  are  as 
follows : 

1.  Some  habitual  response  is  checked  in  its  function- 
ing.    Because  energy,  according  to  natural  law,  follows 
the  line  of  least  resistance,  nervous  energy  is  diverted  from 
the  ready-made  channel  of  habitual  response  to  some 
new  channel  only  when  it  meets  an  obstruction.     When 
the  habit  of  writing  is  checked  by  conflicting  nervous 
activity  due  to  stimuli  caused  by  the  unmarked  paper 
over  which  the  pen  has  passed,  there  is  a  check  in  the 
response  of  writing. 

2.  Reaction  is  directed  towards  the  several  parts  of 
the  situation  until  checked  by  the  disturbing  element, 
which  constitutes  a  part  for  which  no  adequate  response 
has  been  acquired.     When  the  main  channel  is  blocked, 
nervous  energy,  following  the  line  of  least  resistance,  is 
diverted  into  those  channels  which  are  partly  opened  as 
a  result  of  their  connection  with  some  of  the  stimuli  in 
the  situation.    To  the  degree  that  situations  have  stimuli 
in  common,  they  are  similar ;  and,  as  Professor  Thorndike 

1  Bagley,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  p.  68. 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  123 

says,  "  To  any  situation  for  which  neither  nature  nor 
nurture  provides  a  response  the  response  will  be  that 
which  they  provide  for  the  situation  most  like  it."  *  In 
the  case  of  a  very  immature  organism,  the  reaction  that 
appears  when  an  habitual  response  is  checked  may  be 
quite  random.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  very  im- 
mature organism  has  not  developed  reactions  to  closely 
similar  situations.  In  the  case  of  a  more  mature  organism, 
however,  the  reactions  tend  to  be  directed  towards  various 
parts  of  the  situation,  until  the  disturbing  element  is  met. 
This  is  true  because  the  organism  has  acted  in  this  way  in 
similar  situations. 

This  kind  of  reaction  is  determined  by  natural  law, 
because  it  is  the  simplest  way  leading  to  the  reaction 
which  overcomes  the  check,  and  the  way,  therefore,  most 
frequently  taken,  according  to  the  law  of  chance.  As 
such  channels  increase  in  number,  owing  to  many  ex- 
periences of  this  kind,  there  is  a  greater  predisposition  of 
the  organism  to  respond  in  this  way  to  new  situations. 
This  kind  of  response  runs  smoothly,  so  long  as  the 
organism  is  adjusted  easily  to  the  several  parts  of  the 
situation,  but  is  checked  abruptly  when  the  disturbing 
element  is  met,  for  the  disturbing  element  makes  a  part 
of  the  situation  for  which  the  organism  has  acquired  no 
adequate  response.  In  situations  similar  to  that  in  which 
the  response  of  writing  was  checked,  reactions  had  been 
directed  to  the  several  parts  of  the  situation,  so  nervous 
energy,  flowing  through  channels  partly  opened  by 
similarity  of  stimuli,  found  the  same  form  of  expression 
here.  This  manner  of  reaction  ceased  when  the  feed 
tube  of  the  pen  was  reacted  upon  and  a  check  was  ex- 
perienced, because  the  condition  of  the  feed  tube  formed 
1  Thorndike,  E.  L.,  The  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  211. 


124  The  Principles  of  Education 

a  situation  for  which  no  appropriate  response  had  been 
acquired. 

If  nervous  energy  is  diverted  into  a  channel  that  leads 
at  once  to  overcoming  the  check,  the  process  is  abbre- 
viated, and  the  directing  of  activity  to  various  parts  of 
the  situation  does  not  appear.  We  are  making,  however, 
an  analysis  of  the  complete  process,  where  all  of  the  steps 
stand  out  clearly. 

Tendencies  to  reaction  through  channels  partly 
opened  by  similarity  in  stimuli  may  reach  complete 
expression  in  outward  act,  or  they  may  be  affected  by 
other  incipient  tendencies  to  activity,  so  that  they  do 
not  reach  such  complete  expression. 

3.  Response  is  turned  directly  towards  removing  the 
check.  Following  the  line  of  least  resistance,  nervous 
energy  takes  this  form  of  expression,  when  reaction  to  the 
several  parts  of  the  situation  is  blocked  by  stimuli  from 
some  part  for  which  no  adequate  response  has  been 
acquired. 

When  one  channel  does  not  lead  to  the  removal  of  the 
check,  nervous  energy  flows  on  into  others  until  the  check 
is  removed.  The  stimuli  of  the  situation  seed-in-straw- 
tube  was  connected  with  the  response  blow-through- 
tube;  the  stimuli  of  dirt-in-bottle  was  connected  with 
the  response  wash-bottle-with-water,  etc.  Owing  to  the 
fact  that  these  channels  are  partly  opened  by  similarity 
of  stimuli  in  the  situation  dried-ink-in-feed-tube,  nervous 
energy  is  now  diverted  into  these  channels,  and,  as  a 
consequence,  the  organism  will  tend  to  blow  through  the 
tube,  wash  the  tube  with  water,  etc.  Thus  does  the  nerv- 
ous force  go  from  one  channel  to  another  until  the  check 
is  overcome. 

These  tendencies  to  reaction,  as  in  the  case  of  the 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  125 

second  step,  may  reach  complete  expression  in  outward 
act,  or  they  may  be  affected  by  other  tendencies  to  action 
so  that  they  do  not  have  such  complete  expression. 

4.  The  check  is  overcome  and  nervous  energy  follows 
the  open  channel  of  the  response  of  writing. 

The  mental  steps  which  parallel  these  physical  ones  are 
as  follows : 

1.  An  habitual  response  checked  in  its  expression  is, 
as  we  have  learned,1  the  parallel  of  a  purpose. 

2.  Reaction  directed  towards  the  several  parts  of  the 
situation  until  checked  by  the  disturbing  element,  is  the 
counterpart  of  defining  the  problem.     When  the  disturb- 
ing element  is  met  and,  because  no  adequate  response  to 
this  element  has  been  acquired,  the  reaction  is  checked,  a 
purpose  appears  in  consciousness.    This  purpose  marks  a 
problem.     When  a  purpose  appeared  in  the  first  step  of 
the  process,  it  marked  the  problem  very  indefinitely,  but 
the  purpose  now  in  consciousness  as  an  accompaniment 
of  a  checked  reaction  towards  only  a  part  of  the  situation, 
makes  the  problem  more  definite,  for  this  purpose  lies 
immediately  beyond  the  new  means  of  control  needed. 

Tendencies  to  reaction  through  channels  partly  opened 
by  similarity  of  stimuli  correspond  to  hypotheses  based 
upon  analogy.  They  are  hypotheses  because  subject  to 
check  by  later  activity  or  tendencies  to  activity,  if  they 
are  ineffective  in  bringing  adjustment.  If  they  reach  com- 
plete expression  in  outward  act,  their  effectiveness  in 
bringing  adjustment  is  tested  in  action ;  if  they  are 
affected  by  other  incipient  tendencies  to  activity  so  that 
they  do  not  reach  such  complete  expression,  they  are 
tested  only  in  thought. 

3.  When  activity  is  turned  directly  towards  removing 

1  See  p.  93. 


126  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  check,  it  is  obviously  paralleled  by  consciousness  of 
solving  the  problem ;  or,  in  other  words,  of  finding  a  new 
means  of  control  for  overcoming  the  difficulty.  As  in 
the  case  of  the  second  step,  this  process  is  paralleled  by 
the  consciousness  of  hypotheses  tested  either  in  action  or 
in  thought. 

4.  As  the  check  is  overcome  and  nervous  energy  fol- 
lows again  the  open  channel  of  the  habitual  response,  the 
individual  is  conscious  of  using  a  new  means  of  control, 
which  is  the  conscious  parallel  of  the  new  response,  in 
the  service  of  a  purpose,  which  is  the  conscious  parallel 
of  the  habitual  response  checked  in  its  expression. 

From  the  materialistic  point  of  view,  the  basis  of 
meanings  with  which  nature  endows  the  individual  is 
found  in  the  form  of  instincts,  inborn  connections  between 
stimuli  and  responses.  The  simple  meanings  given  by 
nature  and  common  to  all  individuals  are  based  upon 
instinctive  responses,  such  as  fixing  the  eyes  upon  or 
turning  the  ear  towards  some  object.  These  are  paral- 
leled by  the  consciousness  that  the  object  is  something  to 
be  looked  at,  listened  to,  or  used  in  some  other  instinctive 
way. 

Since  there  can  be  no  stimuli  without  response,  there 
can  be  no  symbol  without  meaning.  The  symbol  of  a 
thing  is  the  sensation  which  accompanies  the  immediate 
effect  of  the  stimuli.  This  invariably  passes  on  into 
reaction,  which  is  the  counterpart  of  meaning. 

The  fact  that  meanings  acquired  for  a  thing  become  so 
closely  associated  with  it  that  they  seem  to  be  recognized 
intuitively  as  inherent  in  the  thing,  is  explained  in  the 
natural  science  account  of  perception. 

There  is  more  to  perception  than  passive  impressibility  by  ex- 
ternal forces.  Every  act  of  perception  is  really  an  act  of  association. 


How  New  Means  of  Control  Are  Made  127 

What  is  felt  depends  not  only  upon  how  the  afferent  neurones  are  stimu- 
lated, but  also  upon  what  neurones  they  in  turn  arouse;  not  only  upon 
what  the  external  object  is,  but  also  upon  (A)  the  past  experiences 
and  (B)  the  present  tendencies  of  the  individual  who  perceives  it. l 

Every  perception  is  an  acquired  perception.  Perception  may  then 
be  defined,  in  Mr.  Sully's  words,  as  that  process  by  which  the 
mind  "  supplements  a  sense-impression  by  an  accompaniment  or 
escort  of  revived  sensations,  the  whole  aggregate  of  actual  and 
revived  sensations  being  solidified  or  'integrated'  into  the  form  of 
a  percept,  that  is,  an  apparently  immediate  apprehension  or  cogni- 
tion of  an  object  now  present  in  a  particular  locality  or  region  of 
space."  * 

This  association  of  meaning  so  intimately  with  the  thing 
as  to  make  the  meaning  appear  inherent  in  the  thing  is 
one  of  the  manifestations  of  habit,  through  which  "  the 
neurones  they  in  turn  arouse "  become  so  intimately 
connected  with  the  neurones  first  stimulated  that  nervous 
energy  flows  without  interruption  from  one  to  the  other. 
As  they  become  the  direct  unitary  effect  of  the  stimula- 
tion on  the  physical  side,  they  appear  to  be  the  direct 
unitary  effect  of  the  presence  of  the  object  on  the  mental 
side. 

REFERENCES 

DEWEY,  J.,  How  We  Think,  1910,  pp.  68-78.     (Analyzes  a  complete 

act  of  thought.) 
BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  66-82,  128-138. 

(Discusses  the  reading  of  meanings  into  sense  impressions  and 

the  nature  of  judgment.) 
MOORE,  E.  C.,  What  is  Education?     1915,  pp.  30-58.     (Presents  in 

a  simple  way  the  nature  of  knowledge.) 
COLVIN,  S.  S.,  The  Learning  Process,  1917,  pp.  295-318.     (Discusses 

the  nature  of  the  higher  thought  processes  and   the  thought 

process  in  judgment  and  reasoning.) 

1  Thorndike,  E.  L.,  The  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  226.  The 
italics  are  mine. 

3  James,  William,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  78-79. 


128  The  Principles  of  Education 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Select  six  utensils  commonly  used  and  state  what  problem 
each  was  invented  to  solve. 

2.  What  is  essential  to  a  real  problem  ? 

3.  To  what  steps  in  the  making  of  a  new  means  of  control  does 
Faraday  refer  when  he  says,    "The  world  little  knows  how  many 
of  the  thoughts  and  theories  which  have  passed  through  the  mind 
of  a  scientific  investigator  have  been  crushed  in  stillness  and  secrecy 
by  his  own  severe  criticism  and  adverse  examination ;    that  in  the 
most  successful  instances  not  a  tenth  of  the  suggestions,  the  hopes, 
the  wishes,  the  preliminary  conclusions  have  been  realized"? 

4.  Give  three  instances  in  which  you  have  made  several  hypoth- 
eses before  locating  a  difficulty. 

5.  Give  three  instances  in  which  you  have  made  several  hypoth- 
eses before  finding  the  one  which  solved  your  problem. 

6.  Show  in  six  instances    that  the  hypotheses  you  have  made 
either  to  define  or  to  solve  problems  were  the  result  of  analogy. 

7.  Give  from  your  own  experience  an  illustration  of  the  acquiring 
of  some  means  of  control  in  which  the  four  essential  steps   clearly 
appear. 

8.  Criticize  the  doctrine  of  sense  realism  as  advocated  by  Ratke 
and  Comenius. 

9.  State  and  criticize  Herbart's  idea  of  the  nature  of  the  mind. 
10.   State  and  criticize  Plato's  theory  of  how  ideas  are  acquired. 


CHAPTER  VI 
PERSONAL   DEVELOPMENT 

Personal  development,  which  is  the  result  of  attaining  pur- 
poses through  means  of  control,  takes  place  under  the  condition 
of  interest  or  the  condition  of  effort.  Interest  is  felt  when  the 
process  of  self-realization  runs  smoothly,  without  conflict  of  pur- 
poses; effort  is  felt  when  there  is  a  conflict  of  purposes.  The 
condition  of  interest,  when  interest  is  intrinsic,  is  more  favorable 
to  personal  development  than  is  the  condition  of  effort,  with 
the  exception  that  general  regulative  ideals  such  as  duty  and 
strength  of  will  can  be  acquired  only  under  the  condition  of 
effort.  On  the  subjective  side,  personal  development  appears  as 
character-building;  on  the  objective  side,  it  appears  as  world- 
building.  Character-building  consists  in  acquiring  purposes 
together  with  ability  to  use  means  of  control  in  realizing  them. 
World-building  consists  in  making  meanings  and  purposes  objec- 
tive and  permanent  by  associating  them  so  intimately  with 
things  of  the  world  that  they  appear  to  be  inherent  in  and  to 
constitute  the  essential  nature  of  these  things. 

I 

In  order  to  understand  personal  development,  we  must  under- 
stand (1)  the  nature  of  interest  and  of  effort,  (2)  the  nature  of  char- 
acter-building, and  (3)  the  nature  of  world-lmilding. 

The  self-active  process,  which  consists  of  realizing  pur- 
poses through  means  of  control,  is  continuous  throughout 
life.  No  sooner  has  one  purpose  been  carried  out  than 
another  desired  condition  of  the  self  excites  in  the  indi- 
vidual pleasurable  anticipation  and  becomes  the  object 
of  his  attention.  This  fact  has  led  the  poet  to  say, 

12<J 


130  The  Principles  of  Education 

Hope  springs  eternal  in  the  human  breast ; 
Man  never  is,  but  always  to  be  blest. 

Man  is  not  led,  however,  by  a  mere  will  o'  the  wisp. 
Every  worthy  purpose  realized  brings  some  degree  of 
blessing.  It  helps  to  develop  in  his  experience  the  values 
which  make  life  worth  living  and  to  give  him  more  effec- 
tive control  in  attaining  them;  in  other  words,  it  pro- 
motes his  personal  development.  Personal  development 
is  sometimes  called  self-realization,  because,  as  purpose 
after  purpose  is  attained,  possible  conditions  of  the  self 
are  made  real.  We  have  now  come  to  the  third  larger 
problem  in  the  study  of  the  individual  process ;  namely, 
the  problem  of  how  purposes  and  means  of  control,  which 
are  both  the  factors  and  the  products  of  the  individual 
process,  together  constitute  personal  development. 

Several  facts  point  to  what  we  must  study  in  order  to 
get  a  better  understanding  of  personal  development. 
Both  interest  and  effort  mark  conditions  that  affect  it; 
for  interest  is  felt  when  the  process  of  realizing  purposes 
runs  smoothly,  and  effort  is  felt  when  the  process  runs 
with  difficulty.  As  a  person  develops,  his  character  is 
built,  because  the  character  of  an  individual  depends  upon 
his  purposes  and  his  ability  to  realize  them.  At  the  same 
time,  the  world  as  it  appears  to  him  is  built,  because  pur- 
poses and  meanings  become  so  intimately  associated  with 
things  of  the  world  that  they  appear  as  inherent  values 
and  meanings  of  these  things.  The  same  development, 
therefore,  looked  at  from  the  side  of  inner  personality, 
the  subjective  side,  appears  as  the  building  of  character ; 
and  looked  at  from  the  side  of  things  of  which  the  indi- 
vidual is  conscious,  the  objective  side,  appears  as  the 
building  of  a  world.  In  order  to  get  a  better  understand- 


Personal  Development  131 

ing  of  personal  development,  we  must  study,  therefore, 
(1)  the  nature  of  interest  and  of  effort,  (2)  the  nature  of 
character-building,  and  (3)  the  nature  of  world-building. 

II 

Interest  originates  in  purposes  and  is  carried  over  to  the  means 
of  control  which  serve  these  purposes ;  in  other  words,  interest  in  a 
purpose  is  immediate  and  interest  in  a  means  of  control  is  mediate. 

The  source  of  interest  is  purpose.  An  individual  can- 
not have  a  purpose  unless  he  is  directly,  immediately 
interested  in  it.  Interest  may  be  carried  over,  however, 
from  the  purpose  to  the  means  of  control  which  serves  it. 
Interest  in  the  means  of  control  is  mediate,  indirect,  just 
because  it  originates  elsewhere  and  is  carried  over  to  the 
means.  The  individual  would  be  indifferent  to  the  means 
were  it  not  connected  with  the  purpose.  Professor 
Dewey  says :  "  Genuine  interest  in  education  is  the 
accompaniment  of  the  identification,  through  action,  of 
the  self  with  some  object  or  idea,  because  of  the  necessity 
of  that  object  or  idea  for  the  maintenance  of  self-expres- 
sion." l  The  "  object  or  idea  "  may  be  either  a  purpose 
or  a  means  of  control  through  which  this  purpose  is  being 
realized.  In  the  former  case,  the  accompanying  interest 
is  called  immediate;  in  the  latter,  it  is  called  mediate. 

An  illustration  will  make  plainer  the  difference  between 
immediate  and  mediate  interest.  A  boy  who  desires  to 
catch  fish  is  interested  immediately  in  the  object  of  his 
desire,  and  may  find  it  difficult  to  think  of  anything  else, 
so  strong  is  his  interest.  He  identifies  himself  with  the 
idea  of  catching  fish  by  making  it  his  purpose.  His 
activity  is  directed  towards  realizing  this  future  condi- 
tion of  the  self.  When  he  digs  in  the  garden  for  bait, 
1  Dewey,  John,  Interest  as  Related  to  Will,  p.  12. 


132  The  Principles  of  Education 

however,  he  is  interested  in  digging  not  directly,  but 
because  it  is  a  means  for  carrying  out  his  purpose  of  fish- 
ing. The  interest  here  is  mediate,  because  digging  is 
interesting  not  in  itself,  but  because  it  serves  the  purpose 
of  fishing,  which  is  the  source  of  the  interest. 

An  incident  that  happened  when  the  author  was  teach- 
ing in  a  high  school  may  be  used  for  further  illustration. 
A  boy  who  had  found  mathematics  very  uninteresting  and 
who,  with  patient  resignation,  had  surrendered  to  mathe- 
matical difficulties,  suddenly  had  a  great,  though  tempo- 
rary, change  of  heart  towards  this  subject.  He  even 
remained  after  school  and  asked  the  teacher  to  explain 
to  him  how  to  find  the  value  of  r  to  more  than  five 
decimal  places.  He  said  that  he  desired  to  get  a  more 
accurate  figure  than  3.14159,  which  was  given  in  the 
textbook.  As  the  teacher  explained  the  process  for  find- 
ing the  value  of  IT,  the  boy  manifested  much  interest,  and 
himself  verified  later  each  step  in  the  calculation.  Curi- 
ous as  to  what  had  brought  about  this  change  of  heart, 
the  teacher,  upon  inquiry,  found  that  the  boy  wished  to 
use  the  value  of  TT  in  a  contest  for  a  bicycle.  In  a  shop 
window  was  a  bicycle  with  a  cyclometer  attached  to  the 
rear  wheel,  which  was  turned  by  an  electric  motor.  The 
face  of  the  cyclometer  was  concealed.  The  motor  ran 
at  a  uniform  rate  for  eight  hours  a  day.  A  sign  in  the 
window  said  that  the  bicycle  would  be  given  to  the  person 
who  would  make  the  most  nearly  correct  estimate  of  the 
number  of  miles  that  would  be  indicated  by  the  cy- 
clometer at  the  end  of  eight  days.  The  boy's  purpose 
was  to  possess  the  bicycle.  As  he  thought  of  this,  he  was 
thrilled  with  an  immediate,  spontaneous  interest.  But 
in  order  to  carry  out  his  purpose,  it  was  necessary  to  make 
the  most  nearly  correct  estimate  of  the  number  of  miles 


Personal  Development  133 

to  be  indicated  by  the  cyclometer.  In  order  to  do  this, 
he  must  know  the  circumference  of  the  wheel  and  the 
number  of  revolutions  made  in  a  unit  of  time.  The  num- 
ber of  revolutions  in  a  unit  of  time  he  found  by  counting 
the  number  of  revolutions  for  many  minutes  and  by  then 
finding  the  average  for  one  minute.  Since  he  knew  that 
the  wheel  was  twenty-eight  inches  in  diameter,  he  could 
find  the  circumference  by  using  the  value  of  IT.  Other 
boys  were  using  3.1416  and  3.14159  as  the  value  of  T. 
A  more  accurate  value  than  this  would  be  a  material  help 
in  realizing  his  purpose.  His  interest  in  possessing  the 
bicycle  thus  became  mediated  to  various  means,  including 
the  process  of  finding  the  value  of  TT.  One  day,  it  may  be 
added  to  make  the  story  complete,  he  came  into  the 
schoolroom  with  a  broad  smile  and  exclaimed,  "  Teacher, 
I  got  the  wheel !  "  He  had  passed  through  the  means  of 
control  to  the  realization  of  his  purpose,  and  every  step 
had  held  him  with  an  interest  which  had  its  source  in  the 
end  desired. 

Ill 

Mediate  interests  are  of  two  kinds,  intrinsic  and  extrinsic.  In- 
trinsic interests  are  those  which  originate  in  purposes  that  give  to 
the  means  its  normal,  distinctive  meaning ;  extrinsic  interests  are 
those  which  originate  in  purposes  that  do  not  give  to  the  means  ita 
normal,  distinctive  meaning.  If  a  person  acquires  a  meaning  for  a 
thing  or  an  ideal  under  the  condition  of  extrinsic  interest  only,  ho 
will  not  by  virtue  of  this  experience  make  proper  use  of  the  thing 
when  occasion  calls  for  it.  Ideals  acquired  with  extrinsic  interest 
are  narrowly  limited  in  influence. 

Interests  in  means,  or  mediate  interests,  are  of  two 
kinds,  intrinsic  and  extrinsic.  Intrinsic  interests  are 
those  which  originate  in  purposes  that  give  to  the  means 
its  normal,  distinctive  meaning;  extrinsic  interests  are 


134  The  Principles  of  Education 

those  which  originate  in  purposes  that  do  not  give  to  the 
means  its  normal,  distinctive  meaning.  A  girl  who 
practices  on  the  piano  for  the  purpose  of  producing  better 
music  through  improving  her  technique,  has  an  intrinsic 
interest  in  the  practice ;  a  girl  who  practices  on  the  piano 
for  the  sake  of  getting  a  vacation  trip,  which  has  been 
promised  her  as  a  reward  for  practicing,  has  an  extrinsic 
interest  in  the  work.  The  distinctive  meaning  of  piano 
practice  is  improvement  in  technique  for  the  purpose  of 
producing  more  satisfactory  music,  not  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  a  vacation  trip.  A  pupil  who  studies  rules  of 
grammar  in  order  to  improve  his  understanding  and 
expression  of  the  language  by  a  better  control  of  language 
forms  has  an  intrinsic  interest  in  the  rules ;  if  he  studies 
them  only  for  the  sake  of  securing  a  high  grade,  he  has 
an  extrinsic  interest.  Rules  of  grammar  get  their  normal, 
distinctive  meaning  from  their  use  in  the  control  of  lan- 
guage forms,  not  from  their  use  in  securing  high  grades. 
A  pupil  who  behaves  well  in.  school  for  the  purpose  of 
paying  close  attention  to  his  work  and  of  not  interfering 
with  the  work  of  others  has  an  intrinsic  interest  in  his 
behavior,  because  the  interest  which  attaches  to  it  origi- 
nates in  the  "purpose  that  gives  good  behavior  under  these 
conditions  its  normal,  distinctive  significance.  If  he 
behaves  well  in  school  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  arbi- 
trary punishment  by  the  teacher,  he  has  an  extrinsic 
interest  in  his  good  acts.  Good  conduct  derives  its 
normal  meaning,  not  from  the  fact  that  it  is  a  means  for 
avoiding  punishment,  but  from  the  fact  that  it  is  a  means 
for  securing  other  values. 

Extrinsic  interest,  however,  may  lead  to  a  problem 
that  is  defined  by  a  purpose  which  marks  the  proper  use 
of  the  thing,  and  may  thus  give,  in  a  degree  at  least,  a 


Personal  Development  135 

normal  meaning.  If  this  were  not  the  case,  our  schools 
would  be  very  inefficient  indeed,  because  so  much  of  the 
interest  in  schools  is  extrinsic.  A  boy  who  knows  that 
his  standing  in  school  will  be  lowered  if  he  does  not  get 
proper  verb  forms  in  his  compositions,  will  define  his 
problem  as  that  of  getting  correct  verb  forms.  In  solving 
this  problem,  he  may  acquire  the  rule  that  a  verb  should 
agree  with  its  subject  in  person  and  number,  and  may 
thus,  in  a  degree  at  least,  understand  the  meaning  of  the 
rule.  But  is  the  use,  and  therefore  the  meaning  which 
he  gets  for  the  rule,  completely  normal?  If  asked  why 
he  learns  the  rule,  he  will  reply,  "  For  the  sake  of  getting 
correct  verb  forms,"  and  if  asked  why  he  desires  to  get 
correct  verb  forms,  he  will  answer,  "  For  the  purpose  of 
getting  high  grades."  He  does  not  connect  the  rule  with 
its  more  remote  normal  purposes,  such  as  correct  and 
pleasing  expression  of  thought  and  a  better  understanding 
of  written  and  spoken  language,  which  give  the  essential 
normal  meaning  to  the  correct  use  of  verbs. 

Since  under  the  condition  of  extrinsic  interest  a  person 
uses  a  thing  in  an  abnormal  way  and  thereby  acquires 
an  abnormal  meaning  for  it,  he  docs  not  by  virtue  of  this 
experience  make  proper  use  of  the  thing  later  when  occa- 
sion calls  for  it.  How  many  pupils  who  have  learned  in 
school  to  be  quiet  merely  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  punish- 
ment and  not  for  the  sake  of  better  study,  are  not  quiet 
in  a  public  library  or  lecture  room?  When  punishment 
does  not  threaten  them,  they  do  not  see  the  use  for  being 
quiet.  The  pupil  who  reads  aloud  only  because  the 
teacher  calls  upon  him  to  do  so,  does  not  understand  the 
true  meaning  of  reading  aloud  and  does  not,  therefore,  as 
a  result  of  this  training,  see  the  advantage  of  reading  aloud 
in  the  family  circle.  If  he  had  read  aloud  in  school  for 


136  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  purpose  of  informing  or  entertaining  others  gathered 
about  him,  he  would  as  a  result  recognize  the  use  of  read- 
ing aloud  in  the  family  circle.  Pupils  who  for  the  sake 
of  securing  good  grades  have  learned  to  do  neat  work  in 
writing  exercises  required  in  the  English  class,  may  do 
slovenly  work  in  recording  notes  for  their  own  use  in  the 
history  or  physics  class,  because  they  have  acquired  an 
abnormal  meaning  for  neat  writing  and  do  not  recognize 
it  as  a  means  to  accuracy  and  clearness  in  expression. 

When  a  means  of  control  acquired  under  the  condition 
of  extrinsic  interest  has  been  transformed  into  an  ideal  by 
receiving  value  from  the  abnormal  end  it  has  served,  this 
ideal  is  narrowly  limited  in  its  influence.  The  fact  that 
an  ideal  may  have  a  wide  influence  by  being  carried  from 
one  field  of  activity  to  another,  as  when  the  ideal  of 
neatness  acquired  in  one  kind  of  work  leads  a  person  to 
be  neat  in  another  kind  of  work,  is  clearly  presented  in 
Professor  Bagley's  discussion  of  formal  discipline.1  An 
ideal  acquired  under  the  condition  of  extrinsic  interest 
does  not,  however,  have  this  wide  influence,  because  the 
situation  which  suggests  it  is  peculiar  to  one  kind  of 
activity.  Pupils  who  in  a  mathematics  class  have  ac- 
quired an  appreciation  of  accuracy  by  using  it  merely 
for  the  sake  of  satisfying  an  exacting  teacher,  are  not 
likely  by  virtue  of  this  experience  to  be  influenced  by  this 
ideal  in  other  fields  of  work,  because  the  teacher  is  the 
factor  in  the  situation  which  suggests  the  ideal.  When 
this  particular  teacher  is  not  present,  they  do  not  become 
conscious  of  the  ideal.  If  they  had  acquired  an  apprecia- 
tion of  accuracy  because  they  had  used  it  as  a  means  for 
eliminating  error  and  securing  more  valuable  results, 
many  situations  would  include  factors  suggesting  to  them 
1  Bagley,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  pp.  210-217. 


Personal  Development  137 

the  ideal  of  accuracy.  This  truth  is  a  matter  of  common 
knowledge  in  prison  reform,  in  which  it  is  recognized  that 
proper  ideals  of  behavior,  if  they  are  to  function  when  the 
prisoner  gains  his  freedom,  must  not  be  those  peculiar  to 
the  prison,  but  must  be  developed  through  intimate 
association  with  purposes  which  give  to  these  ideals  their 
normal  value  in  the  life  beyond  the  prison  walls. 

IV 

The  feeling  of  effort  appears  when  two  or  more  purposes  tend  to 
lead  the  individual  to  act  in  conflicting  ways.  It  means,  therefore, 
divided  attention.  Only  under  the  condition  of  effort  can  the  indi- 
vidual acquire  such  general  regulative  ideals  as  those  of  duty  and 
strength  of  will. 

The  feeling  of  effort  appears  when  two  or  more  purposes 
tend  to  lead  an  individual  to  act  in  conflicting  ways. 
Since  from  the  teleological  point  of  view  the  only  causes 
of  activity  are  final  causes,  i.e.  purposes,  these  purposes 
must  be  responsible  for  the  friction  manifested  in  effort. 
Not  outward  difficulty  arising  from  the  attainment  of 
a  single  end,  but  the  struggle  of  one  purpose  against 
another,  is  the  direct  cause  of  the  feeling  of  effort.  Since 
each  purpose  is  a  source  of  interest,  effort  is  due  to  a  con- 
flict of  interests.  Effort  means,  therefore,  divided  atten- 
tion. It  indicates  that  the  process  of  self-activity  is  not 
running  smoothly.  When  the  pupils  in  a  class  are  en- 
gaged in  a  spelling  match,  interest  may  be  dominant, 
because  the  purposes  which  give  interest  to  the  work  are 
in  the  same  line  of  activity ;  but  if  the  music  of  a  circus 
parade  near  the  schoolhouse  is  heard,  the  spelling  match 
is  continued  with  effort  dominant.  The  activity  of 
listening  to  the  music  and  of  seeing  the  parade,  and  the 
activity  of  carrying  on  the  spelling  match  conflict ;  both 


138  The  Principles  of  Education 

processes  cannot  be  realized  at  the  same  time.  Atten- 
tion becomes  divided  between  the  two.  If  the  spelling 
match  is  abandoned  and  if  the  pupils  go  to  the  street  to 
see  the  parade  and  listen  to  the  music,  effort  gives  way  to 
interest.  If  the  parade  passes  by  and  is  out  of  mind,  the 
spelling  match  may  proceed  with  interest.  Again,  a 
person  experiences  effort  in  studying  when  others  are 
talking  near  him,  because  the  desire  to  listen  to  the 
sounds  of  their  voices  and  the  desire  to  study  tend  to 
lead  him  to  conflicting  activities.  He  cannot  do  both  at 
once ;  each  interferes  with  the  other. 

The  degree  of  effort  felt  is  not  dependent  upon  the 
amount  of  energy  necessary  to  carry  out  the  action.  A 
girl  may  skip  rope  very  energetically  and  feel  no  effort 
in  doing  so,  whereas  a  much  less  amount  of  energy  put 
into  washing  dishes  while  she  can  hear  the  shouts  of  other 
children  at  play,  may  bring  a  strong  feeling  of  effort. 
A  boy  may  with  intense  interest  lie  awake  at  night  plan- 
ning how  to  build  a  hut  and  to  make  a  boat  for  camp  life ; 
but  only  with  great  effort  can  he,  under  otherwise  favor- 
able conditions  for  study,  plan  the  solution  of  an  original 
problem  in  geometry  just  before  an  exciting  ball  game  in 
which  he  is  strongly  interested. 

It  may  appear  sometimes  that  the  amount  of  energy 
expended  in  a  single  line  of  activity  and  the  degree  of 
effort  felt  are  correlative.  But  here  also  effort  is  due  to  a 
conflict  of  purposes.  When  the  individual  has  expended 
much  energy,  the  purpose  of  checking  his  activity  and 
resting  comes  to  consciousness  because  he  feels  fatigue, 
which  can  be  overcome  by  resting.  He  cannot,  however, 
both  act  and  cease  to  act  at  the  same  time ;  his  purposes 
conflict.  If  a  girl  desires  to  continue  skipping  rope  in 
order  to  skip  a  larger  number  of  times  than  a  companion, 


Personal  Development  139 

and  simultaneously  desires  to  stop  in  order  to  relieve  her 
feeling  of  fatigue,  she  experiences  effort  in  keeping  up 
the  activity.  If  at  any  moment  the  desire  to  stop  or 
the  desire  to  continue  skipping  rope  takes  complete  pos- 
session of  her,  the  feeling  of  effort  will  give  way  to  the 
feeling  of  interest.  In  mental  activity,  the  same  holds 
true.  When  an  individual  feels  fatigue  or  discouragement 
in  any  kind  of  study,  the  desire  to  stop  appears.  So  long 
as  this  incipient  purpose  is  present,  the  work  is  continued 
with  effort ;  but,  if  either  the  desire  to  stop  or  the  purpose 
of  continuing  the  study  gets  the  right  of  way  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  other,  effort  gives  way  to  a  feeling  of 
interest.  The  blocking  of  the  will  by  difficulty,  however 
great  it  may  be,  does  not  engender  the  feeling  of  effort, 
unless  out  of  this  blocking  arises  a  conflict  of  purposes. 

Since  purposes  are  of  different  values,  the  conflict  in 
the  case  of  effort  is  between  two  desires,  one  of  which, 
although  strong,  is  felt  to  be  less  worthy  than  the  other. 
Frequently  the  conflict  is  between  immediate  and  remote 
ends,  as,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  a  student  in  the 
library  who  has  a  tendency  to  listen  to  conversation  in- 
truding upon  his  purpose  of  preparing  for  class  discussion, 
or  as  in  the  case  of  a  drunkard  who  experiences  the  con- 
flict between  the  desire  to  drink  an  intoxicant  at  once  and 
the  more  worthy  desire  to  get  greater  values  in  the  more 
remote  future  by  abstaining  from  drinking. 

When  the  realization  of  one  purpose  is  checked  by 
competition  with  another,  other  purposes  may  appear 
along  the  line  of  activity  and  add  their  authority  to  that 
of  the  ideal  which  is  struggling  to  command  conduct. 
When  the  pupil  is  tempted  away  from  the  spelling  match 
by  the  circus  music,  the  purposes  of  securing  the  approval 
of  the  teacher,  victory  in  competition,  higher  grades, 


140  The  Principles  of  Education 

freedom  from  punishment,  etc.,  may  appear.  In  addi- 
tion to  more  specific  purposes  along  the  line  of  activity, 
general  ideals  may  be  acquired  to  help  out  in  just  such 
situations  as  this.  These  general  purposes  are,  as  it  were, 
"  free  lances  "  which  come  to  the  assistance  of  worthy 
purposes  that  are  in  danger  of  being  overcome  in  competi- 
tion with  less  worthy  ones.  Chief  of  these  general  ideals 
is  that  of  duty.  Other  "  free  lances  "  are  indicated  by 
such  terms  as  firmness  of  character,  pluck,  strength  of 
will,  grit.  Because  such  purposes  come  to  the  support 
of  others  which,  without  their  help,  would  be  abandoned 
for  activities  more  immediately  pleasing,  they  are  some- 
times looked  upon  as  disagreeable  taskmasters. 

The  individual  can  acquire  such  general  purposes  as 
that  of  duty  only  through  the  experience  of  effort.  Since 
they  are  acquired  ideals,  they  must  be  originally  means 
of  control  and  receive  values  from  the  ends  which  they 
serve.  These  ends  may  be  freedom  from  social  condemna- 
tion and  the  securing  of  social  approval,  or  they  may  be 
also  the  intrinsic  consequences  which  led  society  to  give  its 
approval  to  such  ideals.  But  these  ends  must  be  acquired 
under  the  condition  of  effort.  Unless  the  idea  of  duty 
is  used  to  overcome  a  conflict  of  purposes,  the  individual 
does  not  even  know  what  duty  means.  Because  these 
general  purposes  can  be  developed  only  under  the  condition 
of  effort,  James  says : 

Keep  the  faculty  of  effort  alive  in  you  by  a  little  gratuitous  exercise 
every  day.  That  is,  be  systematically  ascetic  or  heroic  in  little  un- 
necessary points,  do  every  day  or  two  something  for  no  other  reason 
than  that  you  would  rather  not  do  it,  so  that  when  the  hour  of  dire 
need  draws  nigh,  it  may  find  you  not  unnerved  and  untrained  to 
stand  the  test.  Asceticism  of  this  sort  is  like  the  insurance  which  a 
man  pays  on  his  house  and  goods.  The  tax  does  him  no  good  at  the 
time,  and  possibly  may  never  bring  him  a  return.  But  if  the  fire  does 


Personal  Development  141 

come,  his  having  paid  it  will  be  his  salvation  from  ruin.  So  with  the 
man  who  has  daily  inured  himself  to  habits  of  concentrated  attention, 
energetic  volition,  and  self-denial  in  unnecessary  things.  He  will 
stand  like  a  tower  when  everything  rocks  around  him,  and  when  his 
softer  fellow-mortals  are  winnowed  like  chaff  in  the  blast.1 

It  would  seem,  however,  that  abundant  opportunities  for 
effort  appear  in  the  normal  activities  of  everyday  life, 
so  that  it  is  unnecessary  for  a  person  to  go  out  of  his  way 
to  find  "  gratuitous  exercise." 

Effort,  if  persisted  in  long  enough,  will  disappear,  leav- 
ing the  condition  of  interest.  When  purposes  farther 
along  the  line  of  activity  and  general  ideals,  such  as  that 
of  duty,  are  called  to  mind  in  support  of  some  purpose 
in  its  struggle  against  a  less  worthy  one,  they  give  to  this 
purpose  which  they  support  richer  value,  because  this 
purpose,  regarded  now  as  a  means  of  attaining  the  more 
remote  ends  of  the  act  and  of  realizing  such  general  ideals 
as  that  of  duty,  receives  additional  value  from  its  inti- 
mate association  with  these  ends.  As  a  result,  the  worthy 
purpose  having  been  made  still  more  worthful  gains  so 
complete  a  command  of  action  that  the  desire  coming 
into  conflict  with  it  cannot  intrude  upon  it  again.  The 
process  of  self -activity  will  then  run  smoothly  and  interest 
will  be  felt. 


While  interest  and  effort  are  of  no  value  in  themselves,  the  con- 
dition of  interest  in  more  favorable  to  personal  development,  with 
the  exception  that  Hiich  regulative  ideals  a.s  duty  and  strength  of  will 
can  be  acquired  only  under  the  condition  of  effort. 

Neither  interest  nor  effort  is  of  any  value  in  itself; 
they  merely  indicate  whether  the  self-active  process  is 
1  James,  William,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  126. 


142  The  Principles  of  Education 

running  smoothly  or  with  difficulty.  Whether  smooth 
running  or  conflict  is  desirable  depends  upon  the  char- 
acter of  the  realization  at  the  time.  A  person  may  be 
interested  in  things  that  are  bad  as  well  as  in  things  that 
are  good.  The  matter  of  prime  importance  is  the  attain- 
ing of  personal  development  through  the  realization  of 
the  most  worthful  purposes.  Smooth  running  when  the 
purposes  are  unworthy,  or  when  the  individual  avoids 
effort  by  abandoning  half-finished  tasks  because  allure- 
ments to  other  activities  appear,  is  undesirable.  If  in- 
terest marks  concentration  for  valuable  achievement,  it 
is  desirable.  If  effort  means  unnecessary  checking  of 
activity  in  the  service  of  worthy  purposes,  if  it  means 
tasks  that  are  mere  tasks,  it  is  bad.  Interest  and  effort 
mark  conditions  similar  to  those  of  peace  and  war.  Peace 
in  a  nation  may  be  good  under  some  circumstances  and 
bad  under  others ;  war  may  be  just  as  well  as  unjust. 

The  condition  of  effort  is  necessary  for  the  development 
of  certain  general  ideals  such  as  duty  and  strength  of  will, 
but  the  condition  of  interest  is  necessary  for  the  best 
development  through  the  realization  of  other  ideals. 
When  the  individual  feels  effort  in  the  study  of  history 
and  geography,  he  may  be  developing  general  ethical 
ideals  which  will  steady  him  in  his  path  of  self-realization 
and  thereby  add  fiber  to  his  moral  nature,  but  he  is  not 
making  the  progress  in  history  and  geography  that  he 
would  make  if  he  felt  interest  in  the  work.  As  Goethe 
says,  "  Talent  is  developed  in  quietude ;  character  in 
the  turmoil  of  the  world."  A  talent  is  developed  better 
in  quietude,  because  in  such  conditions  its  development 
is  less  liable  to  be  hindered  by  the  appearance  of  distract- 
ing desires.  On  the  other  hand,  the  multifarious  interests 
of  the  world  involve  many  distracting  desires  that  may 


Personal  Development  143 

be  overcome,  and  thus  furnish  the  conditions  necessary 
for  the  development  of  regulative  ideals,  which  are  essen- 
tial to  strength  of  character. 

When  effort  is  largely  predominant  in  the  life  of  an 
individual,  he  misses  the  joy  of  living  which  marks  the 
pathway  of  interest.  Pleasurable  satisfaction  comes  from 
the  attainment  of  ideals;  but  he  is  concerned,  in  a 
large  measure,  with  overcoming  conflict  between  ideals. 
As  a  consequence,  the  effort-burdened  individual  is  liable 
to  become  "  dull,  stubborn,  unalert."  This  truth  is 
recognized  in  the  saying,  "  All  work  and  no  play  makes 
Jack  a  dull  boy." 

VI 

Character-building,  which  is  personal  development  viewed  from 
the  subjective  side,  consists  in  acquiring  purposes  together  with 
the  ability  to  use  means  of  control  in  realizing  them. 

In  the  process  of  personal  development,  character  is 
built.  Character,  as  has  been  said,  is  personal  develop- 
ment viewed  from  the  side  of  inner  personality,  the  sub- 
jective side.  It  marks  the  potentialities  of  the  individual 
for  social  action ;  or,  in  other  words,  what  he  can  be  ex- 
pected to  do.  What  he  can  be  expected  to  do  depends 
upon  his  purposes  and  means  of  control.  The  essentials 
of  good  character  are,  therefore,  both  good  purposes  and 
a  command  of  the  means  of  realizing  them.  Evil  pur- 
poses make  the  criminal,  who  is  often  very  capable  in 
control,  but  may  use  this  ability  to  deprive  men  unjustly 
of  their  property  and  even  of  their  lives.  Inefficient 
control  coupled  with  good  purposes  makes  the  inefficient 
man  of  good  intentions,  who  also  is  a  detriment  to  social 
welfare.  The  well-meaning  but  inefficient  doctor  may 
cause  unnecessary  suffering  and  even  death.  The  well- 


144  The  Principles  of  Education 

meaning  but  inefficient  lawyer  may  not  secure  justice 
for  his  client.  The  well-meaning  but  inefficient  philan- 
thropist may  increase  the  very  evils  he  seeks  to  destroy. 

Day  by  day,  the  individual  builds  his  character  as  he 
acquires  new  purposes  and  new  means  of  control  through 
the  self-active  process.  They  stand  ready  with  full 
authority  to  command  and  guide  his  activity,  whenever 
their  services  are  needed.  The  fact  that  the  values  of 
purposes,  when  once  acquired,  are  appreciated  immedi- 
ately1 marks  the  truth  of  Aristotle's  statement  that  the 
good  is  what  appears  to  be  such  to  the  good  man. 
Through  the  use  of  means  in  the  service  of  worthy  ends 
and  the  transfer  of  values  to  these  means  so  as  to  make 
them  ideals,  the  web  of  values  has  been  woven  in  the 
experience  of  the  good  man  so  that  he  appreciates  the 
good  immediately. 

The  fact  that  acquired  meanings,  after  they  have  been 
worked  out  consciously  in  solving  problems  arising  from 
difficulties  in  action,  are  recognized  immediately2  marks 
the  truth  of  James's  words, 3  when  he  says :  "As  we  become 
permanent  drunkards  by  so  many  separate  drinks,  so 
we  become  saints  in  the  moral,  and  authorities  and 
experts  in  the  practical  and  scientific  spheres,  by  so  many 
separate  acts  and  hours  of  work.  Let  no  youth  have  any 
anxiety  about  the  upshot  of  his  education,  whatever  the 
line  of  it  may  be.  If  he  keep  faithfully  busy  each  hour 
of  the  working-day,  he  may  safely  leave  the  final  result 
to  itself.  He  can  with  perfect  certainty  count  on  waking 
up  some  fine  morning,  to  find  himself  one  of  the  compe- 
tent ones  of  his  generation,  in  whatever  pursuit  he  may 
have  singled  out.  Silently,  between  all  the  details  of  his 
business,  the  power  of  judging  in  all  that  class  of  matter 
1  See  pp.  70-72.  2  See  p.  120.  3  James,  opus  cit.,  p.  127. 


Personal  Development  145 

will  have  built  itself  up  within  him  as  a  possession  that 
will  never  pass  away." 

Both  purposes  and  means  of  control  must  be  used 
normally  in  building  and  maintaining  an  efficient  char- 
acter. The  sentimentalist  uses  his  purposes  merely  as 
means  to  pleasurable  feeling  and  abandons  them  as  soon 
as  this  pleasure  has  been  enjoyed.  He  may  feel  satis- 
faction in  weeping  over  human  suffering  in  the  theater, 
but  does  nothing  to  relieve  suffering  to  which  the  play 
calls  his  attention  in  the  life  about  him.  He  may  enjoy 
the  excitement  of  some  stirring  novel  of  sacrifice  for  the 
sake  of  an  ideal,  but  does  not  lift  a  finger  to  realize  in 
his  own  life  values  for  which  the  novel  has  aroused  his 
emotions.  He  may  feel  enthusiastic  in  listening  to  an 
eloquent  appeal  for  extension  of  the  benefits  of  his  reli- 
gion to  the  heathen,  but  does  not  even  put  an  offering  on 
the  contribution  plate.  As  a  result,  he  weakens  his 
purposes;  he  strips  them  of  authority  to  command  his 
action ;  he  becomes  blase.  Pleasure-seeking  through  the 
abnormal  use  of  purposes,  if  persisted  in,  defeats  itself. 
Verily,  purposes  are  kept  alive  only  through  activity 
directed  to  the  realization  of  them  as  ends.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  mere  theorist  uses  means  of  control  abnormally 
by  treating  them  as  ends  in  themselves.  His  desire  is  only 
to  get  a  knowledge  of  them,  not  to  use  them  in  the  service 
of  those  purposes  upon  which  their  meanings  depend  and 
in  the  realizing  of  which  their  truth  is  tested.  As  a  result, 
he  weakens  his  control ;  he  gets  perverted  meanings ;  he 
becomes  unpractical.  Mere  knowledge-seeking  tends  to 
defeat  itself.  Popular  judgment  made  no  mistake  when, 
in  an  age  in  which  mere  knowledge  was  sought  as  the  aim 
of  education,  it  attached  to  the  word  "  professor  "  the 
stigma  of  unpractically. 


146  The  Principles  of  Education 

VII 

World-building,  which  is  personal  development  viewed  from  the 
objective  side,  consists  in  making  objective  and  permanent  the 
meanings  and  purposes  acquired  in  personal  development,  by 
associating  these  meanings  and  purposes  so  intimately  with  things 
of  the  world  that  they  appear  to  be  inherent  in  these  things  and 
to  constitute  the  essential  nature  of  them. 

In  the  process  of  personal  development,  the  individual 
builds  the  world  in  which  he  consciously  lives,  the  world 
as  he  knows  and  appreciates  it.  As  Davidson  says: 
"  That  the  human  being  will,  under  any  circumstances, 
build  up  some  kind  of  a  world  is  clear.  To  a  large  extent 
he  does  so  unconsciously,  and  without  any  effort.  But 
there  are  worlds  and  worlds.  The  world  of  the  street 
waif  who  picks  pockets  and  goes  to  the  reformatory  or 
jail  is  very  different  from  the  world  of  the  great  scien- 
tist, philosopher,  artist,  or  statesman."  l 

Things  hold  for  us  the  meanings  which,  in  our  personal 
development,  we  acquire  and  associate  with  them.  In 
the  study  of  how  means  of  control  are  made,  we  found 
that  uses,  or  meanings,  become  so  intimately  associated 
with  the  things  involved  that  these  uses,  or  meanings, 
appear  as  inherent  in  the  things.  When  an  individual 
looks  at  a  thing,  he  seems  to  see  directly  the  meaning  of 
it.  A  book  appears  as  something  to  be  read,  a  watch  as 
something  with  which  to  tell  the  time,  a  rule  of  grammar 
as  something  to  make,  in  a  particular  manner,  the  expres- 
sion of  language  more  exact  and  intelligible.  In  this 
way,  as  the  individual  finds  new  uses  for  things,  he  builds 
their  meanings,  which  constitute  their  essential  nature. 
This  fact  points  to  the  truth  in  Davidson's  statement  that 

1  Davidson,  Thomas,  Education  as  World-Building,  Educational 
Review,  Vol.  XX,  p.  329. 


Personal  Development  147 

"  every  world  is  a  means  of  satisfying  desire  and  derives 
all  the  significance  it  possesses  from  such  desire."  l 

Things  not  only  hold  meanings;  they  hold  also  the 
purposes  which,  in  our  personal  development,  we  acquire 
and  associate  with  them.  As  means  of  control  take  on 
ideal  values  from  the  ends  they  serve,  the  meanings  of 
the  things  involved  gain  an  immediate  value  which  trans- 
forms these  meanings  into  purposes.  Thus,  when  a  cup 
of  chocolate  is  placed  before  a  person  at  a  social  gather- 
ing, he  may  not  merely  recognize  its  meaning  as  something 
to  be  drunk,  but  may  have  at  once  the  purpose  of  drink- 
ing it.  When  an  individual  sees  a  book,  he  may  not  only 
recognize  it  as  something  to  be  read ;  but  the  sight  of 
the  book,  if  more  authoritative  desires  do  not  prevent, 
may  carry  with  it  the  purpose  of  reading.  As  soon  as 
he  sees  the  book,  he  may  say  "  I  desire  to  read  it." 

Things  make  up  the  world,  and  because  things  are  the 
bearers  of  meanings  and  purposes  acquired  in  personal 
development,  the  world  which  a  person  knows  and  ap- 
preciates is  the  objective  record  of  his  own  development. 
He  sees  meanings  and  values  in  his  world  because  he  has 
first  put  them  there.  "  All  things  are  common  to  him 
who  sees  with  common  eyes."  If  he  has  put  only  com- 
mon meanings  and  values  into  things,  he  can  see  in  them 
only  that  which  is  common.  Many  soldiers  in  Napo- 
leon's army  may  have  seen  in  the  pyramids  of  Egypt  only 
huge  piles  of  stone,  but  Napoleon  is  said  to  have  exclaimed, 
"  Soldiers,  from  yonder  pyramids  forty  centuries  look 
down  upon  you !  "  He  saw  this  because  he  had  built  in 
his  world  the  meanings  and  values  of  the  wonderful 
civilization  that  once  crowned  the  valley  of  the  Nile, 
meanings  and  values  of  which  the  pyramids  are  enduring 

1  Davidson,  Thomas,  opus  cit.,  p.  332. 


148  The  Principles  of  Education 

symbols.  Alluding  to  Moses  and  the  burning  bush,  Mrs. 
Browning  says : 

Earth's  crammed  with  heaven, 

And  every  common  bush  afire  with  God ; 

But  only  he  who  sees  takes  off  his  shoes.1 

How  is  it  possible  for  a  person  to  see  such  things?  Cer- 
tainly not  by  merely  opening  his  eyes  and  looking.  Out 
of  his  daily  activities  in  realizing  purposes  through  means 
of  control,  he  must  create  the  halos  which  make  common 
objects  divinely  significant.  The  fiat  of  his  will  when  he 
accepts  a  meaning  as  true  or  a  purpose  as  valuable  is 
verily  the  fiat  of  a  creator  making  the  heavens  and  the 
earth  and  the  things  that  in  them  dwell.  These  things 
are  more  than  mere  objects  of  sensation;  their  inner 
essential  natures  are  their  meanings  and  values,  which  the 
individual  creates  in  the  process  of  personal  development. 

The  world  which  an  individual  knows  includes  both 
matter  and  mind.  Reduced  to  its  lowest  terms,  matter 
is  a  permanent  possibility  of  sensation  common  to  all 
people.  This  is  because  every  person,  whether  child  or 
adult,  savage  or  civilized  man,  is  endowed  by  nature  with 
the  common  meaning  that  matter  is  something  to  be  looked 
at,  or  felt,  or  sensed  in  some  other  way.  He  must  have 
this  meaning  in  order  to  be  conscious  of  matter  at  all. 
Then,  as  he  develops  new  uses  for  material  things,  he 
acquires  new  meanings  for  them. 

The  minds  of  other  persons  are  never  known  directly, 
but  only  through  the  medium  of  matter.  The  price  which 
every  person  must  pay  for  his  individuality  is  that  he  can 
never  know  directly  the  mind  of  any  one  else.  He  is 
immediately  conscious  of  other  bodies,  but  the  existence 
1  Browning,  Elizabeth  Barrett,  Aurora  Leigh,  Bk.  III. 


Personal  Development  149 

of  other  minds  is  only  an  assumption,  an  hypothesis  that 
works  in  the  control  of  his  experience.  He  must  assume 
the  existence  of  other  minds  in  order  to  realize  his  ideals 
of  sympathy  and  love,  and  in  order  to  understand  and 
control  the  activities  of  others.  By  accepting  this  hy- 
pothesis and  acting  upon  it,  he  makes  it  into  a  reality  in 
his  world.  So  real  does  this  hypothesis  become  that  he 
may  have  to  take  a  second  thought  in  order  to  convince 
himself  that  he  does  not  know  other  minds  directly. 

Because  new  means  of  control  are  hypotheses  that 
work,  that  bear  the  test  of  action,  and  because  these  hypoth- 
eses are  derived  through  analogy  from  other  means  of 
control,1  the  meanings  of  the  world  as  we  know  them  form 
a  great  web  of  analogies.  Confronted  by  multifarious 
active  things,  —  flying  .birds,  rippling  brooks,  rolling 
stones,  moving  sun,  moon,  and  stars,  —  primitive  man 
naturally  attempted  to  explain  the  activities  of  these 
things  through  analogy  with  his  inner  experience  of  the 
causes  of  his  own  activity.  This  led  to  his  belief  in 
animism ;  he  attributed  to  all  objects  minds,  spirits,  like 
his  own.  He  believed  that  he  could  control  natural 
objects  by  propitiating,  by  "  getting  on  the  good  side  of," 
these  spirits.  Regarding  certain  classes  of  objects  as 
inanimate,  civilized  man  eliminated  thought  and  feeling 
from  the  hypothesis  which,  under  the  assumption  of 
animism,  had  been  used  to  explain  the  changes  in  these 
objects.  This  left  in  the  hypothesis  only  blind  will,  or 
energy,  which  was  considered  the  "efficient  "  cause  of 
changing  phenomena.  A  person  cannot  directly  see  force, 
or  cause,  in  changing  phenomena  of  the  material  world. 
Just  as  truly  as  he  reads  into  other  persons  his  own 
thoughts  and  feelings  in  order  to  understand  their  con- 

1  See  p.  110. 


150  The  Principles  of  Education 

duct,  he  reads  into  inanimate  objects  his  own  inner  ex- 
perience of  energy  stripped  of  thought  and  feeling,  in 
order  to  explain  the  changes  in  these  objects.  This  fact 
is  evident  whether  he  accounts  for  the  phenomena  of  two 
freight  cars  bumping  together  or  of  the  activities  of  atoms 
and  molecules.  That  the  meanings  of  the  world  as  we 
know  them  form  a  great  web  of  analogies  appears,  there- 
fore, even  in  the  derivation  of  the  scientific  concept  of 
material  cause  from  analogy  with  inner  experience. 

When  matter  was  greatly  enriched  through  the  sciences, 
each  new  science,  guided  by  analogy,  borrowed  its  hy- 
potheses, and  therefore  its  truths,  from  other  scientific 
truths  previously  established.  The  matter  and  motion 
of  physics  became  thus  a  basis  for  hypotheses  which 
explain  chemical  changes;  the  truths  of  chemistry  be- 
came a  basis  for  hypotheses  which  explain  biological 
changes;  and  the  truths  of  biology  became  a  basis  for 
hypotheses  which,  according  to  psychology,  explain 
mental  changes. 

Things  become  more  closely  related  as  their  meanings 
develop,  because  they  become  organized  with  reference  to 
purposes  which  they  are  found  to  serve.  The  individual 
thus  organizes  his  world  in  a  large  degree  without  deliber- 
ately seeking  to  do  so,  but  he  carries  this  organization 
much  further  because  he  has  an  inborn  desire  to  do  so. 
This  inborn  desire  appears  as  curiosity,  pure  scientific 
interest,  and  philosophic  wonder.  It  is  strengthened  by 
acquired  values.  For  the  same  reason  that  a  mechanic 
who  uses  many  tools  can  do  more  effective  work  by  ar- 
ranging his  tools  in  an  orderly  way,  so  the  individual,  by 
organizing  his  means  of  control  in  general,  can  more 
effectively  realize  purposes.  This  fact  gives  to  the  organ- 
izing of  means  of  control  an  added  value.  Thus  through 


Personal  Development  151 

both  native  and  acquired  desire,  the  individual  longs  for 
unity.  The  strange  object,  that  which  has  not  yet  been 
given  a  place  in  the  unified  world  as  he  knows  it,  excites 
his  curiosity  and  troubles  him  until  he  has  classified  it 
and  thereby  assigned  it  a  place.  Even  in  the  realm  of 
feeling,  this  desire  for  order  appears.  He  combines 
sounds  into  rhythm  and  melody,  colors  into  harmony,  and 
his  art  is  satisfactory  only  when  it  has  unity.  In  the 
special  sciences,  he  finds  principles  which  organize  mean- 
ings by  grouping  them  in  classes ;  in  philosophy,  he  seeks 
principles  which  will  bring  all  reality  into  a  unified  whole. 
With  the  progress  of  personal  development,  the  world 
which  the  individual  knows  and  appreciates  becomes  a 
permanent,  objective  organization  of  the  meanings  and 
purposes  which  guide  his  activity.  It  is  an  objective 
system  of  plans  of  action  in  which  the  relative  values  of 
these  plans  of  action,  as  he  appreciates  them,  are  apparent. 
As  Davidson  says,  "  The  evolution  of  the  individual  is 
the  evolution  of  an  ordered  world  in  his  consciousness."  l 


VIII 

From  the  materialistic  point  of  view,  the  development  of  reac- 
tions to  environment  is  the  physical  counterpart  of  personal  de- 
velopment. In  its  account  of  the  process  through  which  reactions 
are  developed,  natural  science  gives  authority  to  the  fact  that 
the  condition  of  intrinsic  interest  is  more  favorable  to  personal 
development  than  is  the  condition  of  effort,  excepting  for  the 
acquiring  of  general  regulative  ideals  such  as  duty,  and  it  gives 
authority  also  to  the  fact  that,  in  tho  process  of  personal  develop- 
ment, the  character  of  the  individual  and  the  world  of  which  he  id 
conscious,  arc  built. 

Let  us  now  view  our  conclusions  in  the  light  of  natural 
science.    The  physical  counterpart  of  the  process  of  per- 
1  Davidson,  Thomas,  opus  cit.,  p.  331. 


152  The  Principles  of  Education 

sonal  development  is,  according  to  natural  science,  the 
process  of  progressive  adjustment  of  the  psychophysical 
organism  to  the  environment,  through  stimuli  and  re- 
sponses. As  Miinsterberg  says,  in  writing  from  the 
natural  science  point  of  view,  "  The  development  of  our 
reactions  is  our  life  history."  In  explaining  the  develop- 
ment of  reactions,  natural  science  supports  the  conclu- 
sions reached  above  with  regard  to  the  nature  of  interest 
and  of  effort,  the  nature  of  character-building,  and  the 
nature  of  world-building. 

Interest  is  the  feeling  side  of  attention ;  when  we  feel 
an  interest  in  a  thing,  we  are  attending  to  it.  Since 
interest  and  attention  are  thus  inseparable,  the  materialistic 
explanation  of  the  changes  in  the  nervous  system  ac- 
companying attention  must  be  also  the  explanation  of 
the  changes  in  the  nervous  system  accompanying  interest. 
With  regard  to  the  physical  conditions  that  parallel 
attention,  Miinsterberg  says:  "Our  nervous  system  is 
organized  in  such  a  way  that  if  we  do  a  certain  thing  all 
the  opposite  actions  are  inhibited.  The  channels  of  motor 
discharge  are  somehow  blocked  for  them.  If  it  were  not 
so,  attention  would  not  be  possible.  Now  we  only  have 
to  come  back  to  our  previous  claim,  that  those  ideas 
become  vivid  which  find  the  ways  for  action  open  and 
those  ideas  are  suppressed  which  find  the  channels  of 
activity  closed.  The  whole  process  of  attention  is  then  ex- 
plained." 1  Interest  then  appears  when  there  is  a  single 
channel  open  for  activity.  Since  this  open  channel  is 
marked  on  the  side  of  consciousness  by  a  purpose,  the 
source  of  interest  must  appear,  from  the  teleological  point 
of  view,  to  be  in  a  purpose. 

Extrinsic  interest,  as  we  have  learned,  marks  reactions 
1  Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  p.  159. 


Personal  Development  153 

to  abnormal  situations,  whereas  intrinsic  interest  marks 
reactions  to  normal  situations.  Since  habit  is  a  connec- 
tion between  specific  stimuli  and  response,  an  habitual 
reaction  formed  in  response  to  the  stimuli  of  one  situation 
is  not  called  forth  by  the  stimuli  of  a  different  situation. 
In  the  degree,  then,  that  the  abnormal  situation  is  differ- 
ent from  the  normal  one,  the  organism  that  has  acquired 
its  reactions  under  abnormal  conditions  will  be,  to  that 
extent,  unresponsive  to  the  situations  to  which  these 
reactions  normally  belong.  This  fact  supports  the  state- 
ment that  the  person  who  has  learned  a  thing  only  under 
the  condition  of  extrinsic  rather  than  intrinsic  interest, 
does  not  make  proper  use  of  the  thing  when  occasion  calls 
for  it. 

Effort  appears  when  the  organism  tends  to  react  in 
conflicting  ways.  Effort  is  a  condition  of  divided  atten- 
tion, and  since  attention  is  in  the  line  of  activity,  divided 
attention  must  mean  divided,  or  conflicting,  activity.  In 
the  case  of  fatigue,  the  conflict  may  be  merely  between  a 
reaction  and  its  inhibition,  for  "any  fatigue  sensation  works 
as  a  stimulus  for  the  opposite  reaction."  1  Owing  to  the 
fact  that  "  our  nervous  system  grows  to  the  modes  in 
which  it  has  been  exercised,"  -  the  successful  reaction 
following  a  conflict  of  responses  opens  a  single  way  for 
later  nervous  discharges  under  that  situation,  so  that  in 
time  the  physical  conditions  of  effort  tend  to  give  way  to 
the  physical  conditions  of  interest. 

The  condition  of  interest  is  more  favorable  to  progres- 
sive adjustment  of  the  organism  to  the  environment, 
because,  under  this  condition,  the  process  of  adjustment  is 
not  interrupted  by  a  conflict  of  activities.  Since  personal 

1  Miinsterberg,  HURO,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  p.  161. 

1  James,  William,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  112. 


154  The  Principles  of  Education 

development  is  the  teleological  counterpart  of  this  adjust- 
ment, the  condition  of  interest  is  better  for  personal 
development.  There  is  one  exception,  however.  The 
responses  which  assist  in  overcoming  conflicts  of  activi- 
ties, and  thereby  are  useful  in  adjustment,  can  be  de- 
veloped only  under  conditions  in  which  such  conflicts 
appear.  From  the  teleological  side,  this  means  that  such 
ideals  as  duty  can  be  developed  only  under  conditions  of 
effort. 

In  the  progressive  adjustment  of  the  organism  to  en- 
vironment, the  physical  counterpart  of  personal  develop- 
ment, character  is  built.  A  quotation  from  James's 
Principles  of  Psychology  will  serve  to  show  this. 

The  physiological  study  of  mental  conditions  is  thus  the  most 
powerful  ally  of  hortatory  ethics.  The  hell  to  be  endured  hereafter, 
of  which  theology  tells,  is  no  worse  than  the  hell  we  make  for  our- 
selves in  this  world  by  habitually  fashioning  our  characters  in  the 
wrong  way.  Could  the  young  but  realize  how  soon  they  will  become 
mere  walking  bundles  of  habits,  they  would  give  more  heed  to  their 
conduct  while  in  the  plastic  stage.  We  are  spinning  our  own  fates, 
good  or  evil,  and  never  to  be  undone.  Every  smallest  stroke  of 
virtue  or  of  vice  leaves  its  never  so  little  scar.  The  drunken  Rip 
Van  Winkle,  in  Jefferson's  play,  excuses  himself  for  every  fresh 
dereliction  by  saying,  '  I  won't  count  this  time ! '  Well !  he  may 
not  count  it,  and  a  kind  Heaven  may  not  count  it;  but  it  is  being 
counted  none  the  less.  Down  among  his  nerve-cells  and  fibres,  the 
molecules  are  counting  it,  registering  and  storing  it  up  to  be  used 
against  him  when  the  next  temptation  comes.  Nothing  we  ever  do 
is,  in  strict  scientific  literalness,  wiped  out.1 

Since  habits  are  the  physical  counterparts,  under  proper 
conditions,  of  both  purposes  and  means  of  control,  the 
fact  that  the  building  of  a  good  character  is  the  acquiring 
of  habits  which  harmoniously  adjust  the  organism  to  the 
1  James,  William,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  127. 


Personal  Development  155 

environment  means  on  the  teleological  side  that  the  build- 
ing of  a  good  character  is  the  acquiring  of  good  purposes 
and  the  ability  to  use  means  of  control  effectively  in 
realizing  them. 

The  connecting  of  habitual  responses  with  stimuli  in 
the  process  of  the  adjusting  of  the  organism  to  the  en- 
vironment is  the  physical  parallel  of  world-building. 
Since  sensation  parallels  a  stimulus  and  since  meaning 
and  purpose  are  counterparts  of  the  habitual  response, 
the  intimate  connection  of  stimulus  and  response  cor- 
responds to  the  reading  of  meaning  and  purpose  into 
sense  impression.  This  constitutes  the  developing  of  the 
meanings  and  values  of  things,  which  are  the  objects  of 
sensation,  and  is,  therefore,  world-building.  The  organ- 
izing of  the  world  is  the  mental  counterpart  of  organizing 
habits  of  response. 

The  time  when  fundamental  acquired  reactions  are 
being  formed,  natural  science  calls  the  period  of  plasticity, 
the  period  when  physical  changes  in  the  brain  and  nervous 
system  are  most  easily  made.  From  the  teleological  point 
of  view,  this  appears  as  the  time  when  the  foundation  of 
the  individual's  character  and  world  are  being  laid,  when 
those  meanings  are  being  developed  which  become  the 
bases  through  analogy  of  other  meanings,  and  when  those 
purposes  are  being  developed  which,  in  turn,  give  values 
to  other  purposes.  In  time,  these  meanings  and  pur- 
poses are  held  fast  in  experience  by  threads  of  connection 
running  through  the  whole  fabric  of  the  individual's 
character  and  world.  At  the  beginning,  their  variation 
is  easy ;  but,  with  the  growth  of  experience,  every  means 
and  every  purpose  becomes  bound  in  place  by  its  manifold 
connections  with  a  multiplicity  of  others. 


156  The  Principles  of  Education 

REFERENCES 

DEWEY,  J.,  Interest  as  Related  to  Will,  1895,  pp.  5-26.  (Explains  the 
nature  of  interest.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  Moral  Principles  in  Education,  1909,  pp.  1-17,  47-58. 
(Explains  from  the  point  of  view  of  education  the  nature  of  a  good 
character.) 

ELIOT,  C.  W.,  Education  for  Efficiency,  1909,  pp.  33-55.  (Gives  a 
modern  statement  of  the  nature  of  culture.) 

MOORE,  E.  C.,  What  is  Education?  1915,  pp.  104-141.  (Shows  that 
as  the  individual  develops  he  builds  a  world  in  his  experience.) 

DAVIDSON,  T.,  Education  as  World-Building,  Educational  Review, 
Vol.  XX,  pp.  325-345.  (Shows  that  as  the  individual  develops 
he  builds  a  world  in  his  experience.) 

JAMES,  W.,  The  Principks  of  Psychology,  1904,  Vol.  I,  Ch.  IV.  (Dis- 
cusses individual  development  as  habit  formation.  Each  student 
should  read  this  chapter.) 

PYLE,  W.  H.,  The  Outlines  of  Educational  Psychology,  1911,  pp.  164- 
181.  (Discusses  moral  training  from  the  point  of  view  of  psy- 
chology.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Can  you  make  a  person  attend  to  anything  in  which  he  is  not 
interested  ?    Explain. 

2.  Give  three  instances  in  which  you  were  actuated  by  immediate 
interest  and  three  instances  in  which  you  were  actuated  by  mediate 
interest. 

3.  Give  three  instances  in  which  you  have  acted  with  extrinsic 
interest  and  three  instances  in  which  you  have  acted  with  intrinsic 
interest. 

4.  Give  three  instances  in  which  you  have  experienced  effort 
and  indicate  the  conflicting  purposes  in  each. 

5.  Give  three  instances  in  your  experience  in  which  the  ideal 
of  duty  appeared  in  a  conflict  of  purposes  and  assisted  a  worthy  pur- 
pose to  overcome  an  unworthy  one. 

6.  Must  school  work  be  easy  in  order  to  be  interesting  to  the 
pupils?    Explain. 

7.  In  personal  development  what  is  the  nature  and  importance 
of  the  feeling  of  need  ? 


Personal  Development  157 

8.  A  recent  book  says  with  regard  to  salesmanship :   "The  argu- 
ment that  really  sells  goods  is  the  argument  that  is  based  specifically 
upon  the  needs  of  the  man  you  are  addressing;    the  argument  that 
answers  the  objections  to  your  product  that  exist  in  his  mind;    the 
argument  that  offers  a  satisfactory  supply  for  some  demand  he 
desires  to  fill."     Do  you  believe  that  this  statement  is  true?    Why? 

9.  What  is  the  value  of  corporal  punishment  as  a  method  of  moral 
control  ? 

10.  Is  the  library  regulation  requiring  silence  justifiable,  or  should 
noise  be  permitted  so  that  students  may  develop  greater  powers  of 
concentration  in  study?     Explain. 

11.  a.  What  is  the  most  prominent  argument  made  to  show  that 
effort  should  predominate  in  school  work?     b.  What  answer  would 
you  make  to  this  argument? 

12.  a.  Criticize  the  popular  idea  of  what  constitutes  a  good  moral 
character.     6.  Is  this  popular  idea  changing? 

13.  What  is  culture? 

14.  How  can  strong  initiative  be  cultivated? 

15.  What  is  the  nature  of  individuality? 

16.  Show  that  since  material  objects  are  permanent  possibilities 
of  sensation,  they  become  permanent  objective  memoranda  of  one's 
purposes  and  means  of  control,  and  thereby  guide  one's  daily  activi- 
ties in  the  home,  the  street,  the  office,  the  shop,  etc. 

17.  Which  one  normally  experiences  a  richer  world,  the  boy  of 
sixteen  or  the  man  of  sixty?    Explain. 

18.  What  is  the  relation  between  the  world  and  the  individual? 

19.  Are  the  making  of  purposes  and  the  making  of  means  of  con- 
trol two  distinct  processes  or  two  aspects  of  one  process?     Explain. 


THE   SOCIAL  PROCESS 


CHAPTER  VII 
ANALYSIS   OF   THE   SOCIAL  PROCESS 

Society  furnishes  two  classes  of  patterns,  one  to  guide  the  pro- 
cess through  which  the  individual  acquires  new  purposes,  and  the 
other  to  guide  the  process  through  which  he  acquires  new  means 
of  control.  These  patterns  are  developed  under  social  direction. 
The  best  patterns  for  purposes  are  history  and  the  fine  arts; 
the  best  patterns  for  means  of  control  are  the  sciences.  The 
belief  that  the  most  important  use  of  history,  the  fine  arts,  and 
the  sciences  is  to  give  refined  pleasure  to  the  individual  during  his 
leisure  time,  is  due  to  a  short-sighted  view  that  does  not  disclose 
their  essential  functions. 

I 

In  the  determination  of  what  purposes  and  what  means  of  control 
may  be  acquired  by  the  individual,  society  furnishes,  through  the 
medium  of  matter,  two  kinds  of  patterns,  because  there  are  two  pro- 
cesses to  be  guided. 

In  the  study  of  human  development,  we  come  now  to 
the  social  factor.  The  individual  process  has  been  ex- 
plained, but  this  explanation  does  not  tell  the  whole  story 
of  human  development.  It  accounts  for  how  the  indi- 
vidual acquires  purposes  and  means  of  control,  but  it 
does  not  account  for  what  purposes  and  means  of  control 
he  acquires.  The  latter  is  determined  by  society;  for, 
as  we  have  learned,  the  individual  is  the  agent  through 
whom  social  purposes  and  ideas  are  expressed.1 

Society  guides  the  process  of  individual  development 
by  furnishing  so-called  patterns.  These  patterns  are  the 

»  See  pp.  30-31. 
161 


162  The  Principles  of  Education 

factors  of  the  social  process;  they  guide  individuals  not 
only  to  the  stage  of  development  attained  by  the  race, 
but  also  to  the  experience  of  new  purposes  and  new  means 
of  control  added  year  by  year  to  the  social  stock.  The 
scientific  investigator,  for  example,  acquires  under  social 
guidance  not  only  a  knowledge  of  what  has  been  ac- 
complished in  his  field  of  study  together  with  an  appre- 
ciative understanding  of  the  unsolved  problems,  but 
acquires  also  under  social  guidance  a  scientific  method 
which  enables  him,  on  the  basis  of  this  knowledge,  to 
make  further  progress.  The  problem  of  this  chapter 
is  to  differentiate,  through  analysis  of  the  social  process, 
these  social  factors,  or  patterns,  which  guide  human 
development. 

Society  cannot  give  directly  to  the  individual  new 
purposes  and  means  of  control;  it  can  make  him  con- 
scious of  them  only  by  guiding  the  processes  through 
which  new  purposes  and  new  means  of  control  are  ac- 
quired.1 For  guiding  this  process,  there  must  be  two 
kinds  of  social  patterns,  that  which  guides  the  process 
through  which  new  purposes  are  acquired,  and  that  which 
guides  the  process  through  which  new  means  of  control 
are  acquired.  The  former  guides  the  individual  (1)  to 
feel  the  value  of  some  purpose,  (2)  to  associate  inti- 
mately with  it  a  means  of  control,  and  (3)  to  use  this 
means  in  realizing  the  purpose;  the  latter  guides  him 
(1)  to  experience  a  purpose  in  the  carrying  out  of  which 
he  meets  a  difficulty,  (2)  to  define  the  problem  through 
making  and  testing  an  hypothesis,  (3)  to  solve  the  problem 
through  making  and  testing  an  hypothesis,  and  (4)  to 
use  the  solution  in  carrying  out  the  purpose. 

Under  ordinary  conditions,  the  individual  is  more  in 
1  See  Chs.  IV  and  V. 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process  163 

need  of  guidance  through  some  steps  than  through  others. 
In  acquiring  new  purposes,  he  needs  guidance  especially 
for  the  first  two  steps.  If  the  individual  is  put  into  a 
situation  in  which  he  feels  strongly  a  purpose  and  asso- 
ciates intimately  with  it  a  means  for  its  realization,  he 
usually  passes  on,  without  further  assistance,  through  the 
third  step,  that  of  acting.  Society  may  give  him  special 
assistance  in  the  third  step,  however,  by  making  the 
situation  in  which  he  is  placed  such  that  he  is  not  dis- 
tracted by  conflicting  purposes  and  can,  therefore,  act 
more  easily.  In  acquiring  new  means  of  control,  the 
individual  is  more  in  need  of  guidance  for  the  second  and 
third  steps.  Purposes  which  he  has  acquired  command 
him  to  act  whenever  they  appear  in  consciousness;  a 
demand  for  action  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  every 
purpose.  If  difficulties  stand  in  the  way  of  realizing  these 
purposes,  guidance  is  needed  especially  in  defining  and 
solving  the  problem.  The  fourth  step,  that  of  using  the 
solution,  usually  takes  care  of  itself.  But  here,  also, 
society  may  assist  by  making  the  way  for  action  easy. 
Because  of  these  facts,  the  most  prominent  social  guid- 
ance in  the  making  of  new  purposes  is  that  which  leads 
the  individual  to  associate  intimately  means  of  control 
with  values,  and  the  most  prominent  social  guidance  in 
the  making  of  new  means  of  control  is  that  which  leads 
the  individual  to  define  and  solve  problems. 

Illustrations  which  have  been  given  in  the  discussion 
of  how  new  purposes  and  new  means  of  control  are  ac- 
quired, reveal  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  the  guiding 
influence  of  the  social  factor ;  but,  in  these  cases,  atten- 
tion was  directed  to  the  individual  side.  Several  illus- 
trations may  profitably  be  given  here  with  emphasis 
upon  the  social  side. 


164  The  Principles  of  Education 

Let  us  take  an  instance  in  which  a  child  is  guided  by 
social  influence  to  acquire  the  purpose  of  using  polite 
table  manners.  (1)  His  elders,  according  to  social  custom, 
gather  about  the  table  at  meal  time.  In  this  situation,  he 
becomes  conscious  of  the  purpose  of  eating  with  them. 

(2)  The  admonition  of  his  elders  makes  him  associate 
polite  table  manners  with  his  purpose  as  a  means  of  realiz- 
ing it ;  or  perhaps  the  remembrance  of  having  been  sent 
away  from  the  table  the  day  before  when  he  behaved 
badly,   may  bring  to  his  mind  the  same  association. 

(3)  His  elders  give  him  opportunity  to  use  good  manners 
by  placing  him  at  the  table,  and  make  proper  behavior 
easy  for  him  by  acting  in  exemplary  ways  and  by  putting 
the  cake  beyond  his  reach.     If  his  elders  set  bad  examples 
and  if  the  temptation  to  seize  the  cake  is  not  removed,  the 
child  may  not  be  able  to  act  properly.     Under  ordinary 
conditions,  the  third  step  would  follow  the  other  two 
without  anything  unusual  being  done   to  make   good 
behavior  easy. 

Social  influence  may  guide  a  youth  employed  in  an 
office  or  factory  toward  the  purpose  of  being  industrious 
(1)  by  placing  him  under  conditions  which  make  him 
strongly  conscious  of  the  desire  for  promotion;  (2)  by 
leading  him,  through  the  examples  of  other  employees 
and  the  admonition  of  his  employers,  to  associate  industry 
with  his  desire  as  a  means  of  realizing  it;  and  (3)  by 
giving  him  the  opportunity  to  work  industriously.  If 
distracting  temptations  were  permitted  to  make  con- 
centration upon  his  work  very  difficult,  the  last  step 
might  not  be  taken,  and  the  influence  of  the  first  two 
would,  therefore,  be  lost. 

Passing  from  social  guidance  in  the  acquiring  of  new 
purposes  to  social  guidance  in  the  acquiring  of  new  means 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          165 

of  control,  we  may  consider  an  instance  in  which  an 
individual  is  led  to  understand  that  putting  crude  oil  on 
a  pool  of  stagnant  water  is  a  means  of  avoiding  malarial 
fever.  (1)  If  he  appreciates  the  fact  that  sickness  should 
be  prevented,  his  own  or  his  neighbor's  sickness  due  to 
malarial  fever,  or  a  newspaper  report  of  the  prevalence 
of  this  disease,  may  bring  with  it  a  desire  to  prevent  such 
trouble  in  the  future.  (2)  Through  printed  or  spoken 
words  the  hypothesis  that  the  difficulty  is  due  to  the 
presence  of  mosquitoes  is  presented  to  him.  He  can 
understand  this  hypothesis,  because  of  its  similarity  to 
facts  which  he  has  acquired  regarding  the  spreading  of 
disease  germs.  The  test  he  accepts  as  satisfactory  in 
this  case  may  be  the  agreement  of  medical  experts  con- 
cerning the  truth  of  the  hypothesis.  He  thus  reaches 
the  problem  of  how  to  get  rid  of  mosquitoes.  (3)  In  a 
similar  way,  the  hypothesis  that  crude  oil  on  a  pool  of 
stagnant  water  prevents  it  from  becoming  a  breeding 
place  for  mosquitoes  is  presented  to  him  as  a  solution 
of  the  problem.  He  understands  this  through  its  similar- 
ity to  facts  he  has  learned  about  the  nature  of  insects. 
Here  again  the  test  he  accepts  as  satisfactory  is  the  sup- 
port of  the  hypothesis  by  scientific  experts.  (4)  He  uses 
this  means  in  attaining  his  purpose  of  preventing  the 
recurrence  of  malarial  fever  in  his  neighborhood.  If  the 
illustration  is  modified  so  that  the  first  step  is  the  purpose 
of  merely  knowing  how  to  prevent  malarial  fever,  the 
fourth  step  is  an  act  of  will  by  which  the  individual 
accepts  the  solution  of  the  problem  as  a  fact.  In  either 
case,  the  need  of  social  guidance  is  felt  especially  for  the 
second  and  third  steps.  With  this  guidance,  he  can  acquire 
in  a  very  short  time  a  means  of  control  which  has  been  the 
result  of  years  of  labor  on  the  part  of  scientific  experts. 


166  The  Principles  of  Education 

All  social  guidance  of  the  individual  must  come  through 
the  medium  of  material  objects,  because  material  objects 
alone  are  common  to  the  experience  of  all  individuals. 
Since  the  purposes  and  means  of  control  of  an  individual 
are  intimately  associated  with  material  things,  these 
things  become  the  medium  for  the  social  control  of  his 
experience.  Other  persons  may  control  his  meanings  and 
feelings  of  value  by  manipulating  these  visible  handles, 
as  it  were,  to  which  these  meanings  and  feelings  of  value 
are  attached.  It  is  by  this  manipulation  that  he  is  guided 
to  acquire  further  purposes  and  means  of  control  as  he 
is  made  to  associate  intimately  means  with  ends  or  to 
define  and  solve  problems. 

Words,  which  are  material  things  that  can  be  seen  and 
heard,  are  very  useful  in  guiding  the  individual  processes 
through  which  new  purposes  and  means  of  control  are 
acquired.  They  are  freighted  with  meanings  and  feelings 
of  values  which  have  been  intimately  associated  with 
them  and  which  it  is  their  special  function  to  bear.  The 
close  connection  of  words  with  the  meanings  and  feelings 
they  symbolize  is  kept  alive  by  daily  use.  The  rich 
burden  of  experience  with  which  words  are  connected 
and  the  ease  with  which  they  can  be  manipulated,  make 
them  peculiarly  suited  to  guide  the  process  of  individual 
development.  Like  other  things  words,  however,  hold 
for  the  individual  only  those  meanings  and  values  which 
he  has  already  acquired  for  them  through  the  self -active 
process.  They  do  not  convey  new  purposes  and  new 
meanings  to  him  directly,  but  convey  these  indirectly  by 
guiding  him  through  the  steps  of  the  processes  by  which 
purposes  and  meanings  are  acquired. 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process  167 

II 

Society  leads  the  individual  to  appreciate  social  practices  by 
placing  its  stamp  of  approval  upon  them.  A  natural  result  of  this 
is  formalism,  which  retards  social  progress.  The  function  of 
history  and  the  6ne  arts,  which  are  developed  under  social  direc- 
tion, is  to  free  the  individual  from  formalism  by  leading  him  to 
appreciate  the  intrinsic  values  of  things.  In  doing  this,  history 
reveals  connections  between  means  and  ends  as  they  have  actually 
appeared  in  the  development  of  civilization,  whereas  the  fine 
arts  are  free  to  present  in  imagination  new  connections  between 
things  and  the  values  they  serve. 

The  source  of  all  values,  as  we  have  learned,  is  in  the 
desires  with  which  individuals  are  endowed  by  nature.1 
All  other  desires,  all  other  values,  are  derived  from  these, 
as  feelings  of  worth  are  transferred  from  ends  to  means, 
in  accordance  with  the  process  through  which  new  pur- 
poses are  made.  When  the  connections  between  inborn 
desires  and  the  means  which  the  individual  uses  to  realize 
them  are  so  simple  and  direct  as  to  be  clearly  evident, 
the  means  tend  to  take  on  independent  worth  and  thus 
to  become  ends  in  themselves.  This  fact  appears  in  the 
simple  and  direct  connection  made  in  primitive  times 
between  practice  in  the  use  of  arms  and  a  desire  to  fight. 
In  such  cases,  society  needs  to  guide  the  individual  merely 
in  acquiring  means  of  control ;  the  eventual  change  of  the 
means  into  purposes  takes  care  of  itself.  When  with  the 
growth  of  civilization  the  activities  of  daily  life  have 
become  very  complex,  the  new  means  of  control  invented 
are  so  far  removed  from  the  ultimate  ends  upon  which 
their  values  depend  that  their  connections  with  these 
ends  are  no  longer  directly  evident.  Instances  of  this  fact 
may  be  found  in  the  details  of  modern  governmental 
regulation  and  in  highly  specialized  work  in  factories 

1  See  p.  79  and  pp.  97-98. 


168  The  Principles  of  Education 

under  a  complex  division  of  labor.  This  complexity, 
which  obscures  the  connections  between  means  and  ulti- 
mate ends,  antedates  historical  times.  Even  in  the  case  of 
primitive  peoples,  the  simple  means  of  securing  food, 
shelter,  and  protection  against  enemies,  were  compli- 
cated, because  of  the  superstitious  belief  that  these  means 
must  be  suited  not  only  to  the  material  world,  but  also 
to  a  realm  of  spirits  responsible  for  changes  in  the  material 
world. 

When  the  connections  of  activities  with  the  original 
ends  which  they  served  were  thus  lost  sight  of,  these 
activities  were  not  left  without  authority.  Society  ap- 
proved individuals  who  did  them  and  condemned  indi- 
viduals who  did  not  do  them.  In  this  way,  it  made  them 
the  means  of  securing  social  approval  and  of  avoiding 
social  disapproval,  to  both  of  which  the  individual  is  by 
nature  sensitive.  If  this  did  not  lend  to  the  acts  sufficient 
authority  to  command  conduct,  doing  the  acts  was  made 
a  means  of  avoiding  physical  pain  or  even  death. 

This  intimate  connection  of  arbitrary  consequences  with 
certain  acts  so  as  to  give  these  acts  purposive  values,  came 
about  naturally.  When  individuals  of  the  earlier  genera- 
tions had  come  to  feel  the  values  of  acts  as  ends  in  them- 
selves through  associating  these  acts  with  the  original 
purposes  they  served,  these  individuals  naturally  approved 
those  of  the  next  generations  who  did  the  acts  and  con- 
demned those  who  did  not  do  them.  The  original  purpose 
having  been  lost  sight  of,  the  values  of  things  were  passed 
on  in  the  same  arbitrary  manner.  When  later  genera- 
tions met  new  difficulties  in  doing  these  things  which  they 
had  been  led  to  appreciate  as  means  to  social  approval, 
they  invented  new  means  of  control  to  overcome  these 
difficulties.  In  turn,  they  appreciated  the  new  means  as 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          169 

ends  in  themselves  and  passed  them  on  to  later  genera- 
tions with  no  guidance  as  to  the  values  of  these  things, 
save  the  social  approval  they  gave  to  individuals  who  did 
them.  In  this  way,  the  stock  of  things  which  depended 
for  their  authority  merely  upon  social  approval  accumu- 
lated from  generation  to  generation. 

Let  us  consider  briefly  an  instance  of  this  substitution 
of  social  approval  for  the  intrinsic  values  which  gave  rise 
to  various  forms  of  Latin  study.  In  the  early  part  of  the 
Italian  Renaissance,  Latin  classics  were  used  as  a  means 
for  guiding  people  to  a  fuller  realization  of  human  welfare. 
For  this  reason,  the  study  of  these  classics  received  social 
approval  sufficient  to  cause  its  retention  in  schools  after 
the  original  purpose  had  been  forgotten.  After  difficul- 
ties in  understanding  the  Latin  classics  had  been  over- 
come by  a  systematic  study  of  the  language  itself,  this 
study,  without  reference  to  other  values,  as  the  fact  that 
it  became  purely  formal  shows,  was  continued  in  schools 
because  it  was  socially  approved  as  a  thing  worth  while 
in  itself. 

Even  down  to  the  present  time,  society  has  made  much 
use  of  this  way  of  guiding  individuals  to  feel  the  values  of 
things  by  connecting  these  things  closely  with  social 
approval  or  disapproval.  For  many  of  the  things  that 
we  do  every  day,  we  have  learned  no  other  justification. 
This  method  of  transmitting  appreciations  of  value  was 
especially  strong  in  the  case  of  primitive  peoples,  who  did 
not,  for  the  most  part,  attempt  to  explain  the  values 
of  things  by  connecting  them  with  intrinsic  ends  which 
they  served,  but  rather  taught  them  authoritatively  as 
things  to  be  done.  In  the  initiatory  rites  of  savage 
peoples,  impressive  ceremonies,  in  many  cases  preceded 
by  fasting  and  by  prolonged  silence  on  the  part  of  the 


170  The  Principles  of  Education 

initiates,  made  the  transmission  more  authoritative.  This 
arbitrary  social  guidance,  in  which  the  true  purposes  of 
the  social  practices  were  lost  sight  of,  led  to  all  the  evils 
of  formalism,  and  thus  checked  the  advance  of  civiliza- 
tion, because  practices  which  had  outgrown  their  true 
usefulness  were  still  continued  under  social  guidance 
merely  as  means  to  social  approval.  Change  was  put 
under  the  ban,  and  people  became  "  tradition  bound." 

The  development  of  the  subject  matter  of  history  served 
to  relieve  this  situation.  History  shows  why  things  are 
done  by  revealing  the  connections  of  these  things  as 
means  not  merely  with  social  approval,  but  also  with  the 
remote  consequences  which  alone  are  responsible  for  their 
true  values. 

In  dealing  with  the  various  forms  of  Latin  study 
referred  to  above,  history,  looking  beyond  mere  social 
approval,  would  show  that  the  study  of  the  classics  had 
been  used  to  serve  the  purpose  of  securing  human  welfare, 
and  that,  in  turn,  a  systematic  study  of  the  Latin  language 
had  been  used  to  serve  the  purpose  of  understanding  as 
fully  as  possible  the  content  of  the  classics. 

History  turns  our  attention  to  the  past,  when  social 
life  was  simpler,  and  traces  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion the  new  means  invented  to  overcome  new  difficulties, 
connecting  them  with  the  intrinsic  purposes  which  these 
acts  served  as  means,  down  to  the  intricate  connections 
between  means  and  ends  in  the  present  highly  complex 
civilization.  It  reveals  in  this  way  why  society  was  led 
to  approve  various  acts.  Thus  does  history  give  a  dis- 
criminating sense  of  the  real  worth  of  practices  in  our 
present  social  life,  so  far  as  men  understood  that  worth 
when  they  established  the  practices.  Thus  does  it  free 
social  activities  from  the  conservative  bonds  that  tradi- 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          171 

tion  is  ever  fixing  upon  them;  for  many  of  the  things 
which  tradition  sanctions  may  be  discarded  as  useless  or 
may  be  improved,  when  the  intrinsic  purposes  which  they 
serve  are  known.  In  a  word,  history  helps  to  save  men 
from  blind  tradition,  which  approves  equally  the  useful 
and  the  useless,  the  good  and  the  bad,  if  only  they  once 
become  established  as  social  usages. 

But  even  before  the  day  of  history,  the  development  of 
literature  and  of  the  other  fine  arts  served  to  relieve  the 
situation  in  which  society  arbitrarily  guided  the  individual 
to  appreciate  things  merely  as  means  to  social  approval. 
The  fine  arts  isolate  things  from  the  bewildering  complex 
of  social  action,  and,  by  connecting  these  things  with 
values  which  the  individual  strongly  feels,  lead  him  to 
appreciate  them.  The  Twenty-Third  Psalm,  for  example, 
isolates  the  act  of  following  the  Lord  and  connects  it  with 
various  desirable  results  for  the  attaining  of  which  this 
act  is  represented  to  be  the  means.  In  performing  their 
function,  the  fine  arts  are  not  limited,  as  is  history,  to 
recounting  what  has  actually  happened  in  the  develop- 
ment of  civilization,  but  are  free  to  create  imaginary  situa- 
tions in  which  means  receive  value  from  the  ends  they 
are  represented  to  serve.  In  this  way,  the  fine  arts 
develop  ideals.  The  details  of  how  this  is  done  will  be 
given  in  the  next  chapter.  It  is  sufficient  here  merely 
to  state  that  the  fine  arts  free  the  individual  from  the 
formalism  of  tradition  by  developing  his  appreciations  of 
worth. 

The  making  of  history  and  the  fine  arts  is  done  under 
social  guidance.  In  the  case  of  history,  this  fact  is  clearly 
evident,  because  the  historian  is  dependent  upon  records 
of  the  past  for  the  connections  he  makes  between  purposes 
and  means  of  control.  He  traces  and  records  these  con- 


172  The  Principles  of  Education 

nections  as  society  experienced  them  when  new  means 
were  invented  from  generation  to  generation  in  the  de- 
velopment of  institutional  practices.  Furthermore,  in 
finding  and  interpreting  historical  facts,  he  is  guided  by 
a  technique  created  through  many  generations  of  historical 
investigation  and  by  the  conclusions  which  have  been 
reached  in  previous  historical  investigations  and  socially 
transmitted  to  him  by  means  of  books  and  lectures.  That 
the  fine  arts  are  made  under  social  guidance  is  not  so 
evident,  but,  nevertheless,  is  equally  true.  Works  of 
art,  which  are  patterns  for  new  ideals,  are  attributed  to 
individuals  such  as  Homer,  Raphael,  Michelangelo, 
Shakespeare,  Browning,  and  Tennyson,  who  were  agents 
through  whom  social  values  were  expressed;  but  the 
character  of  the  new  ideals  to  which  these  works  of  art 
lead  depends  upon  the  artist's  place  in  a  developing  social 
order.  The  fact  that  his  poem  or  picture  can  guide  other 
individuals  to  the  same  appreciations  that  he  feels  is 
evidence  that  he  must  connect  means  which  others  already 
understand  with  ends  which  they  appreciate.  He  may, 
however,  represent  these  means  and  values  in  new  com- 
binations, but  even  here  he  is  under  social  guidance, 
because  these  new  combinations  are  based  upon  the 
thoughts  and  feelings  he  has  acquired  socially. 

Ill 

So  long  as  means  of  control  were  developed  by  a  crude  trial  and 
success  method  and  unsystematically  transmitted  through  imita- 
tion as  concrete  facts,  social  progress  was  seriously  limited.  The 
function  of  the  sciences,  which  are  developed  under  social  direction, 
is  to  remove  this  limitation  by  organizing  means  of  control,  by 
transmitting  them  in  the  form  of  principles  rather  than  as  a 
multiplicity  of  particulars,  and  by  leading  to  the  invention  of 
new  means  of  control  through  a  method  of  procedure  devised 
especially  for  that  purpose. 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          173 

In  primitive  times,  the  development  of  control  depended 
entirely  upon  a  crude  trial  and  success  method.  A  new 
means  of  control  was  often  the  result  of  mere  accidental 
variations  from  the  customary  ways  of  doing  things.  As 
Professor  Monroe  says  with  regard  to  the  development  of 
the  means  for  making  pottery :  "  Discovering  first, 
through  the  accidental  burning  of  a  willow  basket  from 
around  the  clay  bowl  within  which  liquids  were  kept,  that 
the  clay  would  harden  and  become  liquid  proof,  the  primi- 
tive man  for  generations  continued  to  make  pottery  by  first 
making  the  willow  basket,  plastering  it  over  with  clay, 
and  then  burning  out  the  wooden  model.  By  accident  again 
discovering  that  the  clay  could  be  shaped  direct,  he  con- 
tinued for  generations  to  impress  the  stamp  of  the  unwoven 
willow  upon  the  clay,  that  it  might  be  burned  in,  though 
he  made  no  willow  model  or  form."  l  The  new  variation 
would  not,  however,  be  transmitted  under  social  guidance 
were  it  not  understood  in  the  light  of  previous  experience 
to  be  a  means  of  overcoming  a  difficulty  in  attaining  some 
purpose. 

A  means  of  control  which  is  developed  by  the  crude 
trial  and  success  method  has  the  disadvantage  of  being 
closely  limited,  because  it  is  associated  with  all  the  char- 
acteristics of  a  particular  complex  thing  rather  than  with 
certain  characteristics  essential  to  control.  It  is  trans- 
mitted socially  as  a  concrete  fact  without  reference  to 
the  causal  principle  involved.  How  this  limits  control 
may  be  shown  by  an  illustration.  When  recently  a  young 
woman's  clothing,  through  an  accident  with  wood  alcohol, 
was  suddenly  enveloped  in  flames,  some  one  extinguished 
the  flames  by  wrapping  her  in  a  rug.  An  uneducated 
colored  woman,  who  was  the  first  to  see  the  accident  and 

1  Monroe,  Paul,  A  Text-Book  in  the  History  of  Education,  p.  11. 


174  The  Principles  of  Education 

who  had  stood  fixed  with  excitement  at  the  alarming 
situation,  found  voice  to  say,  "  Well !  I  done  knowed  you 
could  put  out  a  fire  with  a  blanket,  but  I  never  knowed 
you  could  do  it  with  a  rug!"  The  control  which  the 
colored  woman  had  acquired  under  crude  social  guidance 
was  limited  thus  to  a  particular  means. 

The  sciences  free  man  from  this  limitation.  If  the 
colored  woman  had  learned  that  fire  is  due  to  the  uniting 
of  certain  gases  with  the  oxygen  of  the  air,  and  that 
consequently  anything  which  will  shut  off  the  air  will 
extinguish  the  fire,  she  would  have  had  a  means  of  control 
adapted  to  the  essentials  of  the  situation  and  would  not 
have  been  handicapped  by  the  non-essential  character- 
istics of  the  material  used  to  exclude  the  air. 

The  sciences  organize  means  of  control,  transmit  them 
in  the  form  of  principles  rather  than  as  many  isolated 
particulars,  and  make  advancement  more  rapid  by  sub- 
stituting for  the  hit-and-miss  method  a  definite  form  of 
procedure  in  the  inventing  of  new  means  of  control. 
Through  the  use  of  this  rationally  controlled  method, 
advancement  is  made  all  the  more  rapidly,  because  this 
advancement  goes  from  widely  controlling  principle  to 
principle  rather  than  from  narrowly  controlling  particular 
to  particular.  This  fact  may  be  seen  within  the  limits  of 
any  one  field  of  science,  where  new  principles  are  developed 
through  analogy  with  those  already  established ;  it  may 
be  seen  also  in  the  relation  of  one  science  to  another, 
where  the  principles  of  one  have  given,  through  analogy, 
the  hypotheses  which  were  used  in  making  the  principles 
of  another.  In  this  way,  as  we  have  learned,  psychology 
is  connected  with  biology,  biology  with  chemistry,  and 
chemistry  with  physics.1  In  a  word,  science  is  a  means  of 

1  See  p.  150. 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          175 

control  devised  to  make  more  effectual  the  invention, 
transmission,  and  use  of  means  of  control. 

The  making  of  new  patterns  for  control,  whether  by 
the  hit-and-miss  method  of  primitive  man  or  by  the  care- 
fully regulated  investigations  of  the  modern  scientist,  is 
done  under  social  guidance.  Since  the  individual  is  the 
medium  through  which  society  works,  new  patterns  for 
control  must  be  made  by  the  individual  process.  For 
this  reason,  in  cases  where  records  have  been  made  of 
their  invention,  these  new  patterns  for  control  are  asso- 
ciated with  particular  individuals  in  whose  experience 
they  first  appeared.  The  geometric  proposition  that  the 
square  of  the  hypotenuse  of  a  right  triangle  is  equal  to 
the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  other  two  sides,  is  attributed 
to  Pythagoras;  the  heliocentric  conception  of  the  plan- 
etary system,  to  Copernicus;  the  idea  of  the  circulation 
of  the  blood,  to  Harvey ;  the  law  of  gravitation,  to  New- 
ton; certain  theories  of  knowledge,  to  Locke,  Leibniz, 
and  Kant;  certain  religious  doctrines,  to  St.  Augustine; 
the  steamboat,  to  Fulton;  the  cotton  gin,  to  Whitney; 
the  sewing  machine,  to  Howe;  the  theory  of  evolution, 
to  Darwin;  certain  educational  methods,  to  Comenius, 
Herbart,  and  Froebel;  the  electric  light,  to  Edison; 
heavier-than-air  flying  machines,  to  the  Wright  brothers ; 
and  so  on.  How  society  guides  the  individual  process 
in  making  new  inventions  such  as  these  may  be  shown  by 
illustration. 

In  the  first  place,  society  gives  to  the  individual  the 
purposes  in  the  pursuit  of  which  his  problem  arises.  The 
primitive  man  who  first  found  fire  to  be  a  means  for 
making  pottery  would  have  paid  no  attention  to  the 
hardening  of  clay  in  the  fortunate  burning  of  the  clay- 
lined  willow  basket,  if  he  had  not  lived  in  a  tribe  which 


176  The  Principles  of  Education 

had  trained  him  to  appreciate  the  value  of  containers. 
Whitney  would  not  have  thought  of  the  desirability  of 
seeding  cotton,  if  he  had  not  lived  in  a  society  that,  as 
the  result  of  many  generations  of  development,  had 
found  the  value  of  seeded  cotton  for  textiles  and  other 
things.  If  Froebel  had  not  been  introduced  at  Frankfort 
and  elsewhere  to  the  school,  an  institution  which  is  the 
product  of  centuries  of  social  development,  he  would  not 
have  had  the  purpose  of  improving  educational  methods. 
If  Darwin  had  not  lived  at  a  time  when  a  social  need  was 
felt  for  some  widely  organizing  principle  in  the  field  of 
biological  science,  he  would  not  have  had  the  purpose  of 
finding  a  way  to  explain  the  origin  of  species. 

After  the  individual  has  formed  his  purpose  under 
social  direction  and  has  experienced  a  difficulty  in  realizing 
it,  society  gives  further  direction  by  furnishing  the  knowl- 
edge upon  which  he  makes,  through  analogy,  the  hypoth- 
eses that  define  and  solve  the  problem.  The  primitive 
man  who  first  found  fire  to  be  a  means  for  making  pottery 
recognized  difficulties  in  the  use  of  willow  baskets  lined 
with  unbaked  clay  and  recognized  also  the  effect  of  fire 
in  hardening  the  clay  so  as  to  overcome  these  difficulties, 
because  in  his  life  with  others  he  had  come  to  recognize 
the  difficulty  and  its  solution.  It  was  because  Whitney, 
under  social  guidance,  had  acquired  a  knowledge  of  me- 
chanics and  other  things,  that  he  was  able  to  construct 
the  mechanism  for  the  cotton  gin.  These  scientific  ideas 
upon  the  bases  of  which  he  defined  and  solved  his  problem 
were  the  result  of  many  generations  of  social  development. 
Even  if  the  analogy  which  gives  the  solution  is  found 
through  the  suggestion  of  some  fortunate  accident,  as  is 
said  to  have  been  the  case  in  the  invention  of  the  cotton 
gin,  the  suggestion  is  none  the  less  socially  determined; 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process  177 

for  it  would  never  have  been  recognized  in  its  relation  to 
the  problem,  unless  the  individual  had  been  prepared  for 
this  through  social  guidance.  If  Froebel  had  not  gained, 
under  social  guidance,  ideas  of  religious  mysticism, 
Lamarckian  ideas  of  development  through  use,  and  a 
philosophical  doctrine  of  monism  which  was  prominent 
at  his  time,  as  well  as  many  other  things,  he  could  not 
have  defined  and  solved  the  problem  which  resulted  in 
his  theory  of  education  as  the  development  of  the  divine 
nature  of  the  child  through  self -activity.  The  knowledge 
of  the  principles  of  breeding  and  other  things,  which 
Darwin  had  acquired  under  social  guidance,  determined 
the  nature  of  the  hypotheses  that  defined  his  problem  and 
led  him  to  the  principle  of  natural  selection;  for  it  ap- 
peared that  natural  selection  would  do  a  work  similar  to 
the  selection  made  by  breeders  in  improving  animal  stock. 

When  the  problem  has  been  defined  and  the  solution 
made,  society  adopts  the  use  of  the  new  means  of  control 
and  thereby  adds  it  to  the  stock  of  patterns  to  be  handed 
down  from  generation  to  generation.  This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  individuals  who  have  been  guided  through  the 
previous  steps  naturally  pass  on  to  the  realization  of  the 
purpose  which  started  the  process. 

Because  of  the  difficulty  of  making  the  analogy  which 
leads  to  the  new  means  of  control,  new  social  patterns 
which  mark  important  steps  in  advance  usually  appear 
first  in  the  experience  of  only  exceptional  individuals, 
the  names  of  some  of  whom  have  been  given.  After  a 
new  means  of  control  has  once  been  made,  the  common 
man,  as  has  been  said,  can  see  the  analogy  which  it  bears 
to  the  truth  he  has  already  received  under  social  guidance, 
and  can  thus  take  the  steps  necessary  to  acquire  the  new 
meaning. 


178  The  Principles  of  Education 

Sometimes  social  conditions  guide  several  individuals  to 
invent  a  new  means  of  control  at  practically  the  same 
time.  Striking  instances  of  this  appear  both  in  contests 
for  patent  rights  and  in  cases  where  the  courts  are  not 
called  upon  to  settle  the  questions  of  priority.  Bell  and 
Gray  both  claimed  credit  for  the  invention  of  the  tele- 
phone. James  and  Lange  share  credit  for  a  certain  theory 
of  the  emotions;  Darwin  and  Wallace,  for  a  certain 
theory  of  evolution ;  Dewey,  James,  and  Schiller,  for  the 
philosophic  doctrine  of  pragmatism. 

In  a  large  degree,  social  patterns  are  made  coopera- 
tively. Thousands  are  working  under  social  guidance  in 
particular  lines  of  specialization  in  religious,  industrial, 
commercial,  scientific,  political,  or  other  social  activities. 
As  soon  as  one  person  has  defined  a  new  problem,  formed 
a  new  hypothesis  for  its  solution,  or  put  any  hypothesis 
to  the  test,  whatever  actual  advance  he  has  made  may  be 
transmitted  to  other  persons,  so  that  they  may  center 
their  energies  upon  making  still  further  advance.  Scien- 
tific and  other  journals  devoted  to  particular  kinds  of 
work  give  good  opportunity  for  such  free  exchange  of  ex- 
perience. 

As  a  new  means  of  control  is  copied  by  individual  after 
individual,  it  is  simplified.  This  is  conspicuous  in  the 
case  of  machinery.  The  first  locomotives,  threshing  ma- 
chines, automobiles,  and  typewriters  were  clumsy  com- 
pared with  those  of  later  times.  The  clumsy  parts  are 
simplified  usually  through  the  small  inventions  of  many 
individuals.  The  same  is  true  in  the  case  of  means  of 
control  in  sciences,  education,  politics,  and  every  other 
field  of  activity.  Sometimes  the  individual  who  puts 
the  new  idea  in  a  simple  and  clear  verbal  form  so  that 
others  can  acquire  it  easily,  is  the  one  who  gets  credit  for 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          179 

inventing  it,  because  it  is  socially  transmitted  in  the  form 
he  gives  to  it. 

IV 

Through  history  and  the  fine  arts  the  individual  may  acquire 
new  means  of  control,  and  through  the  sciences  he  may  acquire 
new  ideals;  but,  in  either  case,  these  results  are  only  incidental 
and  not  attained  so  economically  and  effectively  as  under  the 
guidance  of  subject  matter  especially  designed  to  give  them. 

The  distinction  we  have  made  between  the  function  of 
history  and  the  fine  arts  on  the  one  hand  and  that  of  the 
sciences  on  the  other,  is  relative  rather  than  absolute. 
Contrary  to  this  distinction,  it  is  true  that  through  history 
and  the  fine  arts  an  individual  may  acquire  new  means  of 
control,  and  through  the  sciences  he  may  acquire  new 
purposes.  But  these  results,  in  either  case,  are  only 
incidental;  they  are  by-products,  secondary  results, 
which  can  be  attained  more  economically  and  effec- 
tively under  the  guidance  of  other  subject  matter  spe- 
cially designed  for  that  purpose.1 

So  far  as  purpose-giving  subject  matter  is  concerned, 
an  individual  who  has  learned  through  history  how  things 
were  done  in  the  past  may  find  some  of  these  means  of 
control  useful  in  overcoming  difficulties  in  the  present; 
but  various  sciences,  such  as  political  science,  economics, 
sociology,  and  military  science,  are  more  effective  and 
reliable  guides  for  overcoming  present  difficulties.  These 
sciences  are  the  accumulated  product  of  generations  of 
thought  in  the  service  of  this  very  purpose.  It  is  not 
uncommon,  indeed,  for  these  sciences  to  reveal  that 
means  of  control  used  in  the  past  were  not  the  best  in 
the  situations  in  which  they  were  used.  It  is  true  that 

1  See  pp.  112-113. 


180  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  social  sciences  use  some  of  the  material  used  by 
history;  but  they  select  from  the  records  of  the  past 
only  certain  kinds  of  facts  and  work  them  over  according 
to  the  method  of  the  science  concerned,  not  according  to 
the  method  of  history.  The  comparison  of  a  textbook 
in  economics  with  a  textbook  in  history  will  make  this 
fact  clear.  The  social  sciences  undertake  to  discover  the 
relations  of  cause  and  effect  among  social  facts  in  order 
to  provide  scientific  knowledge  that  may  be  used  to  solve 
our  social  difficulties  and  thereby  to  improve  our  social 
practices;  history,  on  the  other  hand,  undertakes  to 
discover  the  purposes  responsible  for  our  social  practices, 
whether  these  practices  are  useful  or  not. 

That  the  fine  arts  are  less  effective  and  reliable  than 
sciences  in  giving  control  is  so  patent  as  not  to  require 
discussion.  Improvement  in  control  depends  upon  a 
thoughtful  solution  of  problems,  which  is  characteristic 
of  the  sciences.  The  fine  arts,  however,  in  order  to  create 
new  appreciations  of  worth,  must  emphasize  feeling  rather 
than  thought ;  they  must  call  forth  strong  appreciations 
of  value  with  which  means  of  control  are  associated  rather 
than  devise  with  cool  deliberation  these  means  of  control 
themselves. 

The  various  sciences  are  made  for  the  individual  who 
has  already  acquired  through  other  social  influences  the 
desire  to  use  them,  and  are  not  fashioned,  therefore,  to 
develop  such  desire.  They  center  attention  so  exclusively 
upon  control  that  the  appreciations  of  value  aroused  by 
them  are  too  weak  to  exert  much  influence  in  transforming 
means  into  ideals.  A  person  does  not  study  the  science  of 
medicine  hi  order  to  make  himself  desire  to  become  a 
physician,  but,  on  the  contrary,  his  desire  to  become  a 
physician  leads  him  to  study  medicine.  The  scientific 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          181 

textbooks  he  uses  are  not  concerned  with  putting  a  halo 
of  value  about  the  medical  profession,  but  with  the  solu- 
tions of  detailed  problems  in  bacteriology,  physiology, 
anatomy,  pharmacology,  etc. 

The  sciences  may  develop  purposes  to  some  degree, 
but  they  are  not  so  effective  in  doing  this  as  are  social 
approval  and  purpose-giving  subject  matter.  It  is  gen- 
erally recognized  that,  for  instance,  grammar,  logic,  and 
ethics  are  comparatively  weak  in  developing  desires  for 
correctness  in  speech,  cogency  in  argument,  and  goodness 
in  conduct.  Each  of  these  sciences  is  fashioned  to  give 
control  to  individuals  who  already  have  the  purpose 
which  it  serves.  But  are  not  sciences  such  as  physics, 
chemistry,  and  mathematics  excellent  guides  to  such 
general  virtues  as  industry,  accuracy,  neatness,  impar- 
tiality, and  truthfulness?  In  answer,  it  may  be  asked 
whether  these  sciences  ever  refer  directly  or  indirectly 
in  any  way  whatsoever  to  the  virtues  mentioned.  The 
individual  may  learn  outside  the  limits  of  the  content  of 
these  sciences  the  truth  that  he  can  secure  the  desired 
results  in  scientific  study  only  by  having  these  virtues, 
and  thus  may  carry  over  to  these  virtues  the  values  of 
the  ends  desired ;  but  the  sciences  themselves  do  not  tell 
him  this.  They  provide  merely  one  of  the  many  classes 
of  activities  in  which  such  ideals  may  be  useful. 


A  short-siRhted  view  of  the  functions  of  history,  the  fine  arts, 
and  the  sciences  discloses  only  the  immediate  pleasure  which  they 
give,  and  nmke.s  it  appear  that  their  most  important  use  is  to 
afford  refined  pleasure  to  the  individual  during  his  leisure  hours. 
Their  essential  function  is  no  more  to  give  pleasure,  however  refined 
and  valuable  it  may  l>e,  than  the  essential  function  of  eating  and 
drinking  is  to  tickle  the  palate  aud  refresh  the  throat,  rather  thaa 


182  The  Principles  of  Education 

to  nourish  the  body  for  action.  By  developing  and  organizing  hia 
purposes  and  means  of  control,  these  classes  of  subject  matter 
capitalize  the  individual's  hours  of  leisure  against  the  day  of 
action. 

History,  the  fine  arts,  and  the  sciences,  under  normal 
conditions,  give  pleasure  to  the  individual.  There  is 
pleasure  in  dwelling  upon  the  interesting  life  of  ancient 
Athens  and  Rome,  seeing  the  creations  of  Michelangelo 
and  Raphael,  witnessing  the  plays  of  Shakespeare,  read- 
ing the  poems  of  Browning  and  Tennyson,  admiring  the 
wonders  revealed  by  Euclid  and  Copernicus.  Some 
thinkers  have  been  so  short-sighted  as  not  to  see  beyond 
this  immediate  feeling  and  have  assumed  that  the  chief 
use  of  history,  the  fine  arts,  and  the  sciences  is  to  give 
refined  pleasure  to  the  individual  during  his  leisure  hours. 
If  any  result  more  permanent  than  this  pleasure  is  recog- 
nized by  such  thinkers,  it  is  vaguely  called  culture,  defined 
only  in  terms  of  feeling,  and  classed  with  silk  hats  and 
kid  gloves,  which  give  an  appearance  of  worth  to  the  man 
whose  head  and  hands  they  adorn.  This  belief  is  most 
prevalent  with  regard  to  the  fine  arts.  Some  practical 
value  is  generally  admitted  for  history  and  still  more  for 
the  sciences.  A  wider  view  reveals  the  fact  that  all  of 
these  classes  of  subject  matter  are  primarily  guides  to 
results  so  important  as  to  overshadow  completely  what- 
ever immediate  pleasure  or  whatever  more  permanent 
but  equally  impractical  adornment  they  may  give  to  the 
individual.  Just  as  eating  and  drinking  are  not  merely 
for  tickling  the  palate  and  refreshing  the  throat  or  even 
for  making  the  body  more  beautiful,  but  serve  the  far 
greater  purpose  of  sustaining  and  developing  the  body 
for  action,  so  history,  the  fine  arts,  and  the  sciences  serve 
the  purpose  of  sustaining  and  developing  the  character 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          183 

of  the  individual.  The  individual  who  profits  normally 
by  the  guidance  of  these  subjects  acquires  more  than 
mere  adornment;  he  capitalizes  his  hours  of  leisure 
against  the  day  of  action.  If  he  has  been  led  to  acquire 
ideals  that  are  worthy  and  strong,  and  control  that  is 
organized  and  efficient,  he  will  stand  in  the  hour  of  trial 
when  others  go  down  before  temptation  and  difficulty. 
Instead  of  giving  only  temporary  pleasure  in  the  time  of 
leisure  and  personal  adornment  afterwards,  these  sub- 
jects, under  normal  conditions,  make  leisure  of  practical 
value  by  turning  it  into  the  service  of  action.  At  no  time 
can  man  escape  his  destiny,  which  is  practical. 

The  short-sighted  view  of  the  value  of  history  is  given 
by  Herbert  Spencer,  who  says  with  regard  to  the  contents 
of  books  on  this  subject : 

They  are  facts  from  which  no  conclusions  can  be  drawn  — 
unorganizable  facts;  and  therefore  facts  which  can  be  of  no  service 
in  establishing  principles  of  conduct,  which  is  the  chief  use  of  facts. 
Read  them,  if  you  like,  for  amusement ;  but  do  not  flatter  yourself 
they  are  instructive.  .  .  .  The  only  history  that  is  of  practical  value, 
is  what  may  be  called  Descriptive  Sociology.  And  the  highest  office 
which  the  historian  can  discharge,  is  that  of  so  narrating  the  lives  of 
nations,  as  to  furnish  materials  for  a  Comparative  Sociology ;  and  for 
the  subsequent  determination  of  the  ultimate  laws  to  which  social 
phenomena  conform.1 

It  is  true  that  many  writers  of  books  labeled  history  have 
not  understood  clearly  the  function  of  this  subject  and 
have  presented,  therefore,  so  much  useless  material  that 
the  true  function  of  the  subject  matter  is  obscured. 
Spencer's  condemnation  of  many  books  of  his  time  that 
purported  to  be  histories,  is,  in  a  large  measure,  justifiable. 

1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Education,  1890,  pp.  52,  55. 


184  The  Principles  of  Education 

But  he  is  short-sighted  in  failing  to  see,  amid  the  mass  of 
irrelevant  matter  given  in  these  books,  connections  of 
social  practice  and  social  purpose  which  give  to  the 
reader  a  more  appreciative  insight  into  the  present  com- 
plex social  situation,  not  by  leading  him  to  the  best  ways 
of  meeting  social  difficulties,  as  the  sciences  would  do,  but 
by  lifting  the  curtain  of  formalism  which  conceals  the 
purposes  of  present  social  activities,  irrespective  of 
whether  these  activities  are  effectual  or  not.  The  history 
of  education,  for  example,  does  not  reveal  what  subject 
matter  should  be  in  the  curriculum;  that  is  a  question 
for  science  to  answer.  It  does  reveal,  however,  the  pur- 
poses which  led  men  to  select  the  subject  matter  now  in 
the  curriculum.  With  reference  to  these  purposes  edu- 
cators may  eliminate  that  part  of  the  curriculum  which 
has  been  selected  in  the  interest  of  purposes  no  longer 
valuable,  may  modify  other  parts  so  as  to  attain  more 
effectively  the  purposes  they  serve,  and  may  supply  new 
subject  matter  for  realizing  purposes  not  provided  for 
in  the  old  curriculum. 

When  Spencer  says,  "  The  only  history  that  is  of  prac- 
tical value,  is  what  may  be  called  Descriptive  Sociology," 
he  does  not  recognize  the  practical  value  of  history,  but 
that  of  something  else  essentially  different  from  history 
in  both  purpose  and  method,  and  which  cannot  be  made 
history  by  changing  its  name.  Far  from  being  a  mere 
servant,  a  mere  hewer  of  wood  and  drawer  of  water  for 
the  sociologist,  the  historian  has  an  independent  mission 
of  his  own  and  aids  human  development  in  a  practical 
way  that  is  just  as  necessary,  useful,  and  honorable  as 
the  work  of  the  sociologist. 

The  short-sighted  view  of  the  value  of  the  fine  arts 
also  may  be  stated  in  the  words  of  Spencer : 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          185 

And  now  we  come  to  that  remaining  division  of  human  life  which 
includes  the  relaxations,  pleasures,  and  amusements  filling  leisure 
hours.  After  considering  what  training  best  fits  for  self-preserva- 
tion, for  the  obtainment  of  sustenance,  for  the  discharge  of  parental 
duties,  and  for  the  regulation  of  social  and  political  conduct ;  we  have 
now  to  consider  what  training  best  fits  for  the  miscellaneous  ends 
not  included  in  these  —  for  the  enjoyments  of  Nature,  of  Literature, 
and  of  the  Fine  Arts,  in  all  their  forms.  Postponing  them  as  we  do 
to  things  that  bear  more  vitally  upon  human  welfare;  and  bringing 
everything,  as  we  have,  to  the  test  of  actual  value ;  it  will  perhaps 
be  inferred  that  we  are  inclined  to  slight  these  less  essential  things. 
No  greater  mistake  could  be  made,  however.  We  yield  to  none  in  the 
value  we  attach  to  aesthetic  culture  and  its  pleasures.  Without 
painting,  sculpture,  music,  poetry,  and  the  emotions  produced  by 
natural  beauty  of  every  kind,  life  would  lose  half  its  charm.  So  far 
from  thinking  that  the  training  and  gratification  of  the  tastes  are 
unimportant,  we  believe  the  time  will  come  when  they  will  occupy 
a  much  larger  share  of  human  life  than  now.  When  the  forces  of 
Nature  have  been  fully  conquered  to  man's  use  —  when  the  means 
of  production  have  been  brought  to  perfection  —  when  labor  has 
been  economized  to  the  highest  degree  —  when  education  has  been 
so  systematized  that  a  preparation  for  the  more  essential  activities 
may  be  made  with  comparative  rapidity  —  and  when,  consequently, 
there  is  a  great  increase  of  spare  time ;  then  will  the  poetry,  both  of  Art 
and  Nature,  rightly  fill  a  large  space  in  the  minds  of  all.  .  .  .  Archi- 
tecture, sculpture,  painting,  music,  poetry,  etc.,  may  be  truly  called 
the  efflorescence  of  civilized  life.1 

It  is  true  that  the  fine  arts  do  belong,  in  a  large  measure, 
to  the  leisure  time  of  life.  When  the  individual  is  per- 
mitted to  escape  the  wearisome  demands  of  practical  life 
with  its  serious  responsibilities,  they  offer  to  him  easy 
pathways  to  a  delightful  land  of  make-believe,  where  his 
imagination  can  play  unrestrained  and  his  spirit  can  be 
refreshed.  But  although  he  may  not  be  conscious  of  the 
fact,  play  is  conducive  here,  as  elsewhere,  to  the  serious 
business  of  life ;  it  is  not  for  itself  alone.  The  kitten  that 
1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Education,  1890,  pp.  57-59. 


186  The  Principles  of  Education 

scampers  after  a  leaf  fluttering  in  the  wind,  is  preparing 
for  the  necessity  later  of  capturing  its  prey ;  children  in 
their  many  forms  of  play  gain  better  control  of  their 
bodies,  and  acquire  other  abilities  useful  in  the  practical 
life.  Likewise,  while  the  individual  is  enjoying  good 
poetry,  sculpture,  painting,  or  music,  he  is  developing 
and  organizing,  with  no  conscious  effort  on  his  part, 
feelings  of  value,  which  as  purposes  take  the  leadership 
of  his  conduct  in  the  world  of  practical  activity  and 
thereby  make  his  life  more  worthful.  While  enjoying 
the  play  Hamlet,  he  acquires  an  appreciation  of  the  value 
of  action  to  realize  his  ideals  when  "  the  time  is  out  of 
joint ; "  while  enjoying  the  singing  of  the  national 
anthem,  he  enriches  his  appreciation  of  national  ideals. 

When  Spencer  says  that  he  yields  to  none  in  the  value 
he  attaches  to  aesthetic  culture  and  its  pleasures,  and 
that  without  painting,  sculpture,  music,  poetry,  and  the 
emotions  produced  by  natural  beauty  of  every  kind,  life 
would  lose  half  its  charm,  he  looks  no  further  than  the 
immediate  enjoyable  feelings  that  come  with  them,  not 
to  their  value  as  definite  guides  to  more  worthful  action 
beyond  the  library,  art  gallery,  music  room,  or  scene  of 
natural  beauty.  When  he  calls  the  fine  arts  the  efflores- 
cence of  civilized  life,  the  champion  of  the  sciences  is  not 
mindful  that  flowers  have  important  functions  in  the 
economy  of  plant  life,  but  intends  to  convey  the  impres- 
sion that  they  are  produced  only  to  be  looked  at  and 
smelled!  This  short-sighted  view  makes  it  appear  that 
the  fine  arts  will  come  to  their  own  after  all  social  diffi- 
culties have  been  vanquished.  If,  however,  the  influence  of 
the  fine  arts  in  giving  ideals  and  thereby  in  preparing  men 
to  work  for  the  advancement  of  civilization  is  recognized, 
Spencer's  conclusion  here  is  as  illogical  as  to  hold  that  a 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process  187 

worker  should  postpone  preparing  for  the  duties  of  his 
calling  until  he  has  the  leisure  that  goes  with  a  retiring 
allowance. 

When  the  fine  arts  arouse  feeling,  they  must,  according 
to  the  laws  of  human  development,  nourish  the  ideal 
nature  of  acts  associated  with  these  feelings.  This  fact 
has  been  explained  in  the  discussion  of  how  new  purposes 
are  made.1  This  transfer  of  value  is  inevitable,  for  every 
thrill  of  appreciation  is  an  incipient  purpose  which  com- 
mands activity  for  the  realization  of  the  value  revealed 
by  it ;  and  though  acts  but  touch  the  hem  of  the  garment 
of  this  feeling,  virtue  gets  into  them  and  makes  them 
appear  worthful  in  themselves.  There  must  always  be 
two  kinds  of  values  derived  normally  from  the  fine  arts ; 
the  immediate  pleasure  which  comes  with  appreciation, 
and  the  enrichment  of  ideals  through  the  transfer  of  feel- 
ing. One  is  a  fleeting  thrill;  the  other  is  a  permanent 
acquisition  in  the  building  of  character.  There  can  be 
no  question  as  to  which  marks  the  essential  function  of 
the  fine  arts. 

Only  when  the  ideal-giving  subject  matter  is  connected 
with  the  hours  of  work  as  well  as  with  the  hours  of  leisure, 
can  it  give  even  the  refined  enjoyment  which  has  loomed 
so  large  before  the  short-sighted.  Because  men  have 
hungered  and  loved  and  fought  and  lost  and  triumphed 
and  worshiped,  they  can  appreciate  the  best  in  poetry, 
painting,  and  music.  Symbolic  reference  to  these  things 
by  the  fine  arts  arouses  strong  emotion  just  because  they 
do  point  to  practical  realities  which  men  feel  in  the  pulsa- 
tions of  their  own  blood.  And  not  only  must  apprecia- 
tion be  fed  constantly  in  this  way  by  values  which  orig- 
inate in  the  practical  life,  but,  if  the  individual  does  not 
1  See  pp.  72  -74. 


188  The  Principles  of  Education 

act  to  realize  the  purposes  to  which  the  fine  arts  direct 
his  attention,  his  capacity  for  getting  pleasure  from  the 
fine  arts  is  decreased.  The  first  stage  of  this  is 
marked  by  vapid  sentimentality  and  the  next  by  the 
unresponsiveness  of  the  blase.  In  a  word,  the  thrills 
which  are  aroused  by  the  fine  arts  have  inherited  their 
worth  from  the  practical  life  out  of  which  they  have  been 
born,  and  it  is  their  duty  to  pass  on  this  inheritance  to  a 
progeny  of  new  and  better  leaders  for  life's  struggle.  If 
they  fail  to  do  this,  their  birthright  has  been  sold  for  a 
mess  of  pottage. 

That  the  practical  value  of  the  fine  arts  overshadows 
the  value  of  the  momentary  pleasure  which  they  give, 
is  evident  when  the  two  come  into  conflict.  In  the  case 
of  food,  the  sense  of  taste  gives  pleasure  and  at  the  same 
time  guidance  as  to  what  should  be  eaten.  But  no  matter 
how  much  enjoyment  the  eating  of  anything  gives,  if 
we  find  that  the  result  is  injurious  to  the  body,  there  is 
no  question  as  to  whether  temporary  pleasure  or  per- 
manent welfare  of  the  body  should  be  preferred.  So  in 
the  case  of  the  fine  arts,  no  amount  of  temporary  pleasure 
can  ever  be  justified  when  it  is  known  to  result  in  a  lower- 
ing of  ideals  and  consequent  perverted  conduct.  The 
pleasurable  excitement  given  by  the  fine  arts  is  only 
incidental ;  the  main  result  is  their  effect  upon  action. 

The  truth  that  the  fine  arts  have  important  practical 
effects  beyond  the  mere  giving  of  pleasure  does  not  mean 
that  either  the  artist  or  the  individual  enjoying  the  art 
creation  must  be  conscious  of  these  effects,  any  more  than 
that,  in  the  enjoyment  of  a  meal,  one  must  be  conscious 
of  the  process  of  nutrition  and  the  effect  of  the  food  upon 
the  body ;  or  that  in  play  the  child  must  be  conscious  of 
the  preparation  which  he  is  receiving  for  the  serious  busi- 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process  189 

ness  of  later  life.  In  the  fine  arts,  attention  should  be 
centered  upon  those  things  which  give  thrills  of  apprecia- 
tion and  those  things  which  through  connection  with 
these  thrills  of  appreciation  receive  new  values.  The 
consequences  take  care  of  themselves,  and  any  analysis  of 
consequences  would  cool  the  feeling,  bring  in  other  asso- 
ciated ideas  than  those  to  be  given  value,  and  thus  distract 
from  the  purpose-making  process.  In  fact,  it  would 
center  attention  upon  the  solving  of  problems  and  thereby 
substitute  the  control-making  process  for  the  purpose- 
making  process.  So  far  as  the  individual  is  concerned 
at  the  tune,  the  intelligent  appreciation  of  fine  arts  is  an 
end  in  itself,  but,  nevertheless,  he  receives  the  benefit 
for  practical  life.  The  essential  value  of  his  experience 
in  studying  the  fine  arts  depends  upon  this  benefit. 

The  short-sighted  view  which,  in  seeking  the  function 
of  sciences,  looks  no  farther  than  the  immediate  pleasure 
in  contemplating  scientific  truth,  dates  back  to  the  time 
of  Plato  and  other  classical  philosophers.  Some  of  the 
leaders  of  thought  then  reached  the  conclusion  that  the 
highest  ideal  towards  which  man  can  struggle  on  earth 
and  which  in  heaven  is  the  supreme  attribute  of  the 
Divine  Being  is  knowledge,  —  not  knowledge  for  the  sake 
of  control,  but  knowledge  for  its  own  sake.  Sciences, 
according  to  this  view,  are  their  own  justification.  Simply 
to  know  them  repays  fully  the  student  for  burning  the 
midnight  oil;  the  noble  pleasure  which  the  contempla- 
tion of  truth  inspires  in  him  is  the  greatest  reward  for 
his  long  and  arduous  task. 

This  belief  has  a  strong  foundation  in  human  nature. 
Individuals  have  an  inborn  desire  to  know,  which  is 
manifested  throughout  life,  from  childish  curiosity  to 
philosophic  wonder.  Copernicus,  when  a  child  fingering 


190  The  Principles  of  Education 

unfamiliar  objects,  asked  what  they  were  and  found 
pleasurable  satisfaction  when  his  nurse  classified  them 
with  reference  to  the  meanings  he  had  already  acquired. 
Copernicus,  when  he  had  become  a  man  and  had  put 
away  childish  things,  still  retained  his  desire  to  know  and 
became  dissatisfied  when  some  celestial  phenomena  were 
found  to  be  strangers  to  the  meanings  which  older 
astronomers  had  taught  him.  Since  there  was  no  repre- 
sentative of  society  to  make  the  needed  explanation,  he 
worked  patiently  until  he  found  a  classification  of  phenom- 
ena which  gave  these  strangers  their  places.  Since  the 
desire  to  acquire  knowledge  is  so  prominent  in  the  scientist 
and  philosopher,  who  give  their  lives  to  such  work,  their 
judgment  with  regard  to  the  function  of  the  sciences  is 
liable  to  be  prejudiced  by  this  desire. 

Does  the  pleasurable  feeling  in  contemplating  truth, 
however  noble  this  feeling  may  be,  mark  the  essential 
function  of  the  sciences?  Has  nature  given  us  hunger, 
love,  and  zest  in  the  battle  of  life  only  that  Satan  may 
have  a  means  by  which  to  tempt  us  from  the  holy  ex- 
perience in  our  laboratories  and  libraries?  Or  do  we  go 
into  our  laboratories  and  libraries  not  only  to  contemplate 
the  truth  that  may  be  found  there ;  but  also,  —  which 
is  far  more  important,  —  to  acquire  means  to  satisfy  our 
hunger,  to  consecrate  our  love,  and  to  win  in  the  battle 
of  life  our  spiritual  freedom? 

The  nature  of  knowledge  itself  gives  the  answer.  Just 
as  truly  as  the  fine  arts  begin  and  end  in  practical  life, 
and  depend  upon  it  for  sustenance,  so  do  the  sciences. 
Ideas  which  are  embodied  in  means  of  control,  whether 
they  are  the  data  with  which  the  sciences  begin  or  the 
principles  with  which  they  end,  are,  as  we  have  learned, 
plans  of  action  that  have  been  developed  in  overcoming 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process  191 

practical  difficulties.  Their  meanings  are  just  these  uses. 
To  be  captured  by  some  investigator  and  cooped  in  the 
pigeonholes  of  a  scientific  treatise  for  the  mere  purpose 
of  being  looked  at,  is  indeed  a  sad  fate  for  them.  Shut 
off  from  their  useful  connections  with  practical  action, 
they  would  become  dead  forms  from  which  the  life  of 
meaning  has  departed.  And  then  even  the  contempla- 
tion of  them  would  lose  its  pleasurable  satisfaction. 

The  "  pure  "  scientist,  who  seeks  truth  for  its  own  sake, 
represents  only  one  phase  of  scientific  activity  specialized 
in  the  division  of  labor.  He  is  justified  in  not  looking 
beyond  his  immediate  purpose  of  seeking  the  truth, 
because  others,  by  applying  his  conclusions  to  the  prac- 
tical affairs  of  life,  supplement  his  work  and  thereby  give 
to  it  significance  and  value.1 

History,  the  fine  arts,  and  the  sciences  organize  the 
individual's  appreciations  and  means  of  control  so  as  to 
make  them  the  pathways  through  which  life  is  guided  to 
its  fullest  and  best  realization.  The  worth  of  these 
classes  of  subject  matter  in  this  service  determines  the 
value  of  the  immediate  pleasure  and  cultural  influence 
which  they  give.  Whoever  does  not  see  beyond  this 
immediate  pleasure  reaches  a  short-sighted  conclusion 
that  would  separate  appreciation  and  theory  on  the  one 
hand  from  practice  on  the  other,  and  would  eventually 
preclude  the  attainment  of  the  highest  values  of  either. 
Just  as  the  parts  of  the  human  body  get  their  full  signifi- 
cance and  value  from  their  functional  relations  to  the  other 
parts  of  the  body,  so  do  the  various  forms  of  experience 
get  their  significance  and  value  from  their  functional 
relations  to  the  other  forms  of  experience.  Just  as  the 
parts  of  the  body  are  members  one  of  another,  so  these 

1  See  pp.  262-264. 


192  The  Principles  of  Education 

forms  of  experience  are  members  one  of  another.  Iso- 
lated they  dwindle  and  die,  but  working  together  in  the 
service  of  the  whole,  both  they  and  the  whole  of  which 
they  are  parts  attain  the  highest  welfare. 

VI 

The  materialistic  account  of  the  factors  in  the  development  of 
adjustment  to  environment  through  the  connecting  of  acquired 
reactions  with  systems  of  habits  and  through  the  forming  of  new 
reactions,  supports  our  conclusions  with  regard  to  the  two  kinds 
of  social  patterns  and  with  regard  to  the  functions  of  history,  the 
fine  arts,  and  the  sciences. 

Natural  science,  to  which  we  shall  now  look  for  addi- 
tional evidence,  supports  the  conclusion  that,  in  determin- 
ing what  purposes  and  what  means  of  control  may  be 
acquired  by  the  individual,  society  furnishes,  through  the 
medium  of  matter,  two  kinds  of  patterns.  The  human 
organism  is  born  with  an  incomplete  nervous  system, 
which  is  developed  through  interaction  with  the  environ- 
ment.1 Stimuli  from  the  environment  and  reactions 
thereto  control  the  exercise  of  the  nervous  system,  which 
"  grows  to  the  ways  in  which  it  has  been  exercised." 
The  development  of  the  reactions  of  the  immature  organ- 
ism depends  primarily  upon  the  causal  influence  of  actions 
of  other  organisms  in  the  environment  and  changes  which 
they  have  made  in  material  things.  For  this  reason  the 
reactions  developed  after  birth  may  truly  be  called  a 
social  inheritance.  The  environmental  influence  cannot, 
however,  change  directly  the  connections  between  stimuli 
and  responses  in  the  immature  organism,  but  must  exert 
its  causal  influence  b^affecting  the  processes  through 
which  the  nervous  system  acquires  new  reactions.  There 

1  See  pp.  42-43. 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process  193 

are  two  kinds  of  such  processes,  —  one,  through  which  a 
new  reaction  that  has  been  acquired  is  brought  into 
intimate  connection  with  a  system  of  habits,  and  the 
other,  through  which  the  nervous  system  is  modified  so 
as  to  produce  a  new  reaction.  These,  we  have  found,1 
are  the  material  counterparts  of  the  teleological  processes 
through  which  new  purposes  and  new  means  of  control 
are  made.  Since  changes  in  the  nervous  system  depend 
thus  upon  the  influence  of  the  material  environment, 
matter  only  is  the  medium  through  which  one  organism 
can  affect  ariother.  Material  forms  which  regulate  the 
development  of  nervous  connections  in  the  organism  may 
properly  be  called  patterns. 

Natural  science  explains,  from  its  point  of  view,  that 
the  primary  function  of  history  and  the  fine  arts  is  to 
develop  purposes.  When  the  same  forms  of  reaction 
have  been  acquired  in  common  by  mature  organisms,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  activities  of  the  home,  the  state,  and  the 
church,  these  forms  of  reaction  are  fixed  as  social  habits. 
Succeeding  generations  may  acquire  them  not  through 
interaction  with  the  environmental  conditions  which 
caused  them  in  the  first  place,  but  through  interaction 
with  these  other  organisms.  If  the  immature  organism 
does  not  imitate  these  forms  of  reaction,  other  organisms 
may  even  affect  it  adversely,  making  these  forms  of  re- 
action necessary  for  adjustment  to  the  other  organisms. 
It  may  be  possible  that  the  situations  to  which  these 
reactions  originally  made  adjustment  no  longer  exist. 
Habits  that  have  become  intrinsically  useless  may  thus 
be  perpetuated  comparatively  in  isolation  merely  because 
they  are  necessary  for  adjustment  to  organisms  which 
possess  them.  This  handicap  to  the  development  of 
»  See  pp.  92-96  and  122  126. 


194  The  Principles  of  Education 

efficient  adjustment  is  overcome  only  when  these  reac- 
tions are  connected  with  the  fundamental  systems  of 
habits  which  turn  them  to  their  true  uses  with  relation 
to  the  environment.  This  is  what  history  and  the  fine 
arts  do.  History  causes  the  organism  to  make  connec- 
tions between  acquired  reactions  and  fundamental  habits 
as  they  have  occurred  in  the  development  of  the  race. 
The  fine  arts  make  similar  connections  which  are  useful 
in  adjustment,  but  which  may  not  have  occurred  pre- 
viously. These  forms  of  subject  matter,  which  through 
material  word  symbols  affect  the  immature  organism, 
are  created  by  group  interaction.  The  particular  line  of 
least  resistance  along  which  nervous  energy  first  makes 
the  new  connection  is  formed  in  some  individual  organism 
as  the  result  of  the  interaction  of  this  organism  with 
others.  This  organism  may  then  through  words  make 
a  similar  connection  in  other  organisms. 

The  function  of  the  sciences,  according  to  the  material- 
istic view,  is  to  make  adjustment  more  efficient  in  a  way 
which  corresponds  to  making  means  of  control.  When 
the  form  of  adjustment  to  a  concrete  situation  is  modified 
through  the  influence  of  only  this  particular  situation, 
this  form  of  adjustment  is  connected  with  the  total 
stimuli  of  the  situation.  To  make  the  reaction  function 
again,  stimuli  representing  non-essentials  as  well  as  those 
representing  essentials  of  the  situation  must  recur  to- 
gether. This  limits  the  effectiveness  of  the  response  as 
in  the  case  of  the  colored  woman  who  did  not  react  in 
the  situation  dress-on-fire-and-rug-on-floor,  although  she 
had  acquired  the  reaction  to  the  situation  dress-on-fire- 
and-blanket-on-bed,  which  was  essentially  the  same.  The 
reaction  would  function  only  when  the  non-essential 
stimuli  peculiar  to  the  blanket  were  present.  A  great 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          195 

advance  is  made  in  adjustment  when  connections  are 
made  between  the  essentials  of  situations  and  the  essen- 
tials of  reactions  that  adjust  the  organism  to  them.  In 
the  case  just  cited,  one  step  in  that  direction  would  be 
the  connecting  of  the  reaction  shutting-off-the-supply-of- 
oxygen  with  the  essential  stimuli  belonging  to  both 
blanket  and  rug  in  the  situation  something-on-fire-and 
rug-or-blanket-near-by.  The  further  this  is  carried,  — 
that  is,  the  more  situations  are  simplified  so  that  one  form 
of  reaction  will  be  connected  with  a  larger  number  of 
situations,  —  the  more  effective  does  adjustment  become. 
Reactions  also  may  be  simplified  by  eliminating  non- 
essential  movements.  For  instance,  the  woman  might 
have  attempted  to  wrap  the  blanket  about  a  victim  of 
fire  in  some  special  way  that  had  been  used  under  similar 
circumstances,  when  some  other  way  would  have  fitted 
the  situation  better.  The  case  cited  above  in  which 
primitive  man  unnecessarily  impressed  the  stamp  of 
unwoven  willow  on  pottery,  is  another  instance  of  this. 
Organizing  the  essentials  of  reactions  is  just  what  the 
sciences  do.  The  sciences,  which  appear  largely  in  the 
form  of  word  symbols  that  affect  the  immature  organism, 
are  created  by  group  influence,  since,  although  each  ad- 
vance is  made  through  some  particular  organism,  it  is 
causally  dependent  upon  other  reactions  which  have  been 
acquired  under  group  influence. 

The  materialistic  view  supports  the  facts  that  means 
of  control  acquired  under  the  guidance  of  history  and  the 
fine  arts,  and  purposes  acquired  under  the  guidance  of 
the  sciences  are  developed  only  incidentally  and  not  in 
the  most  economical  ways.  The  efficiency  of  new  re- 
actions developed  by  history  and  the  fine  arts  is  not 
tested  systematically  as  the  sciences  would  test  it,  and 


196  The  Principles  of  Education 

indeed,  these  reactions  may  not  give  the  best  adjustment 
to  the  environment.  On  the  other  hand,  connections 
made  by  sciences  between  new  reactions  and  larger  sys- 
tems of  habits  are  not  so  intimate  and  thorough  as  those 
made  by  history  and  the  fine  arts. 

Natural  science  reveals  very  definitely  the  short-sight- 
edness of  the  belief  that  the  essential  function  of  history, 
the  fine  arts,  and  the  sciences  is  to  give  pleasure.  The 
organism  is  made  for  active  adjustment  to  environment. 
In  this  adjustment  process,  the  brain  is  the  medium  be- 
tween the  incoming  nerves,  which  bring  stimuli  from  the 
environment,  and  the  outgoing  nerves,  which  cause  re- 
actions to  this  environment.  Brain  changes  are  thus 
in  the  service  of  action.  Since  thoughts  and  feelings 
are  the  counterparts  of  brain  changes,  their  fundamental 
significance,  too,  is  practical.  Indeed,  history,  the  fine 
arts,  and  the  sciences  are  biological  necessities  in  the 
development  of  adjustment  to  environment;  they  mark 
a  new  chapter  in  this  development. 


REFERENCES 

CHARTERS,  W.  W.,  Methods  of  Teaching,  1912,  pp.  26-40.  (Discusses 
the  nature  of  subject  matter  from  the  functional  point  of  view.) 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  Educational  Values,  1911,  pp.  164-179.  (Points  to 
history,  biography,  literature,  art  in  any  of  its  forms,  and  reli- 
gion as  the  chief  sources  of  materials  for  the  direct  development 
of  ideals.) 

BALDWIN,  J.  M.,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Develop- 
ment, 1906,  pp.  465-484.  (Shows  the  social  influence  in  the 
development  of  subject  matter.) 

ROBINSON,  J.  H.,  The  New  History,  1912,  pp.  1-25.  (Discusses  the 
function  of  history.) 

PARKER,  DEW.  H.,  The  Principles  of  Esthetics,  1920.  (Gives  an 
analysis  of  the  nature  and  meaning  of  art.) 


Analysis  of  the  Social  Process          197 

GORDON,  K.,  Esthetics,  1909,  pp.  46-67.  (Explains  the  origins  and 
functions  of  art.) 

FAIRCHILD,  A.  H.  R.,  The  Making  of  Poetry,  1912,  pp.  187-209. 
(Discusses  the  need  and  value  of  poetry.) 

THORNDIKE,  E.  L.,  Principles  of  Teaching,  1906,  pp.  198-202.  (Holds 
that  the  emotions  have  a  practical  value.) 

THOMSON,  J.  A.,  Introduction  to  Science,  1911,  pp.  224-248.  (Ex- 
plains in  a  simple  manner  the  utility  of  science.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Why  should  teachers  have  definite  ideas  of  the  functions  of  the 
various  kinds  of  subject  matter  they  teach? 

2.  Name  five  ideals  you  have  acquired  as  a  result  of  your  home 
influence  and  explain  how  you  acquired  them. 

3.  Name  five  means  of  control  you  have  acquired  in  the  home 
and  explain  how  you  acquired  them. 

4.  Name  five  ideals  you  have  acquired  that  were  created  or 
strengthened  by  the  study  of  history  or  literature. 

5.  Name  five  valuable  means  of  control  you  have  learned  from 
the  study  of  science. 

6.  a.  Can  you  trace  any  ideal  you  have  formed  to  the  study  of 
Latin,  mathematics,  English  grammar,  or  physical  science?     6.  If 
so,  explain  how  the  ideal  was  derived  from  this  study. 

7.  If  a  teacher  believes  that  knowledge  is  an  end  in  itself  and  not 
for  the  sake  of  action,  what  is  the  most  serious  error  he  is  liable  to 
make  in  teaching  geography  or  grammar? 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   NATURE   OF  PATTERNS  FOR   PURPOSES  - 
HISTORY   AND   THE   FINE   ARTS 

The  particular  natures  of  history  and  the  several  fine  arts  are 
determined  by  various  limitations  under  which  they  guide  in  form- 
ing new  purposes.  In  giving  an  appreciative  understanding  of 
present  social  practices,  history  is  limited  to  connecting  them 
intimately  with  purposes  in  the  service  of  which  they  were  estab- 
lished. Literature,  sculpture,  painting,  architecture,  and  music 
are  free  to  represent  necessary  or  probable  connections  between 
means  and  ends,  irrespective  of  whether  these  have  been  experi- 
enced before,  but  are  limited  in  various  ways  by  different  media 
of  expression.  A  new  and  widely  influential  medium  of  artistic 
expression  is  the  moving  picture.  The  freedom  of  the  fine  arts  in 
transferring  values  makes  it  easily  possible  for  them  to  be  perverted 
so  as  to  give  false  appreciations  of  worth. 


.  The  problem  of  this  chapter  is  to  find  in  detail  how  history 
and  each  of  the  more  important  fine  arts  guide  in  forming  new 
purposes.  History  is  limited  to  past  experiences ;  the  fine  arts 
are  free  to  create  probable  situations  that  may  not  have  actually 
existed.  The  fine  arts  differ  one  from  another  because  they  use 
different  media  of  expression. 

History  and  the  fine  arts,  as  we  have  learned,  are  the 
truest  guides  in  forming  new  purposes.  Sciences  may 
develop  purposes  incidentally,  but  sciences  are  concerned 
essentially  with  making  means  of  control,  not  with  the 
far-reaching  values  which  these  means  of  control  may 
serve.  Social  authority  is  widely  influential  and  very 

198 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  199 

effective  in  developing  purposes,  but  its  guidance  is 
unreliable  and  arbitrary.  Social  authority,  it  is  true, 
puts  a  stamp  of  approval  upon  acts  because  they  have 
been  found  worthful,  just  as  governmental  authority 
puts  a  coinage  stamp  upon  gold  because  the  gold  is 
valuable  in  itself.  But  acts  are  less  stable  in  value  than 
gold ;  they  may  depreciate  greatly  when  better  standards 
are  found ;  they  may  become  even  worthless  when  social 
conditions  change ;  and  yet  those  which  have  lost  much 
or  all  of  their  value  may  still  retain  the  social  stamp. 
History  and  the  fine  arts,  however,  reveal  the  intrinsic 
values  of  acts  as  truly  as  the  methods  of  the  assayer  test 
gold.  Not  only  are  they  truer  guides  than  social  authority 
because  they  are  more  reliable,  but  they  are  truer  to  the 
nature  of  the  individual,  for  they  free  him  from  arbitrary 
social  authority.  They  lead  him  to  accept  purposes, 
not  through  external  compulsion,  but  because  his  inner 
nature  demands  them,  because  he  feels  them  necessary 
for  personal  development,  through  which  he  may  realize 
his  highest  possibilities  and  become  in  the  fullest  sense 
himself. 

Our  problem  now  is  to  examine  history  and  each  of 
the  more  important  fine  arts  separately,  so  that  we  may 
learn  in  greater  detail  how  they  function  as  purpose- 
giving  subject  matter.  Each  of  them  conforms  to  the 
law  which  controls  the  making  of  new  purposes;  each 
brings  to  consciousness  valuable  ends,  associates  inti- 
mately with  these  ends  means  of  control,  and  under 
normal  conditions,  leads  to  action ;  but  they  do  this  in 
various  ways,  because  of  differences  in  scope  and  dif- 
ferences in  media  of  expression  used. 

The  wider  distinction  is  between  history  and  the  fine 
arts.  History  gives  accurately  the  essentials  of  past 


200  The  Principles  of  Education 

experience,  and  is  limited,  therefore,  to  purposes  that 
people  have  actually  had  and  to  the  means  they  have  used 
for  realizing  these  purposes ;  the  fine  arts  are  free  to  create 
situations  that  are  probable,  but  may  never  have  existed 
in  real  life.  A  truly  historical  account  of  Julius  Caesar  can 
ascribe  to  the  conqueror  only  that  which  he  actually  said 
and  did,  but  Shakespeare's  Julius  Csesar,  a  work  of  literary 
art,  may  ascribe  to  him  purely  imaginary  words  and  acts. 
Because  the  fine  arts  may  present  purely  imaginary 
situations,  they  can  reveal  between  means  and  ends 
intimate  connections  that  appear  universally  applicable, 
-  true  yesterday,  to-day,  and  forever.  Not  limited  to 
particular  dates  and  localities,  these  experiences  may  be 
felt  applicable  to  all  men.  When  David  says  "  The 
Lord  is  my  shepherd,"  we  may  feel  that  through  countless 
generations  the  Lord  is  the  shepherd  of  all  who  love  and 
follow  Him.  Turner's  The  Slave  Ship  makes  us  feel  a 
horror  for  slavery,  no  matter  when  or  where  slavery  exists. 
The  fine  arts,  it  is  true,  may  represent  historical  situa- 
tions ;  but,  when  this  is  done,  the  situation  is  taken  out 
of  its  particular  setting  and  universalized,  so  that  its  ap- 
plication belongs  to  no  particular  time  and  space.  As 
Aristotle  says,  "  There  is  no  reason  why  some  real  events 
would  not  have  that  internal  probability  or  possibility 
which  entitles  the  author  to  the  name  of  poet."  1 

The  essential  distinction  between  history  and  the  fine 
arts  may  be  summarized  in  the  words  of  Aristotle : 
"  It  is,  furthermore,  evident .  .  .  that  it  is  not  the  function 
of  the  poet  to  relate  what  has  happened,  but  what  may 
happen,  giving  what  is  possible  according  to  the  law  of 
probability  or  necessity.  The  poet  and  the  historian 
differ  not  by  writing  in  verse  or  in  prose.  The  work  of 
1  Aristotle,  Poetics,  IX. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  201 

Herodotus  might  be  put  into  verse  and  it  would  still 
be  a  species  of  history,  with  meter  no  less  than  without  it. 
The  true  difference  is  that  one  is  related  to  what  has 
happened,  the  other  to  what  may  happen." l  This 
distinction  will  become  clearer  in  the  separate  discussions 
of  history  and  the  several  fine  arts. 

The  fine  arts  differ  one  from  another,  because  they  are 
limited  in  various  ways  by  different  media  of  expression. 
Sculpture  and  painting  are  limited  by  marble  and  canvas 
to  the  presentation  of  a  single  situation,  and  must,  there- 
fore, bring  to  mind  by  implication  whatever  else  is  needed 
to  create  the  new  appreciation  of  value ;  poetry  and  music 
can  present  sequence  of  situations.  This  is  why  Aristotle 
calls  sculpture  and  painting  arts  of  rest  as  distinguished 
from  poetry  and  music,  which  he  calls  rhythmic  arts. 
Sculpture,  which  uses  media  of  three  dimensions  without 
significant  variation  in  color,  excels  in  expression  of  form, 
but  is  greatly  limited  in  expression  of  spiritual  character- 
istics; painting,  which  uses  as  media  colors  on  a  plane 
surface,  excels  in  the  expression  of  spiritual  characteristics, 
but  is  greatly  limited  in  the  expression  of  form.  When 
early  Greek  artists  represented  perfections  of  the  human 
body,  they  made  statues,  which  could  be  viewed  from 
all  sides ;  when  Christianity  turned  the  attention  of  later 
artists  to  perfections  of  spirit,  they  painted  pictures  in 
which  spiritual  manifestations,  appearing  best  from  one 
point  of  view,  which  usually  includes  facial  expression, 
are  of  prime  importance.  Again,  sculpture  is  not  suited 
as  is  painting  to  representing  woodland  and  lake,  moun- 
tain and  valley.  Architecture  may  be  classed  with  sculp- 
ture and  painting  as  an  art  of  rest,  with  obvious  limita- 
tions due  to  the  special  media  used.  Poetry,  with  its 
1  Aristotle,  Poetics,  IX. 


202  The  Principles  of  Education 

symbolic  words,  differs  from  music,  which  makes  a  direct 
appeal  to  the  feeling  through  combinations  of  tones.  How 
the  differences  in  media  used  for  expression  make  dif- 
ferences in  ways  in  which  the  several  kinds  of  fine  arts 
give  ideals,  will  appear  more  definitely  in  separate  dis- 
cussions of  the  fine  arts. 

Sometimes  fine  arts  are  used  in  combination,  as  when 
poetry  is  set  to  music.  Such  combinations  do  not  need 
separate  discussions;  an  understanding  of  the  natures 
of  the  separate  arts  reveals  how  they  work  together 
effectively  in  combination.  They  may  work  together 
easily,  because  all  conform  to  the  same  general  law  in 
guiding  to  new  ideals. 

II 

History  gives  an  appreciative  understanding  of  social  practices 
by  connecting  them  intimately  with  purposes  in  the  service  of  which 
they  were  established.  It  thus  prevents  formalism,  strengthens  the 
desire  to  participate  in  valuable  social  practices,  and  makes  social 
practices  in  all  institutions  plastic  for  improvement.  Failure  to 
understand  the  function  of  history  has  led  to  (1)  factualism, 
(2)  fiction,  (3)  sensationalism,  and  (4)  the  confusion  of  history  with 
the  social  sciences. 

A  person  who  has  entered  a  theater  when  the  later 
scenes  of  an  unfamiliar  drama  are  being  enacted,  fails 
to  appreciate  the  full  significance  of  the  present  action, 
unless  he  learns  what  has  taken  place  in  the  earlier  scenes. 
We  have  entered  the  world  after  centuries  of  action  have 
passed  in  the  drama  of  the  school,  of  the  government,  and 
of  other  institutions.  In  order  to  appreciate  the  full 
significance  of  what  is  being  done,  we,  too,  must  learn 
what  has  taken  place  before;  in  other  words,  we  must 
learn  the  history  of  these  institutions. 

The  essential  function  of  history  is  to  give  an  apprecia- 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  203 

tive  understanding  of  present  social  practices  by  connect- 
ing them  intimately  with  the  purposes  in  the  service  of 
which  they  were  established.  Social  practices,  as  we  have 
learned,  were  originally  means  of  control  devised  to  over- 
come difficulties  in  the  way  of  attaining  things  people 
considered  worth  while.1  They  were  solutions  of  problems 
to  which  these  difficulties  gave  rise.  Trial  by  a  jury  of 
peers  was  a  solution  of  the  problem  how  to  preclude 
prejudice  which  stood  in  the  way  of  justice ;  the  Chinese 
examination  system  was  a  solution  of  the  problem  how 
to  select  for  office  men  most  thoroughly  versed  in  the 
Chinese  Classics,  and  the  use  of  special  examination  cells 
was  the  solution  of  the  problem  how  to  prevent  candidates 
from  getting  assistance;  a  congress  composed  of  senate 
and  house  of  representatives  was  a  part  of  the  answer 
to  the  problem  how  to  secure  wise  legislation,  which  would 
represent  the  will  of  the  people  and  yet  be  saved  from 
sudden  fluctuations  in  popular  opinion.  After  a  social 
practice  has  been  long  established,  the  specific  purpose 
for  which  it  was  created  is  gradually  forgotten,  unless 
there  is  something  to  keep  men  mindful  of  this  purpose. 
As  a  result,  the  practice  tends  to  become  formal;  it  is 
continued  merely  because  it  is  a  custom  indorsed  by 
social  approval,  not  because  people  have  a  discriminating 
sense  of  its  value.  It  may  be  used,  therefore,  when  the 
advance  of  science  has  revealed  better  practices  which 
might  be  substituted  for  it ;  because,  when  men  are  not 
conscious  of  the  purpose  of  a  practice,  they  have  no  way 
to  judge  its  effectiveness,  since  its  effectiveness  is  its 
usefulness  in  attaining  this  purpose.  Furthermore,  it 
may  be  continued  after  the  purpose  which  it  originally 
served  is  no  longer  of  value  and  its  usefulness  has  thus 
1  See  pp.  167-168. 


204  The  Principles  of  Education 

been  entirely  outgrown.  Examples  of  the  one  or  the  other 
of  these  conditions  may  be  found  whenever  unreasoned 
conservatism  stands  in  the  way  of  beneficial  reform. 
Men  who  justify  their  opposition  to  change  in  social 
practice  merely  on  the  ground  that  what  was  good  enough 
for  their  forefathers  is  good  enough  for  them,  are  under 
the  bondage  of  formalism.  To  prevent  formalism  by 
increasing  the  true  appreciation  of  those  social  practices 
which  are  good,  so  that  men  feel  a  new  desire  to  perform 
them,  and  by  making  inferior  social  practices  plastic 
for  improvement,  is  an  important  service  in  the  develop- 
ment of  civilization.  History  performs  this  service  by 
associating  intimately  social  practices  with  the  intrinsic 
purposes  they  serve. 

History  has  been  defined  as  "  past  politics."  This 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  much  attention  has  been  given  to 
the  political  aspect  of  social  life,  because  the  values  of 
justice  and  freedom  are  so  fundamental,  and  because  the 
making  of  political  institutions  that  do  not  yield  to  private 
advantage  has  been  so  difficult.  But  all  social  practices 
should  have  their  histories,  —  industrial,  educational, 
literary,  scientific,  philosophical,  musical,  religious,  and 
all  other  kinds.  Every  practice,  in  whatever  field  it 
may  be,  needs  to  be  saved  from  the  deadening  effect  of 
formalism. 

Because  our  present  social  practices  are  bewildering 
in  complexity  and  because  the  purposes  they  serve  are 
usually  not  directly  evident,  it  is  necessary  to  study  the 
past  in  order  to  get  an  appreciative  understanding  of  the 
present.  Through  tracing  step  by  step  their  growth  from 
simpler  forms,  we  can  more  easily  understand  and  appre- 
ciate the  complex  social  practices  of  the  present,  as  in  the 
case  of  our  getting  an  appreciative  insight  into  the  modern 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  205 

textile  industry  by  tracing  the  development  of  this  in- 
dustry from  the  days  of  the  hand  loom.1  Furthermore, 
through  a  study  of  the  past,  we  can  find  the  purposes 
responsible  for  the  origin,  modification,  and  change  in 
value  of  our  various  social  practices.  Men  who  were 
directly  concerned  with  making  new  practices  or  changes 
in  old  ones  were  obviously  of  all  men  most  clearly  aware 
of  the  purposes  which  led  them  to  do  these  things. 

Brief  illustrations  taken  from  politics  and  education 
will  show  concretely  that  an  appreciative  insight  into 
present  social  practices  can  be  had  only  in  the  light  of  the 
past.  The  democratic  government  of  the  United  States 
is  an  organized  accumulation  of  ways  of  doing  things 
political,  which  has  been  the  outgrowth  of  many  genera- 
tions of  struggle  for  human  rights.  It  includes  practices 
which  were  devised  long  before  Magna  Charta,  the  Bill 
of  Rights,  and  freedom  from  England.  Every  change, 
however  simple,  in  the  development  of  the  government, 
was  made  to  overcome  some  difficulty  in  realizing  a 
purpose,  which,  at  the  time,  was  keenly  appreciated  and 
consciously  sought  by  those  responsible  for  the  change. 
The  constitutional  amendment  requiring  election  of 
United  States  senators  by  popular  vote  is  a  recent  example 
of  this  fact.  This  change  in  the  practice  of  electing  the 
United  States  senators  was  made  mainly  for  the  purpose 
of  overcoming  difficulties  which  the  election  of  the  senators 
by  state  legislatures  put  in  the  way  of  the  expression  of  the 
people's  will  and  for  the  purpose  of  precluding  the  evils 
which  resulted  from  the  election  of  state  legislators  with 
reference  to  their  preferences  for  senatorial  candidates 
rather  than  with  reference  to  their  fitness  for  enacting 
wise  legislation.  We  must  seek  the  motives  for  such 

1  For  a  detailed  example,  see  pp.  286-289. 


206  The  Principles  of  Education 

changes  in  the  records  of  the  times  when  the  changes 
were  made.  A  change  made  in  one  generation  may, 
indeed,  be  modified  many  times  in  later  generations,  and 
both  the  original  purpose  and  the  ones  in  the  interest  of 
which  modifications  were  made  must,  therefore,  be 
understood  in  order  to  evaluate  properly  the  practice 
in  its  resulting  form.  How  could  one  get  an  appreciative 
understanding  of  the  method  by  which  the  president  of  the 
United  States  is  now  chosen,  except  through  a  knowledge 
of  the  purposes  and  consequent  modifications  of  practice 
that  have  come  with  the  growth  of  the  machinery  of 
political  parties?  Again,  a  discriminating  sense  of  the 
educational  situation  at  the  present  time  can  be  had 
only  in  the  light  of  the  past,  where  the  practices  are  found 
consciously  connected  with  the  purposes  which  they  were 
made  to  serve.  The  Hebrew  ideal  of  national  worship  of 
Jehovah;  the  emphasis  of  Athenian  philosophers  upon 
contemplation  as  the  highest  good ;  the  Roman  love  of 
power  in  the  practical  world ;  the  other-worldly  spirit  of 
monasteries;  the  gallant  dreams  of  chivalry;  worths 
sought  in  the  Italian  Renaissance,  Protestant  Reformation, 
and  French  Revolution;  ideals  of  statesmen,  scientists, 
and  industrial  leaders,  have  all  given  the  authority  of 
their  values  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  to  phases  of  present 
educational  practice.  The  historical  method  is  the  only 
method  whereby  this  intricate  network  of  means  and 
ideals  can  be  unraveled. 

While  historians  are  studying  the  records  of  the  past, 
they  must  not  forget,  however,  that  the  ultimate  guide  to 
the  relative  importance  of  what  they  find  is  the  appre- 
ciative insight  it  gives  into  the  social  life  of  the  present. 
The  value  of  history,  as  of  all  subject  matter,  depends 
upon  its  use  in  guiding  action  in  the  present;  both  the 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  207 

teleological  and  materialistic  views  of  human  development 
have  taught  us  this  fact.1  Whatever  subject  matter  is 
not  thus  valuable  is  a  mere  incumbrance,  worse  than 
useless,  because  it  consumes  time  and  energy  which  might 
otherwise  be  given  to  that  which  is  worth  while. 

If  an  historian  should  ignore  the  present  social  situa- 
tion, he  would  have  no  guide  for  his  investigations,  and 
would,  consequently,  become  lost  in  the  maze  of  centuries 
of  human  activities.  In  order  to  make  definite  progress, 
he  must  be  able  to  distinguish  between  important  and 
unimportant  matters.  Just  as  one  must  look  to  the  oak 
in  order  to  understand  the  importance  of  the  acorn; 
just  as  one  must  look  to  the  socially  developed  man  in 
order  to  understand  the  importance  of  the  various  tend- 
encies to  activity  in  the  child ;  so  one  must  look  ulti- 
mately to  the  outcome  of  past  events  in  our  present  social 
life  in  order  to  determine  the  relative  importance  of  these 
events.  As  Davidson  points  out : 

When  Columbus  set  sail  across  the  untraversed  western  sea  his 
purpose  was  to  reach  by  a  new  path  a  portion  of  the  old,  known 
world,  and  he  lived  and  died  in  the  belief  that  he  had  done  so.  He 
never  knew  that  he  had  discovered  a  new  world.  So  it  was  with 
Socrates.  When  he  launched  his  spiritual  bark  upon  the  pathless 
ocean  of  reflective  thought  his  object  was  to  discover  a  new  way  to 
the  old  world  of  little  commonwealths  and  narrow  interests,  and  he 
probably  died  thinking  that  he  had  succeeded.  He  did  not  dream 
that  he  had  discovered  a  new  world  —  the  world  of  humanity  and 
universal  interests.  But  so  it  was ;  and  though  mankind  are  still 
very  far  from  having  made  themselves  at  home  in  that  world,  and 
from  having  availed  themselves  of  its  boundless  spiritual  treasures, 
it  can  never  again  be  withdrawn  from  their  sight,  nor  the  conquest 
of  it  cease  to  be  the  object  of  their  highest  aspirations.1 

1  See  pp.  182-184  and  p.  196. 

1  Davidson,  Thomas,  The  Education  of  the  Greek  People,  p.  118. 


208  The  Principles  of  Education 

Again,  the  magnificent  Roman  court  was  the  center  of 
interest  nineteen  centuries  ago.  It  seemed  completely 
to  overshadow  the  cross  upon  which,  in  an  obscure  part 
of  the  world,  a  man  of  lowly  family,  in  a  despised  nation, 
was  crucified  between  two  thieves.  The  crucifixion 
seemed  to  affect  only  a  few  men  in  humble  walks  of  Me ; 
even  these  went  away  discouraged.  But  the  place  of 
Christianity  in  our  civilization  to-day  shows  that  the 
cross  overshadowed  in  importance  the  palace  of  Caesar. 
Browning  suggests  the  dramatic  reversal  of  contem- 
poraneous judgment,  which  could  not,  of  course,  see  the 
future,  when  he  makes  Cleon  write  to  Protus,  with 
reference  to  St.  Paul : 

Thou  canst  not  think  a  mere  barbarian  Jew 

As  Paulus  proves  to  be,  one  circumcised, 

Hath  access  to  a  secret  shut  from  us? 

Thou  wrongest  our  philosophy,  O  king, 

In  stooping  to  inquire  of  such  an  one, 

As  if  his  answer  could  impose  at  all ! 

He  writeth,  doth  he?  well,  and  he  may  write. 

Oh,  the  Jew  findeth  scholars !   certain  slaves 

Who  touched  on  this  same  isle,  preached  him  and  Christ ; 

And  (as  I  gathered  from  a  bystander) 

Their  doctrine  could  be  held  by  no  sane  man. 

It  is  true  that  the  immediate  purpose  of  an  historical 
investigator  may  not  go  beyond  the  past  event  which 
he  is  studying.  The  making  of  history  is  too  big  a  task 
for  one  man.  There  must  be  a  division  of  labor  in  which 
investigators  must  delve  in  the  records  of  remote  events 
in  order  to  determine,  with  the  greatest  possible  accuracy, 
the  facts  with  regard  to  these  events.  But  the  essential 
significance  of  the  work  of  every  special  historical  in- 
vestigator depends  entirely  upon  the  value  of  the  con- 
tribution he  makes  to  history  as  a  completed  instrument 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  209 

for  social  guidance.  The  man  who,  in  a  large  factory, 
selects  hickory  for  the  spokes  of  automobile  wheels 
must  be  intent  upon  selecting  with  the  greatest  accuracy 
the  pieces  of  hickory  to  be  used ;  but  he  might  as  well 
spend  his  time  selecting  pebbles,  if  it  were  not  for  the 
usefulness  of  the  machine  to  which  he  makes  a  contribu- 
tion. The  significance  and  value  of  what  he  does  depends 
upon  that  of  the  completed  product  to  the  making  of 
which  he  contributes.  This  is  as  true  in  the  making 
of  history  as  in  the  making  of  automobiles. 

Failure  to  recognize  the  essential  function  of  history 
has  led,  among  other  things,  to  (1)  factualism,  (2)  fiction, 
(3)  sensationalism,  and  (4)  the  confusion  of  history  with 
the  social  sciences,  the  function  of  which  is  to  give  control 
rather  than  appreciative  insight.  These  things  have 
interfered  with  the  most  effective  making  and  use  of 
history. 

(1)  It  is  of  primary  importance  that  history  present 
as  accurately  as  possible  the  facts  with  regard  to  past 
events ;  but  this  should  not  be  permitted  to  obscure  the 
importance  of  interpreting  these  facts,  so  that,  in  the 
completed  history,  they  are  connected  with  one  another 
up  to  the  present  time.  As  in  the  case  of  the  individual, 
society  no  sooner  establishes  a  new  practice  for  over- 
coming some  difficulty  in  the  way  of  what  is  felt  to  be 
worth  while  than  it  projects  out  of  this  situation  other 
purposes  and  establishes  other  practices  for  attaining 
them.  Through  the  centuries,  the  connection  of  social 
purposes  is  unbroken  even  to  the  present  time.  Facts 
not  held  together  by  this  chain  of  purposes  are  discon- 
nected, isolated,  useless ;  they  have  no  significant  place 
in  social  development,  and  do  not  give  a  better  apprecia- 
tive insight  into  it.  We  cannot  understand  and  appre- 


210  The  Principles  of  Education 

ciate  the  various  acts  done  by  an  individual  unless  we 
know  his  purpose,  what  he  is  trying  to  accomplish.  Our 
first  question  is,  What  is  he  trying  to  do?  Likewise,  we 
cannot  understand  and  appreciate  social  activities  unless 
we  know  the  purposes  they  serve.  The  mere  fact  that 
our  national  Congress  meets  as  two  houses  gains  its  true 
significance  only  when  we  know  the  purpose  for  this  divi- 
sion of  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government.  Pur- 
poses are  final  causes,  the  only  causes  that  history  can 
recognize.  They  are  as  essential  to  history  as  efficient 
causes  are  essential  to  natural  sciences;  interpreting 
facts  by  connecting  them  with  purposes  is  as  much  a  sine 
qua  non  of  history  as  explaining  efficient  causal  relations 
of  phenomena  is  a  sine  qua  non  of  natural  sciences. 

Especially  in  the  condensation  of  historical  statement 
is  there  grave  danger  of  interpretation  being  squeezed 
out,  so  that  mere  facts  are  left.  This  is  an  example : 

Robert  the  Wise  (of  Anjou)  (1309-1343),  the  successor  of  Charles  II 
of  Naples,  and  the  champion  of  the  Guelphs,  could  not  extend  his 
power  over  Sicily  where  Frederick  II  (1296-1337),  the  son  of  Peter 
of  Aragon,  reigned.  Robert's  granddaughter,  Joan  I,  after  a  career 
of  crime  and  misfortune,  was  strangled  in  prison  by  Charles  Durazzo, 
the  last  male  descendant  of  the  house  of  Anjou  in  Lower  Italy  (1382), 
who  seized  on  the  government.  Joan  II,  the  last  heir  of  Durazzo 
(1414-1435),  first  adopted  Alfonso  V,  of  Aragon,  and  then  Louis  III,  of 
Anjou,  and  his  brother,  Rene.  Alfonso,  who  inherited  the  crown  of 
Sicily,  united  both  kingdoms  (1435),  after  a  war  with  Rene  and  the 
Visconti  of  Milan.1 

Condensation  of  statement  should  be  secured  not  by  the 
omission  of  all  interpretation,  but  by  the  omission  of  the 
less  important  facts  and  their  interpretation,  while  the 
more  important  facts  with  their  interpretation  are 
retained. 

1  Quoted  by  J.  H.  Robinson  in  The  New  History,  p.  3. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  211 

Commenting  upon  the  factual  quotation  given,  Professor 
Robinson  says  that  "  in  treating  the  Italian  Renaissance, 
this  writer  has  chosen  barely  to  mention  the  name  of 
Francesco  Petrarca,  but  devotes  a  twelfth  of  the  available 
space  to  the  interminable  dynastic  squabbles  of  southern 
Italy."  Such  lack  of  perspective  is  inevitable  in  the 
absence  of  interpretation,  because  the  facts  themselves, 
as  we  have  learned,  do  not  reveal  their  own  importance. 
Their  relative  importance  depends  upon  the  parts  they 
play  in  social  development,  and  these  parts  are  revealed 
only  through  interpretation,  which  places  them  in  a 
connected  purposive  development. 

When  the  relative  importance  of  facts  is  lost  sight  of, 
undue  emphasis  is  likely  to  be  given  to  biographical  details 
and  to  individual  matters  of  little  social  consequence, 
because  these  are  definite,  simple,  and  often  easy  to  find. 
They  are  valuable  historically,  however,  only  in  the  degree 
that  they  throw  light  upon  social  practice.  Individuals 
such  as  Petrarch,  Luther,  and  Rousseau,  who  figured 
prominently  in  social  changes,  acquired  under  social 
direction,  as  we  have  learned,  their  purposes,  problems, 
and  the  bases  for  the  solutions  of  these  problems.  In 
each  case,  the  individual's  solution  was  limited  to  the 
social  problem  as  he  understood  it  and  to  the  use  of 
social  ideas  he  had  acquired.  In  so  far  as  his  conclusions 
were  adopted  by  society,  biographical  details  which  give 
a  clearer  understanding  of  these  matters  are  truly  sig- 
nificant, for  they  throw  light  upon  a  social  movement. 
Biographical  details  which  have  no  wide  social  signifi- 
cance are  mere  encumbrances  to  history. 

(2)  Contrasted  with  factualism  is  the  tendency  on  the 
part  of  some  writers  to  let  fiction  usurp  the  place  of  care- 
fully verified  and  accurately  stated  facts  in  what  purports 


212  The  Principles  of  Education 

to  be  history.  Extreme  cases  of  this  can  be  found  in  the 
writings  of  monks  of  the  Middle  Ages,  where  mere  hear- 
say and  uninvestigated  statements  of  marvelous  happen- 
ings were  accepted  as  facts,  if  only  they  were  in  harmony 
with  the  preconceived  interpretations  which  the  writers 
wished  to  place  upon  them.  Even  in  modern  times, 
especially  when  the  writer  is  strongly  partisan,  as  in  the 
case  of  Macaulay,  a  tendency  to  warp  facts  to  fit  preju- 
diced interpretations  may  be  found.  The  evil  of  this 
is  apparent. 

(3)  Another  fault  due  to  a  failure  to  understand  the 
true  function  of  history  is  sensationalism.  Detailed 
accounts  of  battle  scenes  and  stories  of  non-essential 
dramatic  episodes  are  instances  of  this.  The  latter 
need  no  comment.  Warfare  is  a  means  through  which 
men  have  settled  conflicts  of  religious,  political,  economic, 
and  other  purposes.  The  desires  that  led  men  to  battle 
may  be  of  far-reaching  historical  significance,  but  the 
details  of  battles  and  of  military  campaigns  do  not  give  an 
insight  into  these  conflicting  values,  the  fate  of  which 
hangs  in  the  balance.  Military  students,  who  wish  to 
get  an  appreciative  understanding  of  the  practices  of 
warfare,  would  find  such  accounts  useful;  but  men  in 
general,  who  have  no  need  to  become  expert  in  managing 
military  campaigns,  would  profit  more  by  historical 
accounts  that  give  an  appreciative  insight  into  institu- 
tional activities  in  which  they  are  daily  engaged. 

Surely  the  sensationalism  of  war  is  not  needed  to  arouse 
interest  in  the  past,  when  the  historian  has  before  him 
the  whole  realm  of  values  which,  generation  after  genera- 
tion, engrossed  the  attention  of  the  people  of  the  time 
and  gave  zest  to  their  lives,  values  which  have  often  been 
consecrated  by  great  sacrifice  made  in  their  service. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  213 

We  are  of  the  same  human  nature  as  our  forefathers, 
and  able,  therefore,  to  sympathize  with  them  in  their 
desires  and  difficulties.  The  situations  of  the  past  which 
were  intensely  interesting  to  them  will  produce  no  small 
degree  of  interest  in  us,  if  the  essentials  of  these  situations 
are  presented  with  accuracy  and  vividness. 

To  reveal  accurately  and  vividly  the  essentials  of  social 
situations  in  the  past  so  as  to  make  readers  appreciate 
the  values  sought  by  the  men  of  the  time,  imposes  upon 
the  historical  writer  a  difficult  task,  for  which  the  "  yellow 
journalistic "  appeal  to  primitive  interests  is  an  easy 
substitute.  Just  as  cheap  literature  gets  its  interest 
from  "  blood  and  thunder,"  so  does  cheap  history.  In 
neither  case  does  that  which  is  given  come  close  home  to 
the  daily  lives  of  men  and  give  significance  and  value 
to  what  they  do. 

(4)  A  failure  to  understand  the  essential  function  of 
history  has  led  to  confusing  it  with  the  social  sciences, 
the  function  of  which  is  to  give  control.  History  is 
concerned  with  what  people  actually  did  and  why  they 
did  it;  science  is  concerned  with  finding  the  causal 
relations  of  things  so  that  the  most  effective  means  may 
be  available,  whether  any  one  ever  used  them  or  not.  It 
is  not  uncommon,  indeed,  as  has  been  said  in  a  previous 
chapter,1  for  sciences  to  show  that  practices  established 
in  the  past  are  not  the  most  effective  for  realizing  the 
purposes  in  the  service  of  which  they  were  devised,  as 
in  the  case  of  recent  scientific  conclusions  as  to  the  effec- 
tiveness of  formal  discipline  in  education. 

As  patterns  for  control,  social  practices  of  the  past 
are  no  more  adequate  than  the  machinery  of  the  past. 
Growth  of  civilization  means  the  improvement  of  methods 

1  See  pp.  179  180. 


214  The  Principles  of  Education 

for  attaining  ideals  as  well  as  the  development  of  new 
purposes.  Older  methods  are  cast  off  as  inadequate  when 
better  ones  have  been  devised  to  take  their  places.  Polit- 
ical constitutions,  religious  creeds,  methods  of  manu- 
facturing, educational  practices,  are  no  sooner  made  than 
they  are  found  in  need  of  improvement,  antiquated. 
Not  many  years  ago,  women  supposed  to  be  witches  were 
burned  to  rid  the  world  of  untoward  influences,  slavery 
was  justified  by  Biblical  interpretation,  guilt  was  tested 
by  finding  whether  the  accused  man,  when  put  into  water, 
would  sink  with  the  weight  of  iniquity.  As  Professor 
Robinson  says,  "  It  is  true  that  it  has  long  been  held  that 
certain  lessons  could  be  derived  from  the  past, — precedents 
for  the  statesman  and  the  warrior,  moral  guidance  and 
consoling  instances  of  providential  interference  for  the 
commonalty.  But  there  is  a  growing  suspicion,  which 
has  reached  conviction  in  the  minds  of  most  modern 
historians,  that  this  type  of  usefulness  is  purely  illusory." l 

The  historian  who  confuses  history  with  social  sciences 
is  liable  to  criticize  the  effectiveness  of  past  social  practices 
in  the  light  of  modern  sciences,  when  such  criticism  serves 
only  to  confuse  the  real  issue.  As  historian  he  is  not 
concerned  with  the  faults  which  modern  sciences  reveal 
in  past  practices,  but  with  the  faults  that  were  recognized 
by  the  people  of  the  time  and  that  thus  led  to  new  pur- 
poses, new  problems,  and  the  changes  in  practices  which 
the  solutions  of  these  problems  brought  about.  In  going 
beyond  this,  he  brings  foreign  considerations  into  the 
discussion  of  an  historical  situation  which  is  complicated 
enough  as  it  is. 

Emphasis  upon  control  in  historical  writing  has  tended 
to  bring  history  itself  into  disrepute.  Men  are  led  to 
1  Robinson,  J.  H.,  The  New  History,  p.  17. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  215 

compare  its  effectiveness  in  giving  control  with  that  of 
social  sciences,  which  are  especially  designed  for  control. 
In  such  comparison,  history  must  always  appear  at  a 
disadvantage.  Much  of  the  dissatisfaction  with  the 
history  of  education  as  a  subject  for  the  professional 
training  of  teachers  is  due  to  an  attempt  to  use  it  to 
secure  results  in  control,  for  which  the  history  of  educa- 
tion was  never  rightly  intended.  Methods  of  teaching, 
to  cite  one  form  of  control,  are  not  to  be  learned  econom- 
ically and  effectually  from  the  study  of  the  writings  of 
Plato,  Quintilian,  Rousseau,  Pestalozzi,  Herbart,  and 
Froebel,  but  from  the  study  of  the  most  recent  books 
giving  a  scientific  treatment  of  this  subject.  The  works 
of  these  reformers  throw  light  upon  certain  stages  in  the 
history  of  education  and  thereby  help  us,  so  far  as  methods 
of  teaching  are  concerned,  to  appreciate  the  ideals  which 
the  present  practices  serve  and  to  understand  the  problems 
these  practices  are  intended  to  solve ;  but  the  determina- 
tion of  the  best  solutions  of  these  problems  belongs  to 
the  field  of  science.  From  Plato's  doctrine  of  formal 
discipline  to  Froebel's  belief  in  a  mysterious  symbolism, 
many  of  the  teachings  of  these  reformers  are  not  supported 
by  the  scientific  conclusions  of  to-day. 

History  must  always  be  a  complement  of  the  sciences, 
not  a  rival  of  them.  History  reveals  the  purposes  under- 
lying our  institutional  practices,  it  shows  the  ends  for 
which  they  were  intended,  and  thereby  keeps  alive  social 
problems;  but  when  the  effectiveness  of  these  practices 
is  to  be  determined,  when  we  wish  to  find  whether  the 
practices  can  be  improved,  we  must  close  our  histories 
and  open  our  books  in  the  social  sciences,  which  organize 
activities  according  to  their  causal  values  for  the  sake 
of  control.  History  saves  us  from  the  deadening  influence 


216  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  formalism,  —  that  is,  of  acting  without  appreciating 
the  true  purposes  of  our  acts;  the  sciences  show  us 
how  to  improve  our  practices  when  we  appreciate  the 
ends  these  practices  serve.  Both  are  necessary  to  the 
best  human  development. 

Ill 

Literature  incites  feelings  of  worth  mainly  through  words  which 
symbolize  strongly  appreciated  ideals  and  through  the  more  direct 
appeal  of  rhythm.  It  then  presents,  either  by  direct  statement 
or  suggestion,  a  means  of  control  which  receives  a  crown  of  value 
through  intimate  association  with  this  worth.  Nature  poetry 
keeps  us  mindful  of  fundamental  values  by  making  common  things 
symbolic  of  these  values. 

A  work  of  literary  art  in  furnishing  a  pattern  for  a  new 
purpose  must  incite  feelings  of  worth.  This  step  is  the 
first  in  the  process  through  which  a  new  purpose  is  made.1 
Literature  incites  feelings  of  worth  for  the  most  part  by 
means  of  words,  which  are  material  things  connected  in 
previous  experience  with  feelings  of  worth  possessed  by 
the  individual.  Just  as  a  painter  who  sees  in  imagina- 
tion the  glory  of  a  sunset,  presents  what  he  sees  to  others 
by  combining  on  the  canvas  various  colors,  so  a  literary 
artist  who  feels  some  worth  which  crowns  an  ideal,  presents 
it  to  others  by  combining  hi  their  consciousnesses  various 
feelings  of  value  which  natural  endowment  and  past 
experience  have  already  provided  for  them.  These 
original  and  acquired  feelings  of  worth  are  the  stuff  with 
which  he  must  work.  They  appear  as  halos  of  ideals 
possessed  by  the  individual,  and  may  be  called  to  con- 
sciousness by  words  which  symbolize  them.  Prominent 
in  literature,  therefore,  are  words  which  symbolize  strong 
feelings  of  worth,  such  as  those  of  love  in  its  various  forms, 

1  See  p.  72. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  217 

physical  and  moral  valor,  joyful  satisfactions  of  nature, 
aversion  to  suffering,  mystery  of  life,  horror  of  death,  hope 
of  immortality,  dependence  upon  and  reverence  for  a 
Supreme  Being.  These  were  old  when  the  world  was 
young;  they  pulsate  strongly  in  human  experience. 
Guided  by  intuition,  through  which  feelings  are  known 
and  appreciated  by  being  felt,  not  by  objective  mechanical 
construction,  the  literary  artist  combines  them  so  as  to 
make  the  feeling  of  worth  which  he  wishes  to  express. 

The  music  of  the  words  can  be  used  in  literature  to 
arouse  feeling  in  addition  to  that  which  comes  to  mind 
with  the  ideals  symbolized.  Stately  serious  spondees, 
joyfully  bounding  anapaests,  and  all  other  musical  forms 
to  which  spoken  language  is  subject,  make  a  direct  appeal 
to  feeling.  In  Poe's  The  Bells,  this  music  is  very  promi- 
nent. Listen : 

Hear  the  sledges  with  the  bells  — 

Silver  bells ! 

What  a  world  of  merriment  their  melody  foretells ! 
How  they  tinkle,  tinkle,  tinkle, 

In  the  icy  air  of  night ! 
While  the  stars  that  oversprinkle 
All  the  heavens,  seem  to  twinkle 
With  a  crystalline  delight ; 
Keeping  time,  time,  time, 
In  a  sort  of  Runic  rhyme, 
To  the  tintinnabulation  that  so  musically  wells 
From  the  bells,  bells,  bells,  bells, 

Bells,  bells,  bells  — 
From  the  jingling  and  the  tinkling  of  the  bells. 

Again,  in  Annabel  Lee,  the  musical  element  is  prominent. 

And  neither  the  angels  in  heaven  above, 
Nor  the  demons  down  under  the  sea, 

Can  ever  dissever  my  soul  from  the  soul 
Of  the  beautiful  Annabel  Lee : 


218  The  Principles  of  Education 

For  the  moon  never  beams,  without  bringing  me  dreams 

Of  the  beautiful  Annabel  Lee ; 
And  the  stars  never  rise,  but  I  feel  the  bright  eyes 

Of  the  beautiful  Annabel  Lee ; 
And  so,  all  the  night-tide,  I  lie  down  by  the  side 
Of  my  darling  —  my  darling  —  my  life  and  my  bride, 

In  the  sepulchre  there  by  the  sea, 

In  her  tomb  by  the  sounding  sea. 

The  form  of  poetry  demands  musical  quality.  The  form 
of  literary  prose  does  not  demand  it,  but  prose,  as  well  as 
poetry,  may  incite  feeling  by  its  music.  Dickens's  story 
of  the  death  of  Little  Nell  in  The  Old  Curiosity  Shop  has  an 
effective  musical  quality. 

She  was  dead.  No  sleep  so  beautiful  and  calm,  so  free  from  trace 
of  pain,  so  fair  to  look  upon.  She  seemed  a  creature  fresh  from  the 
hand  of  God,  and  waiting  for  the  breath  of  life ;  not  one  who  had 
lived  and  suffered  death. 

Her  couch  was  dressed  with  here  and  there  some  winter  berries 
and  green  leaves,  gathered  in  a  spot  she  had  been  used  to  favor. 
"When  I  die,  put  near  me  something  that  has  loved  the  light,  and 
had  the  sky  above  it  always."  Those  were  her  words. 

She  was  dead.  Dear,  gentle,  patient,  noble  Nell,  was  dead. 
Her  little  bird  —  a  poor,  slight  thing  the  pressure  of  a  finger  would 
have  crushed  —  was  stirring  nimbly  in  its  cage ;  and  the  strong 
heart  of  its  child-mistress  was  mute  and  motionless  for  ever. 

Where  were  the  traces  of  her  early  cares,  her  sufferings,  and 
fatigues?  All  gone.  Sorrow  was  dead  indeed  in  her,  but  peace 
and  perfect  happiness  were  born ;  imaged  in  her  tranquil  beauty  and 
profound  repose. 

And  still  her  former  self  lay  there,  unaltered  in  this  change.  Yes. 
The  old  fireside  had  smiled  upon  that  same  sweet  face ;  it  had  passed, 
like  a  dream,  through  haunts  of  misery  and  care;  at  the  door  of 
the  poor  schoolmaster  on  the  summer  evening,  before  the  furnace 
fire  upon  the  cold  wet  night,  at  the  still  bedside  of  the  dying  boy, 
there  had  been  that  same  mild,  lovely  look.  So  shall  we  know  the 
angels  in  their  majesty,  after  death. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  219 

But  literature  must  do  more  than  merely  stir  up  feeling. 
If  it  did  no  more  than  this,  it  would  not  guide  the  individ- 
ual to  new  ideals,  but  would  only  recall  in  various  com- 
binations appreciations  he  had  already  acquired.  If  a 
new  ideal  is  to  be  developed  under  the  guidance  of  a 
literary  pattern,  the  halo  of  feeling  which  the  literary 
work  has  brought  to  mind  must  be  transferred  to  some 
means  of  control  intimately  associated  with  the  appre- 
ciated worth.  This  means  of  control  is,  indeed,  necessary 
to  give  unity  to  a  literary  work,  for  all  the  appreciations 
of  value  called  forth  are  called  forth  to  give  this  means  of 
control  a  new  halo  of  worth ;  they  unite  in  it.  Then  the 
individual  must  act  in  realizing  the  appreciated  value 
through  the  means  of  control  associated  with  this  value, 
but  this  last  step  is  not  provided  by  the  literary  pattern. 
It  is  left  to  follow  as  a  result  of  the  other  two  steps. 

Let  us  now  find  these  steps  in  several  typical  works 
of  literary  art.  Owing  to  its  brevity,  simplicity,  and 
directness,  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm  reveals  the  steps 
clearly.  The  function  of  this  psalm  is  to  give  a  new 
worth  to  the  idea  of  the  Lord  as  a  Being  to  be  worshiped 
and  obeyed.  The  Hebrews  had,  at  one  time,  been  led  to 
appreciate  the  Lord  as  a  man  made  large,  who  walked  in 
the  Garden  of  Eden  and  talked  with  Adam  and  Eve. 
Later  they  regarded  Him  as  a  mighty  warrior,  irresistibly 
leading  His  chosen  people.  Still  later  they  felt  towards 
Him  as  towards  a  just  judge,  who  would  punish  iniquity 
and  reward  righteousness.  But  in  the  mind  of  David 
there  had  developed  a  new  ideal  of  Jehovah,  a  new  value 
in  worship  and  obedience.  In  the  expression  of  this 
value,  he  gave  to  those  of  his  own  and  later  generations 
a  work  of  literary  art  which  would  guide  them  to  this  new 
ideal  of  the  Lord. 


220  The  Principles  of  Education 

It  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  psalmist  wrote 
his  poem  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  guiding  others  to 
the  new  ideal  he  appreciated.  He  may  have  sung  out 
of  the  fullness  of  his  heart,  giving  expression  to  the  feelings 
that  welled  up  within  him.  Intuition  guided  him,  how- 
ever, to  call  to  mind  ideals  with  strong  halos  of  apprecia- 
tion, to  stir  up  feeling  through  the  music  of  his  words, 
and  to  associate  intimately  with  the  resulting  feeling  the 
idea  of  following  the  Lord  as  a  means  for  realizing  the 
values  appreciated. 

Pastoral  life  had  developed  in  men  of  his  nation  a 
feeling  of  value  associated  with  the  good  shepherd,  who 
loved  his  sheep,  protected  them  from  danger,  and  kept 
them  from  want.  When  the  psalmist  says  "  The  Lord 
is  my  shepherd;  I  shall  not  want,"  the  feeling  towards 
the  shepherd  becomes  associated  with  the  idea  of  following 
the  Lord,  in  accordance  with  the  law  controlling  the 
making  of  new  purposes ;  for  following  the  Lord  appears 
to  be  the  means  through  which  this  value  may  be  realized 
in  the  lives  of  men.  The  poem  then  leads  to  the  enrich- 
ment of  appreciation  by  dwelling  upon  more  specific 
values.  Green  pastures  and  deep  wells  of  cool  water 
would  naturally  call  forth  a  glow  of  feeling  in  the  minds 
of  men  accustomed  to  the  vicissitudes  of  pastoral  life. 
With  this  added  feeling  is  the  statement  that  the  Lord 
is  the  means  to  the  realization  of  the  value  it  crowns. 
One  by  one,  different  appreciations,  including  those 
created  by  the  music  of  the  verse,  are  thus  carried  over 
to  the  idea  of  the  Lord  as  the  poet  continues : 

He  restoreth  my  soul :  he  leadeth  me  in  the  paths  of  righteousness 
for  his  name's  sake. 

Yea,  though  I  walk  through  the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death, 
I  will  fear  no  evil :  for  thou  art  with  me ;  thy  rod  and  thy  staff  they 
comfort  me. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  221 

Thou  preparest  a  table  before  me  in  the  presence  of  mine  enemies : 
thou  anointest  my  head  with  oil ;  my  cup  runneth  over. 

Surely  goodness  and  mercy  shall  follow  me  all  the  days  of  my 
life ;  and  I  will  dwell  in  the  house  of  the  Lord  for  ever. 

As  all  of  these  feelings  of  value  fuse,  they  make  a  new  crown 
of  appreciation  for  the  idea  of  following  the  Lord,  and 
thereby  give  men  a  new  purpose  in  obedience  and  worship. 
Thus  is  the  psalm  a  pattern  for  guiding  experience  in 
making  a  new  ideal. 

In  Browning's  Cleon,  which  has  been  quoted  in  part 
in  the  discussion  of  history,  the  reader  feels  Cleon's 
despair  in  the  attempt  to  satisfy  the  deepest  longings  of 
his  soul  through  philosophy,  art,  and  pagan  religion; 
while  heightened  in  effect  through  contrast  with  these 
appear  the  values  for  which  Cleon  yearns.  He  says : 

"But,"  sayest  thou  —  (and  I  marvel,  I  repeat, 
To  find  thee  tripping  on  a  mere  word)  "what 
Thou  writest,  paintest,  stays ;   that  does  not  die ! 
Sappho  survives,  because  we  sing  her  songs, 
And  jEschylus,  because  we  read  his  plays ! " 
Why,  if  they  live  still,  let  them  come  and  take 
Thy  slave  in  my  despite,  drink  from  thy  cup, 
Speak  in  my  place.     Thou  diest  while  I  survive? 
Say  rather  that  my  fate  is  deadlier  still, 
In  this,  that  every  day  my  sense  of  joy 
Grows  more  acute,  my  soul  (intensified 
By  power  and  insight)  more  enlarged,  more  keen ; 
While  every  day  my  hair  falls  more  and  more, 
My  hand  shakes,  and  the  heavy  years  increase  — 
The  horror  quickening  still  from  year  to  year, 
The  consummation  coming  past  escape, 
When  I  shall  know  most,  and  yet  least  enjoy  — 
When  all  my  works  wherein  I  prove  my  worth, 
Being  present  still  to  mock  me  in  men's  mouths, 
Alive  still,  in  the  phrase  of  such  as  thou, 
I,  I  the  feeling,  thinking,  acting  man, 


222  The  Principles  of  Education 

The  man  who  loved  his  life  so  over-much, 
Shall  sleep  in  my  urn.     It  is  so  horrible, 
I  dare  at  times  imagine  to  my  need 
Some  future  state  revealed  to  us  by  Zeus, 
Unlimited  in  capability 
For  joy,  as  this  is  in  desire  for  joy, 
—  To  seek  which,  the  joy-hunger  forces  us : 
That,  stung  by  straitness  of  our  life,  made  strait 
On  purpose  to  make  prized  the  life  at  large  — 
Freed  by  the  throbbing  impulse  we  call  death, 
We  burst  there  as  the  worm  into  the  fly, 
Who,  while  a  worm  still,  wants  his  wings.     But  no ! 
Zeus  has  not  yet  revealed  it ;   and  alas, 
He  must  have  done  so,  were  it  possible ! 

Live  long  and  happy,  and  in  that  thought  die, 
Glad  for  what  was !     Farewell.    And  for  the  rest, 
I  cannot  tell  thy  messenger  aright 
Where  to  deliver  what  he  bears  of  thine 
To  one  called  Paulus ;  we  have  heard  his  fame 
Indeed,  if  Christus  be  not  one  with  him  — 
I  know  not,  nor  am  troubled  much  to  know. 
Thou  canst  not  think  a  mere  barbarian  Jew 
As  Paulus  proves  to  be,  one  circumcised, 
Hath  access  to  a  secret  shut  from  us? 
Thou  wrongest  our  philosophy,  O  king, 
In  stooping  to  inquire  of  such  an  one, 
As  if  his  answer  could  impose  at  all ! 
He  writeth,  doth  he?  well,  and  he  may  write. 
Oh,  the  Jew  findeth  scholars !   certain  slaves 
Who  touched  on  this  same  isle,  preached  him  and  Christ ; 
And  (as  I  gathered  from  a  bystander) 
Their  doctrine  could  be  held  by  no  sane  man. 

Thus  through  delicate  suggestion,  which  is  stronger  than 
bold  affirmation  because  the  reader  himself  leaps  to  the 
discovery,  Christianity  is  recognized  to  be  the  means  of 
satisfying  the  deepest  yearnings  of  the  human  soul.  In 
this  flash  of  intimate  association,  the  thrill  of  appreciation 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  223 

is  carried  over  to  Christianity,  which  receives  a  brighter 
crown  and  is,  therefore,  more  strongly  cherished. 

The  play  Hamlet  is  a  guide  for  developing  the  purpose 
of  prompt  action  in  doing  one's  duty.  Hamlet,  a  young 
man  of  splendid  idealism,  returns  from  university  life  to 
find  a  shocking  situation  in  his  home.  His  father,  who 
was  king,  has  been  murdered,  and  his  mother  is  living  in 
unholy  union  with  the  murderer,  her  former  husband's 
brother.  The  demands  of  moral  law  written  deep  in 
human  nature  through  centuries  of  experience  could  not 
have  been  expressed  more  clearly  than  in  Hamlet's  words, 

The  time  is  out  of  joint ;  —  0  cursed  spite, 
That  ever  I  was  born  to  set  it  right ! 

This  is  the  key  to  the  whole  situation.  The  ideals  created 
in  his  earlier  experience  cry  out  for  realization.  He  is 
clearly  conscious  of  the  fact.  But  what  does  he  do? 
Opportunity  after  opportunity  is  given  him  to  strike  for 
their  realization,  but  each  time  he  hesitates,  trifles  with 
opportunity,  procrastinates  action.  With  each  failure 
to  act,  he  is  caught  more  tightly  in  the  web  of  fate,  from 
which  obedience  to  the  moral  law  would  have  delivered 
him,  until  the  consequences  are  appalling.  Most  pathetic 
of  all,  Ophelia,  Laertes,  and  Hamlet  himself,  are  unneces- 
sarily sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  procrastination,  because 
Hamlet  has  neglected  opportunities  to  realize  an  ideal 
the  authority  of  which  he  felt  from  the  first.  Each 
calamity  is  pictured  through  description  and  suggestion 
in  such  manner  as  to  intensify  feeling,  and  each  in  turn 
is  discovered  to  be  the  consequence  of  Hamlet's  pro- 
crastination. "  Whatsoever  a  man  soweth,  that  shall 
he  also  reap ;  "  the  value  of  the  sowing  is  the  value  of 
the  harvest.  Not  through  mere  intellectual  symbolism, 


224  The  Principles  of  Education 

but  in  the  pulsations  of  his  own  heart  does  the  reader 
find  a  new  ideal  value  in  immediate  action  to  realize  his 
ideals,  a  value  which  tends  to  make  his  practical  life  more 
effective.  The  essential  function  of  tragedy  is  indicated 
by  the  last  words  of  that  master  of  tragedy,  Euripides: 
"  0  gods  of  mortals,  give  humanity  light,  that  it  may 
learn  the  source  of  its  griefs  and  learn  to  avoid  them !  " 

Nature  poetry  not  only  creates  new  purposes,  but  also 
keeps  us  mindful  of  them  by  associating  them  with 
common  things  about  us.  Quotations  from  the  Bible 
are  sometimes  hung  in  homes  with  a  view  to  keeping  the 
occupants  mindful  of  religious  ideals  which  should  guide 
their  daily  lives.  In  an  analogous  way,  nature  poetry 
makes  objects  that  we  meet  everywhere  remind  us  in  an 
effective  way  of  the  purposes  which  are  important  in 
human  life. 

The  little  flower  is  given  a  new  crown  of  value  as  the 
means  of  revealing  what  God  and  man  are,  when  Tennyson 
says: 

Flower  in  the  crannied  wall, 

I  pluck  you  out  of  the  crannies, 

I  hold  you  here,  root  and  all,  in  my  hand, 

Little  flower  —  but  if  I  could  understand 

What  you  are,  root  and  all,  and  all  in  all, 

I  should  know  what  God  and  man  is. 

One  who  has  acquired  this  appreciation  sees  in  the  flower 
the  mystery  of  human  life  and  is  carried  over  the  petty 
purposes  of  the  moment  to  comprehensive  ideals.  These 
ideals  tend  to  annul  the  momentary  desires  which  conflict 
with  them  and  to  intensify  those  which  are  in  harmony 
with  them.  They  bring  the  individual  into  the  presence 
of  the  more  fundamental  values  of  life,  which  as  purposes 
take  leadership  in  guiding  his  conduct. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  225 

The  individual  who  has  fully  appreciated  Bryant's 
To  a  Waterfowl,  is  reminded  of  God's  care,  when  he  sees 
the  bird  soaring  above  him.  Two  stanzas  are  quoted : 

There  is  a  Power  whose  care 

Teaches  thy  way  along  that  pathless  coast, — 

The  desert  and  illimitable  air, — 

Lone  wandering,  but  not  lost. 

He  who,  from  zone  to  zone, 

Guides  through  the  boundless  sky  thy  certain  flight, 

In  the  long  way  that  I  must  tread  alone, 

Will  lead  my  steps  aright. 

To  repeat  Mrs.  Browning's  verses  which  allude  to 
Moses  and  the  burning  bush, 

Earth's  crammed  with  heaven, 

And  every  common  bush  afire  with  God ; 

But  only  he  who  sees  takes  off  his  shoes. 

Nature  poems  make  us  see.     They  make  us  live  in  the 
presence  of  fundamental  values. 

In  dealing  with  nature,  the  poet  is  often  led  to  make 
things  appear  to  participate  in  human  experience;  or, 
in  other  words,  to  personalize  them.  A  new  world  of 
values  is  thus  opened  for  common  things,  so  that  these 
things  appear  not  only  as  means  to  the  realizing  of  human 
ideals,  but  also  as  consciously  sharing  with  man  the 
process  of  realization.  Longfellow's  Autumn,  which  is 
here  quoted  in  part,  exemplifies  this  personalizing. 

There  is  a  beautiful  spirit  breathing  now 
Its  mellow  richness  on  the  clustered  trees, 
And,  from  a  beaker  full  of  richest  dyes, 
Pouring  new  glory  on  the  autumn  woods, 
And  dipping  in  warm  light  the  pillared  clouds. 
Morn  on  the  mountain,  like  a  summer  bird, 


226  The  Principles  of  Education 

Lifts  up  her  purple  wing,  and  in  the  vales 
The  gentle  wind,  a  sweet  and  passionate  wooer, 
Kisses  the  blushing  leaf,  and  stirs  up  life 
Within  the  solemn  woods  of  ash  deep-crimsoned, 
And  silver  beech,  and  maple  yellow-leaved, 
Where  Autumn,  like  a  faint  old  man,  sits  down 
By  the  wayside  a-weary.  .  .  . 

Burns  reads  human  experience  into  the  mouse  when  he 

says: 

Thou  saw  the  fields  laid  bare  and  waste, 
An'  weary  winter  comin'  fast, 
An'  cozie  here,  beneath  the  blast, 

Thou  thought  to  dwell, 
Till,  crash !  the  cruel  coulter  past, 

Out  thro'  thy  cell. 

"  Ambitious  ocean,"  "  scolding  winds,"  "  threatening 
clouds,"  "  joyful  sea,"  —  such  examples  are  innumerable. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  any  extended  illustrations  of 
prose  literature,  because  prose  literature  is  like  poetry, 
except  that  its  form  only  permits  rather  than  demands 
a  musical  quality.  Lincoln's  speech  at  the  dedication  of 
the  cemetery  at  Gettysburg  creates  a  strong  appreciation 
by  calling  to  mind  the  consecration  of  the  soldiers  who 
gave  their  lives  for  their  country,  and  by  adding  to  this 
appreciation  the  effect  of  rhythmic  language.  In  turn, 
this  appreciation  is  carried  over  to  the  cemetery  which 
symbolizes  it  and  which  holds  this  value  in  a  permanent, 
objective  way  for  all  men  who  have  been  led  to  appreciate 
it. 

Prose  fiction,  whether  it  associates  human  acts  with 
their  consequences  or  whether  it  gives  deeper  apprecia- 
tions of  nature,  conforms  as  does  poetry  to  the  law  con- 
trolling the  making  of  new  purposes.  Through  imaginary 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  227 

situations  artistically  presented,  feelings  of  value  are 
incited  and  carried  over  to  ideas  intimately  associated 
with  them  as  means  to  end.  If  this  leads  to  action,  the 
reader  acquires  new  purposes. 

IV 

Sculpture  calls  forth  feelings  of  worth  mainly  by  symbolizing  a 
strongly  appreciated  climax  of  action  and  by  the  more  direct  appeal 
of  beauty  of  form.  It  also  suggests  the  means  which  is  to  receive 
value  through  intimate  association  with  these  feelings  of  worth. 

Sculpture  must  make  the  best  of  the  one  unchanging 
presentation  to  which  it  is  limited.  What  poetry  would 
tell  in  successive  verses,  sculpture  must  present  all  at  once. 
The  kind  of  appeal  that  poetry  makes  through  rhythm 
and  harmony  of  sounds,  sculpture  makes  through  beauty  of 
physical  form.  A  statue,  in  so  far  as  it  is  symbolic,  must 
represent  the  climax  of  events,  the  part  richest  in  feeling. 
In  the  best  sculpture,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Laocoon  Group, 
the  sculptor,  instead  of  representing  the  climax  directly, 
represents  a  situation  near  it,  so  that  the  excited  imagina- 
tion of  the  observer  may  be  free  to  create  its  own  image 
of  the  climax.  The  climax  represented  only  in  the  imagi- 
nation of  the  observer  arouses  stronger  feeling  than  the 
climax  directly  represented  by  the  statue  would  arouse. 
The  statue  must  associate  intimately  with  the  strong 
feeling  of  value  excited  some  means  for  realizing  this 
value. 

The  statue  of  Olympic  Zeus  leads  to  an  appreciation 
of  a  supernatural  personality  just  as  truly  as  the  Twenty- 
Third  Psalm  leads  to  an  appreciation  of  the  Lord.  Colos- 
sal size,  perfect  physical  development,  and  bodily  control 
that  makes  it  appear  easy  for  Zeus  to  rise  and  hurl  a 
thunderbolt,  incite  an  appreciation  of  power.  Every 


228  The  Principles  of  Education 

feature  impresses  the  observer  with  the  dignity  and 
nobility  of  the  god.  Feelings  of  value  are  called  to  con- 
sciousness by  beauty  of  form.  As  all  these  appreciations 
fuse,  they  are  carried  over  to  the  supernatural  personality 
represented,  just  as  various  appreciations  called  forth  by 
the  Twenty-Third  Psalm  are  carried  over  to  the  Lord. 
When  universalized,  the  statue  gives  an  appreciation  of 
divinity,  although  the  observer  may  not  believe  that  the 
pagan  god  truly  represents  this  divinity. 

The  Laocoon  Group  illustrates  an  instance  in  which 
sculpture  symbolizes  a  story  that  must  be  understood, 
if  the  new  ideal  is  developed.  One  could  appreciate 
this  work  of  art  without  understanding  the  meaning  sym- 
bolized, just  as  one  could  appreciate  rime  and  rhythm 
of  poetry  in  a  language  which  he  did  not  understand. 
But  as  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  meaning  in  order  to 
acquire  the  essential  value  of  poetry,  so  it  is  necessary 
to  know  the  meaning  in  order  to  get  the  essential  value  of 
statuary.  An  individual  who  did  not  understand  the 
story  represented  by  the  Laocoon  Group  might  gain  only 
the  feeling  that  serpents  should  be  avoided. 

There  are  several  stories  which  the  Laocoon  Group  may 
represent,  but  the  same  essential  idea  runs  through  them 
all.  The  story  most  common  now  is  given  by  Vergil.1 
Laocoon,  a  priest  of  Apollo,  advised  against  taking  the 
wooden  horse  of  Ulysses  within  the  walls  of  Troy,  and 
gave  expression  to  his  feelings  by  hurling  a  spear  against 
the  horse.  In  this  way,  Laocoon  opposed  the  gods  who 
were  supporting  the  strategy.  As  a  punishment,  two 
serpents  came  from  the  sea,  and,  when  the  father  was 
making  a  sacrifice,  attacked  the  two  sons.  Suddenly 
apprised  of  what  was  taking  place,  Laocoon  rushed  to 

1  ^Eneid,  Book  II. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  229 

rescue  his  sons,  but  was  caught  with  them  in  the  deadly 
coils.  An  earlier  story  makes  Laocoon  suffer  because 
he  had  desecrated  the  temple  of  Apollo,  and  thus  brought 
the  disfavor  of  the  god  upon  him.  Still  another  story  is 
that  Laocoon  offended  Apollo  by  marrying  against  the 
will  of  the  god.  In  all  of  these  accounts,  however,  there 
is  the  one  essential  idea  that  Laocoon  was  punished 
because  he  opposed  the  will  of  some  supernatural  power. 

The  statue  thrills  the  observer  with  the  horror  of  the 
situation  as  he  sees  the  agony  expressed  in  Laocoon's 
face  and  realizes  that  the  father  in  his  death  struggle  is 
helpless  to  save  either  himself  or  his  sons,  upon  whom  his 
rash  act  has  brought  calamity.  The  parent's  grief  over 
the  hopeless  death  struggle  of  his  two  innocent  sons  is 
added  to  the  physical  torture  he  suffers.  Beauty  of  form 
and  strength  of  body  of  those  about  to  be  destroyed  add 
to  the  pathos  of  the  situation. 

As  the  tragic  scene  is  carried  to  its  climax  in  the  excited 
imagination  of  the  observer,  it  stirs  deeply  his  feeling. 
At  the  same  time  he  recognizes  that  the  punishment  of 
Laocoon  came  as  a  result  of  offending  a  supernatural 
power.  The  will  of  the  gods  thus  acquires  a  new  appre- 
ciation ;  the  observer  feels  the  superiority  of  a  supernatural 
power,  which,  as  the  work  of  art  becomes  universalized, 
does  not  necessarily  mean  the  particular  personalities  in 
whom  the  Greeks  believed,  but  whatever  supernatural 
power  the  individual  may  recognize.  As  in  the  case  of 
new  value  given  to  Christianity  by  the  poem  Clean,  not 
mere  intellectual  recognition  of  cause  and  effect,  but  the 
calling  forth  and  transfer  of  strong  feeling,  mark  the 
development  of  the  new  ideal. 


230  The  Principles  of  Education 

V 

Painting  functions  similarly  to  sculpture,  but  differs  from  sculp- 
ture in  that  it  uses  colors  and  is  limited  to  the  representation  of 
one  point  of  view. 

Painting  is  limited  like  sculpture  to  one  unchanging 
presentation,  but  differs  from  sculpture  in  that  it  uses 
colors  and  is  confined  to  two  dimensions.  Although 
painting  can  give  only  one  point  of  view,  it  has  the 
advantage  of  warmth  of  color  and  of  power  to  represent 
finer  evidences  of  the  inner  life.  The  face  of  a  statue  is 
cold,  dull,  rigid ;  but  the  face  in  a  picture  is  warm  and  life- 
like, and  reveals  spiritual  qualities  of  the  person  repre- 
sented. When  Christianity  turned  the  attention  of 
artists  from  physical  form  to  spiritual  life,  painting  was 
used  to  represent  that  peace  and  beauty  which  God 
gives  to  those  who  do  His  will.  The  advantages  of  paint- 
ing over  sculpture  in  representing  natural  scenery  are 
obvious.  Where  a  scene  includes  numerous  objects  and 
where  color  is  an  important  factor,  painting  excels  sculp- 
ture. 

The  Sistine  Madonna  may  illustrate  how  painting 
guides  to  a  new  ideal.  This  picture  excites  complex 
appreciation  which  includes  that  of  noble  womanly 
character,  the  innocence  and  helplessness  of  infancy, 
mother's  love,  religious  value  suggested  by  the  halo  and 
by  the  angel  faces,  and  sensuous  beauty  of  form  and  color. 
This  complex  feeling  of  value  is  transferred  to  the  Ma- 
donna, who  appears  to  be  the  means  through  which  these 
values  have  been  made  incarnate. 

Turner's  The  Slave  Ship  pictures  the  sun  about  to  give 
over  to  the  darkness  of  night  a  scene  freighted  with  horror. 
In  the  distance  is  a  storm-battered  slave  ship,  and  nearer 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  231 

by,  in  the  water,  are  manacled  human  beings,  helpless 
amid  stormy  waves  and  fierce  denizens  of  the  sea.  As 
one's  soul  is  stirred  with  horror,  the  feeling  is  carried  over 
to  slavery,  which  is  felt  to  be  the  cause  of  it  all.  Harriet 
Beecher  Stowe's  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin  develops  an  aversion 
to  slavery  by  making  it  appear  in  a  series  of  incidents  as 
the  cause  of  great  human  suffering;  Turner's  The  Slave 
Ship  exerts  the  same  kind  of  influence,  but  is  confined 
to  the  representation  of  one  incident.  While  the  picture 
has  the  disadvantage  of  telling  the  story  through  only  one 
incident,  it  has  the  great  advantage  of  making  a  concrete 
vivid  appeal  to  the  imagination  rather  than  one  dependent 
upon  words  more  or  less  general  in  meaning,  and  also  the 
advantage  of  presenting  all  at  once  elements  of  feeling 
which  the  novel  must  give  in  successive  passages. 

Studies  in  still  life  have  a  function  similar  to  that  of 
nature  poetry.  Appreciations  of  natural  beauty  ac- 
centuated in  the  picture  with  its  satisfying  proportions 
and  delightful  color  harmonies,  ideals  suggestive  of  rest, 
peace,  freedom,  and  of  the  joy  and  mystery  of  life,  give 
richer  value  to  nature  about  us,  so  that  we  live  in  the 
presence  of  these  greater  worths  and  are  practically 
affected  by  them. 

VI 

Architecture  calls  forth  feelings  of  worth  by  lx»auty  of  form  and 
by  the  values  of  ideals  it  symbolizes.  It  also  MIHHI-MS  that  to 
which  the  worth  is  transferred,  as,  for  example,  religious  faith  in 
the  cane  of  a  magnificent  cathedral. 

Architecture  is  usually  included  among  the  fine  arts, 
although  it  borders  closely  upon  the  "  useful  "  arts.  The 
palace  and  the  temple  are  to  shelter  people  as  well  as  to 
incite  appreciation.  Buildings  may  be  useful,  however, 


232  The  Principles  of  Education 

without  appealing  to  appreciation,  and  such  appeal  is, 
therefore,  something  in  addition  to  this  usefulness. 

Architecture  calls  forth  a  feeling  of  appreciation  by 
equalizing  conflicts  of  forces;  it  is  adapted  to  express 
power  of  mere  material  objects,  as  sculpture  is  adapted 
to  express  power  of  the  human  body,  and  painting  and 
music,  spiritual  power.  A  column,  because  of  its  rigidity, 
resists  the  force  of  gravity  in  what  it  supports.  A  column 
that  is  unnecessarily  massive  with  relation  to  the  weight 
of  the  superstructure,  or  is  so  slender  as  to  give  the  im- 
pression of  weakness,  causes  a  feeling  of  dissatisfaction. 
In  the  one  case,  there  appears  to  be  waste  of  energy,  and 
in  the  other,  there  appears  to  be  strain.  A  column 
should  be  of  greatest  diameter  in  the  middle  where  the 
greatest  strength  is  needed,  and  the  superstructure  should 
be  placed  upon  it  so  that  the  weight  can  be  supported 
to  the  greatest  advantage.  A  favorable  feeling  is  caused 
when  forces  are  nicely  balanced.  Stability  gives  a  feeling 
of  satisfaction.  This  is  true  not  only  of  columns,  but  of 
all  architectural  forms. 

Our  feelings  with  regard  to  equalization  of  forces  are 
due  to  the  tendency  to  personalize  objects,  to  read  our 
experiences  into  them.  Our  feeling  of  resistance  against 
opposing  objects  is  essential  to  the  idea  of  force  which 
we  read  into  other  objects.  We  sympathetically  imagine 
that  a  column  supporting  too  heavy  a  superstructure  is 
strained  with  the  burden.  The  author  once  saw  on  an 
elaborately  decorated  theater  a  heavy  cornice  supported 
by  figures  of  men  in  horizontal  position  with  feet  against 
the  wall  and  backs  against  the  cornice.  This  appeared 
inartistic,  because  it  gave  the  observer,  through  sympathy 
with  the  figures,  an  annoying  feeling  of  instability.  He 
did  not  stop  to  reason  about  it ;  he  immediately  felt  it. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  233 

This  personalizing  excites  some  appreciation  even  for 
products  of  the  "  useful  "  arts.  For  this  reason,  the  nice 
adjustments  of  forces  in  the  modern  locomotive  or  auto- 
mobile excite  greater  appreciation  than  do  the  clumsy 
adjustments  in  the  earlier  types. 

Our  own  personal  feelings  in  the  use  of  the  architectural 
product  also  may  appear.  The  curves  of  an  ax  handle 
would  be  just  as  graceful,  if  reversed,  but  would  give  one 
a  feeling  of  dissatisfaction,  because  they  would  not  be 
adapted  to  the  use  intended.  It  would  be  uncomfortable 
to  use  such  an  ax  handle.  For  the  same  reason,  a  dis- 
proportionately small  entrance  to  a  building,  or  a  ceiling 
that  appears  to  be  too  low,  gives  an  unpleasant  feeling. 

Largeness  and  durability  are  also  factors  of  appreciation 
of  architectural  work.  A  great  cathedral  is  more  impres- 
sive than  an  exact  copy  of  it  in  the  form  of  a  small  model. 
The  forces  involved  are  greater  in  the  former  instance. 
Permanence  and  strength  make  stone  more  effective 
material  than  wood,  not  only  for  the  sake  of  the  building, 
but  also  for  the  sake  of  appreciation. 

In  addition  to  the  appreciation  excited  by  beauty  of 
form,  architecture  gives  appreciation  by  symbolizing 
ideals.  Ionian,  Dorian,  Attic,  Queen  Anne,  Colonial, 
-  all  of  these  types  are  symbolic  of  past  civilizations  and 
rich,  therefore,  in  ideal  associations.  When  Napoleon 
exclaimed,  "  Soldiers,  from  yonder  pyramids  forty  cen- 
turies look  down  upon  you,"  he  felt  an  appreciation  of  the 
pyramids  for  what  they  symbolized,  as  well  as  for  their 
durable  material,  stable  form,  and  magnificent  size. 

Whatever  may  be  the  causes  of  appreciation,  —  whether 
satisfactory  proportion,  size,  or  ideals  symbolized,  —  is 
carried  over  to  the  social  institution  or  whatever  else  the 
observer  is  led  to  associate  with  the  appreciated  values 


234  The  Principles  of  Education 

as  a  means  of  realizing  them.  A  massive  stone  building 
causes  a  feeling  of  security  which  may  be  transferred  to 
the  bank  or  trust  company  it  shelters;  a  stately  temple 
of  justice  arouses  feelings  of  dignity  and  power  which  may 
be  transferred  to  the  courts;  a  magnificent  cathedral 
may  in  like  manner  make  religious  faith  appear  more 
noble  and  authoritative.  Architecture  is  thus  a  perma- 
nent guide  for  the  developing  of  feelings  of  worth  which 
create  new  ideals. 

VII 

Music  is  especially  strong  in  direct  appeal  to  feeling,  but  is  more  or 
less  indefinite  in  suggesting  that  to  which  appreciation  is  trans- 
ferred. 

Music  is  less  symbolic  than  literature,  painting,  and 
sculpture,  and  is  stronger  than  other  fine  arts  in  direct 
appeal  to  feeling.  The  murmuring  of  the  brook,  the 
whispering  of  leaves,  the  song  of  the  bird,  the  cry  of  the 
wolf,  the  roar  of  waves,  the  crash  of  thunder,  and  many 
sounds  of  the  human  voice,  impress  one  with  a  wide  range 
of  feelings.  They  are  the  language  of  nature  that  speaks 
directly  to  the  heart  of  man. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  other  fine  arts,  appreciation  of  a 
musical  composition  is  built  up  through  the  uniting  of 
appreciated  elements.  Just  as  words  are  combined  into 
meaningful  sentences  and  paragraphs,  so  musical  tones 
are  combined  into  larger  units.  In  the  degree  that  these 
combinations  are  not  felt,  the  music  becomes  a  confusion 
of  tones.  As  a  key  sentence  guides  the  reader  to  the 
appreciation  of  the  unity  of  a  paragraph,  so  the  motif, 
made  prominent  in  its  simplicity  at  the  beginning  of  a 
complex  musical  composition,  guides  the  hearer  to  appre- 
ciate the  unity  of  tones.  Now  one  part  and  now  another 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  235 

of  the  harmonic  structure  is  made  to  stand  out  until 
recognized,  so  that  its  effect  can  be  felt  when  it  is  less 
accentuated  in  a  manifold  elaboration  of  tones  later. 

In  addition  to  making  a  direct  appeal,  music  increases 
appreciation  by  calling  to  consciousness  strong  ideals 
which  it  symbolizes.  His  country's  national  anthem 
heard  by  a  patriot  in  a  foreign  land  is  a  forceful  example  of 
this.  Music  which  one  has  associated  with  happy  days  of 
one's  youth  in  home  and  church  gains  an  enhanced  value 
due  to  what  it  represents.  The  wedding  march  and 
funeral  dirge  excite  stronger  feeling  on  account  of  what 
they  symbolize.  Symbolization  is  most  frequently  due 
to  songs,  in  which  the  music  is  expressed  in  the  form  of 
words.  The  words  carry  with  them  not  only  tones,  but 
ideals  also,  as  in  war  and  love  songs,  and  in  religious 
hymns. 

In  accordance  with  the  law  controlling  the  making  of 
new  purposes,  feelings  of  value  excited  by  music  are 
carried  over  to  whatever  is  intimately  associated  with 
them.  In  a  song,  words  symbolize  the  idea  that  receives 
the  new  value.  When  music  and  poetry  are  thus  com- 
bined, not  only  is  there  a  double  source  of  appreciation, 
but  the  transfer  of  feeling  is  more  directly  guided.  Value 
may  be  given  to  the  place  to  which  one  must  go  in  order 
to  hear  the  music,  as  the  church,  the  school,  the  theater, 
or  the  home.  Ideas  to  receive  new  values  may  be  sug- 
gested by  the  music  itself ;  for,  as  imagination  runs  free, 
moods  created  by  the  music  bring  to  mind  ideas  that  pre- 
viously have  been  associated  with  these  moods. 

The  purpose-giving  influence  of  music  has  been  recog- 
nized in  a  practical  way  from  the  time  of  primitive  man, 
who  strengthened  his  courage  with  the  war  song  and 
developed  his  religious  awe  for  mystic  divinities  by  the 


236  The  Principles  of  Education 

religious  chant.  Early  Athenians  made  much  use  of 
music  to  develop  ideals  of  patriotism  and  religion  in  the 
youths  preparing  for  citizenship.  For  centuries,  music 
was  prominent  in  religious  education.  To-day  in  many 
practical  ways  the  fact  appears  that  music  not  only  in- 
tensifies our  joys  and  soothes  our  sorrows,  but  also  gives 
authority  to  many  purposes,  which  take  leadership  in 
action. 

VIII 

In  the  moving  picture,  a  new  medium  for  artistic  expression  has 
been  found. 

A  new  medium  for  artistic  expression  has  appeared  in 
the  moving  picture,  which  is  widely  influential  in  guiding 
the  development  of  ideals.  Owing  to  the  newness  of  this 
medium,  the  full  range  of  its  possibilities  has  not  yet 
been  discovered.  Although  it  is  associated  with  the 
expression  of  various  forms  of  literature  on  the  stage,  its 
possibilities  are  different.  Compared  with  the  spoken 
drama,  it  is  greatly  limited  in  the  use  of  words,  but  it  has 
far  greater  possibilities  in  the  scope  of  action  directly 
presented,  in  the  rapidity  with  which  scenes  are  changed, 
and  in  the  power  to  stress  essential  parts  of  a  complex 
scene  by  means  of  the  "  close-up."  The  law  controlling 
the  development  of  new  purposes  and  the  applications  of 
it  made  in  the  discussion  of  literature  and  painting,  sug- 
gest how  the  moving  picture  may  guide  in  forming  new 
ideals. 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  237 


IX 

Because  of  the  freedom  of  the  fine  arts  in  making  associations, 
they  may  be  perverted  so  as  to  give  false  values,  which  become 
subversive  of  human  welfare.  The  same  work  of  art  may  influence 
two  persons  in  quite  different  ways. 

The  freedom  of  the  fine  arts  in  selecting  appreciations 
of  worth  and  ideas  to  which  these  feelings  are  transferred, 
is  beset  with  certain  dangers.  Relations  of  means  and 
ends  may  be  stated  or  suggested  when  internal  probability 
or  necessity  does  not  justify  such  connections.  As  the 
fine  arts  appeal  to  feeling  rather  than  to  critical  rational 
judgment,  the  subtle  transfer  of  feeling  from  the  end  to 
some  idea  associated  with  it,  may  take  place  without  the 
individual's  discovering  that  his  association  is  not  justi- 
fiable and  that  the  resulting  appreciation  is  injurious. 
There  is  danger,  therefore,  that  the  function  of  fine  arts 
be  perverted  so  that  they  give  false  values,  which  become 
subversive  of  human  welfare  when  they  are  made  guides  of 
action.  This  is  the  case  when  admiration  of  physical 
bravery  is  associated  with  deeds  of  an  outlaw,  as  in  some 
thrilling  novels  written  for  boys.  War  and  peace  become 
unduly  glorified  as  valuable  in  themselves  by  association 
with  appreciations  that  misrepresent  the  value  of  the  one 
or  the  other.  The  creation  of  false  values  in  this  way 
is  a  common  occurrence. 

In  painting,  sculpture,  and  music,  the  character  of  the 
appreciation  excited  and  that  of  the  idea  which  receives 
the  new  value  are  dependent  more  or  less  upon  suggestion. 
Because  different  appreciations  and  ideas  are  called  forth 
by  suggestion,  one  person  may  feel  that  a  work  of  art  is 
immoral  in  its  influence,  while  another  may  feel  that  the 
same  work  of  art  is  moral.  Both  judgments  may  be 


238  The  Principles  of  Education 

right  for  the  individuals  concerned.  The  influence  upon 
any  person  or  group  of  persons  cannot  be  determined  until 
what  is  suggested  in  each  case  is  known. 


In  showing  how  history  and  the  several  fine  arts  connect  re- 
actions with  fundamental  systems  of  habits,  natural  science  gives 
the  physical  counterpart  of  the  ways  in  which  they  create  feelings 
of  value  and  associate  with  them  means  of  control. 

Let  us  now  consider  history  and  the  fine  arts  from  the 
point  of  view  of  natural  science.  Since  history  and  the 
fine  arts  are  purpose-giving  subject  matter,  their  nature, 
from  the  materialistic  point  of  view,  may  be  found  in 
the  natural  science  explanation  of  how  new  purposes  are 
made.  They  give  stimuli  which  tend  to  open  fundamental 
channels  of  expression,  and,  at  the  same  time,  open  less 
important  channels  so  that  the  latter  become  united  with 
the  former.  When  the  otherwise  less  important  reaction 
has  become  an  integral  part  of  a  fundamental  system  of 
habits,  a  check  in  it  is  a  check  in  the  system,  and  is, 
therefore,  accompanied  by  the  stronger  feeling  of  value 
that  goes  with  the  system. 

Before  the  War  of  1812,  shipping  activities  in  the  New 
England  States  were  important  in  the  adjustment  of 
organisms  to  the  environment.  The  War  of  1812  checked 
the  ocean  commerce  and  thereby  interfered  with  the 
fundamental  habits  acquired  by  the  people  of  New  Eng- 
land in  their  adjustment  to  environment.  In  the  reaction 
to  this  new  situation,  certain  acts  of  collecting  tariff  on 
imported  goods  were  developed  in  accordance  with  the 
process  through  which  new  reactions  are  formed.  The 
more  fundamental  habits  of  living  functioned  better, 
when,  as  a  result  of  the  tariff,  activities  of  manufacturing 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  239 

were  developed.  In  time,  collecting  a  tariff  became  fixed 
as  a  social  habit  and  was  transmitted  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree  through  imitation,  the  younger  generation  con- 
tinuing what  the  older  had  begun.  In  the  degree  that 
it  was  transmitted  through  imitation,  it  became  isolated 
from  the  system  of  habits  in  connection  with  which  it  was 
developed.  History  restores  this  connection.  On  the 
side  of  consciousness,  the  activity  of  collecting  the  tariff 
is  a  fact,  and  the  system  of  habits  with  which  the  tariff 
is  connected  appears  as  a  purpose.  Connecting  reactions 
with  habits  in  relation  to  which  they  have  developed, 
is  paralleled  on  the  side  of  consciousness  by  the  experience 
of  interpreting  facts.  When  the  reaction  has  been 
reunited  with  the  more  fundamental  system  of  habits, 
tension  in  the  reaction  is  paralleled  in  consciousness  by  a 
feeling  of  value  that  belongs  to  the  system  of  habits  of 
which  the  reaction  is  now  an  integral  part.  A  check  in  it 
is  a  check  in  the  whole  system  of  habits. 

As  time  passed,  situations  changed  and  new  difficulties 
arose  in  adjustment,  so  collecting  a  tariff  was  modified 
and  connected  with  other  habits  in  reaction  to  environ- 
ment. These  habits  represent  on  the  side  of  consciousness 
new  purposes  which  came  in  to  modify  the  tariff.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  give  them  in  detail  here,  because  in 
making  these  new  connections,  history  merely  repeats 
what  has  been  explained  in  the  preceding  paragraph  as 
the  parallel  of  interpretation. 

In  Browning's  Clean,  the  fundamental  system  of 
habits  having  to  do  with  self-preservation  is  stimulated 
under  conditions  that  make  its  conscious  accompani- 
ments appear,  and,  at  the  same  time,  activities  peculiar  to 
Christianity  are  similarly  stimulated.  The  partly  opened 
channels  run  together  so  that  activities  represented  by 


240  The  Principles  of  Education 

Christianity  become  a  part  of  the  more  fundamental  sys- 
tem of  habits.  Stimulating  the  system  of  habits  cor- 
responds to  creating  an  appreciation,  and  connecting 
activities  of  Christianity  with  it  corresponds  to  associat- 
ing these  activities  as  means  to  the  appreciated  end.  If 
the  activities  of  Christianity  are  checked,  the  conscious 
parallel  now  becomes  that  of  the  value  of  the  whole 
system  of  habits ;  for  the  check  in  the  activity  is  a  check 
in  the  system  of  which  it  is  now  an  integral  part.  This 
is  the  parallel  of  the  transference  of  value. 

In  the  play  Hamlet,  stimuli  are  such  as  to  open  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree  strongly  fixed  channels  of  response 
that  would  turn  one  away  from  suffering  and  death. 
On  the  mental  side,  this  corresponds  to  inciting  certain 
appreciations  of  value.  Then  nervous  connections  neces- 
sary for  prompt  action  are  associated  with  these  habits 
as  necessary  to  their  proper  functioning.  This  corre- 
sponds to  associating  prompt  action,  the  opposite  of 
procrastination,  with  the  value  as  the  means  of  realiz- 
ing it.  Afterwards,  when  prompt  action  is  checked,  the 
mental  accompaniment  is  that  which  belongs  to  the  more 
fundamental  system  with  which  it  has  been  connected ; 
for  checking  this  particular  reaction  now  is  checking  the 
whole  system  of  which  it  is  a  part. 

The  difference  between  history  and  the  fine  arts  is 
that  history  gives  stimuli  connecting  only  those  channels 
which  have  been  connected  at  one  time  or  another  in 
organisms  of  earlier  generations,  whereas  the  fine  arts  may 
give  stimuli  which  make  connections  that  have  not  existed 
in  organisms  of  earlier  generations.  The  fine  arts  are  dis- 
tinguished one  from  another  by  the  differences  in  the 
kinds  of  stimuli  they  give,  as  words,  tones,  and  colors, 
and  by  the  consequent  differences  in  the  ways  in  which 


History  and  the  Fine  Arts  241 

they  open  channels  of  fundamental  habits  and  connect 
particular  reactions  with  these  channels. 

When  the  fine  arts,  in  modifying  the  complex  automatic 
switchboard  of  the  brain,  do  not  organize  reactions  in 
ways  to  give  better  adjustment,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
connect  particular  channels  of  reaction  and  fundamental 
systems  of  habits  so  as  to  interfere  with  adjustment,  the 
physical  parallel  of  an  immoral  influence  appears.  The 
reader  of  an  immoral  novel  or  the  observer  of  an  immoral 
moving  picture  may,  through  wrong  organization  of 
channels  of  response,  react  in  ways  that  bring  injurious 
consequences.  Because  the  fine  arts  are  not  limited,  as 
is  history,  to  connections  that,  at  one  time  or  another,  have 
actually  been  made  and  accepted  in  social  practice,  it  is 
easily  possible  for  them  to  make  connections  that  interfere 
with  adjustment.  Because  of  the  fact  that  stimuli  given 
by  some  fine  arts,  as  sculpture,  painting,  and  music, 
may  excite,  as  a  result  of  previous  influences,  quite  dif- 
ferent tendencies  to  response  in  different  organisms,  the 
same  work  of  art  may  be  beneficial  to  one  organism  and 
injurious  to  another. 

REFERENCES 

ROBINSON,  J.  H.,  The  New  History,  1912,  pp.   132-153.     (Shows 

what  kind  of  history  is  most  valuable  to  the  common  man.) 
JUDD,  C.  H.,  Psychology  of  High-School  Subjects,  1915,  pp.  370-391. 

(Discusses  history  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  psychologist.) 
FAIRCHILD,  A.  H.  R.,  The  Making  of  Poetry,  1912,  pp.   155-184. 

(Explains  the  nature  of  poetry.) 
GORDON,  K.,  Esthetics,  1909,  Chs.  XI-XVII,  pp.  195-294.     (These 

chapters  are  devoted  respectively  to  a  discussion  of  architecture, 

sculpture,   painting,  language  as  an   art  medium,   poetry,   the 

drama,  and  prose  forms.) 
DE   GARMO,   C.,   Aesthetic   Education,    1913,   pp.    1-156.     (Students 

especially  interested  in  the  fine  arts  will  find  valuable  material 


242  The  Principles  of  Education 

in  this  book.     Pages  155-156  contain  a  list  of  books  valuable 
for  collateral  study.) 

PARKER,  DE  W.  H.,  The  Principles  of  ^Esthetics,  1920,  Chs.  VI- 
XV.  (Discusses  the  underlying  criteria  by  which  standards  in  art 
are  developed.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Should  the  achievements  in  science  and  industry  have  a  less 
important  place  in  our  school  history  than  the  achievements  in  war? 

2.  In  a  continued  story  in  a  magazine,   the  later  instalments 
are  sometimes  preceded  by  a  summary  of  the  earlier  part  of  the 
story.    Show  that  the  function  of  history  is  analogous  to  the  function 
of  this  summary. 

3.  In  the  professional  training  of  teachers,  what  is  the  value 
of  the  history  of  education? 

4.  Find  in  some  textbook  in  history  a  section  that  is  largely  factual. 

5.  May  history  appropriately  be  called  "social  memory"?    Ex- 
plain. 

6.  In  what  important  ways  do  you  believe  the  content  of  the 
history  courses  you  studied  in  the  high  school  could  have  been  im- 
proved ? 

7.  How  could  your  study  of  literature  in  the  high  school  have 
been  made  more  profitable  to  you? 

8.  Why  is  it  important  to  develop  in  children  a  taste  for  litera- 
ture and  other  fine  arts? 

9.  Having  selected  three  poems  and  three  pictures,  show  what 
purpose  is  enriched  by  each  and  how  this  enrichment  is  caused. 

10.  Show  that  in  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm  or  in  some  other  work 
of  art  the  idea  to  which  ideal  value  is  to  be  transferred  is  the  basis 
of  the  unity  of  the  work  of  art. 

11.  Do  you  believe  that  in  addition  to  training  the  pupils  to  sing, 
the  public  school  should,  through  courses  designed  especially  for  the 
purpose,  develop  in  them  an  appreciation  of  the  best  music,  instru- 
mental as  well  as  vocal?     Explain. 

12.  Criticize    the    following:     "The    psychological    purpose    of 
aesthetic  education  ...  is  to  promote  the  pure,  unselfish  joy  of  life, 
to  enable  us  to  see  and  appreciate  the  beautiful  wherever  it  exists, 
and  when  possible  to  produce  it  where  it  is  not,  but  should  be." 

13.  Was  the  moral  influence  of  some  "  picture  show  "  you  attended 
recently  good  or  bad  ?    Explain. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    NATURE    OF    PATTERNS    FOR    CONTROL  - 
THE   SCIENCES 

The  function  of  the  sciences  is  to  describe  and  explain  in  the 
simplest  manner  the  behavior  of  things,  in  order  that  these 
things  may  be  used  most  effectively  in  control.  This  descrip- 
tion and  explanation  require  the  abstracting  of  things  from 
values,  the  considering  of  special  aspects  of  these  things,  the 
reducing  of  them  to  elements,  and  the  finding,  on  the  basis  of 
efficient  causation  or  logical  cogency,  of  laws  descriptive  of  how 
these  elements  behave  singly  or  in  combination.  The  fact 
that  the  sciences  are  outgrowths  of  ordinary  experience  accounts 
for  the  following:  their  logical  classifications  of  phenomena 
are  normally  also  "  psychological " ;  the  pure  sciences  are  an  inter- 
mediate stage  in  the  development  of  control  and  are  supple- 
mented by  the  "applied  sciences";  the  normal  approach  to  the 
pure  sciences  begins  with  practical  activities.  The  classifica- 
tion of  the  sciences  develops  slowly  and  can  never  be  complete. 
The  beliefs  that  the  sciences  give  insight  into  reality  or  speak 
authoritatively  about  ultimate  values,  are  erroneous. 


The  function  of  the  sciences  is  to  descril>e  in  the  simplest  manner 
the  l>ehavior  of  things,  in  order  that  these  things  may  l>e  used  most 
effectively  in  control.  Each  science  (1)  considers  things  apart 
from  all  feelings  of  value  ;  (II)  deals  with  only  one  asi>cct  of  them  ; 
(3)  reduces  them,  from  its  »|>ecial  point  of  view,  to  their  simplest 
part*,  or  element*;  and  (•!)  finds  laws  which  descrilw  how  these 
elements  hchuve.  Ixith  separately  and  in  combination. 

The  sciences  are  the  most  valuable  guides  in  developing 
means  of  control.     They  give  control  in  the  form  of  widely 

24.3 


244  The  Principles  of  Education 

useful  organized  principles  rather  than  in  the  form  of 
a  multiplicity  of  isolated  facts;  they  increase  rapidly 
man's  power  over  nature  by  substituting  a  definite  method 
of  investigation  for  the  trial  and  error  method  of  primitive 
man.  As  Karl  Pearson  says,  "  In  the  capacity  he  has 
evolved  for  resuming  vast  ranges  of  phenomena  in  brief 
scientific  formulae  in  his  knowledge  of  natural  law,  and 
the  foresight  this  knowledge  gives  him,  lie  the  sources  of 
man's  victory  over  other  forms  of  life,  from  the  brute 
power  of  the  wild  beast  to  the  subtle  power  of  the  micro- 
scopic bacillus  of  some  dread  disease."  To  find  more 
definitely  how  sciences  guide  in  developing  control,  is  the 
problem  of  this  chapter. 

Things  of  the  world  act  in  ways  of  their  own.  They 
are  rigidly  stubborn  in  nature;  they  always,  under  the 
same  conditions,  act  persistently  in  the  same  ways. 
This  fact  is  termed  the  uniformity  of  nature.  Water 
expands  when  it  freezes  and  ice  absorbs  heat  when  it 
melts ;  light  and  sound  vary  in  intensity  with  the  square 
of  the  distance ;  a  grain  of  corn  in  the  warm  moist  earth 
sprouts  into  a  plant.  A  congress  of  nations  could  not 
make  them  do  differently. 

Man  can  make  things  work  for  him  only  by  finding 
out  just  what  they  do  and  under  what  conditions  they  act. 
Then  he  can  set  to  work  those  which  do  what  he  desires 
done.  The  farmer  must  know  how  seed  and  soil  act; 
the  cook  must  know  how  flour  and  yeast  behave;  the 
builder  of  locomotives  must  know  what  steam  will  do 
under  various  conditions;  the  maker  of  electrical  appli- 
ances must  understand  the  behavior  of  electricity;  the 
debater  must  know  the  power  of  premises  to  compel 
conclusions ;  a  man  who  desires  to  do  his  duty  must  know 
the  effects  upon  life  of  various  kinds  of  conduct.  In 


The  Sciences  245 

every  line  of  his  activity,  man  can  get  the  assistance  of 
things  only  by  letting  them  work  for  him  in  their  own 
peculiar  ways. 

The  province  of  the  sciences  is  to  describe  and  explain 
in  the  simplest  manner  the  activities  of  things  considered 
by  themselves,  so  that  we  can  most  easily  understand 
how  to  make  use  of  these  things  in  attaining  our  purposes. 
In  the  words  of  Miinsterberg, 

If  we  want  to  make  use  of  things  in  the  world,  we  must  know 
what  they  are  in  themselves,  not  only  what  they  mean  to  us  and 
what  they  are  for  our  will,  but  what  they  are  independent  of  us  and 
our  interests.  Hence,  we  must  look  on  the  chaos  of  things  with  the 
special  aim  of  finding  out  what  they  themselves  contribute  to  our 
experience  and  how  they  hang  together  without  reference  to  us.  To 
do  this,  we  must  consider  them  as  objects,  which  are  cut  loose  from 
our  will  and  interest.  As  soon  as  we  deal  with  the  things  of  life 
as  if  they  were  nothing  but  mere  objects,  they  interest  us  only  with 
reference  to  their  connection.  Their  relation  to  us,  to  our  feeling 
and  will,  is  then  ignored  and  omitted.  We  call  this  connection  of 
the  things  among  one  another  causality.1 

This  simplicity  in  description  and  explanation  requires 
(1)  that  things  having  the  same  characteristics  be  treated, 
not  as  individuals,  but  as  a  class,  so  that  one  descriptive 
and  explanatory  statement  will  do  for  a  number  of  things ; 
it  requires  also  (2)  that  this  statement  be  as  simple  as 
possible.  As  the  number  of  things  in  a  class  is  increased, 
the  control  given  by  one  scientific  formulation  is  in- 
creased ;  as  the  description  of  the  class  is  made  simpler,  it 
is  more  easily  understood.  As  Karl  Pearson  says, 

By  the  formation  of  conceptions,  which  may  or  may  not  have 
perceptual  equivalents  in  the  sphere  of  sense-impression,  the  scientist 

1  Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  pp.  28-29. 
(This  separation  of  things  from  purposes  is,  however,  relative  rather 
than  absolute.) 


246  The  Principles  of  Education 

is  able  to  classify  and  compare  phenomena.  From  their  classification 
he  passes  to  formulae  or  scientific  laws  describing  their  sequences 
and  relationships.  The  wider  the  range  of  phenomena  embraced,  and 
the  simpler  the  statement  of  the  law,  the  more  nearly  we  consider  that 
he  has  reached  a  "fundamental  law  of  nature."  The  progress  of 
science  lies  in  the  continual  discovery  of  more  and  more  comprehen- 
sive formulae,  by  the  aid  of  which  we  can  classify  the  relationships 
and  sequences  of  more  and  more  extensive  groups  of  phenomena. 
The  earlier  formulae  are  not  necessarily  wrong,  they  are  merely 
replaced  by  others  which  in  briefer  language  describe  more  facts.1 

Again,  to  use  the  words  of  Professor  Santayana, 

But  the  hope  of  science,  a  hope  which  is  supported  by  every  success 
it  scores,  is  that  a  simpler  law  than  has  yet  been  discovered  will  be 
found  to  connect  units  subtler  than  those  yet  known ;  and  that  in 
these  finer  terms  the  universal  mechanism  may  be  exhaustively 
rendered.2  \ 

Things  come  usually  in  the  form  of  bundles;  they 
are  composite  in  nature  and  complex  in  activity.  Not 
many  composite  things  can  be  included  as  such  in  the 
same  class  for  description,  because,  although  they  may 
be  similar  in  some  particulars,  they  usually  differ  in 
others ;  and  even  if  they  were  included  in  the  same  class, 
the  complexity  of  their  activities  would  make  simple 
description  impossible.  Sciences  must  proceed,  therefore, 
in  accordance  with  the  fable  that  sticks  may  be  broken 
one  at  a  time  when  they  cannot  be  broken  together  in  a 
bundle.  The  sciences  can  fulfill  their  mission  only  when 
they  make  the  task  of  description  and  explanation  as 
easy  as  possible  by  separating  complex  things  into  the 
simplest  elements  and  by  taking  account  of  these  ele- 

1  Pearson,  Karl,  The  Grammar  of  Science,  1911,  pp.  96-97.    The 
italics  are  mine. 

2  Santayana,  G.,  The  Life  of  Reason  —  Reason  in  Science,  p.  33. 


The  Sciences  247 

ments  one  at  a  time.  This  fact  is  illustrated  by  Hobhouse 
when  he  says : 

The  mind,  with  all  its  powers,  is  incapable  of  grasping  the  whole 
even  of  the  "flower  in  the  crannied  wall."  It  deals  with  it  first  under 
this  aspect,  and  then  under  that  —  as  a  thing  of  beauty,  as  suggestive 
of  a  Wordsworthian  sonnet,  as  injurious  to  the  structure  of  the  wall, 
as  a  composite,  as  consisting  mainly  of  carbon,  oxygen,  hydrogen, 
and  nitrogen  in  certain  proportions,  as  decomposing  so  many  cubic 
feet  of  carbonic  acid  per  diem  under  the  influence  of  sunlight.  And 
whichever  aspect  we  like  to  take  we  are  pretty  sure  to  leave  out  the 
rest.  The  sonnet  would  be  deranged  by  a  thought  of  the  carbonic 
acid.  And  yet  somehow  all  these  aspects  belong  to  the  flower. 
The  whole,  which  is  the  real,  contains  or  presents  them  all  and  many 
more.  And  so  we  learn  our  first  lesson  about  thought,  that  to  grasp 
anything  at  all  we  must  leave  out  the  greater  part  of  it.1 

In  simplifying  material  for  special  study,  a  science 
(1)  separates  things  from  all  feelings  of  value  which  one 
may  have  for  them,  (2)  separates  one  aspect  from  all 
other  aspects  of  the  things  it  considers,  and  (3)  divides 
these  things,  from  this  special  point  of  view,  into  the 
simplest  parts,  or  elements.  This  process  of  scientific 
method  is  abstraction,  a  term  which  comes  from  the 
Latin  word  meaning  "  to  draw  away."  By  abstraction,  we 
take  away  from  a  thing  in  imagination  that  which  cannot 
be  taken  away  from  it  in  reality.  Whiteness,  for  instance, 
cannot  exist  by  itself,  but  always  appears  as  the  color  of 
some  object ;  yet  we  can  consider  whiteness  in  imagination 
as  though  it  had  a  separate  existence. 

The  ordinary  way  of  examining  a  complex  thing,  we  have 
learned,  is  to  take  it  apart  and  put  it  together  again. 
This  is  the  method  used  by  the  scientist  in  dealing  with 
the  intricate  things  in  nature  just  as  it  is  the  method  used 
by  the  child  in  trying  to  understand  some  mechanical 

1  Quoted  by  J.  Welton,  The  Logical  Bases  of  Education,  p.  64. 


248  The  Principles  of  Education 

toy.  The  simplest  parts,  or  elements,  are  found,  and  then 
the  ways  in  which  these  elements  combine  are  discovered. 
In  chemistry,  for  example,  material  things  are  separated 
into  such  elements  as  oxygen,  hydrogen,  and  carbon,  and 
then  the  ways  in  which  these  elements  combine  to  form 
the  many  things  in  nature  are  described.  Descriptions 
of  how  elements  go  together,  of  how  they  act  singly  and 
in  combination  when  uniting,  form  the  laws  of  nature. 

(1)  In  our  real  world,  things  are  always  connected  with 
purposes.    We  give  attention  to  them  when  we  use  them 
in  satisfying  our  desires.     Because  of  their  relation  to 
purposes,  things  acquire  some  value  recognized  imme- 
diately through  feelings  of  appreciation.    With    these 
values,  the  sciences  are  not  concerned.     The  province  of 
the  sciences,  as  we  have  learned,  is  to  find  how  things  act 
when  taken  by  themselves,  and  shuts  out  at  once,  there- 
fore, all  consideration   of    how  persons  may  feel  about 
these  things.     Whenever  feelings  of  value  intrude  upon 
a  field  of  science,  they  become  mischief-makers;    they 
create  prejudices,  confuse  the  issue,  encumber  thought. 
The  scientist  must  be  an  unprejudiced  observer  of  things ; 
he  must  see  what  takes  place,  but  feel  no  preference 
whatever  for  one  thing  above  another.     Personally  he 
may  prefer  fragrant  flowers  to  stinking  weeds,  and  words 
of  wisdom  to  the  babblings  of  idiocy ;  but  as  botanist  or 
psychologist  he  must  be  absolutely  impartial.1 

(2)  After  things  have  been  abstracted  from  the  values 
we  feel  for  them,  they  are  still  very  complex.     For  ex- 
ample, corn,  although  we  may  not  at  the  time  desire  to 
use  it  in  any  way,  may  be  considered  as  seed,  as  food,  as 
a  commodity  to  be  sold,  as  a  material  for  making  alcohol, 
as  a  cargo  for  a  ship,  etc.     Further  abstraction,  or  analysis 

1  Cf.  Munsterberg,  Hugo,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  p.  30. 


The  Sciences  249 

in  imagination,  must  be  made.  Whether  one  thing 
appears  before  or  after  another,  the  length  of  time  between 
them,  differences  in  the  sizes  and  relative  positions  of 
things  in  space,  are  important  considerations  affecting 
causal  relations.  When  such  time  and  space  relations 
are  considered  by  themselves,  the  problem  becomes  much 
simpler  than  it  would  be,  if  the  particular  natures  of  things 
in  time  and  space  were  considered  simultaneously  with 
these  relations.  Time  and  space  abstracted  from  all 
content  mark  the  field  of  mathematics.  Light,  heat, 
sound,  and  other  forms  of  energy  manifested  in  things, 
also  may  be  considered  by  themselves.  This  abstraction 
marks  the  field  of  physics.  Qualitative  changes  in  things 
which  affect  their  properties  as  forms  of  matter,  are 
abstracted  for  study  by  the  science  of  chemistry.  Changes 
due  to  life  in  organic  matter  mark  another  abstract  field 
for  study,  the  field  of  biology.  In  grammar  and  logic, 
forms  of  language  and  of  reasoning  respectively  are  ab- 
stracted from  content,  so  that  investigation  will  not  be 
encumbered  by  the  particular  meanings  of  sentences  and 
arguments.  Each  of  these  fields  may,  in  turn,  be  sub- 
divided by  further  abstraction.  The  field  of  mathe- 
matics may  be  subdivided  into  those  of  arithmetic, 
algebra,  geometry,  etc. ;  the  field  of  physics  may  be 
subdivided  into  those  of  mechanics,  heat,  light,  sound, 
and  electricity ;  the  field  of  biology  may  be  subdivided 
into  those  of  botany  and  zoology. 

(3)  When  all  personal  preferences  have  been  eliminated 
and  certain  aspects  of  things  have  been  abstracted  for 
investigation,  still  further  analysis  is  necessary  for  the 
sake  of  simplicity.  Sciences  seek,  therefore,  the  elements 
within  their  respective  fields.  In  the  elements,  the 
simplest  forms  are  reached ;  there  is  no  immediate  pos- 


250  The  Principles  of  Education 

sibility  of  further  subdivision.  If  further  subdivision 
were  possible,  it  would  mean  that  an  element  has  not 
been  found.  Thus  mathematics  seeks  axioms;  physics, 
molecules;  chemistry,  atoms;  and  grammar,  parts  of 
speech.  Because  the  simplest  particle  of  matter  that 
can  be  seen  even  with  the  aid  of  the  most  powerful  micro- 
scope is  still  divisible,  physics  and  chemistry  have  been 
compelled  to  invent  hypothetical  molecules  and  atoms, 
which  have  never  been  seen  by  anybody  and  are  purely 
inferential  though  well  established.  From  the  atom,  even 
a  smaller  unit,  the  electron,  has  been  separated  hi  the 
service  of  certain  phases  of  science. 

Scientific  analysis  not  only  simplifies  objects,  but  also 
greatly  reduces  in  number  the  classes  of  objects  to  be 
described.  Elimination  of  personal  preferences  does 
away  with  many  classifications  that  have  no  significance 
for  science.  A  classification  of  plants  on  the  basis  of  some 
investigator's  personal  preferences  for  their  beauty,  odor, 
or  some  sentimental  value  would  be  useless,  because 
.individuals  differ  in  such  preferences.  Countless  objects 
differing  greatly  in  other  respects  may  have  in  common 
some  aspects  which  may  be  taken  together  for  description. 
When  we  have  a  certain  number  of  characteristics  to  deal 
with,  the  larger  the  number  of  characteristics  included 
in  each  of  the  various  classes  for  description,  the  smaller 
is  the  number  of  classes  for  description.  All  material 
things  are  in  time  and  space,  manifest  forms  of  energy, 
and  undergo  qualitative  changes.  Descriptions  included 
in  mathematics,  physics,  and  chemistry  may,  therefore, 
apply  to  all  of  these  things  and  thus  reduce  the  number 
of  classes  to  be  considered.  All  organic  matter  may 
undergo  changes  due  to  life,  which  are  described  in  biology. 
Language  and  reasoning  have  respectively  common 


The  Sciences  251 

characteristics  which  may  be  treated  by  a  single  science 
as  grammar  or  logic.  Finding  the  elements  still  further 
reduces  the  number  of  classes  to  be  described.  Twenty- 
six  letters  spell  all  the  words  of  the  language;  about 
eighty  chemical  elements  are  responsible  for  all  the  quali- 
tative differences  in  material  things ;  nine  parts  of  speech 
make  all  the  sentences  uttered  by  man. 

When  elements  have  been  reached,  the  next  step  is 
to  find  how  they  behave  both  separately  and  in  combina- 
tion. Here  their  stubbornness  is  an  advantage  to  the 
scientist ;  for  they  always  behave  in  the  same  ways  under 
the  same  conditions.  Observation  has  revealed  so  many 
instances  of  this  that  the  scientist  assumes  it  to  be  uni- 
versally true.  If  there  were  no  such  uniformity  of  nature, 
if  things  behaved  in  capricious  ways,  descriptions  of  their 
behavior  at  one  time  would  be  of  no  use  in  setting  them 
to  work  later.  If,  under  the  same  conditions,  hydrogen 
and  oxygen,  when  united  in  the  proportion  of  two  volumes 
to  one,  might  form  water  or  milk;  if  iron  might  be 
attracted  to  the  earth  or  repelled  by  the  earth ;  if  sound 
might  become  more  intense  or  less  intense  with  the  dis- 
tance ;  if  bread  might  be  a  food  or  a  poison ;  if  the  same 
argument  might  force  conviction  or  be  absurd ;  —  if,  in 
every  instance,  nature  were  not  uniform,  of  what  use 
would  descriptions  of  the  behavior  of  things  be?  Only 
when  man  knows  with  certainty  what  they  will  do  can  he 
successfully  set  them  to  work  for  him. 

Descriptions  of  these  uniformities  in  the  behavior  of 
things  constitute  the  laws  of  nature.  The  laws  of  nature, 
accordingly,  are  not  like  those  of  a  state,  which  may  or 
may  not  be  obeyed.  Nature  needs  no  policemen  or  penal 
institutions  to  compel  obedience.  In  so  far  as  scientific 
laws  are  true,  they  tell,  not  what  ought  to  be  done,  but 


252  The  Principles  of  Education 

what  was,  is,  and  will  be  done,  unfailingly,  precisely, 
universally.  When  things  are  set  to  work  for  man  in 
accordance  with  true  scientific  formulae,  they  never 
shirk ;  they  are  always  reliable. 

We  must  know  not  only  what  kind  of  behavior  things 
manifest,  but  also  how  much  they  accomplish.  As 
Spencer  says,  "  Our  first  achievement  is  to  foretell  the 
kind  of  phenomena  which  will  occur  under  specified 
conditions;  our  last  achievement  is  to  tell  not  only  the 
kind  but  the  amount."  l  A  physician  must  know  not 
only  what  kind,  but  also  how  much  medicine  must  be 
given  to  bring  about  the  desired  result.  Too  little  may 
be  useless  and  too  much  may  be  injurious.  In  the  appli- 
cation of  chemistry  to  manufacturing,  measuring  instru- 
ments are  conspicuous.  Even  if  the  desired  result  is 
attained  when  more  than  the  necessary  amount  of  some 
chemical  is  used,  there  is  at  least  a  waste  of  material. 
Some  things  are  more  effective  than  others,  furthermore, 
in  accomplishing  the  same  kind  of  result.  Some  filaments 
hi  lamps  give  more  light  than  others  with  less  electricity ; 
some  educational  methods  give  greater  results  than  others 
with  less  work  on  the  part  of  both  the  pupil  and  the 
teacher.  Measurement  is  necessary  for  determining  which 
are  more  useful.  This  is  obvious  in  the  case  of  the  lamp 
filament ;  it  is  less  obvious,  but  just  as  true,  in  the  case 
of  educational  methods.  Only  with  the  use  of  objective 
measurement  such  as  that  made  possible  for  hand- 
writing, arithmetic,  and  composition,  and  by  various  other 
methods  for  measuring  mental  abilities,  can  educational 
practice  escape  inaccurate  opinion  and  be  put  on  a  truly 
scientific  basis.  Just  as  the  phenomena  of  heat  could  not 

1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Essays  —  Scientific,  Political,  and  Speculative, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  4-5. 


The  Sciences  253 

be  treated  scientifically  until  the  thermometer  was  in- 
vented, so  the  phenomena  of  education  could  not  be 
treated  scientifically  until  appropriate  methods  of  objec- 
tive measurement  were  invented. 

Just  as  the  scientist  goes  beyond  direct  observation  in 
finding  atoms  and  molecules  as  the  elements  of  physical 
things,  so  he  goes  beyond  direct  observation  in  finding  the 
laws  of  nature.  In  both  cases,  he  gives  imaginary  descrip- 
tions that  have  been  found  to  work  satisfactorily  when 
tested  in  the  light  of  what  he  can  observe.  As  hypotheses 
that  are  found  to  work  satisfactorily  when  tested,  laws 
of  nature  are  man-made  instruments  justified  by  their 
usefulness.  Pearson  says : 

The  discovery  of  some  single  statement,  some  brief  formula  from 
which  the  whole  group  of  facts  is  seen  to  flow,  is  the  work,  not  of  a 
mere  cataloguer,  but  of  the  man  endowed  with  creative  imagination. 
The  single  statement,  the  brief  formula,  the  few  words  of  which 
replace  in  our  minds  a  wide  range  of  relationships  between  isolated 
phenomena,  is  what  we  term  a  scientific  law.1 

Nobody  has  ever  seen  how  light  is  transmitted  in  space ; 
the  laws  of  light  transmission  based  upon  the  assumption 
of  ethereal  vibration,  are  inventions  made  because  they 
are  useful  in  describing  and  explaining  the  phenomena  of 
light.  Darwin  did  not  see  directly  the  laws  of  evolution, 
but  invented  them  through  suggestions  received  from  the 
methods  of  breeding  plants  and  animals.  Yes,  laws  of 
nature  are  just  as  truly  inventions  as  are  mechanical 
devices  used  in  the  industrial  world.  In  both  cases, 
when  more  effectual  ones  have  been  invented,  the  older 
ones  are  cast  aside ;  and,  to  a  reader  of  the  history  of 
science,  the  scrap  heap  of  antiquated  laws  appears  as 
conspicuous  as  the  scrap  heap  of  antiquated  machines. 
1  The  Grammar  of  Science,  1911,  Pt.  I,  p.  31. 


254  The  Principles  of  Education 

II 

The  sciences  recognize  two  kinds  of  persistent  behavior  in  things, 
—  that  dependent  on  efficient  causation  and  that  dependent  on 
logical  cogency.  Efficient  causation  is  manifested  only  in  physical 
things,  and  is,  therefore,  peculiar  to  physical  sciences,  such  as 
physics,  chemistry,  and  biology.  Logical  cogency  is  peculiar  to 
sciences  such  as  logic  and  mathematics,  which  deal  with  pure  forms. 

In  saying  that  the  function  of  the  sciences  is  to  find 
the  "  activity  "  or  "  behavior  "  of  things  taken  by  them- 
selves, we  have  attributed  to  things  characteristics  of  the 
human  will.  This  common  and  easier  way  of  regarding 
things  dates  back  to  primitive  animism,  and,  in  the  light 
of  modern  knowledge,  is  true  only  metaphorically. 
Pearson  expresses  the  truth  more  accurately  when  he  says 
that  a  scientific  law  is  "  the  single  statement,  the  brief 
formula,  the  few  words  of  which  replace  in  our  minds  a 
wide  range  of  relationships  between  isolated  phenomena."  1 

The  sciences  recognize  two  kinds  of  persistent  activity 
or  behavior  of  things ;  or,  better  expressed,  two  kinds  of 
relationships  among  phenomena,  —  that  dependent  on 
efficient  causation,  as  when  the  blow  of  a  hammer  causes 
heat,  and  that  dependent  on  logical  cogency,  as  when  a 
mathematical  proof  compels  one  to  accept  the  conclusion. 

1 A  still  more  significant  statement  is  given  by  Pearson  as  follows : 
"A  scientific  law  is  related  to  the  perceptions  and  conceptions  formed 
by  the  perceptive  and  reasoning  faculties  in  man;  it  is  meaningless 
except  in  association  with  these ;  it  is  the  resume  or  brief  expression 
of  the  relationships  and  sequences  of  certain  groups  of  these  percep- 
tions and  conceptions,  and  exists  only  when  formulated  by  man." 
(Opus  ciL,  p.  82.)  The  truth  of  this  statement  appears  in  the  light 
of  the  fact  that  the  nature  of  things  consists  largely  of  meanings  de- 
veloped by  reason  and  read  into  sensation  symbols.  In  order  to  avoid 
making  the  discussion  of  the  scientific  treatment  of  things  unneces- 
sarily difficult,  we  have  not  short-circuited  the  relation  between  the 
sciences  and  reason  by  treating  things  as  largely  objectified  reason. 


The  Sciences  255 

Physical  sciences,  such  as  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology, 
deal  directly  with  the  former;  dialectic  sciences,  such  as 
mathematics  and  logic,  deal  directly  with  the  latter. 

Although  the  physical  sciences  take  special  abstract 
points  of  view,  they  still  deal  with  material  objects,  which 
manifest  physical,  or  efficient,  causation.  Through  physi- 
cal causation,  the  heat  in  the  firebox  of  a  locomotive 
causes  the  steam  pressure  in  the  cylinder ;  the  steam  pres- 
sure in  the  cylinder  causes  the  movements  of  the  piston 
rod ;  the  movements  of  the  piston  rod  cause  the  turning  of 
the  wheels ;  the  turning  of  the  wheels  causes  the  movement 
of  the  locomotive.  These  changes  appear  one  after  another 
in  time.  The  laws,  or  formulae,  minutely  describing  them 
can  be  derived  by  a  process  of  induction  based  on  observa- 
tion of  concrete  facts.  For  this  reason,  there  is  always 
the  possibility,  however,  that  new  facts  which  appear  with 
more  extended  observation  may  invalidate  the  laws,  or 
formulae,  attained  through  induction. 

Scientific  abstraction  may,  however,  go  so  far  as  to 
exclude  all  physical  objects  and  take  separately  for  investi- 
gation only  the  forms  in  which  they  appear,  such  as  time 
and  space.  Or  it  may  go  still  one  step  further  to  the 
highest  degree  of  abstraction,  which  deals  with  the  forms 
of  thought  itself.  Mathematics,  formal  grammar,  and 
logic  are  examples  of  sciences  that  do  not  include  material 
things  in  their  abstract  points  of  view.  We  have  learned 
that  where  there  are  no  physical  objects,  there  can  be 
no  physical,  or  efficient,  causation.  Physical  energy 
cannot  be  stored  in  a  void,  —  in  absolutely  empty  time, 
space,  and  forms  of  thought.  Yet  pure  forms  are  just  as 
stubborn  in  having  their  own  way  as  are  physical  things ; 
relations,  as  in  the  case  of  pure  mathematics,  are  un- 
alterably fixed.  Twice  eight  is  sixteen ;  opposite  angles 


256  The  Principles  of  Education 

are  equal;  and  the  will  of  no  man  can  change  these 
relations.  However  unwelcome  a  conclusion  may  be, 
a  person  must  believe  it,  if  he  accepts  the  premises  as 
true,  and  if  he  fully  understands  the  steps  in  a  logically 
sound  argument  that  leads  to  the  conclusion.  The 
necessary  relations  in  mathematics  and  logic  are  due 
to  what  is  called  logical  cogency. 

Logical  cogency  is  not  passed  from  one  thing  to  another 
in  time  as  is  physical  causation.  The  series  of  relations 
pointed  out  in  the  several  steps  of  a  geometrical  proof 
exist  all  at  once.  The  steps  in  the  proof  are  due  merely 
to  our  attending  to  one  thing  after  another  in  time. 
Similarly  in  logical  argument,  the  conclusion  exists  in  the 
meaning  of  the  premises ;  there  is  nothing,  as  in  the  case 
of  physical  causation,  passed  on  from  one  step  to  another. 
The  conclusions  of  sciences  which  deal  with  pure  forms 
impress  one,  moreover,  as  having  universal  validity; 
there  is  no  feeling,  as  in  the  case  of  truths  derived  induc- 
tively in  physical  sciences,  that  further  observations  may 
invalidate  the  conclusions.  Dialectic  sciences  have  all 
the  evidence  in  the  case ;  for  they  are  essentially  deduc- 
tive, and  their  validity  does  not  depend,  therefore,  upon 
the  observation  of  particulars,  which  are  infinite  in 
number,  but  upon  premises  that  are  universal  and  all- 
sufficient. 

The  high  degree  of  abstraction  involved  in  dealing 
with  pure,  empty  forms  adds  to  the  difficulty  of  dialectic 
sciences.  The  comparative  difficulty  in  comprehending 
highly  abstract  ideas  becomes  evident  whenever  we  pass 
from  a  highly  abstract  conclusion  to  a  concrete  illustra- 
tion of  it. 

Physical  and  dialectic  sciences  are  not,  however,  entirely 
separate.  Mathematics  and  logic  may  be  used  as  "  tools  " 


The  Sciences  257 

in  developing  physical  sciences.  Indeed,  without  the 
assistance  of  mathematics  and  logic,  practically  no 
progress  could  be  made  in  the  physical  sciences. 

Ill 

If  an  individual  acquires  normal  experience  of  the  sciences,  the 
logical  classifications  involved  must  be  psychological  for  him. 
Sciences  are  merely  "a  development  of  that  common  knowledge 
acquired  by  the  unaided  senses  and  uncultured  reason."  Logical 
and  psychological  stand  opposed  to  each  other  only  in  the  case  of  an 
individual  who,  without  taking  the  intermediate  steps,  jumps 
from  a  comparatively  crude  knowledge  of  control  to  the  use  of 
highly  developed  social  patterns  for  control. 

In  the  life  process  of  projecting  purposes  and  realizing 
them  through  means  of  control,  the  latter  are  organized 
with  reference  to  the  purposes  they  serve.  A  person's 
pen,  ink,  paper,  blotter,  desk,  chair,  and  lamp,  are  con- 
nected through  his  purpose  of  writing.  His  purpose  of 
writing  is,  in  turn,  connected  with  the  purpose  of  putting 
certain  ideas  in  permanent  form  for  use  in  teaching; 
teaching  is  connected  with  various  purposes,  including 
that  of  making  an  income ;  the  income  is  connected  with 
many  ends  for  which  it  is  spent.  Not  only  are  the  pen, 
ink,  paper,  blotter,  etc.,  connected  with  one  another  by 
these  purposes  with  which  they  are  associated,  but  they 
are  connected  also  with  all  other  things  that  serve  the 
same  purposes,  —  with  the  schoolroom  in  which  he 
teaches,  its  equipment,  and  pupils ;  with  investments 
used  to  increase  his  income;  with  home,  church,  theater, 
food,  clothing,  and  all  other  things  for  which  he  spends 
money.  Things  of  his  world,  no  matter  how  extensive 
and  complex  that  world  may  be,  are  all  bound  together 
by  his  interrelated  purposes ;  nothing  can  escape  such 
organization.  In  following  these  lines  of  connection, 


258  The  Principles  of  Education 

no  break  is  experienced  anywhere.  This  organization  of 
things  has  been  termed  psychological.  Its  bonds  are 
essentially  bonds  of  feeling,  because  feeling  is  essential 
to  purpose. 

The  very  first  step  in  scientific  procedure  dissolves 
these  bonds  of  feeling;  it  abstracts  things  from  the 
purposes  they  serve,  and  thus  prepares  them  for  classifica- 
tion with  reference  to  what  they  do  by  themselves.  Just 
as  in  a  dictionary  words  are  classified  not  according  to 
the  combinations  in  which  men  ordinarily  use  them,  but 
with  reference  to  certain  characteristics  of  the  words 
themselves,  i.e.  their  initial  letters,  so  in  the  sciences 
things  are  not  classified  according  to  how  men  use  them, 
but  with  reference  to  certain  characteristics  peculiar  to 
the  things  themselves.  As  distinguished  from  the  psy- 
chological, such  classification  is  termed  logical. 

Because  the  sciences  are  developed  in  the  self-active 
process,  they  cannot,  however,  escape  connection  with 
purposes.  If  a  scientific  investigator  truly  understands 
the  significance  of  his  work,  it  is  because  he  has  come  to  a 
place  in  personal  development  where  he  feels  the  need 
of  such  investigation  for  the  purpose  of  more  effectual 
use  of  things  in  control.  This  purpose,  which  marks 
the  function  of  sciences,  connects  their  logically  organized 
contents  in  a  normal  psychological  way  with  the  whole 
realm  of  purposes,  which  unite  things  of  the  world  so 
intimately  and  fluently.  Under  normal  conditions,  the 
logical  classification  is  for  this  reason  also  psychological. 

If  a  child  who  has  read  only  story  books  undertakes 
to  read  a  dictionary  without  understanding  the  purpose 
which  the  dictionary  serves,  he  feels  no  connection  between 
definitions.  Words  which  in  his  story  books  were  com- 
bined in  a  meaningful  way  with  no  apparent  breaks,  now 


The  Sciences  259 

appear  disconnected.  Sentences  which  led  so  fluently 
one  to  another,  now  appear  isolated.  If  he  is  made  to 
feel,  however,  the  need  of  what  the  dictionary  does,  that 
it  takes  the  place  of  a  teacher  who  tells  him  quickly  the 
meanings  of  unfamiliar  words,  and  if  he  is  led  not  only 
to  appreciate  the  purpose  of  the  dictionary  but  also  to 
understand  how  it  organizes  words  alphabetically  for  his 
convenience,  then  the  contents  of  the  dictionary  become 
intimately  connected  with  the  other  things  in  his  world. 
When  he  meets  a  new  word  in  his  reading,  he  may  use  the 
dictionary  and  return  to  his  reading  without  feeling  a 
break.  If  he  should  learn  elsewhere  the  meaning  of  some 
word  not  in  his  dictionary,  he  may  make  the  dictionary 
more  useful  by  inserting  the  word  with  its  definition  at 
the  proper  place  in  the  margin.  The  dictionary  arrange- 
ment of  words  which  appeared  at  first  so  strange,  dis- 
connected, and  disconcerting,  now  takes  its  normal  place 
in  his  experience.  It  has  become  "  psychologized  "  for 
him. 

So  it  is  with  the  scientific  organization  of  facts.  If 
the  individual  who  has  not  felt  the  need  of  scientific 
analysis  and  classification  is  led  abruptly  into  the  realm 
of  the  sciences,  things  appear  strange,  disconnected,  dis- 
concerting. The  contents  of  the  sciences  do  not  appear 
in  the  natural  relations  of  things  in  his  daily  life  with  its 
bonds  of  feeling.  The  several  sciences  appear  cut  off  by 
themselves;  they  "  fractionalize  "  his  world.  Between 
physics  and  grammar,  botany  and  arithmetic,  there  seems 
to  be  no  connection.  Even  within  one  science,  groups  of 
facts  appear  isolated.  In  grammar,  the  various  parts  of 
speech  are  grouped  separately ;  in  physiology,  bones, 
muscles,  and  other  parts  of  the  body  are  similarly  isolated  ; 
in  physics,  the  facts  of  mechanics,  heat,  light,  sound,  and 


260  The  Principles  of  Education 

electricity  are  kept  apart  one  from  another.  He  has 
never  before  met  facts  classified  and  pigeonholed  in  this 
way.  The  logical  classification  appears  to  him  as  some- 
thing quite  different  from  the  normal,  or  psychological, 
one.  But  when  the  individual,  in  passing  from  the  logical 
to  the  psychological  classification,  has  been  led  to  appre- 
ciate the  purpose  of  the  sciences  and  to  understand  the 
method  by  which  they  give  better  control  over  the  activ- 
ities of  his  daily  life,  this  break  between  the  logical  and 
the  psychological  classifications  disappears.  Sciences 
take  their  normal  place  in  his  world,  which  is  interrelated 
by  bonds  of  purpose.  The  logical  method  of  the  sciences 
has  now  become  psychological  for  him. 

Unless  a  science  does  thus  become  psychological  for 
the  individual,  it  cannot,  indeed,  be  logical  for  him; 
because  the  true  significance  of  the  groupings  of  facts 
depends  upon  the  purpose  for  which  these  groupings 
were  made  and  are  used.  In  a  word,  the  individual  to 
whom  a  science  is  not  psychological  misses  the  logic 
of  its  classifications,  and,  therefore,  misses  everything 
that  makes  it  science. 

When  we  view  the  sciences  from  the  wider  perspective 
of  their  social  development,  the  psychological  and  logical 
organizations  of  things  do  not  appear  incongruous.  They 
stand  opposed  to  each  other  only  in  the  experience  of 
some  individual  who,  without  taking  the  intermediate 
steps,  jumps  from  a  comparatively  crude  experience  of 
control  to  the  use  of  social  patterns  for  highly  developed 
experience,  as  in  the  case  of  a  pupil  who  with  a  meagre 
knowledge  of  natural  phenomena  begins  the  study  of  a 
logically  organized  textbook  in  chemistry.  The  omission 
of  these  intermediate  steps  makes  the  break  appear 
between  the  psychological  and  logical.  The  advanced 


The  Sciences  261 

patterns  do  not  have  an  appropriate  basis  in  his  experience, 
and  give,  therefore,  abnormal  results. 

The  sciences,  to  use  the  words  of  Spencer,  are  "a 
development  of  that  common  knowledge  acquired  by 
the  unaided  senses  and  uncultured  reason." l  They 
arose  historically  when  practical  difficulties  made  men 
feel  the  need  of  better  control.  When  the  Nile  overflowed 
its  banks  and  washed  away  landmarks,  geometry  was  de- 
vised for  the  practical  purpose  of  redistributing  the  land. 
To  regulate  the  dates  of  religious  festivals  and  to  fix  times 
for  agricultural  operations,  astronomy  was  devised.  As 
Spencer  says,  "  How  to  fix  the  religious  festivals ;  when  to 
sow;  how  to  weigh  commodities;  in  what  manner  to 
measure  ground ;  were  purely  practical  questions  out  of 
which  arose  astronomy,  mechanics,  geometry."  -  Scientific 
method  is  not  something  externally  imposed  upon  the  mind 
to  guide  its  investigations,  but  merely  a  recognition  of  the 
necessary  ways  in  which  the  mind  works  in  developing 
means  of  control.  When  these  ways  are  known,  they 
can  be  followed  deliberately,  thus  giving  the  best  results 
with  the  least  expenditure  of  thought.  There  is  no 
break,  therefore,  in  going  from  the  uncultured  to  the 
cultured  reason.  Nor  is  there  a  break  in  going  from  the 
unaided  to  the  aided  senses.  Seeing  with  a  telescope 
and  microscope  is  not  essentially  different  from  seeing 
with  the  naked  eye.  The  only  difference  is  one  of  dis- 
tinctness and  minuteness  of  vision.  In  primitive  times, 
aids  to  the  senses  appeared  in  such  variable  standards  of 
measurement  as  the  length  of  a  man's  foot,  arm,  or  step, 
the  width  of  his  hand,  the  breadth  of  grains  of  barley, 
the  weight  of  grains  of  wheat,  the  length  of  a  day,  and  the 

1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Eiways  —  Scientific,  Political,  and  Spcculativct 
Vol.  II,  p.  29.  »  Spencer,  Herbert,  opus  ciL,  p.  69. 


262  The  Principles  of  Education 

duration  of  the  cycle  of  the  moon's  changes.  They  have 
developed  until,  according  to  Marmery,  "  we  can  now 
perceive  the  9,000th  part  of  a  degree  in  temperature, 
1,000,000th  of  a  second  in  time,  1,000,000th  of  an  inch  in 
space,  1,000,000th  of  a  gramme  in  weight,  the  presence  of 
the  10,000,000th  part  of  a  gramme  of  a  substance.  We 
can  in  fact  observe  '  quantities  300,000  or  400,000  times 
as  small  as  in  the  time  of  the  Egyptians.'  "  1 


IV 

Social  division  of  labor  has  rightly  provided  workers  in  the  pure 
sciences  who  are  not  concerned  with  applying  the  results  of  their 
investigations  to  practical  affairs.  The  pure  sciences  are,  however, 
only  intermediate  steps  in  the  social  development  of  control,  and 
are  supplemented  by  applied  sciences  such  as  those  of  engineering, 
medicine,  and  education. 

Although  sciences  arose  in  overcoming  difficulties  in 
the  practical  life  and  are  the  outgrowth  of  common  ex- 
perience, they  could  not  be  developed  by  one  man  or  by 
one  generation  of  men.  They  are  the  slow  and  difficult 
product  of  centuries  of  investigation.  Aristotle  and 
Bacon,  who  lived  two  thousand  years  apart,  both  contrib- 
uted to  the  development  of  scientific  method.  In  the 
social  division  of  labor,  it  was  natural  for  men  specially 
gifted  in  scientific  research  to  devote  their  lives  to  such 
work.  The  developing  of  the  sciences  has  thus  become  the 
task  of  a  special  class  of  men  who  are  not  concerned  with 
applying  the  results  of  their  investigations  to  practical 
affairs,  but  serve  their  function  in  the  social  order  by 
merely  finding  and  recording  the  laws  of  nature.  They 
are  limited  in  this  way  to  pure  sciences. 

1  Marmery,  J.  V.,  The  Progress  of  Science,  p.  268. 


The  Sciences  263 

Pure  sciences  are,  however,  only  an  intermediate  stage 
in  the  social  development  of  control.  The  purpose  which 
normally  calls  them  into  being  is  not  fulfilled  until  they 
are  put  in  the  service  of  the  practical  life.  They  are 
put  in  the  service  of  the  practical  life  by  the  so-called 
applied  sciences,  the  workers  in  which  must  understand 
not  only  truths  established  by  pure  sciences  but  also  the 
practical  activities  in  which  these  truths  may  be  useful. 

The  conclusions  of  the  pure  sciences,  like  blossoms  on 
a  tree,  do  not  all  bear  fruit.  Applied  sciences  must  select 
those  which  prove  to  be  useful,  and  organize  them  for 
practical  ends.  Medical  science  includes  useful  results 
of  such  pure  sciences  as  anatomy,  physiology,  biology, 
and  chemistry;  agricultural  science  includes  useful 
results  of  such  pure  sciences  as  botany,  zoology,  geology, 
and  chemistry;  engineering  sciences  involve  useful  con- 
clusions of  various  branches  of  mathematics,  physics, 
and  chemistry.  In  education,  truths  that  give  practical 
guidance  are  taken  from  psychology,  sociology,  logic, 
ethics,  and  other  fields.  The  function  of  applied  sciences 
is  thus  to  turn  pure  sciences  to  service  in  the  practical 
life,  in  which  they  originated. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  ultimate  purpose  of  sciences 
is  practical,  should  not  all  investigators  have  in  view  the 
practical  uses  to  which  their  conclusions  may  be  put? 
Would  not  this  prevent  waste  of  time  with  trifling  matters 
and  definitely  guide  investigations  in  the  most  useful 
directions?  However  important  may  be  the  scientific 
results  attained  by  men  working  with  direct  practical 
purposes,  it  would  be  a  distinct  social  loss  to  have  all 
investigations  conducted  under  such  conditions.  At 
best,  the  practical  investigator  can  have  in  mind  only 
comparatively  few  uses  for  testing  the  importance  of 


264  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  truths  he  finds.  He  would  be  liable,  therefore,  to 
neglect  facts  which  other  men  might  recognize  as  very 
useful.  The  pure  scientist,  who  has  no  interest  in  the 
practical  application  of  the  truths  he  finds,  records  all 
his  results,  so  that  all  men,  whatever  may  be  their  prac- 
tical interests,  can  apply  what  appears  to  be  useful  to 
them.  Matters  which  may  seem  to  be  objects  of  mere  idle 
curiosity  may,  furthermore,  under  the  impartial  investi- 
gations of  the  pure  scientist,  develop  into  truths  of  far- 
reaching  importance.  As  Thomson  says : 

The  twitching  of  the  legs  of  Galvani's  frogs  was  studied  as  a  theo- 
retical curiosity;  who  could  have  foretold  that  it  pointed  to  teleg- 
raphy? .  .  .  Dr.  A.  E.  Shipley  has  recently  called  attention  to 
two  diagrammatic  illustrations  of  our  theme.  "  A  few  years  ago  no 
knowledge  could  seem  more  useless  to  the  practical  man,  no  research 
more  futile  than  that  which  sought  to  distinguish  between  one  species 
of  gnat  or  tick  and  another ;  yet  that  knowledge  has  rendered  it  pos- 
sible to  open  up  Africa  and  to  cut  the  Panama  Canal."  "  This  wit- 
ness," Mr.  F.  A.  Dixey  remarks,  "  is  true ;  and  it  would  be  difficult 
to  point  to  a  more  complete  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  natural 
knowledge  pursued  for  its  own  sake,  without  any  direct  view  to 
future  utility,  will  often  lead  to  results  of  the  most  unexpected  kind 
and  of  the  very  highest  practical  importance."  (Nature,  Sept.  2, 
1909.)i 


The  normal  path  leading  an  individual  from  unscientific  expe- 
rience to  a  genuine  understanding  of  the  pure  sciences,  begins  with 
the  application  of  scientific  truths  to  practical  affairs,  and  passes  on 
through  difficulties  which  can  be  overcome  only  by  scientific 
methods. 

Pure  and  applied  sciences  have  developed  hand  in 
hand.  The  earliest  scientific  investigations  were  in  the 
interest  of  practical  affairs,  and,  although  a  place  was 

1  Thomson,  J.  Arthur,  Introduction  to  Science,  pp.  240,  243-244. 


The  Sciences  265 

made  later  for  pure  scientists  in  the  social  division  of 
labor,  men  have  been  ever  ready  to  make  practical 
applications  of  truths  established.  This  wider  view 
reveals  the  normal  pathway  over  which  individuals  may 
pass  from  common  experience  to  the  highly  organized 
experience  represented  by  pure  sciences.  The  individual 
must  understand  the  function  of  pure  sciences,  we  have 
found,  in  order  that  he  may  profit  by  their  guidance. 
Only  thus  can  the  logical  organization  of  subject  matter 
be  psychological  for  him,  and,  therefore,  genuinely 
meaningful.  The  function  of  the  pure  sciences  easily 
appears  to  him  when  he  approaches  them  through  the 
application  of  scientific  truths  to  practical  affairs.  How 
to  make  a  fire,  to  ventilate  a  room,  to  repair  an  electric 
bell,  to  avoid  diseases,  to  perform  various  agricultural 
operations,  to  detect  adulterations  in  foods  and  textiles, 
-  these  few  random  problems  indicate  some  of  the  many 
points  of  contact  which  the  sciences,  if  approached  from 
the  practical  side,  may  be  found  to  have  with  common 
experience.  In  the  study  of  such  practical  problems  one 
eventually  meets  difficulties  which  can  be  overcome  only 
by  the  use  of  scientific  methods.  When  the  individual 
has  reached  this  stage  in  his  experience,  the  step  to  pure 
sciences  is  interesting,  significant,  and  easy. 

Some  school  courses  intended  to  give  a  general  intro- 
duction to  the  more  fundamental  sciences  have  made  the 
mistake  of  centering  discussion  about  common  things 
such  as  air,  fire,  water,  earth,  rather  than  about  activities 
such  as  those  mentioned  above.  This  method  has  three 
serious  disadvantages.  (1)  It  does  not  call  forth  strong 
practical  motives,  but  puts  the  burden  of  interest  upon 
mere  curiosity.  (2)  It  provides  no  criterion,  such  as 
importance  in  use,  by  which  the  more  important  facts 


266  The  Principles  of  Education 

may  be  selected  for  presentation.  (3)  It  lacks  not  only 
the  psychological  organization  in  which  facts  are  arranged 
in  the  order  needed  to  guide  some  practical  activity, 
but  lacks  also  the  logical  organization  which  groups  facts, 
not  according  to  their  relations  to  particular  things,  but 
according  to  relations  existing  among  the  facts  them- 
selves. At  the  same  time,  this  method  does  nothing  to 
lessen  the  break  between  the  facts  of  one  field  of  science 
and  those  of  another. 

There  is  a  mistaken  belief  that  mere  curiosity  may  lead 
the  individual  directly  into  the  realm  of  pure  sciences. 
The  satisfaction  of  curiosity,  which  is  possessed  by  prim- 
itive man  and  even  by  lower  animals,  is  no  guarantee  of 
scientific  experience.  Only  when  man's  curiosity  has 
been  disciplined  by  experience  of  the  need  of  pure  sciences 
and  by  a  knowledge  of  their  method,  does  it  become  a 
truly  scientific  motive. 

VI 

The  only  unity  in  the  sciences  is  unity  of  method.  As  investi- 
gators mark  more  definitely  their  respective  fields  and  reveal 
thereby  the  relations  between  their  own  and  other  nearly  related 
fields,  the  classification  of  the  sciences  will  slowly  develop.  Since 
things  studied  by  the  scientist  ever  become  more  complex,  because 
of  new  meanings  read  into  them,  there  will  always  be  scientific 
developments  so  new  and  ill-defined  as  to  elude  classification. 

Classification  of  the  various  sciences  is  a  task  so  difficult 
that  it  has  not  been  successfully  done,  although  master 
minds  have  attempted  it.  As  sciences  develop,  the 
relations  among  the  more  fundamental  ones  become 
better  defined,  but,  at  the  same  time,  the  task  of  classi- 
fication becomes  more  difficult,  because  new  fields  of 
investigation  more  or  less  elusive  of  classification  are 
opened. 


The  Sciences  267 

The  only  unity  of  the  sciences,  as  in  the  case  of  the  fine 
arts,  is  unity  of  method.  We  have  found  that  the  fine 
arts  differ  one  from  another,  because,  although  they 
follow  the  same  general  method,  this  method  must  be 
adapted  to  the  different  kinds  of  material  used.  Every 
science  abstracts  things  from  values,  limits  itself  to  some 
abstract  phase  of  these  things,  analyzes  its  material  into 
elements,  and  finds  how  these  elements  combine.  The 
second  abstraction,  which  limits  each  science  to  one 
aspect  of  the  things  considered,  differentiates  the  various 
sciences  by  marking  their  special  fields  of  investigation. 
If  a  science  deals  with  material  things,  it  can  use  efficient 
causation  in  its  explanations ;  if  its  field  is  that  of  time, 
space,  or  forms  of  thought  abstracted  from  content, 
it  must  use  logical  cogency  in  its  explanations.  If  the 
material  is  amenable  to  accurate  measurement,  the  science 
is  exact;  if  the  material  is  amenable  to  only  inexact 
measurement,  the  science  is  inexact. 

Since  the  sciences  differ  because  the  fields  to  which  they 
apply  the  same  general  method  differ,  the  logical  classi- 
fication of  the  sciences  depends  upon  the  relation  of 
these  fields  one  to  another.  Comte  imagined  these  fields 
arranged  as  a  flight  of  steps,  each  step  resting  upon  the 
one  below  it  and  supporting  the  one  above  it  in  what  is 
termed  a  hierarchy.  Recognizing  six  fundamental 
sciences,  he  arranged  them  in  the  following  order :  mathe- 
matics, astronomy,  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and 
sociology.  These  six  steps,  according  to  Comte,  lead  to 
another  above  them,  which  is  the  science  of  morals.  He 
supports  this  organization  by  the  argument  that  both  in 
the  order  of  the  parts  of  a  particular  science  and  in  the 
order  of  the  whole  body  of  sciences,  there  is  a  progress 
from  that  which  is  more  general  to  that  which  is  less 


268  The  Principles  of  Education 

general.  He  claims  also  that  this  is  the  order  in  which 
these  sciences  originated  historically.  Comte  is  mis- 
taken with  regard  to  both  the  logic  and  history  of  the 
development  of  the  sciences.  A  sufficient  test  of  his  con- 
clusions, without  our  going  into  a  detailed  consideration 
of  them,  is  the  obvious  fact  that  mathematics  is  not 
related  to  sociology  merely  through  the  intervening  steps 
of  astronomy,  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology.  Mathe- 
matics is  not  applied  to  physics  merely  through  astron- 
omy, nor  is  physics  applied  to  biology  merely  through 
chemistry.  In  making  hypotheses  to  be  tested,  each 
science  has  taken  advantage  of  analogies  with  sciences 
below  it  in  the  order  named ;  but  it  is  by  no  means  limited 
exclusively  to  such  analogies. 

In  representing  the  relations  of  the  sciences,  a  better 
analogy  than  the  staircase  is  the  tree.  The  latter,  which 
appears  in  the  common  expression  "  branches  "  of  science, 
is  an  idea  of  long  standing.  There  are  two  main  branches 
of  the  trunk,  one  representing  the  sciences  that  deal  with 
forms  only,  and  the  other  representing  sciences  that  deal 
with  material  things.  The  former  main  division  has 
two  large  branches,  that  of  mathematics,  which  deals 
with  the  forms  of  time  and  space,  and  that  of  logic,  which 
deals  with  the  forms  of  reasoning.  The  latter  main 
division  has  as  its  two  largest  branches  the  physical  and 
the  biological  sciences.  Out  of  the  physical  sciences  come 
physics  and  chemistry,  and  out  of  the  biological  sciences 
come  botany  and  zoology.  Physics  branches  into  me- 
chanics, sound,  heat,  light,  electricity,  and  so  on. 

Although  the  analogy  of  the  tree  has  a  number  of  points 
in  its  favor,  it  is  not  true  in  all  respects.  As  Spencer  says : 

It  suggests  the  facts  that  the  sciences  had  a  common  origin; 
that  they  have  been  developing  simultaneously ;  and  that  they  have 


The  Sciences  269 

been  from  time  to  time  dividing  and  sub-dividing.  But  it  fails  to 
suggest  the  fact,  that  the  divisions  and  sub-divisions  thus  arising  do 
not  remain  separate,  but  now  and  again  re-unite  in  direct  and  indirect 
ways.  They  inosculate;  they  severally  send  off  and  receive  con- 
necting growths;  and  the  intercommunion  has  been  ever  becom- 
ing more  frequent,  more  intricate,  more  widely  ramified.1 

The  use  of  mathematics  and  logic  in  the  development  of 
other  sciences  is  a  conspicuous  example  of  this  complica- 
tion. 

As  the  tree  of  scientific  knowledge  grows,  however,  the 
more  fully  developed  branches  become  more  definitely 
marked  in  their  relations  one  to  another.  This  appears 
in  the  relations  of  the  sciences  traced  above.  As  we 
come  to  the  newer  growths,  the  relations  are  more  and 
more  obscure.  This  is  because  newer  sciences  are  com- 
paratively undeveloped,  more  or  less  changing  in  nature, 
and  often  deal  with  fields  that  overlap.  This  last  is 
sometimes  seen  in  the  overlapping  of  advanced  science 
courses  in  university  work. 

As  one  mind  cannot  comprehend  all  the  sciences, 
organization  is  possible  only  through  the  cooperation  of 
scientists.  As  investigators  mark  more  and  more  defi- 
nitely the  limits  of  their  respective  fields,  and  reveal  the 
relations  between  their  own  and  other  nearly  related 
fields,  the  classification  of  the  sciences  slowly  develops. 
This  classification  will  always  be  far  behind  the  newer 
scientific  developments ;  it  can  never  overtake  all  sciences. 
The  chief  reason  for  this  is  that  as  new  meanings  are 
found  for  things  and  read  into  them,  these  things  offer  new 
abstract  aspects  for  study.  This  marks  the  essential 
truth  of  Pearson's  statement : 

1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Essays  —  Scientific,  Political,  and  Speculative, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  28-29. 


270  The  Principles  of  Education 

Every  great  advance  of  science  opens  our  eyes  to  facts  which  we 
had  failed  before  to  observe,  and  makes  new  demands  on  our  powers 
of  interpretation.  This  extension  of  the  material  of  science  into 
regions  where  our  great-grandfathers  could  see  nothing  at  all,  or 
where  they  would  have  declared  human  knowledge  impossible,  is  one 
of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  modern  progress.  Where  they 
interpreted  the  motion  of  the  planets  of  our  own  system,  we  discuss 
the  chemical  constitution  of  stars,  many  of  which  did  not  exist  for 
them,  for  their  telescopes  could  not  reach  them.  Where  they  dis- 
covered the  circulation  of  the  blood,  we  see  the  physical  conflict 
of  living  poisons  within  the  blood,  whose  battles  would  have  been 
absurdities  for  them.  Where  they  found  void  and  probably  demon- 
strated to  their  own  satisfaction  that  there  was  void,  we  con- 
ceive great  systems  in  rapid  motion  capable  of  carrying  energy 
through  brick  walls  as  light  passes  through  glass.  Great  as  the 
advance  of  scientific  knowledge  has  been,  it  has  not  been  greater 
than  the  growth  of  the  material  to  be  dealt  with.  The  goal  of  science 
is  clear  —  it  is  nothing  short  of  the  complete  interpretation  of  the 
universe.  But  the  goal  is  an  ideal  one  —  it  marks  the  direction 
in  which  we  move  and  strive,  but  never  a  stage  we  shall  actually 
reach.  The  universe  grows  ever  larger  as  we  learn  to  understand  more 
of  our  own  corner  of  it.1 


VII 

The  belief  that  the  sciences  give  insight  into  the  essential  nature, 
or  reality,  of  things,  and  the  belief  that  they  give  materialistic 
conceptions  of  life  that  necessarily  conflict  with  idealism,  are  erro- 
neous. 

Two  erroneous  ideas  of  the  nature  of  the  sciences  are 
so  widely  prevalent  as  to  justify  our  discussing  them  here. 
One  is  that  the  sciences  lift  the  veil  from  nature,  give  an 
immediate  insight  into  the  reality  of  things,  and  therefore 
reveal  the  absolute  truth.  The  other  idea  is  that  the 
sciences  restrict  us  to  sordid  materialistic  conceptions  of 
life  which  necessarily  conflict  with  idealism,  that  they  con- 

1  Pearson,  Karl,  The  Grammar  of  Science,  1911,  Pt.  I,  p.  14. 


The  Sciences  271 

tradict  the  moral  freedom  of  the  will,  point  to  only 
"  worldly  "  success,  and  deny  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 

The  sciences  do  not  give  insight  into  the  reality  of 
things.  They  deal  with  all  sorts  of  hypothetical  assump- 
tions that  are  not  known  directly  and  that  are  justified 
only  because  they  serve  as  guides  in  control.  No  one 
ever  saw  atoms,  molecules,  and  ethereal  vibrations. 
Such  conceptions  are  accepted  by  the  scientist  as  true 
because  they  are  the  conceptions  that  best  guide  him  in 
the  use  of  things.  Other  conceptions  might  give  better 
control.  If  these  are  invented,  the  less  effective  ones  will 
be  laid  aside  and  the  new  will  take  their  places.  Old 
scientific  conceptions  have  been  replaced  by  new  ones 
over  and  over  again. 

The  laws  of  nature,  furthermore,  as  formulated  by  the 
sciences,  are  man-made  inventions  in  the  interest  of 
control.  This  fact  is  expressed  by  Pearson  as  follows : 

Let  it  be  noted  that  in  this  it  is  not  only  the  process  of  reaching 
scientific  law  which  is  mental,  but  that  the  law  itself  when  reached 
involves  an  association  of  natural  facts  or  phenomena  with  mental 
conceptions,  lying  quite  outside  the  particular  field  of  those  phe- 
nomena. Without  the  mental  conceptions  the  law  could  not  be,  and 
it  only  comes  into  existence  when  these  mental  conceptions  are  first 
associated  with  the  phenomena.  The  law  of  gravitation  is  not  so  much 
the  discovery  by  Newton  of  a  rule  guiding  the  motion  of  the  planets  as 
his  invention  of  a  method  of  briefly  describing  the  sequences  of  sense- 
impressions,  which  we  term  planetary  motion.  He  did  this  in  terms  of 
a  purely  mental  conception,  namely,  mutual  acceleration.  Newton 
first  brought  the  idea  of  mutual  acceleration  of  a  certain  type  into 
association  with  a  certain  range  of  phenomena,  and  was  thus  enabled 
to  state  a  formula,  which,  by  what  we  may  term  mental  shorthand, 
resumes  a  vast  number  of  observed  sequences.  The  statement  of  this 
formula  was  not  so  much  the  discovery  as  the  creation  of  the  law  of 
gravitation.  We  are  thus  to  understand  by  a  law  of  science,  i.e. 
by  a  "  law  of  nature,"  a  rcsumt  in  mental  shorthand,  which  replaces 


272  The  Principles  of  Education 

for  us  a  lengthy  description  of  the  sequences  among  our  sense-im- 
pressions. Law  in  the  scientific  sense  is  thus  essentially  a  product  of 
the  human  mind  and  has  no  meaning  apart  from  man.  It  owes 
its  existence  to  the  creative  power  of  his  intellect.  There  is  more 
meaning  in  the  statement  that  man  gives  laws  to  Nature  than  in  its 
converse  that  Nature  gives  laws  to  man.  .  .  .  The  reason  we  find  in 
natural  phenomena  is  surely  put  there  by  the  only  reason  of  which 
we  have  any  experience,  namely,  the  human  reason.  The  mind  of 
man  in  the  process  of  classifying  phenomena  and  formulating  natural 
law  introduces  the  element  of  reason  into  nature,  and  the  logic  man 
finds  in  the  universe  is  but  the  reflection  of  his  own  reasoning  faculty.1 

A  person  who  has  acquired  scientific  meanings  reads 
them  into  the  things  of  his  world,  just  as  we  have  found 
he  reads  other  meanings  into  these  things.2  The  hot 
radiator  appears  to  the  student  of  physics  as  having 
accelerated  molecular  vibrations,  and  falling  objects 
seem  to  him  to  obey  a  law  that  can  be  expressed  with 
definite  mathematical  formulae.  The  student  of  chem- 
istry sees  in  common  salt  a  combination  of  sodium  and 
chlorine,  and  fire  appears  to  be  due  to  the  uniting  of  an 
inflammable  and  an  inflaming  gas.  In  plants  and  animals 
about  him,  the  student  of  biology  reads  the  meanings  of 
cell  life,  evolution,  and  heredity  which  science  has  taught 
him.  The  further  his  study  goes,  the  more  reason  he 
seems  to  find  in  the  world,  but  he  finds  it  there  because 
he  has  first  developed  it  himself  and  has  then  read  it  into 
the  things  about  him ;  he  does  not  get  his  scientific  truth 
through  a  direct  insight  into  the  real  nature  of  things. 

That  the  sciences  necessarily  conflict  with  idealism 
and  restrict  us  to  sordid  materialistic  conceptions  of  life 
is  another  erroneous  belief.  The  most  conspicuous 
example  of  this  error  is  found  in  the  belief  that  the  bio- 

1  Pearson,  Karl,  The  Grammar  of  Science,  1911,  Pt.  I,  pp.  86-87,  91. 

2  See  p.  120. 


The  Sciences  273 

logical  sciences,  in  describing  and  explaining  materialisti- 
cally the  nature  of  life,  have  final  authority  to  deny  the 
moral  freedom  of  the  will,  the  existence  of  God,  and  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  When  the  biological  sciences 
are  regarded  as  techniques  invented  by  man  to  control 
nature  for  the  sake  of  realizing  his  ideals,  it  becomes  clearly 
evident  that  these  ideals  in  the  last  analysis  lie  beyond 
the  realm  of  the  biological  sciences,  which  can  neither 
prove  nor  disprove  their  value.  In  the  last  analysis  the 
sciences  are  the  servants  of  ideals,  not  the  masters ;  they 
have  neither  meaning  nor  value  apart  from  the  purposes 
which  they  serve.1 

VIII 

The  analogy  in  function  between  the  brain  and  a  switchboard 
has  implications  supporting  the  teleological  views  given  above  with 
regard  to  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  sciences,  the  relations 
between  the  psychological  and  the  logical  organizations  of  subject 
matter,  and  the  erroneous  beliefs  that  the  sciences  reveal  the 
essential  natures  of  things  and  give  conceptions  of  life  that  authori- 
tatively conflict  with  idealism. 

Let  us  next  find  how  natural  science  explains  the  nature 
of  the  sciences.  From  the  materialistic  point  of  view, 
the  sciences  are  patterns  for  organizing  the  automatic 
"  switchboard  "  of  the  brain  in  a  way  that  simplifies  and 
makes  more  effective  the  overcoming  of  obstructions  in 
the  reaction  of  the  organism  to  the  environment.  We 
are  concerned  with  the  general  nature  of  the  changes  that 
the  sciences,  acquired  as  a  social  inheritance,  make  in  the 
brain  of  the  organism.  In  explaining  these  changes  we 
are  limited  to  analogical  reasoning  based  upon  the  simi- 
larity in  function  between  a  switchboard  and  the  brain. 
In  the  switchboard,  the  interconnections  are  channels 
1  See  pp.  17-18. 


274  The  Principles  of  Education 

for  electricity ;  in  the  brain,  they  are  channels  for  nerve 
force.  The  explanations  which  follow  are,  of  course, 
merely  plausible  implications  based  upon  this  analogy. 

When,  in  the  adjustment  of  the  organism  to  the  en- 
vironment, the  fundamental  brain  channels,  involving 
those  which  are  inborn,  or  instinctive,  are  checked  in 
functioning,  acquired  channels  of  response  which  conduct 
nerve  energy  in  ways  that  overcome  these  checks  are 
connected  with  these  fundamental  channels.  In  other 
words,  new  reactions  are  formed  in  the  process  of  over- 
coming the  checks  in  the  functioning  of  old  habits.  Let 
those  channels  which  are  essentially  instinctive  be  called 
primary,  and  let  those  which  are  acquired  in  overcoming 
the  checks  in  the  functioning  of  these  primary  channels 
be  called  secondary.  The  function  of  the  sciences  is  to 
organize  the  secondary  channels  for  effective  adjustment.1 

Since  the  changes  in  the  brain  in  the  process  of  organ- 
ization under  the  influence  of  the  sciences  take  place  in 
the  secondary  channels,  the  function  of  which  is  merely 
to  overcome  checks  in  the  primary  channels,  the  individual 
in  the  study  of  the  sciences  is  conscious  of  dealing  only 
with  means  of  control.  If  feelings  of  value  appear,  this 
scientific  organization  is  perverted  and  therefore  less 
effective,  because  the  feelings  of  value  would  indicate 
that  primary  channels,  in  relation  to  which  the  feelings  of 
value  originate,  are  influencing  the  organization  so  as  to 
give  to  some  secondary  channels  stronger  places  in  the 
organization  than  their  use  in  overcoming  checks  would 
require,  and  that  other  useful  channels  are  given  rela- 
tively weaker  places,  with  the  result  that  the  greatest 
efficiency  is  not  secured.  This  interference  by  primary 
channels  would  take  place  if,  for  example,  the  botanist 
1  Cf.  pp.  194-195. 


The  Sciences  275 

because  of  instinctive  preference  would  study  fragrant 
flowers  and  neglect  offensive  weeds,  knowledge  concerning 
which  is  very  useful  in  the  field  of  botany.  Accordingly, 
the  fact  that  the  sciences  organize  only  the  secondary 
channels  in  the  brain  in  ways  that  make  control  most 
effective,  means  on  the  side  of  consciousness  that  the 
values  felt  for  things  are  disregarded  when  these  things 
are  considered  from  the  strictly  scientific  point  of  view. 

The  responses  necessary  to  overcome  checks  in  reactions 
to  the  same  thing  in  the  environment  may  be  various. 
In  opening  the  way  for  some  particular  system  of  habits 
to  function,  it  may  be  necessary  that  a  quantity  of  corn, 
for  example,  be  changed  to  a  different  place,  lifted  against 
the  force  of  gravity,  used  in  making  alcohol,  or  planted. 
These  various  reactions  represent  the  points  of  view  from 
which  various  sciences  regard  the  object.  The  considera- 
tion of  relative  position  falls  within  the  province  of 
mathematics;  the  investigation  of  the  manifestations  of 
gravity  belongs  to  physics;  the  study  of  the  process  of 
making  alcohol  belongs  to  chemistry ;  and  the  phenomena 
of  growing  corn  belong  to  biology.  The  isolation  of 
each  of  the  various  classes  of  responses  is  obviously  an 
essential  step  towards  the  effective  reorganization  of  the 
responses  in  each  class. 

The  next  essential  step  in  the  organization  of  secondary 
channels  of  response  is  the  reducing  of  them  to  their 
simplest  forms.  This  step  reduces  the  number  of  the  kinds 
of  responses,  because  a  few  simple  reactions  may  be  united 
in  many  combinations  which  as  wholes  are  very  different 
one  from  another.  Since  ideas  of  the  meanings  of  things 
parallel  the  reactions  with  regard  to  them,  this  analysis 
of  responses  into  their  simplest  forms  corresponds  to  the 
analysis  of  things  into  their  elements. 


276  The  Principles  of  Education 

When  the  simplest  forms  of  secondary  channels  for 
reaction  have  been  isolated,  the  next  essential  step  in 
the  economical  reorganization  of  responses  is  combining 
these  simple  forms  in  effective  connections.  Since  re- 
actions correspond  to  meanings,  the  economical  organ- 
ization of  the  simple  channels  for  reaction  into  useful 
combinations  corresponds  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
ways  in  which  elements  combine;  or,  in  other  words,  it 
corresponds  to  the  formulation  of  the  laws  of  nature. 

In  normal  development,  the  brain  changes  gradually 
from  a  less  to  a  more  organized  condition ;  there  are  no 
breaks.  Because  ideas  are  the  parallels  of  these  brain 
changes,  this  truth  is  the  materialistic  way  of  explaining 
the  fact  that  there  is  no  break  between  the  psychological 
and  the  logical  classification  of  phenomena,  if  the  logical 
classification  develops  in  a  normal  way.  This  truth 
means  also  that  the  natural  pathway  to  scientific  investi- 
gation originates  in  the  use  of  things  for  definite  practical 
ends,  since  the  organization  of  secondary  channels  for 
response  is  an  outgrowth  of  the  process  of  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  organism  to  the  environment,  in  which 
process  both  primary  and  secondary  channels  are  in- 
volved. 

The  fact  that  the  sciences  do  not  give  insight  into  the 
real  nature  of  things  is  supported  by  natural  science, 
because  natural  science  holds  that  the  meanings  of  the 
things  with  which  the  sciences  deal  are  parallels  of  the 
brain  changes  due  to  the  responses  to  stimuli  and  not  to 
direct  impressions  of  outer  realities  upon  the  brain. 

Since  the  sciences  organize  only  the  secondary  channels 
of  response,  and  since,  as  we  have  learned,  the  experience 
of  ultimate  values  is  relative  to  the  primary  channels, 
the  sciences  have  no  authority  to  contradict  the  worth 


The  Sciences  277 

felt  for  those  ultimate  ideals  which  give,  in  the  last 
analysis,  significance  and  value  to  human  life. 

REFERENCES 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  161-163.  (States 
briefly  the  nature  of  science.) 

MUNSTERBERG,  H.,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  1910,  pp.  27-33. 
(States  briefly  the  nature  of  science.) 

THOMSON,  J.  A.,  Introduction  to  Science,  1911,  pp.  7-248.  (Discusses 
in  a  popular  manner  the  scientific  mood,  the  aim  of  science,  scien- 
tific method,  classification  of  the  sciences,  science  and  philosophy, 
science  and  art,  science  and  religion,  and  the  utility  of  science.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  How  We  Think,  1910,  pp.  56-63.  (Distinguishes  between 
the  psychological  and  the  logical.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  Democracy  and  Education,  1916,  pp.  256-266.  (Discusses 
the  nature  of  science.) 

MILLER,  I.  E.,  The  Psychology  of  Thinking,  1910,  pp.  260-267.  (Dis- 
cusses the  nature  of  the  hypothesis  in  the  process  of  induction.) 

JUDD,  C.  H.,  Psychology  of  High-School  Subjects,  1915,  pp.  304-317. 
(Discusses  briefly  the  origin  and  nature  of  science  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  psychologist.) 

PEARSON,  K.,  The  Grammar  of  Science,  1911,  pp.  39-75,  77-112.  (Dis- 
cusses the  nature  of  the  facts  of  science  and  of  scientific  law. 
Suitable  for  advanced  students.) 

SPENCER,  H.,  Essays  —  Scientific,  Political,  and  Speculative,  1892,  Vol. 
II,  pp.  1-73,  74-117.  (Discusses  the  genesis  of  science  and  the 
classification  of  the  sciences.  Suitable  for  advanced  students.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Which  is  more  reliable  in  determining  the  methods  that  should 
be  used  in  education,  science  or  common  sense?     Explain. 

2.  Why  is  it  that  the  best  books  in  literature  are  in  many  cases  the 
oldest,  whereas  the  best  books  in  science  are,  comparatively  spoaking, 
the  newest? 

3.  a.  Give    some  instance   in   your  school   work   in   which   you 
experienced  a  break  between  tho  psychological  and  the  logical  classi- 


278  The  Principles  of  Education 

fication  of  subject  matter.     6.  In  this  instance  was  the  logical  organ- 
ization of  the  subject  matter  truly  logical  for  you  ?     Explain. 

4.  What  in  your  judgment  are  the  advantages,  if  any,  of  giving  in 
the  high  school  a  course  in  general  science  introductory  to  the  work 
in  the  special  science  courses  ? 

5.  In  what  important  ways  do  you  believe  that  the  science  courses 
you  completed  in  the  high  school  could  have  been  improved? 

6.  Criticize  Herbert  Spencer's  essay  entitled    What  Knowledge 
is  of  Most  Worth  ?     (Spencer's  Education,  Ch.  I.) 

7.  Do  you  believe  in  the  moral  freedom  of  the  will,  despite  the 
conclusions  of  natural  science  with  regard  to  this  matter?     Give 
the  reasons  for  your  answer. 


CHAPTER  X 
SOCIAL   DEVELOPMENT 

Social  development  means  the  increased  effectiveness  of  insti- 
tutions, which  are  organized  in  the  service  of  the  fundamental 
values  of  life.  It  requires  greater  division  of  labor  and  greater 
interdependence  of  men.  Under  varying  conditions,  social 
development  may  be  gradual,  arrested,  or  revolutionary.  The 
fine  arts,  history,  and  the  sciences  promote  gradual  development, 
which  is  normal.  As  society  advances  from  the  state  of  nature 
to  that  of  culture,  man  is  guided  to  greater  personal  freedom. 

I 

The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  find  more  definitely  the  nature 
of  social  development.  To  simplify  the  problem,  social  activities 
may  be  classified  as  those  of  the  industries,  the  home,  the  school, 
the  state,  and  the  church.  Each  of  these  institutions  serves  some 
fundamental  human  value. 

The  history  of  civilization  reveals  a  long  process  of 
social  development.  Each  generation  not  only  inherits 
from  earlier  generations  accumulated  patterns  for  pur- 
poses and  means  of  control,  but  in  turn  acts  vicariously 
by  adding  to  this  inheritance  and  passing  on  to  succeed- 
ing generations  still  richer  values  and  easier  ways  for  at- 
taining them.  Machinery  has  thus  replaced  handwork ; 
democracy  has  replaced  monarchy;  the  law  of  justice 
and  mercy  has  followed  the  reign  of  arbitrary  might  and 
revenge.  It  is  true  that  this  improvement  is  made  by 
individuals,  for  they  are  the  media  through  which  society 
works ;  but  what  these  individuals  do,  depends  upon  their 

279 


280  The  Principles  of  Education 

places  in  a  social  order.  They  contribute  to  a  continuous 
social  development,  the  history  of  which  can  be  traced  irre- 
spective of  any  particular  individuals  who  participated  in 
it.  One  complete  step  in  social  advance  may  be  the  result 
of  a  long  period  of  cooperativeVork ;  generations  may  come 
and  go  between  the  origin  and  the  solution  of  a  social 
problem.  In  the  Middle  Ages,  men  toiled  in  building  a 
great  cathedral  which  could  not  be  completed  until  long 
after  they  were  dead ;  they  toiled  for  the  benefit  of  suc- 
ceeding generations,  with  no  hope  of  seeing  the  magnifi- 
cent mural  decorations  of  the  completed  edifice,  of  hear- 
ing the  sublime  music  of  its  mighty  organ,  of  feeling  the 
inspiration  of  worship  before  its  altar.  So  it  is  in  the 
building  of  civilization.  From  the  very  foundation,  the 
life-works  of  countless  thousands  of  human  beings  lie 
buried  in  its  stone  and  mortar.  What  they  did  depended 
upon  what  had  been  done  before  they  came  on  the  scene 
of  action,  and  had  a  significance  far  beyond  their  partic- 
ular lives.  To  find  more  definitely  the  nature  of  this 
social  development  to  which  they  contributed  is  the  prob- 
lem of  this  chapter. 

To  simplify  the  problem,  social  life  may  be  analyzed 
into  institutions.  An  institution  is  a  complex  group  of 
activities  developed  in  the  service  of  some  fundamental, 
purpose  the  realizing  of  which  is  necessary  for  human 
welfare.  Human  welfare  requires  (1)  that  men  be  pro- 
vided with  food,  clothing,  and  other  necessities  of  life; 

(2)  that  the  race  be  continued  by  the  rearing  of  offspring  ; 

(3)  that  these  offspring  be  given  purposes  and  means  of 
control  necessary  to  enable  them  to  take  their  places  in 
social  life ;  (4)  that  opportunities  for  doing  things  neces- 
sary for  human  welfare  be  safeguarded ;  and  (5)  that  men 
be  induced  to  turn  from  misleading  and  capricious  selfish 


Social  Development  281 

desires  and  strive  continuously  for  that  which  is  most 
worth  while  for  humanity.  In  the  service  of  these  fun- 
damental purposes,  five  great  institutions  have  been  de- 
veloped, —  the  industries,  the  home,  the  school,  the 
state,  and  the  church.  These  institutions  are  so  closely 
interrelated  that  they  can  be  separated  only  as  different 
aspects  of  social  life  rather  than  as  divisions  of  it.  Their 
effectiveness  marks  the  stage  of  civilization  attained  by 
man ;  the  history  of  human  progress  is  the  history  of  the 
remaking  of  these  institutions  so  that  they  more  effec- 
tively realize  the  purposes  in  the  service  of  which  they 
were  established. 

(1)  The  necessity  of  the  industries  to  the  life  of  man  is 
obvious ;   he  must  eat  his  daily  bread  and  be  sheltered 
in  order  to  live.     Elaborate  systems  of  production,  ex- 
change, and  distribution,  which  command  by  far  the 
greater  part  of  man's  energy,  are  everywhere  evident  in 
modern  society. 

(2)  The  home  is  necessary,  because  children  are  born 
helpless  and  must  pass  through  a  long  period  of  infancy 
before  they  are  ready  to  take  up  the  responsibilities  of 
mature  life.     The  permanence  of  marriage  and  the  con- 
sequent stability  of  the  home  are  due  primarily  to  the 
long  period  of  infancy  during  which  children  need  the 
protection  and  care  of  parents. 

(3)  When  social  life  became  complex,  the  school  was 
developed  out  of  the  home  for  the  purpose  of  supplement- 
ing the  home  in  giving  individuals,  during  the  period  of 
infancy,  the  preparation  necessary  for  meeting  the  in- 
creasingly difficult  demands  of  civilization.     The  func- 
tion of  the  school  is  to  supplement  other  educational 
agencies  in  giving  the  individual  that  experience  which  is 
necessary  to  make  him  socially  efficient. 


282  The  Principles  of  Education 

(4)  The  state  is  primarily  for  the  sake  of  securing 
justice.     Society  must  protect  man  in  fulfilling  the  duties 
which  human  welfare  requires  of  him.     The  fact  that  he 
has  duties  means  that  he  has  rights  necessary  for  perform- 
ing these  duties.     The  state  should  protect  the  individual 
when  forces,  either  within  or  without  the  social  group, 
encroach  upon  his  rights.     Democracy,  which  gives  each 
mature  responsible  person  voice  in  defining  and  protecting 
his  rights,  the  division  of  powers  of  government,  and 
many  other  safeguards  to  secure  the  honest  and  fair 
making  and  enforcement  of  law,  are  all  in  the  interest  of 
the  main  purpose  of  the  state. 

(5)  The  function  of  the  church  is  to  promote  righteous- 
ness.    It  develops  and  keeps  alive  in  men  an  active  appre- 
ciation of  the  final,  all-inclusive  purpose  which  gives  the 
deepest  significance  and  value  to  human  life.     If  this 
purpose  is  attributed  to  a  personal  God,  the  essential  of 
the  religious  attitude  is  "  Thy  will  be  done."     When  a 
person  feels  himself  a  co-worker  with  God  in  realizing  the 
purpose  of  life,  the  common  virtues,  upon  which  he  must 
depend  for  guidance  in  doing  this,  receive  a  deeper  sig- 
nificance and  stronger  sanction  than  the  immediate  ends 
which  they  serve  can  give  to  them.     Religion  thus  tends 
to  keep  man  in  the  straight  and  narrow  way  that  leads  to 
the  highest  welfare. 

The  church,  as  other  institutions,  has  a  basis  in  human 
nature.  Various  values  which  men  in  common  feel,  such  as 
the  value  of  life  itself,  of  love,  of  justice,  and  of  truth,  point 
onward  to  worths  greater  than  those  which  can  be  realized 
in  the  temporal  world.  Is  life,  which  we  prize  so  highly, 
no  more  than  a  feverish  struggle  for  existence  between 
the  cradle  and  the  grave?  Is  it  "  a  tale  told  by  an  idiot, 
full  of  sound  and  fury,  signifying  nothing  "  ?  Is  our  love 


Social  Development  283 

to  be  mocked  by  the  annihilating  power  of  death  ?  What 
is  the  significance  of  our  sense  of  justice,  if  all  ends  with 
this  world,  where  the  sun  shines  and  the  rain  falls  equally 
upon  the  just  and  the  unjust  ?  And  has  our  desire  to  know 
ultimate  truth  no  meaning?  Shadows  of  weariness,  of 
discouragement,  and  of  dissatisfaction  over  partial  achieve- 
ment which  darken  our  pathway,  —  are  they  not  to  be 
dispelled  by  a  light  from  afar  that  gives  hope  of  the  final 
realization  of  that  which  the  temporal  life  compels  us  to 
seek,  but  does  not  let  us  find?  Values  deeply  implanted 
in  our  nature  cry  out  for  justification,  and  their  justifi- 
cation points  us  to  God  and  immortality.  Religion  is, 
therefore,  at  its  foundation  a  matter  of  feeling,  a  matter  of 
faith,  because  it  rests  upon  the  implications  of  values  the 
authority  of  which  is  known  only  by  being  felt.  Although 
some  particular  form  of  religion  may  be  accepted  as  a 
special  divine  revelation  to  man,  its  strongest  authority 
is  the  satisfaction  it  gives  to  felt  needs  of  the  human  soul. 
When  religious  faith  has  been  established,  it  returns  to 
the  practical  life  to  sanction  the  common  things  that  are 
worth  while.  By  placing  in  an  eternal  order  the  humblest 
acts  that  contribute  to  the  good  of  man,  such  as  those  of 
our  daily  work  in  the  home,  the  factory,  and  the  school, 
it  makes  these  acts  divinely  significant.  Since  the  com- 
mon virtues  are  guides  in  realizing  the  final  purpose  of 
life  as  it  appears  in  religious  faith,  and  since  the  thought 
is  father  to  the  act,  this  final  purpose  commands,  "  What- 
soever things  are  true,  whatsoever  things  are  honest, 
whatsoever  things  are  just,  whatsoever  things  are  pure, 
whatsoever  things  are  lovely,  whatsoever  things  are  of 
good  report ;  if  there  be  any  virtue,  if  there  be  any  praise, 
think  on  these  things."  The  value  of  religion  is  made 
out  of  the  funded  values  of  human  ideals  that  fail  of  real- 


284  The  Principles  of  Education 

ization  in  the  temporal  life ;  religion  then  gives  the  whole 
of  this  funded  value  as  a  sanction  to  strengthen  each 
worthy  human  purpose,  and  thereby  promotes  human 
welfare. 

We  have  now  pointed  out  the  principal  organized 
means  which  society  has  developed  for  realizing  the  fun- 
damental human  purposes.  The  industries  provide  the 
necessities  for  life;  the  home  nurtures  children;  the 
school  supplements  other  educational  agencies  in  prepar- 
ing youths  for  the  responsibilities  of  maturity ;  the  state 
protects  men  in  their  rights  so  that  they  may  adequately 
perform  their  duties;  the  church  keeps  alive  in  men's 
experience  those  values  which  must  be  sought  in  attain- 
ing the  highest  welfare. 

II 

Since  the  practices  included  in  an  institution  are  ways  of  over- 
coming the  difficulties  in  realizing  the  purpose  served  by  the  insti- 
tution, changes  which  make  the  realizing  of  this  purpose  more 
effective  constitute  improvement.  This  improvement  requires 
greater  division  of  labor  and  greater  interdependence  of  men. 
As  institutions  are  all  members  one  of  another,  they  develop  with 
relation  one  to  another. 

Institutional  practices  are  the  ways  of  overcoming 
difficulties  in  realizing  the  purposes  which  the  institutions 
serve.  Since  difficulties  give  rise  to  problems  the  solu- 
tions of  which  are  ways  of  overcoming  these  difficulties, 
institutional  practices,  as  noted  in  the  discussion  of  his- 
tory, are  the  solutions  of  problems.  The  institutional 
life  of  primitive  man  was  simple,  because  his  problems 
were  simple.  When  fire  was  used  to  make  tools  and  agri- 
culture turned  men  from  nomadic  life  to  settled  abodes, 
problems  began  to  multiply  rapidly,  and  the  solutions  of 
these  problems  made  the  institutional  life  more  complex. 


Social  Development  285 

In  the  industries,  men  had  to  solve  the  problems  of  how 
to  work  the  fields  with  advantage,  how  to  make  imple- 
ments, how  to  construct  storehouses,  dwellings,  and  the 
necessary  furnishings.  New  relations  resulting  from  life 
in  settled  communities  presented  new  problems  of  govern- 
ment. Several  illustrations  selected  at  random  from 
modern  times  will  make  this  matter  clearer.  The  educa- 
tional practices  of  the  Jesuits  were  careful  solutions  of  the 
problems  that  arose  out  of  the  religious  situation  when 
this  order  began  the  counter-reformation.  One  difficulty 
was  to  prevent  heretical  teachings  at  a  time  of  unstable 
religious  beliefs.  The  answer  to  this  problem  included, 
among  other  things,  an  elaborately  devised  ratio  stu- 
diorum  showing  definitely  what  should  be  taught,  a 
thorough  preparation  of  teachers  in  the  Roman  Catholic 
faith,  careful  plans  for  the  selection  of  officers  and  in- 
structors, and  a  direct  inspection  of  classroom  teaching. 
When  the  emphasis  upon  drill  and  the  frequent  reviews  re- 
quired in  the  Jesuit  schools  were  found  to  dull  the  interest 
of  the  students,  one  way  devised  to  overcome  this  diffi- 
culty was  a  system  of  rivalry.  Again,  the  growth  of  the 
modern  state  systems  of  education  in  Europe  and  Amer- 
ica has  not  been  capricious  and  haphazard.  The  devel- 
opment of  industrialism  and  democratic  government,  for 
the  most  part,  presented  new  educational  problems  in 
answer  to  which  changes  were  made  from  time  to  time  in 
educational  practices.  The  systems  of  education  in  the 
several  countries  developed  along  different  lines,  because 
the  social  situations  and  the  resulting  problems  or  the 
means  available  for  solving  them  were  not  the  same.  A 
nation,  such  as  Germany,  for  example,  which  recognized 
distinct  social  classes  had  to  devise  a  corresponding  system 
of  education  differing  from  that  of  a  nation,  such  as  the 


286  The  Principles  of  Education 

United  States,  which  does  not  recognize  these  classes. 
School  practices  already  firmly  established  by  tradition, 
the  educational  influence  of  the  church,  the  form  of  gov- 
ernment, —  these  and  many  other  considerations  modify 
both  educational  problems  and  their  solutions,  and  thus 
modify  educational  practices.  In  the  state  as  an  institu- 
tion, to  give  a  further  illustration,  democratic  government 
is  a  solution  of  the  problem  of  how  to  prevent  injustice 
on  the  part  of  privileged  classes ;  the  direct  primary  is  one 
detail  in  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  how  to  secure  a 
true  expression  of  the  will  of  the  people. 

Since  an  institution  is  a  means  serving  some  funda- 
mental purpose,  changes  which  make  it  serve  this  purpose 
more  effectively  constitute  the  development  of  the  insti- 
tution. The  general  nature  of  this  development  and  its 
far-reaching  social  effects  may  be  illustrated  by  Marmery's 
account  of  the  progressive  changes  made  in  the  method 
of  preparing  corn  for  food,  which  constitute  one  phase  of 
industrial  development. 

Men  at  an  early  stage  of  social  life  have  no  other  means  of  pre- 
paring corn  for  food,  beyond  boiling  it,  than  by  manual  labour.  Corn 
is  spread  on  a  flat  or  a  hollowed  stone,  and  then  crushed  by  hammering 
at  it  with  another  stone.  Each  family  prepares  corn  in  this  way  for 
its  own  consumption,  and  the  work,  whether  it  be  done  by  the  head 
of  the  family  or  his  wife  or  children,  is  slow  and  roughly  done;  the 
flour  resulting  from  the  crushing  is  coarse  and  scarcely  fit  for  kneading 
into  dough.  A  time  comes  when  a  savage  of  genius  conceives  the 
idea  of  grinding  corn  between  two  heavy  flat  stones,  the  upper  of 
which  is  moved  backward  and  forward  or  in  a  circular  manner  by 
one  or  several  hands.  This  manipulation  gives  finer  flour  than  before 
and  does  so  in  less  time  too.  A  double  benefit  is  at  once  effected; 
the  corn-grinder  has  obviously  saved  time,  and  provided  better  and 
more  digestible  food.  The  process  spreads  quickly  among  the  com- 
munity and  a  rise  of  material  welfare  ensues,  for  those  who  feed  on  the 
improved  nourishment  are  more  healthy  and  stronger,  so  that  they 


Social  Development  287 

can  accomplish  their  work  more  efficiently,  and  the  time  spared  by 
the  new  system  can  be  spent  in  the  pursuit  of  other  kinds  of  work, 
whether  it  be  hunting  game  for  food,  or  tilling  the  soil  for  any  purpose, 
or  weaving,  or  implement-making.  Time  comes  when  the  two  grind- 
ing-stones  are  replaced  by  a  handmill.  The  inventor  of  this  machine 
is  a  greater  benefactor  than  the  first ;  the  upper  stone  is  now  moved 
round  and  round  rapidly  by  one  hand ;  the  work  is  far  more  satisfac- 
tory than  by  the  previous  process ;  for,  as  one  person  is  sufficient  to 
grind  corn  for  the  whole  tribe,  the  other  members  of  the  tribe  are 
relieved  from  the  necessity  of  grinding  for  themselves,  and  can,  undis- 
turbed, attend  to  various  occupations.  The  benefit  is  not  limited 
to  this ;  with  the  new  appliance  there  also  arises  a  new  state  of  things : 
the  corn-grinder  is  paid  in  kind  for  his  labour,  and  if  the  tribe  be  a 
numerous  one,  he  has  to  hire  assistants  in  order  to  carry  out  the  whole 
work;  and  thence  there  come  to  be  two  orders  of  men,  the  master 
and  the  workmen.  The  latter  have  secured  a  means  of  existence; 
they  can  marry  and  bring  up  a  family  with  their  earnings,  be  the  wages 
what  they  may  —  corn,  fruit,  garden  produce,  game,  or  garments. 
Later,  say  during  the  Egyptian  or  the  Roman  period,  the  water-mill 
is  invented  —  an  improvement  by  which  numerous  benefits  are 
secured:  1,  hand-labour  is  now  replaced  by  machinery;  2,  a  natural 
force,  water,  becomes  man's  servant,  and  saves  the  employment  of 
a  score  of  hands ;  that  is,  it  has  economized  or,  more  properly,  mul- 
tiplied labour;  3,  the  miller  making  flour  for  the  whole  district  now 
becomes  a  trader ;  he  buys  corn  from  the  grower,  thereby  benefiting 
the  tiller  of  the  soil,  who  gets  a  return  for  his  labour  sufficient  to  keep 
himself  and  his  family,  and  to  pay  working  hands;  4,  the  miller  also 
sells  his  flour  to  the  bakers,  who  obtain  it  from  him  at  a  lower  rate 
than  if  they  had  to  grind  their  own  corn ;  5,  the  consumer  buys  ready- 
made  bread  at  a  moderate  price,  since  the  machinery  used  has  reduced 
the  first  cost  by  saving  wages  to  the  miller,  and  certainly  far  cheaper 
than  if  he  had  to  leave  off  his  own  pursuit,  say,  weaving,  for  a  whole 
day  in  order  to  procure  corn,  grind  it  himself,  make  and  bake  his 
loaves.  The  consumer  would  lose  work,  wages,  and  eat  dearer  and 
worse  bread  into  the  bargain.  6,  The  consumer  has  a  family,  and 
the  whole  family  benefits  by  the  invention  of  the  water-mill ;  7,  the 
miller,  saving  hand-labour  as  he  does,  nevertheless  employs  as  many  or 
more  men  than  before  the  new  invention,  no  longer  as  corn-grinding 
hands,  but  as  porters,  drivers,  buyers,  sellers,  travellers ;  8,  the  trade 
thus  extended  necessitates  the  making  of  sacks,  hence  weavers  have 


288  The  Principles  of  Education 

more  work  and  more  food ;  the  making  of  carts,  hence  wheelwrights, 
if  they  do  not  exist  already,  are  brought  into  existence ;  smiths  have 
more  to  do ;  harness-makers  have  more  work,  and  in  their  turn  increase 
the  leather  trade;  this  promotes  cattle-breeding,  and  the  landowner 
finds  a  new  source  of  profit  in  the  improved  industry.  9,  But  the 
general  distribution  of  benefits  does  not  stop  there;  the  water-mill 
has  to  be  built,  and  its  construction  gives  work,  hence  wages  and  food, 
to  a  crowd  of  people :  labourers  to  excavate  the  soil  for  the  foundation ; 
wood-cutters  to  fell  trees ;  carpenters  to  prepare  and  fit  the  timbers ; 
smiths  to  make  cog-wheels,  tires,  bolts,  nails;  mill-stone  quarriers 
and  mill-stone  cutters;  tool-makers  to  provide  implements  for  all 
these;  brick-makers,  brick-layers,  tile-makers,  and  tilers;  an  archi- 
tect or  clever  artisan  to  plan,  direct,  and  supervise  the  building.  The 
new  invention  thus  does  good  to  the  whole  community,  for  the  general 
increase  of  prosperity,  on  account  of  the  greater  purchasing  power  of 
the  people,  improves  the  clothing  and  building  trades  —  in  fact, 
everything.  And  not  material  good  only  has  been  brought  about, 
but  moral  good  also.  Work  being  easily  obtainable,  men  who, 
from  want,  might  have  been  driven  into  violence  and  crime,  respect- 
ably bring  up  a  family,  use  their  natural  abilities  to  improve  their 
social  condition,  live  orderly  lives,  and  benefit  the  country.  Some 
will  even  spend  their  leisure  time  in  mental  and  mechanical  work 
which  may  be  fruitful  of  ulterior  benefits  to  all.  One  thing  is  clear : 
crime  has  decreased,  order  and  discipline  have  become  a  habit,  peace 
has  become  dear  —  that  is,  relatively  speaking.  And  when  it  is 
remembered  that  the  new  process  of  milling  finds  a  ready  acceptance 
everywhere,  that  water-mills  are  constructed  wherever  a  water  stream 
is  available  for  the  purpose,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  immensely  beneficial 
it  is  to  mankind,  and  what  a  great  benefactor  its  inventor  has 
proved.  His  invention  has  made  life  easier  to  everyone,  has  se- 
cured a  living  to  a  multitude,  has,  with  the  prosperity  it  has 
caused,  permitted  a  large  increase  of  population.  The  increase  of 
people  extends  the  area  and  power  of  peaceful  labour  (if  the  word 
civilization  be  inapplicable),  since  they  will  spread  beyond  the 
former  limits  of  the  community,  cultivate  more  land,  raise  the 
amount  of  produce,  and  thus  add  to  the  augmentation  of  the 
general  prosperity.  After  the  water-mill  comes  the  windmill, 
which  at  once  doubles  the  results  obtained  by  the  water-mill, 
and  in  addition  causes  competition,  a  new  factor  which  works 
to  the  consumer's  advantage.  Later  comes  the  steam  flour-mill, 


Social  Development  289 

which  multiplies  these  results  a  hundred  times!  The  modern 
miller  stands  intellectually  and  socially  far  above  his  predeces- 
sor. He  has  travelled  and  has  acquired  an  extensive  knowledge  of 
the  world;  he  is  more  than  a  trader;  he  is  to  a  certain  extent  a 
learned  man :  he  is  conversant  with  some  questions  of  political  econ- 
omy, and  somewhat,  may  be,  with  chemistry  —  a  branch  of  knowledge 
which  enables  him  to  know  the  different  properties  of  every  descrip- 
tion of  wheat  growing  in  various  countries,  each  weed  being  affected 
by  the  climate  and  soil.  Socially,  too,  he  stands  very  high ;  his  sons 
are  brought  up  to  become  merchants,  engineers,  manufacturers, 
politicians,  writers,  lawyers,  scientific  men,  each  of  them  an  agent  of 
progress  or  a  centre  of  social  influence. 

Each  industry  has  a  history  similar  to  that  of  milling ;  so  that  the 
preceding  description  of  growth  and  results  applies  to  brewing,  from 
the  poorest  beverage  to  the  richest  product  of  the  modern  brewery; 
weaving,  from  sackcloth  to  silk,  velvet,  lace,  tapestry,  and  so  on; 
glass-making,  from  opaque  glass  to  lenses,  spectacles,  the  telescope, 
the  microscope,  the  spectroscope ;  metallurgy,  from  the  rough  bronze 
weapon  and  implement  to  the  steel  engine,  physical  implements, 
cannon,  bridges,  tunnels,  steam  trading  and  war  ships,  railways; 
paper,  from  packing-paper  to  the  finest  vellum,  papier-mach6  trays, 
tables,  and  cabinets ;  furniture,  from  the  rough  stool  to  the  throne ; 
printing,  from  the  label  to  the  book,  advertising  placards,  printed 
calico,  engraving ;  lighting,  from  the  primitive  torch  to  the  oil-lamp, 
gas,  and  electric  light ;  _and  so  forth  continuously.1 

This  account  reveals  clearly  the  fact  that  the  develop- 
ment of  an  institution  requires  ever  greater  division  of 
labor  and  ever  greater  interdependence  of  men.  In- 
creased efficiency  demands  that  the  kind  of  work  done 
by  one  man  be  divided  among  many  men  who  act  in  close 
cooperation.  In  this  way,  time  and  energy  are  saved 
through  "  team  work,"  and  each  man  acquires  greater 
skill  by  confining  his  attention  to  a  highly  specialized 
kind  of  work,  thus  learning  to  do  one  thing  well  rather 
than  many  things  less  efficiently. 

1  Marmery,  J.  Villin,  Progress  of  Science,  London,  pp.  289-293. 


290  The  Principles  of  Education 

Changes  in  one  institution  tend  to  bring  about  changes 
in  others.  Since  education  is  to  prepare  for  life  in  all 
institutions,  it  would  be  affected,  if  not  too  tradition- 
bound,  by  important  changes  in  any  of  them.  Modifi- 
cations of  the  school  due  to  the  Protestant  Reformation 
and  to  the  growth  of  industries  and  of  democratic  govern- 
ment, need  only  be  mentioned  in  support  of  this  statement. 
The  mutual  influence  of  democratic  government  and  in- 
dustries has  been  very  direct.  Institutions  are  all  mem- 
bers one  of  another,  and,  therefore,  must  grow  with 
relation  one  to  another. 

Ill 

Social  development  is  irregular,  (a)  It  is  gradual  when  men  keep 
alive  to  the  intrinsic  values  of  institutional  practices,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  make  progress  in  means  of  control ;  (fr)  it  is  arrested 
when  they  lose  sight  of  the  intrinsic  ends  served  by  customs ; 
(c)  it  is  revolutionary  when,  through  a  conflict  in  social  regula- 
tions, they  lose  faith  in  traditions  and  reconstruct  institutional 
practices  with  the  advantage  of  new  knowledge  developed  after 
the  old  traditions  had  become  fixed. 

Social  development  has  been  irregular.  Sometimes  it 
has  been  gradual ;  at  other  times  it  has  been  arrested  or 
revolutionary.  This  irregularity  is  due  to  three  typical 
conditions  which  influence  social  development.  Let  us 
now  examine  these  conditions  in  detail. 

(1)  The  essential  condition  of  gradual  development 
exists  when  the  purposes  which  institutional  practices 
serve  are  kept  alive  in  the  experience  of  men.  If  a 
practice  is  followed  merely  as  a  tradition,  without  the 
appreciation  of  its  purpose,  there  is  no  basis  for  judging 
whether  any  particular  change  would  be  an  improvement 
or  not;  but,  if  the  purpose  is  known,  any  change  is  at 
once  tested,  and  when  found  to  serve  this  purpose  better 


Social  Development  291 

is  recognized  as  an  improvement.  In  the  great  improve- 
ment of  the  locomotive,  the  automobile,  and  many 
machines  used  in  manufacturing,  this  condition  clearly 
appears.  Because  men  know  just  what  the  invention  is 
intended  to  do,  they  can  recognize  certain  changes  as 
improvements.  What  is  true  of  these  forms  of  industrial 
activities  is  true  of  all  institutional  practices,  —  political, 
religious,  educational,  and  domestic.  The  chief  differ- 
ence is  that  the  ends  served  by  various  machines  are  rec- 
ognized more  easily  than  those  served  by  complicated 
social  practices. 

The  development  of  modern  methods  of  teaching,  for 
illustration,  has  been  gradual  in  so  far  as  educators  have 
kept  before  them  the  ideal  of  conforming  to  the  nature 
of  the  child,  an  ideal  subsidiary  to  the  main  purpose 
served  by  education.  Rousseau,  expressing  a  tendency 
of  his  time,  called  attention  to  this  ideal  with  convincing 
force.  Basedow,  finding  that  children  like  motion  and 
noise,  followed  this  ideal  in  modifying  methods.  Pes- 
talozzi,  in  the  absence  of  any  scientific  treatment  of  the 
mind,  depended  upon  sympathetic  insight  into  the  nature 
of  the  child,  which  resulted  in  making  his  chief  contribu- 
tion, so  far  as  methods  are  concerned,  concrete  examples. 
He  did  not  explain  definitely  the  essential  nature  of  his 
methods  so  that  teachers  by  understanding  general 
principles  could  apply  them  effectively  to  the  work  of 
teaching.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  Yverdon  be- 
came the  Mecca  for  open-minded  educators;  they  went 
to  learn  by  observation  what  they  could  not  get  from 
Pestalozzi's  statements. 

Men  of  a  younger  generation  undertook  to  -solve  the 
problem  of  how  to  describe  more  definitely  a  process  of 
teaching  conforming  to  the  nature  of  the  child's  mind. 


292  The  Principles  of  Education 

In  the  absence  of  scientific  facts,  the  answer  to  this 
problem  made  necessary  some  guiding  theory  of  the 
nature  of  mental  processes.  Three  general  aspects  of 
mind  were  recognized,  —  intellect,  will,  and  feeling, —  and, 
based  on  the  assumption  that  one  or  another  of  these 
is  fundamental,  three  types  of  theory  of  teaching  ap- 
peared. Herbart  assumed  the  intellect  as  fundamental, 
and  his  problem,  therefore,  became  how  to  get  ideas  into 
the  mind.  He  believed  that  if  the  process  of  acquiring 
ideas  is  properly  guided,  the  pupil  will  feel  and  act  prop- 
erly. Froebel  assumed  the  will  as  fundamental,  and  his 
problem,  therefore,  became  how  to  guide  the  activities  of 
the  child.  He  believed  that  if  the  process  of  will  —  self- 
activity  —  is  properly  guided,  the  pupil  will  have  the 
proper  feeling  and  knowledge.  Rosmini,  an  Italian, 
assumed  feeling  as  fundamental,  but  his  theory  exerted 
so  little  influence  upon  our  educational  development  that 
we  are  not  concerned  with  it  here. 

In  answering  his  problem,  Herbart,  discarding  the  old 
faculty  psychology  and  emphasizing  the  content  of  the 
mind,  regarded  ideas  as  having  certain  affinities  which 
controlled  the  acquiring  and  organizing  of  new  ideas. 
The  process  of  acquiring  new  ideas  he  analyzed  into 
four  formal  steps,  —  clearness,  association,  system,  and 
method.  Because  they  show  more  specifically  what 
should  be  done  in  teaching,  these  principles  are  an  improve- 
ment upon  the  less  specific  ones  attributed  to  Pestalozzi. 
Followers  of  Herbart  made  further  improvement  in  the 
direction  of  specific  principles  by  describing  five  instead 
of  four  formal  steps,  —  preparation,  presentation,  com- 
parison, generalization,  and  application.  Later  the  devel- 
opment of  psychology,  logic,  and  the  theory  of  knowledge 
revealed  the  fact  that  will,  or  activity,  is  fundamental. 


Social  Development  293 

Guided  by  this  truth,  disciples  of  Herbart  gave  more 
definite  meaning  to  the  first  step.  As  previously  defined, 
this  step  consisted  in  preparing  the  mind  for  new  ideas 
by  calling  to  consciousness  acquired  ideas  related  to 
them.  It  was  now  made  to  include  giving  the  child  a 
purpose,  or  motive.  A  purpose  is  that  which  a  person 
tries  to  attain ;  a  motive  (cf .  movere)  is  that  towards  which 
he  "  moves."  Because  a  purpose  which  may  be  served 
by  the  subject  matter  is  something  definite,  this  change 
gave  more  explicit  direction  as  to  what  ideas  should  be 
called  to  mind,  and  was,  therefore,  a  decided  improve- 
ment. The  change,  however,  made  the  five  formal  steps 
hybrid  in  nature,  because  the  first  step  now  led  the  pupil 
to  seek  a  definite  purpose,  whereas  the  subsequent  steps 
neglected  this  purpose  and  remained  intellectualistic. 
In  order  to  make  the  subsequent  steps  consistent  with  the 
first  one  when  modified  so  as  to  include  a  motive,  Her- 
bart's  guiding  conception  of  the  primacy  of  the  intellect 
must  be  abandoned.  The  steps  are  then  those  necessary 
to  overcome  some  difficulty  in  action  by  defining  and 
solving  a  problem,  and  by  using  the  solution  in  attaining 
the  original  purpose.  This  functional  method,  which  has 
reference  in  every  step  to  a  definite  act  pointed  out  by  the 
motive  in  the  first  step,  gives  much  more  definite  and, 
therefore,  better  guidance  in  teaching  than  does  a  method 
with  intellectualistic  steps.  This  functional  method  is  a 
direct  outgrowth  of  the  assumption  made  by  Froebel  that 
activity  is  primary,  an  assumption  now  supported  by 
psychology,  logic,  and  the  theory  of  knowledge.  Step 
by  step  the  functional  method  has  been  improved  so  that 
now  the  nature  of  self-activity  and  the  meaning  of  the 
precept  "  learn  by  doing  "  have  been  made  very  definite. 
Each  unit  of  subject  matter  is  regarded  as  the  solution  of 


294  The  Principles  of  Education 

a  problem  arising  out  of  a  difficulty  in  attaining  some 
purpose.  Further  development  of  the  functional  method 
of  teaching  is  needed,  because,  although  it  has  clearly 
analyzed  the  process  by  which  the  pupil  acquires  knowl- 
edge, it  has  not  with  equal  clearness  analyzed  the  process 
by  which  the  pupil  acquires  appreciation.1  The  gradual 
improvement  that  has  been  made  in  the  methods  of  teach- 
ing would  not  have  been  possible,  if  educational  thinkers 
had  not  kept  in  mind  the  purpose  of  devising  principles 
of  teaching  that  correspond  to  the  nature  of  the  child. 

Some  general  improvements  in  the  school  system  of 
England  may  be  cited  briefly  in  further  illustration  of 
the  gradual  development  due  to  continued  appreciation 
of  the  end  served.  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  common  schools  in  England  were  conducted  by 
religious  societies  largely  under  the  educational  ideal  of 
the  Reformation.  With  the  growth  of  industrialism  and 
of  democratic  government  came  a  general  appreciation 
of  the  desirability  of  an  efficient  school  system.  A  year 
after  an  extension  of  the  franchise,  the  central  govern- 
ment, in  1833,  began  to  aid  church  schools  by  subsidies. 
This  was  an  improvement  upon  previous  conditions.  In 
1870,  two  years  after  a  further  extension  of  the  franchise, 
board  schools  were  established,  since  the  religious  socie- 
ties did  not  provide  schools  in  all  localities.  The  board 
schools  were  maintained  by  both  government  grants  and 
local  taxes.  This  change  was  a  great  advance.  A  further 
step  toward  an  efficient  system  of  schools  was  taken  in 
1899,  when  a  central  board  of  education  was  established 
to  have  general  charge  over  educational  matters.  Be- 
cause church  schools  were  not  supported  so  well  financially 
as  board  schools,  and  were,  therefore,  less  efficient,  they 

'     *  An  attempt  to  analyze  this  process  is  made  in  Ch.  XIII. 


Social  Development  295 

were  permitted  in  1902  to  share  in  local  taxes.  This 
act  was  another  important  advance.  There  was  still 
some  difficulty  because  the  state  did  not  have  sufficient 
control  in  the  management  of  church  schools,  but  soon  a 
movement  to  remedy  this  difficulty  began.  In  a  similar 
way,  other  improvements  have  been  made.  Thus  almost 
decade  by  decade  the  English  system  of  common  schools 
has  been  improved,  because  men  have  kept  clearly  in 
mind  a  definite  purpose  and  have  found  better  and  better 
ways  for  realizing  it. 

(2)  The  condition  of  arrested  development,  or  formal- 
ism, exists  when  customs  are  transmitted  to  younger 
generations  merely  as  practices  which  society  approves, 
without  any  indication  of  the  intrinsic  ends  which  these 
customs  serve.  Without  knowledge  of  the  end  served, 
one  cannot  judge  whether  some  particular  change  is  an 
improvement  or  not.  When  practices  have  become  for- 
mal, they  not  only  fail  to  improve,  but  may  even  become 
useless,  because  of  changed  social  conditions  which  make 
the  purposes  they  originally  served  no  longer  vital.  A 
most  conspicuous  example  of  arrested  development  is 
found  in  the  history  of  Chinese  institutions  for  centuries 
preceding  the  present  one.  Long  before  the  Christian 
era,  China  was  saved  from  social  disintegration  by  return- 
ing to  old  practices  in  the  service  of  unity,  harmony,  and 
justice.  These  practices  were  described  in  the  Chinese 
sacred  books.  To  insure  the  permanence  of  old  customs, 
provision  was  made  to  put  in  state  offices  only  men  well 
versed  in  the  Chinese  Classics.  In  time,  the  study  of  the 
Classics  received  strong  traditional  value,  but  the  pur- 
pose which  it  originally  served,  —  that  of  promoting  unity, 
harmony,  and  justice  in  social  relations,  —  was  forgotten. 
The  slightest  change  in  the  Classics  was  not  tolerated, 


296  The  Principles  of  Education 

even  though  it  might  improve  them  as  means  to  the  ends 
they  originally  served.  Although  centuries  of  social 
change  not  only  made  the  language  of  the  Classics  anti- 
quated, but  also  made  the  content  of  little  value  com- 
paratively, an  enormous  amount  of  time  was  wasted  in 
the  study  of  these  ancient  writings.  Again,  in  the  educa- 
tion of  western  Europe,  the  extensive  formal  study  of 
scholasticism  and  of  Latin  and  Greek  were  instances  of 
arrested  development.  Every  social  practice  tends  to  be- 
come formal,  whether  in  education,  politics,  religion,  or 
any  other  institution.  Arrested  development  means  for- 
malistai,  because  the  vital  spirit  of  a  practice  dies  when  the 
practice  is  severed  from  the  intrinsic  purpose  which  alone 
can  give  it  true  significance  and  value. 

(3)  The  condition  of  revolutionary  development  ap- 
pears when  a  period  of  arrested  development,  or  formalism, 
is  interrupted  by  a  conflict  of  social  practices.  China 
began  a  revolutionary  advance  with  the  present  century. 
So  long  as  the  Chinese  wall  and  the  Pacific  Ocean  isolated 
China  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  so  long  as  new 
practices  did  not  through  conflict  challenge  old  ones, 
formal  traditions  were  continued  in  that  country.  But 
when  the  Chinese,  through  missionary  and  merchant, 
came  into  contact  with  practices  of  the  western  world, 
the  values  of  their  traditions  were  successfully  challenged 
in  the  conflict,  and  a  revolutionary  change  of  Chinese 
institutions  began.  In  the  history  of  the  western  world, 
a  number  of  periods  stand  out  as  revolutionary.  Promi- 
nent among  these  are  the  periods  of  the  sophists  and 
philosophers  in  Greece,  the  Augustan  Age  in  Rome,  the 
Italian  Renaissance,  the  Protestant  Reformation,  and  the 
French  Revolution.  In  each  case  formal  customs  and  be- 
liefs were  interrupted  by  a  conflict  of  social  practices  and 


Social  Development  297 

a  revolutionary  change  in  institutions  was  begun.  The 
present  age  also  is  undoubtedly  one  of  important  revolu- 
tionary advance,  as  is  evidenced  by  the  rapid  changes 
taking  place  in  all  institutions. 

When  social  practices  become  formal  and  their  values 
are  challenged  by  conflicting  traditions,  three  steps  follow 
in  order ;  namely,  (a)  the  loss  of  faith  in  tradition,  (6)  in- 
dividualism, and  (c)  the  adoption  of  better  practices  with 
an  appreciation  of  the  ends  served  by  them. 

(a)  The  loss  of  faith  comes  naturally,  since  the  formal 
tradition  is  accepted  not  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  worth, 
but  because  it  is  indorsed  by  society.  As  soon  as  society 
is  found  to  indorse  also  some  practice  that  conflicts  with 
it,  the  individual  does  not  know  which  to  accept. 

(6)  In  the  degree  that  faith  in  social  regulation  is  lost, 
individualism,  more  or  less  capricious,  becomes  prominent ; 
that  is,  individuals  follow  personal  inclinations  which  may 
conflict  with  the  social  welfare.  When  external  convention 
does  not  guide  a  person's  activities,  he  falls  back  upon  the 
guidance  of  feelings  more  or  less  primitive  and  does  what 
he  likes  to  do.  Since  men  differ  in  their  likings,  there  is 
lack  of  uniformity  and  cooperation  in  what  they  do, 
which  makes  this  individualism  conspicuous.  This  period 
in  which  men  lose  faith  in  the  authority  of  traditions  is  a 
period  of  unstable  morality.  A  temptation  is  the  result  of 
a  conflict  between  what  a  person  feels  under  social  direc- 
tion he  ought  to  do  and  what  impulsively  he  feels  he 
would  like  to  do.  If  social  authority  is  removed  and  he 
is  free  to  do  what  he  pleases,  that  which  would  otherwise 
be  the  evil  in  a  temptation  may  now  be  unchallenged  when 
it  appears  to  control  his  conduct.  He,  therefore,  neglects 
his  duties  in  the  various  social  institutions  when  these 
duties  are  not  in  the  direction  of  his  personal  desires. 


298  The  Principles  of  Education 

(c)  This  individualistic  tendency  is  short-sighted  and 
leads  inevitably  to  dissatisfaction.  The  fundamental 
values  of  life  can  be  attained  only  through  methods  which 
are  worked  out  slowly  and  painfully  through  years  of 
social  cooperation,  and  which  are  made  more  effective  by 
every  advance  in  civilization.  The  technique  for  attaining 
the  most  important  values  of  life  is  just  what  constitutes 
civilization.  Capricious  desires  of  an  individual  that 
conflict  with  it  must  be  disciplined,  not  clothed  with 
authority.  When  they  get  control  of  conduct,  the  organ- 
ization of  activities  for  the  attainment  of  human  welfare 
has  given  place  to  anarchy. 

Sooner  or  later  the  loss  of  the  greater  values  that  make 
life  worth  while  and  the  consequent  dissatisfaction  cause 
men  to  turn  from  individualism  and  to  seek  better  prac- 
tices with  an  appreciation  of  the  ends  served  by  these 
practices.  Inquiry  as  to  what  makes  life  worth  while  and 
how  it  can  be  attained  becomes  prominent.  Men  may 
thus  find  anew  the  intrinsic  values  of  old  customs  and 
"  go  back  to  the  good  old  times,"  as  the  Chinese  did  when 
they  submitted  to  the  teachings  of  the  Classics;  they 
may  accept  the  customs  of  another  civilization,  as  the 
Romans  did  when  they  adopted  the  Christian  religion  to 
take  the  place  of  pagan  beliefs  in  which  they  had  lost 
faith,  or  as  the  Italians  did  when,  in  the  Renaissance, 
Graeco-Roman  ideas  were  introduced ;  they  may  strike 
out  anew  and  develop  by  their  own  effort  social  regula- 
tions, as  the  Athenians  did  in  the  philosophical  period, 
and  as  people  of  the  western  world  are  now  doing  in 
a  social  reconstruction  that  dates  back  to  the  climax  of 
individualism  emphasized  in  the  French  Revolution. 
When  the  period  of  reconstruction  comes,  men  have 
the  advantage  of  vital  appreciations  of  worth  and  of 


Social  Development  299 

knowledge  acquired  after  the  old  traditions  were  fixed, 
whether  the  new  development  is  made  under  the  guidance 
of  borrowed  patterns  or  whether  new  patterns  are  de- 
vised. As  a  result,  the  new  practices  are  better  than  the 
old.  The  adoption  of  these  new  practices  means  social 
progress. 

The  analysis  of  revolutionary  advance  given  above 
agrees  with  Spencer's  statement  of  the  "  three  phases 
through  which  human  opinion  passes."1  He  says  that 
these  phases  are  "the  unanimity  of  the  ignorant,  the 
disagreement  of  the  inquiring,  and  the  unanimity  of  the 
wise,"  and  adds,  "  They  are  not  sequences  in  time  only ; 
they  are  sequences  in  causation."  His  attention  here  is 
confined  to  revolutionary  changes  only,  because  they  have 
been  conspicuous  in  the  development  of  civilization ;  and 
what  he  says  about  opinion  is  true  of  practices,  because  the 
former  guides  the  latter.  The  period  of  the  unanimity  of 
the  ignorant  is  the  period  of  formalism,  when,  ignorant  of 
the  true  significance  of  social  practices,  men  carry  them 
out  under  the  authority  of  mere  custom.  The  period 
marked  by  the  disagreement  of  the  inquiring  covers  the 
stage  of  individualism  and  the  beginning  of  reconstruc- 
tion. The  unanimity  of  the  wise  means  the  general  ac- 
ceptance of  practices  with  a  knowledge  and  appreciation 
of  their  true  significance.  In  time,  the  unanimity  of  the 
wise  passes  over  into  the  unanimity  of  the  ignorant,  be- 
cause knowledge  and  appreciation  of  the  significance  of 
the  practices  are  gradually  lost,  although  the  practices 
themselves  continue  under  the  weight  of  traditional  au- 
thority. 

Let  us  now  consider  a  concrete  instance  of  revolu- 
tionary development.  In  early  times  Athens  had  a  form 
1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Education,  1890,  Ch.  II,  p.  87. 


300  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  education  which  had  grown  up  in  answer  to  the  demands 
of  the  city-state.  Industrial  work  having  been  turned  over 
to  slaves,  the  chief  social  demands  upon  citizens  were  to 
meet  the  problems  of  democracy  within  the  state  and  the 
dangers  of  war  without  it.  In  educating  the  citizen- 
soldier,  there  were  three  stages.  In  the  first  stage,  boys 
from  the  ages  of  seven  to  sixteen  spent  half  of  the  day  in 
the  palestra,  where  their  bodies  were  developed  by  physi- 
cal exercises,  and  the  other  half  of  the  day  in  the  music 
school,  where,  learning  to  "  love  the  things  that  ought  to 
be  loved  and  to  hate  the  things  that  ought  to  be  hated," 
they  acquired  patriotic  and  religious  ideals.  After  their 
hearts  had  become  set  on  the  right  things,  the  youths  were 
given,  in  addition  to  physical  exercises,  an  apprenticeship 
training  in  the  activities  of  the  citizen-soldier.  During 
the  period  of  civic  training,  which  lasted  two  years,  the 
boys  spent  half  time  in  physical  exercises  in  the  gym- 
nasium and  half  time  enjoying  the  freedom  of  the  city, 
where  in  a  very  direct  way  they  became  acquainted  with 
the  civic  activities  of  the  city-state.  In  the  period  of  mili- 
tary training,  they  spent  one  year  in  police  duty  near  the 
city  and  the  other  hi  active  military  life  on  the  frontier. 
At  the  age  of  twenty,  after  the  youths  had,  in  these  three 
stages  of  training,  acquired  the  right  purposes  and  the 
means  of  realizing  them,  they  were  admitted  to  full 
citizenship. 

At  first  these  educational  practices  had  strong  authority, 
for  they  were  recognized  as  necessary  to  secure  peace  and 
justice  within  the  state  and  protection  against  enemies 
without  it.  In  time,  however,  tradition  laid  its  chilly 
hand  upon  them,  as  the  purposes  which  originally  gave 
them  authority  became  less  keenly  appreciated.  In 
other  words,  they  became  formal. 


Social  Development  301 

Mere  tradition  is  strong  enough  to  continue  social  prac- 
tices indefinitely,  if  there  is  nothing  to  oppose  it,  as  has 
been  seen  hi  the  case  of  China.  But  the  Athenians 
were  not  isolated  from  the  outside  world,  and,  owing  to 
this,  opposing  traditions  eventually  made  their  appear- 
ance. The  Constitution  of  Clisthenes  admitted  to  cit- 
izenship hi  the  Athenian  state  all  free  people  of  Attica, 
with  purposes  and  practices  differing  from  those  of  earlier 
Athenians.  Then  came  contact  with  the  traditions  of 
the  Orient  as  a  result  of  the  Persian  wars.  Commercial 
enterprises  took  Athenians  to  foreign  countries  and 
foreigners  to  Athens.  The  enrichment  of  Athens  with 
money  misappropriated  from  the  treasury  of  the  Delian 
League  also  attracted  many  foreigners  to  the  city.  Travel 
and  colonization  brought  still  more  foreign  customs,  (a) 
As  a  consequence,  traditions  tended  to  lose  authority 
through  conflict,  and,  in  so  far  as  this  happened,  the 
individual  was  deprived  of  social  guidance  in  which  he 
had  confidence.  For  example,  because  of  the  conflicts 
respectively  among  the  religious,  educational,  and  po- 
litical traditions  of  the  various  people  with  whom  he 
associated,  he  lost  faith  to  a  large  extent  in  the  religious, 
educational,  and  political  ideals  of  his  ancestors. 

(6)  In  the  absence  of  other  guidance,  the  individual  was 
left  at  the  mercy  of  more  or  less  selfish  purposes,  from 
which  he  had  not  been  alienated  in  this  conflict.  Selfish 
interests  differed  so  that  some  individuals  sought  one  thing 
and  some  another.  The  desire  for  wealth,  selfish  political 
and  social  ambitions,  and  the  love  of  pleasure  usurped 
the  place  of  loyalty  to  state  and  religion.  Since  the  life 
of  the  soldier  was  filled  with  hardship,  the  youths  began 
to  escape  it.  Since  lounging  in  the  gymnasium  and  con- 
versing with  one  another  were  more  pleasing  than  run- 


302  The  Principles  of  Education 

ning,  jumping,  wrestling,  and  boxing  in  the  arena,  Aris- 
tophanes had  reason  to  complain  that  the  youths  were 
becoming  "  narrow  chested  and  long  tongued."  Interest 
in  the  serious  activities  of  citizenship  waned.  Ear- 
pleasing  music  and  love  songs  encroached  upon  the  mar- 
tial and  religious  airs  that  had  predominated  in  the  music 
school.  This  condition  meant  individualism. 

A  new  class  of  teachers,  called  sophists,  appeared  in 
response  to  this  new  demand  for  individual  satisfaction. 
They  came  first  from  the  colonies,  where  the  conflict  of 
traditions  and  a  consequent  demand  for  individualistic 
teachers  had  taken  place  at  an  earlier  date.  Some  of  these 
teachers  went  so  far  as  to  boast  that  they  could  teach  any- 
body anything.  They  taught  many  subjects,  from  as- 
tronomy to  cooking.  They  gave  chief  emphasis,  how- 
ever, to  rhetoric,  because  power  to  persuade  is  effective  in 
carrying  out  one's  personal  ambitions  by  securing  the  as- 
sistance of  other  men.  Some  sophists  claimed  even  that 
they  were  able  to  teach  how  to  make  the  worse  appear  the 
better  reason,  and  thus  to  enable  their  students  to  dupe 
other  people.  The  extreme  individualists  said  that  the 
individual  man  was  the  measure  of  all  things,  meaning 
that  his  individual  feelings  should  take  the  place  of  social 
regulation.  Justice  was  regarded  as  the  interest  of  the 
stronger;  or,  in  other  words,  with  no  over-individual 
regulation,  might  was  regarded  as  right,  when  selfish 
desires  conflicted.  Consistent  with  their  individualism, 
sophists  demanded  money  for  teaching,  because  loyalty 
to  the  interests  of  the  state  was  not  felt  as  a  motive  strong 
enough  to  command  their  efforts  as  teachers.  This  was 
indeed  a  period  of  individualism ;  social  ideals  had  given 
way,  in  a  conspicuous  measure,  to  selfish  ambitions. 

(c)  The  stage  was  now  set  for  the  work  of  reconstruc- 


Social  Development  303 

tion.  Social  regulations  are  not  normally  mere  impo- 
sitions upon  the  individual ;  they  are  guides  which  society, 
in  its  generations  of  experience,  has  worked  out  as  leading 
to  the  highest  human  welfare.  When  social  regulations 
lost  authority,  values  less  effective  in  securing  human 
welfare  usurped  command.  The  short-sightedness  of 
these  selfish  purposes  led  to  disappointment.  Is  not 
every  temptation  a  struggle  between  values  supported  by 
social  authority  and  what  the  individual  feels  that  he 
would  personally  like  to  do?  If  social  authority,  in  the 
case  of  temptation,  is  too  weak  to  command,  does  he  not 
follow  his  lower  inclinations?  And  are  not  these  incli- 
nations classified  as  lower  just  because  they  do  not  serve 
the  greater  values  of  life  ?  Failure  to  realize  these  greater 
values  is  bound  to  bring  dissatisfaction  and  consequent 
attempts  to  find  better  forms  of  conduct. 

In  Athens,  far-sighted  men  saw  that  the  state,  which 
should  bring  justice,  peace,  and  security,  was  going  to 
pieces.  When  old  ideals  which  had  led  men  to  cooperate 
for  the  good  of  all  lost  their  power,  when  members  of  the 
state  neglected  civic  and  military  training,  when  they 
sought  private  advantage  rather  than  public  good,  how 
could  it  be  otherwise?  Short-sighted  men  whose  vision 
went  no  farther  than  selfish  interests  suffered  disappoint- 
ment ;  for  there  is  a  law  as  old  as  human  nature  that  man 
finds  his  highest  salvation  by  losing  himself  in  the  serv- 
ice of  others.  This  law  is  true  because  man  is  by  nature  a 
social  individual,  and  the  greatest  satisfaction  comes  from 
acting  in  accordance  with  his  nature.  So  among  the 
Athenians  there  appeared  two  purposes,  one  to  secure  the 
unity  of  the  state  and  the  other  to  gain  the  greatest  pos- 
sible satisfaction  in  life.  In  the  service  of  these  purposes, 
social  practices  must  now  be  put  into  the  melting  pot, 


304  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  dross  must  be  eliminated,  and  out  of  the  pure  gold  in 
them  new  practices  must  be  made. 

Social  and  individual  welfare  are  not  two  different 
things  that  normally  come  into  conflict.  The  highest 
realization  of  the  one  means  also  the  highest  realization 
of  the  other,  for  the  values  which  the  individual  desires 
are  normally  social  as  well  as  individual.  Those  who  had 
been  strongly  influenced  by  the  individualistic  movement 
did  not,  however,  appreciate  the  value  of  securing  the  gen- 
eral welfare.  When  Aristophanes  urged  them  to  go  back 
to  the  good  old  times,  they  did  not  respond.  When  Con- 
fucius attempted  to  overcome  social  disintegration  in 
China  by  a  similar  recommendation,  his  efforts  led  even- 
tually to  success,  because  China  was  a  monarchy  and  those 
who  were  interested  in  preserving  the  integrity  of  the 
state  had  power  to  give  the  authority  of  leadership  only  to 
men  who  were  thoroughly  conversant  with  the  traditions 
of  the  good  old  times.  But  Athens  was  a  democracy. 
The  Athenian  people  had  to  be  interested  in  a  reform 
before  it  could  be  made  effectual.  So  far  as  the  influence 
of  individualism  prevailed,  they  were  prone  to  listen  only 
to  words  that  promised  satisfaction  to  individual  desires. 
Aristophanes,  Xenophon,  and  others  who  appealed  to  the 
motive  of  securing  the  welfare  of  the  state  found  only  a 
weak  response,  whereas  Socrates,  who  emphasized  the  prob- 
lem of  how  to  secure  the  greatest  personal  good,  quickly 
gained  an  audience.  He  was  compelled,  however,  to  con- 
fess his  inability  to  solve  this  problem.  Then  this  question 
became  the  heritage  of  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  less  prominent 
professional  philosophers.  The  problem  of  Plato's  Re- 
public, for  instance,  is,  How  should  a  man  act  in  order  to 
get  the  most  out  of  life?  These  philosophers,  in  answer 
to  the  question  society  had  thus  given  them,  offered 


Social  Development  305 

solutions  which  were  later  taken  up  by  tradition  as  guides 
for  social  action.  In  the  field  of  education,  the  philo- 
sophical schools  and  other  institutions  which  emphasized 
the  theoretical  rather  than  the  practical,  were  the  imme- 
diate results.  Here  the  movement  hardened  into  formal- 
ism, before  the  step  in  social  advance  was  completed. 
The  Romans,  however,  carried  on  the  movement  by  put- 
ting Greek  theory  into  practice.  In  the  fields  of  govern- 
ment and  religion,  Greek  philosophy  furnished  ideas  to 
which  the  practical  Romans  gave  expression  in  juris- 
prudence, Christian  theology,  the  organization  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  the  political  organization  of 
the  Roman  Empire  itself.  With  ideas  of  social  practice, 
Greece  made  captive  her  conquerors,  and,  as  a  result,  the 
social  reconstruction  in  the  simple  city-state  became  a 
controlling  influence  throughout  the  whole  civilized 
world. 

IV 

The  fine  arts,  history,  and  the  sciences  promote  gradual  advance, 
which  is  the  normal  form  of  social  development. 

In  the  never-ending  road  from  the  state  of  nature  to  that 
of  culture,  gradual  advance  is  better  than  arrested  devel- 
opment or  revolutionary  advance.  It  may  be  regarded 
as  the  normal  condition.  In  arrested  development, 
many  institutional  practices,  because  of  changed  situa- 
tions, fail  to  serve  the  purposes  for  which  they  were 
devised ;  in  revolutionary  development,  useful  practices 
are  often  cast  aside  with  the  useless ;  but  in  gradual 
advance,  institutions  are  ever  undergoing  a  process  of 
reconstruction  which  keeps  them  in  the  service  of  their 
true  ends,  so  far  as  the  stage  of  knowledge  men  have 
attained  makes  this  possible. 


306  The  Principles  of  Education 

The  fine  arts,  history,  and  the  sciences,  which  ever 
become  more  necessary  as  society  grows  in  complexity, 
are  in  the  service  of  gradual  development.  In  a  confus- 
ing multiplicity  of  purposes,  the  fine  arts  keep  men  alive 
to  fundamental  values ;  in  the  intricate  relations  between 
means  and  ends,  history  reveals  the  purposes  served  by 
institutional  practices ;  in  the  complexity  of  means  used, 
a  highly  developed  scientific  technique  is  necessary  for 
efficient  control.  When  there  is  an  adequate  appreciation 
of  definite  values  to  be  attained  and  a  continuous  improve- 
ment in  scientific  control,  we  have  the  essential  conditions 
for  gradual  development. 

V 

The  development  of  civilization  ever  increases  the  personal  freedom 
of  man  by  revealing  to  him  the  intrinsic  worth  of  what  he  does 
as  the  authority  for  his  conduct,  and  by  enabling  him  to  make 
nature  a  servant  in  carrying  out  his  purposes. 

In  the  progress  of  civilization  from  nature  to  culture, 
society  makes  the  individual  more  and  more  a  free  person. 
It  does  this  by  guiding  him  to  stronger  and  more  definite 
appreciation  of  the  fundamental  values  of  human  life 
served  by  social  institutions,  so  that  he  cooperates  with 
his  fellow  men  in  seeking  these  values  from  inner  choice 
rather  than  from  external  compulsion.  The  man  who 
cooperates  with  his  fellows  from  mere  individual  economic 
necessity  or  fear  of  law,  and  not  because  he  feels  the  true 
worth  of  what  he  does  as  a  social  activity,  is  as  truly  a 
slave  as  his  horse,  which,  drawing  a  plow  or  a  wagon 
under  the  compulsion  of  the  bit  and  the  lash,  blindly  per- 
forms a  service  to  society.  With  the  advance  of  civil- 
ization, society  not  only  frees  man  by  revealing  the  intrin- 
sic values  of  his  activities,  but  also  by  guiding  him  to 


Social  Development  307 

greater  control  over  nature  in  realizing  these  values.  To 
the  extent  that  he  learns  how  to  avoid  disease  and  hunger, 
and,  indeed,  how  to  satisfy  every  morally  legitimate 
want,  he  is  transformed  from  the  slave  of  nature  to  the 
master  of  nature.  Thus  does  the  development  of  civili- 
zation through  the  improvement  of  institutions  mark  the 
progress  of  man  from  the  low  plane  of  animal  existence 
to  an  ever  greater  realization  of  the  boundless  poten- 
tialities of  human  life. 

VI 

Natural  science  regards  social  development  as  improvement  in  the 
system  of  group  adjustment  to  environment,  and  institutions  as 
group  habits.  In  explaining,  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  habit 
formation,  conditions  influencing  the  development  of  group  habits, 
natural  science  supports  the  conclusions  reached  from  the  teleo- 
logical  point  of  view  with  regard  to  gradual  social  advance,  arrested 
development,  and  revolutionary  advance.  In  explaining  the  nature 
of  the  guidance  by  the  group,  it  gives  the  counterpart  of  civiliza- 
tion guiding  man  to  personal  freedom. 

Our  next  problem  is  to  find  whether  the  foregoing 
explanation  of  social  development  is  supported  by  natural 
science. 

In  the  lower  forms  of  life,  each  organism  is  compara- 
tively independent  in  the  process  of  adjustment  to  envi- 
ronment. Living  as  a  hermit  in  its  solitary  web,  the 
spider  gets  along  very  well.  In  the  process  of  evolution, 
a  great  advance  was  made,  however,  when  the  individual 
organism  secured  adjustment  not  alone,  but  by  cooper- 
ating with  others.  Through  this  change,  the  group  be- 
came the  unit  for  adjustment,  and  the  individual  organism 
was  no  longer  self-sufficient.  Cooperation  brought  better 
adjustment,  because,  by  requiring  of  any  one  member  of 
the  group  only  a  small  part  of  the  reactions,  it  enabled 


308  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  group  as  a  unit  to  develop  a  complex  system  of  re- 
sponses far  beyond  the  capability  of  any  one  organism  to 
acquire.  The  growth  in  complexity  of  group  reactions 
is  unlimited,  because  the  greater  complexity  of  reactions 
by  the  group  is  balanced  by  the  greater  division  of  them 
among  members  of  the  group.  This  development  has 
been  rapid  in  the  case  of  human  beings,  since,  having 
incomplete  nervous  systems  at  birth,  they  rapidly  acquire 
and  transmit  new  forms  of  adjustment.  Natural  science 
explains  in  this  way  the  general  character  of  human 
development  with  its  increasing  division  of  responses 
among  individuals  and  the  increasing  interdependence  of 
these  individuals. 

Activities  taken  over  by  the  group  as  a  unit  (1)  furnish 
for  individual  organisms  within  the  group  such  neces- 
sities as  food  and  shelter ;  (2)  take  care  of  offspring  during 
the  period  of  infancy ;  (3)  bring  about  in  infant  organisms 
the  acquired  reactions  that  enable  them  to  participate 
effectively  in  group  activities;  (4)  protect  each  organism 
from  those  acts  of  others  which  would  interfere  with  the 
adjustment  process ;  (5)  give  the  greatest  unity  and  har- 
mony in  adjustments  by  making  individual  organisms,  in 
their  divided  fields  of  reactions,  respond  to  the  widest 
environment  and  promote  the  adjustment  of  the  group  as 
a  whole.  The  organization  of  activities  that  tends  to 
bring  about  each  of  these  results  is  an  institution.  These 
institutions,  it  is  obvious,  are  respectively  the  industries 
including  commerce,  the  home,  the  school,  the  state,  and 
the  church. 

The  natural  science  explanation  of  the  varying  condi- 
tions which  affect  the  growth  of  institutions  and,  there- 
fore, social  development,  is  made  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  habit  formation.  Institutions  may  be  regarded 


Social  Development  309 

as  social  habits  subject  to  the  laws  of  habit  formation, 
because  the  activities  which  constitute  them  are  habits 
of  cooperating  individual  organisms.  Only  through  the 
modification  of  these  habits  of  individual  organisms  do 
institutions  change.  (1)  The  condition  for  gradual  de- 
velopment is  that  in  which  secondary  reactions  are  not 
isolated,  but  remain  connected  with  the  fundamental 
habits  the  functioning  of  which  they  facilitate.  The 
failure  of  a  fundamental  habit  to  function  compels  changes 
in  the  secondary  responses  connected  with  it,  and  when 
any  influence  upon  the  nervous  system  makes  in  these 
secondary  responses  modifications  that  result  in  better 
functioning  of  the  fundamental  habit,  these  modifications 
are  incorporated  with  the  system  of  habits.  When,  how- 
ever, secondary  responses  become  isolated  from  the  fun- 
damental habits  in  connection  with  which  they  were  de- 
veloped, they  may,  as  explained  below,  be  continued 
without  change.  Since  means  of  control  correspond  to 
secondary  responses,  which  function  in  overcoming  checks 
in  fundamental  habits,  and  since  purposes  in  the  last 
analysis  correspond  to  fundamental  habits,  this  material- 
istic explanation  supports  our  conclusion  that  the  condi- 
tion of  gradual  advance  exists  when  men  recognize  the 
purposes  of  the  institutional  practices  in  which  they  are 
engaged.  (2)  The  condition  of  arrested  development  is 
that  in  which  a  group  of  responses  becomes  isolated  from 
the  general  system  of  habits  to  which  it  normally  belongs, 
and,  consequently,  is  set  off  by  only  a  part  of  the  stimuli 
which  normally  cause  this  system  of  habits  to  function. 
James  says,  "  Who  is  there  that  has  never  wound  up  his 
watch  on  taking  off  his  waistcoat  in  the  day  time,  or 
taken  his  latch  key  out  on  arriving  at  the  doorstep  of  a 
friend?  "  Winding  the  watch  and  taking  out  the  latch 


310  The  Principles  of  Education 

key  are,  under  such  circumstances,  isolated  from  the 
general  systems  of  habits  to  which  they  respectively 
belong,  so  that  they  are  set  off  by  only  a  part  of  the 
stimuli  that  normally  cause  these  systems  of  habits  to 
function.  In  the  one  case,  winding  the  watch  is  isolated 
from  the  whole  system  of  habits  connected  with  retiring 
at  night;  in  the  other  case,  taking  out  the  latch  key  is 
isolated  from  the  whole  system  of  habits  connected  with 
approaching  through  a  certain  street  and  dooryard  one's 
own  house  and  entering  it.  Furthermore,  only  part  of 
the  stimuli  normally  belonging  to  the  situation  retiring- 
at-night  in  the  one  case  and  of  the  situation  entering- 
one's-house  in  the  other,  are  responsible  respectively  for 
the  winding  up  of  the  watch  and  the  taking  out  of  the 
latch  key.  Let  us  now  consider  a  similar  instance  with 
an  extensive  group  of  social  habits.  The  acquiring  of  the 
Latin  language  became  the  chief  part  of  the  school  cur- 
riculum at  a  time  when  this  language  was  the  only  medium 
for  transmitting  a  vast  range  of  useful  adjustments  orig- 
inated by  earlier  peoples.  It  was  thus  made  a  part  of  the 
great  system  of  educational  habits  developed  in  the  process 
of  transmitting  acquired  reactions.  Although  in  time  the 
vernacular  languages  became  better  media  than  Latin 
for  the  general  transmission  of  acquired  reactions,  the 
study  of  Latin  continued  to  be  the  main  part  of  the  cur- 
riculum, because,  in  the  process  of  transmission  to  later 
generations,  it  had  become  isolated  from  the  system  of 
habits  in  the  improving  of  which  it  had  been  incorpo- 
rated into  the  school  activities.  Evidence  of  this  isolation 
is  the  fact  that  the  study  of  Latin  was  now  called  forth 
by  only  a  part  of  the  stimuli  belonging  to  the  system  of 
educational  habits,  with  the  result  that  changes  in  those 
wider  environmental  conditions  which  had  been  effective 


Social  Development  311 

in  putting  Latin  into  the  school  curriculum  lost  their 
control  over  it  after  it  had  been  put  there.  The  study  of 
Latin  was  now  a  response  merely  to  the  narrow  school 
situation,  and,  therefore,  was  limited  to  the  language 
itself.  Since  in  the  last  analysis  purposes  correspond 
to  fundamental  habits,  the  isolation  of  secondary  re- 
sponses, as  the  study  of  Latin,  from  the  fundamental 
habits  to  which  they  normally  belong  is,  when  stated 
teleologically,  the  separation  of  activities  from  the  pur- 
poses they  normally  serve.  Thus  does  natural  science 
support  the  conclusion  reached  teleologically  that  the 
condition  of  arrested  development  is  that  in  which  social 
practices  are  transmitted  without  the  transmission  of  the 
purposes  they  normally  serve.  (3)  When  the  group 
develops  extensive  new  systems  of  responses  because  old 
systems  of  group  habits  have  by  mutual  conflict  been 
checked  in  their  functioning,  we  have  the  materialistic 
counterpart  of  revolutionary  development  caused  by  a 
conflict  of  traditions.  This  condition  follows  a  period  of 
formalism,  in  which  responses  are  more  easily  overcome 
because  they  have  been  weakened  by  isolation  from  fun- 
damental habits  to  which  they  normally  belong. 

The  condition  of  gradual  advance  keeps  up  continu- 
ously the  best  possible  adjustments  of  the  organism. 
Under  this  condition,  each  change  in  the  environment  or 
improvement  in  the  nervous  connections  of  the  organism 
results  in  the  acquiring  of  more  adequate  responses.  The 
fine  arts  and  history  promote  gradual  development  by 
preventing  the  isolation  of  reactions  from  the  fundamental 
habits  to  which  they  belong,  and  the  sciences  promote  it 
by  organizing  more  effectually  the  secondary  reactions, 
which  correspond  to  means  of  control.1 

1  See  pp.  238-240  and  273-276. 


312  The  Principles  of  Education 

The  improvement  of  group  guidance  is  the  counter- 
part of  the  advancement  of  civilization  from  nature  to 
culture.  That  this  advancement  of  civilization  increases 
the  freedom  of  men  finds  its  counterpart  in  the  conclu- 
sions of  natural  science.  By  developing  in  the  organism 
upon  the  basis  of  instincts  elaborate  systems  of  response, 
group  guidance  makes  the  organism  more  self-determined 
in  its  reactions.  Its  cooperation  with  the  group  in  ad- 
justment is  determined  by  far-reaching  systems  of  re- 
sponse developed  in  the  organism  and  does  not  have  to  be 
directed  at  every  turn  by  group  interference.  Further- 
more, as  group  guidance  develops  more  efficient  reactions 
in  an  organism,  the  powers  of  the  latter  are  extended, 
because  its  acts  modify  the  environment  in  a  way  that 
turns  external  forces  to  work  in  its  service,  as  in  the  use  of 
waterfalls  and  steam  power.  Instead  of  merely  remaining 
subject  to  the  forces  in  the  environment,  the  organism 
makes  the  environment  assist  in  the  adjustment.  Thus 
does  natural  science  give  the  counterpart  of  the  fact  that 
social  development  guides  the  individual  to  greater  free- 
dom by  making  him  more  self-determined  in  action  and 
also  by  making  him  the  master  rather  than  the  slave 
of  nature. 

REFERENCES 

HORNE,  H.  H.,  The  Philosophy  of  Education,  1905,  pp.  1-4.    (Discusses 
briefly  institutions  as  agencies  of  civilization.) 

BALDWIN,  J.  M.,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Develop- 
ment, 1906,  pp.  537-550.    (Explains  the  nature  of  social  progress.) 

ELLWOOD,  C.  A.,  Sociology  in  its  Psychological  Aspects,  1912,  pp.  366- 
381.     (Gives  the  theory  of  social  progress.) 

MACVANNEL,  J.  A.,  Outline  of  a  Course  in  the  Philosophy  of  Education, 
1912,  pp.  117-120,  162-168.     (Gives  a  condensed  statement  of 


Social  Development  313 

the  nature  of  institutions  and  of  the  relation  of  education  to 
social  progress.     Valuable  especially  for  advanced  students.) 
PEARSON,  K.,  The  Grammar  of  Science,  Pt.  I,  1911,  pp.  1-3.     (Gives 
some  brief,  interesting  remarks  regarding  social  progress  and  our 
understanding  of  it.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Show  why  the  responsibility  of  the  school  is  greater  now  than 
it  was  fifty  years  ago. 

2.  Why  is  the  study  of  education  more  important  now  in  the 
United  States  than  it  was  one  hundred  years  ago? 

3.  Show  how  the  school  promotes  social  progress. 

4.  State  five  important  problems  peculiar  to  the  United  States 
at  the  present  time. 

5.  Does  society  tend  to  become  more  unified  as  it  develops  ?    Ex- 
plain. 

6.  What  is  the  meaning  of  democracy? 

7.  What  advantages  has  a  democracy  over  a  beneficent  autocracy? 

8.  How  can  the  United  States  be  made  more  democratic? 

9.  Has  division  of  labor  tended  to  make  men  more  or  less  demo- 
cratic? 

10.  What  are  the  main  influences  that  have  led  to  greater  centraliza- 
tion of  authority  in  the  United  States? 

11.  Explain  in  detail,  from  the  point  of  view  of  education,  the 
essential  steps  in  the  advances  known  as  the  Italian  Renaissance,  the 
Protestant  Reformation,  and  the  Naturalistic  Movement. 

12.  Are  we  living  in  a  period  of  arrested  development,  gradual  de- 
velopment, or  revolutionary  advance?     Explain. 

13.  Show  that  as  a  result  of  education  you  now  have  greater  freedom 
than  you  had  five  years  ago. 


THE  EDUCATIONAL  PROCESS 


CHAPTER   XI 

ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EDUCATIONAL  PROCESS 

The  educational  process,  which  is  found  in  all  institutions, 
unites  the  individual  and  the  social  processes  by  selecting  social 
patterns  and  by  adapting  them  to  the  nature  of  the  individual  so 
that  he  acquires  purposes  and  means  of  control  necessary  for 
social  efficiency.  The  function  of  the  school  is  to  supplement  the 
educative  work  of  the  other  institutions.  Various  traditional 
statements  of  the  aim  of  education,  made  with  regard  to  the 
school,  are  reconciled  in  the  wider  aim  of  social  efficiency,  which 
is  emphasized  in  recent  times  by  the  growing  complexity  of 
social  life  and  by  the  scientific  study  of  education.  The  educa- 
tive work  of  all  institutions  should  be  rationalized  with  reference 
to  this  aim,  which  provides  for  gradual  social  growth  and  for  free 
personal  development.  In  rationalizing  the  work  of  the  school, 
the  most  important  problems,  which  must  ever  be  solved  anew 
because  of  changing  social  conditions,  are  those  of  selecting  and 
organizing  the  curriculum  and  of  finding  the  methods  of  teaching. 
These  two  problems  are  closely  related,  the  one  emphasizing  the 
content  of  subject  matter  and  the  other  emphasizing  the  form  in 
which  subject  matter  is  presented. 

I 

The  educational  process  unites  tho  social  and  the  individual  pro- 
cesses by  selecting  social  patterns  and  by  adapting  them  to  the 
nature  of  the  individual  so  that  he  acquires  the  purposes  and  tho 
means  of  control  necessary  to  make  him  socially  efficient. 

At  birth,  the  child  has  only  the  crude  basis  for  the  pur- 
poses and  the  means  of  control  which  are  necessary  to 
guide  his  action  effectively.  He  is  incomplete;  not  yet 
himself.  In  order  to  realize  the  possibilities  of  his  nature, 

317 


318  The  Principles  of  Education 

he  must  be  able  to  work  for  a  living,  but  he  knows  no 
trade ;  he  must  share  the  responsibility  of  continuing  the 
race,  but  he  knows  nothing  of  the  duties  of  parenthood ; 
he  must  help  to  promote  justice  and  peace  among  men, 
but  he  knows  nothing  of  human  rights  and  duties ;  he  must 
feel  the  inspiring  thrill  of  a  world  purpose  which  sanc- 
tions the  highest  forms  of  human  development,  but  he  is 
ignorant  of  religion.  Verily,  he  must  be  born  again. 
Just  as  he  passed  through  a  process  of  development  be- 
fore he  was  born  into  the  physical  world,  so  he  must  pass 
through  a  superior  process  of  development  before  he  is 
born  into  the  spiritual  world.  This  superior  process  of 
development,  in  which  the  individual  is  equipped  with 
the  appreciations  of  value  and  the  knowledge  of  control 
necessary  for  full  participation  in  social  life,  is  education. 
Our  problem  now  is  to  find  the  general  nature  of  this 
process. 

Education,  we  have  learned,  unites  the  individual  and 
the  social  processes,  which  have  been  described  in  pre- 
vious chapters.  On  the  basis  of  natural  endowment,  the 
individual  builds  new  purposes  and  new  means  of  control 
in  accordance  with  definite  laws.  Society  furnishes 
"patterns"  that  guide  the  individual  to  acquire,  in  ac- 
cordance with  these  laws,  valuable  purposes  and  effective 
means  of  control,  which  have  been  the  result  of  ages  of 
social  progress  and  which  he  could  not  attain  without 
such  guidance.  In  uniting  these  two  factors  of  experi- 
ence, the  educational  process  (1)  selects  social  patterns 
and  (2)  guides  individual  development  in  accordance 
with  them. 

It  must  select  patterns  with  regard  to  their  social 
values  and  also  with  regard  to  their  adaptability  to  imma- 
ture individuals  in  various  stages  of  development.  On 


The  Educational  Process  319 

the  social  side,  selection  must  be  made  because  patterns 
exist  for  evil  as  well  as  for  good  conduct.  The  profes- 
sional thief,  just  as  truly  as  the  honest  business  man,  is 
guided  in  his  conduct  by  purposes  and  means  of  control 
acquired  under  social  direction.  Furthermore,  division 
of  labor  in  pursuits  which  promote  human  welfare  re- 
quires that  various  individuals  be  prepared  for  different 
kinds  of  activities,  each  with  its  peculiar  purposes  and 
means  of  control.  Even  in  the  case  of  primitive  peoples, 
where  social  patterns  are  comparatively  meager,  labor  is 
divided.  Men  fight  the  enemies  and  hunt  game,  whereas 
women  take  care  of  the  children  and  do  the  menial  work 
in  the  camp.  As  society  advances,  soldiers,  priests,  and 
artisans  perform  different  functions  in  the  social  group. 
Even  within  these  classes  there  are  subdivisions  for  each 
of  which  a  special  sort  of  preparation  is  required.  In 
modern  social  life,  the  complex  division  of  labor  neces- 
sitating different  kinds  of  training  is  everywhere  mani- 
fest. Some  ideals  and  methods  are,  moreover,  preferable 
to  others  for  the  same  general  kind  of  activity,  whether 
it  be  in  the  home,  factory,  state,  or  other  institution.  On 
the  individual  side,  selection  must  be  made  with  reference 
to  the  development  already  attained  by  those  who  are  to 
be  educated  ;  because,  as  we  have  found,  an  individual  can 
acquire  new  purposes  and  means  of  control  only  on  the 
basis  of  those  already  realized  in  his  experience.  Social 
patterns  that  do  not  fit  his  experience  cannot  function  in 
his  development. 

After  social  patterns  have  been  selected,  the  individual 
must  be  put  under  conditions  that  lead  him  to  profit  by 
their  guidance.  Purposes,  or  motives,  to  use  these  pat- 
terns must  be  aroused  in  his  experience;  and,  where  the 
patterns  do  not  fit  well  into  the  purposes  and  means  of 


320  The  Principles  of  Education 

control  he  has  acquired,  appreciations  must  be  developed 
and  explanations  must  be  made  that  prepare  a  basis  of 
experience  necessary  to  make  guidance  in  accordance 
with  the  patterns  effective.  This  work  is  done  usually 
by  persons  who  have  already  attained  the  development 
represented  by  the  social  patterns  and  who  have  also  a 
sympathetic  insight  into  the  immature  experience  of  the 
individual  to  be  educated.  With  the  starting  point  and 
a  near  definite  goal  in  mind,  they  can  devise  the  inter- 
mediate steps  necessary. 

II 

All  institutions  educate. 

Every  institution  educates;  it  selects  social  patterns 
and  guides  the  development  of  individuals  in  accordance 
with  them.  In  a  shoe  factory,  the  best  ways  of  making 
shoes  are  selected  and  arranged  according  to  the  increasing 
abilities  of  employees  as  they  advance  to  more  respon- 
sible positions.  Individuals  are  put  under  conditions 
which  make  vital  to  them  the  acquiring  of  means  of  con- 
trol necessary  for  manufacturing  shoes,  and  are  helped 
over  difficulties  through  explanations  and  demonstra- 
tions by  co-workers  and  foremen.  They  acquire  not  only 
means  of  control,  but  also  purposes  which  regulate  the 
special  kinds  of  work  involved.  The  minute  division  of 
labor  and  the  use  of  machinery,  it  is  true,  have  put  serious 
limitations  upon  the  educative  influence  of  many  factories, 
but  they  have  not  destroyed  this  influence.  As  in  the 
case  of  the  shoe  factory,  all  forms  of  industry  educate. 
In  the  home,  furthermore,  members  of  the  family  acquire 
purposes  and  means  of  control  selected  and  made  vital 
to  them  by  this  institution.  Children  are  led  to  appre- 


The  Educational  Process  321 

ciate  common  moral  ideals  and  to  understand  various 
kinds  of  domestic  activities.  They  learn  the  most  useful 
forms  of  speech.  The  home  provides,  in  many  cases,  the 
only  training  individuals  receive  for  the  responsibilities 
of  parenthood.  By  participating  in  activities  of  citizen- 
ship, men  acquire  purposes  and  ideas  in  the  field  of  govern- 
ment. In  the  church,  they  are  given  religious  ideals  and 
trained  to  carry  on  the  work  of  this  institution.  The 
school  develops  both  the  pupils  and  the  teachers. 

Ill 

The  function  of  the  school  is  to  supplement  the  educative  work 
of  the  other  institutions  where  they  fail  to  prepare  individuals  for 
effective  participation  in  social  life. 

The  school  differs  from  other  institutions  in  guiding 
individual  development,  because  education  is  the  essential 
function  of  the  school,  whereas  it  is  only  incidental  to  the 
work  of  other  institutions.  Factories  are  to  produce  cer- 
tain kinds  of  commodities;  the  home  is  to  nurture  chil- 
dren ;  the  state  is  to  secure  justice ;  the  church  is  to  pro- 
mote righteousness ;  but  the  school  is  to  educate.  For 
this  reason,  the  school,  under  normal  conditions,  educates 
better  than  other  institutions.  Patterns  that  constitute 
the  school  course  of  study  are  selected  to  develop  indi- 
viduals for  many  important  kinds  of  activity,  not  for  one 
particular  kind  as  in  the  case  of  a  shoe  factory,  in  which 
the  educational  influences  are  limited,  in  a  large  measure, 
to  the  making  of  shoes.  Pupils  are  advanced  in  the 
school  as  rapidly  as  their  development  justifies,  not  held 
back  because  higher  positions  are  occupied  by  others. 
The  school  constantly  influences  individuals  to  make 
progress,  whereas  other  institutions  often  leave  them  un- 
disturbed to  continue  the  same  kind  of  work  indefinitely. 


322  The  Principles  of  Education 

Instruction  in  the  school  is  systematic,  according  to  a 
more  or  less  definite  scientific  technique ;  in  other  institu- 
tions, it  consists  of  haphazard  explanations  and  demon- 
strations by  persons  who,  unaided  by  a  scientific  knowl- 
edge of  how  purposes  and  means  of  control  are  acquired, 
depend  for  guidance  in  teaching  upon  only  sympathetic 
insight  into  the  experience  of  the  individual  needing 
assistance. 

The  school  exists  just  because  the  other  institutions  fail 
to  give  the  education  required  for  effective  participation 
in  them.  In  primitive  times,  individuals  were  educated 
only  incidentally  through  imitation  and  active  partici- 
pation in  social  life.  The  school^was  unnecessary.  When 
advancing  civilization  greatly  increased  the  demands  upon 
the  individual,  this  incidental  education  became  inade- 
quate. The  school  was  then  developed  as  a  social  institu- 
tion to  meet  the  increasing  need  for  an  education  supple- 
mentary to  that  given  by  other  institutions.  Its  function 
is  to  do  what  they  leave  undone  in  preparing  the  indi- 
vidual for  his  place  in  the  social  order ;  or,  in  other  words, 
to  balance  the  equation  between  social  demands  upon  the 
individual  and  the  ability  which  the  individual  has  ac- 
quired incidentally  through  other  institutions  to  meet 
these  demands. 

A  few  examples  of  the  supplementary  character  of  school 
education  will  reveal  more  clearly  the  relation  between 
the  school  and  other  institutions.  The  lowest  grade  of 
school  work  is  planned  for  children  who  can  talk  and  who 
have  other  abilities  acquired  in  the  home.  At  one  time, 
the  industries  educated  individuals  for  special  trades  by 
means  of  the  apprenticeship  system;  but  when  this  ap- 
prenticeship system  was  abandoned,  the  responsibility 
of  industrial  training  fell,  in  a  large  measure,  upon  the 


The  Educational  Process  323 

school.  When  the  amount  of  knowledge  required  for 
efficient  conduct  of  the  home  greatly  increased  through 
the  application  of  science  to  household  arts,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  the  educative  influence  of  the  home  in  such 
matters  decreased,  the  school  was  called  upon  to  teach 
household  arts.  When  advanced  scientific  methods  were 
applied  to  agriculture,  and,  as  a  consequence,  life  on  the 
farm  no  longer  afforded  adequate  educational  oppor- 
tunities, the  study  of  agriculture  was  introduced  into 
schools. 

Several  institutions  have  called  upon  the  school  for 
assistance  in  moral  training.  The  impersonal  relations 
in  modern  life  have  removed  some  strong  sanctions  of 
good  conduct.  Formerly  one  man  worked  for  another 
with  whom  he  was  personally  acquainted  and  for  whom 
he  had  usually  a  friendly  feeling.  This  personal  rela- 
tionship gave  a  strong  sanction  to  honesty ;  for,  when  he 
looked  his  employer  in  the  eyes,  he  realized  vividly  that 
his  dishonest  gain  would  be  an  unjust  injury  to  his  em- 
ployer. But  when  a  man  worked  for  a  corporation  formed 
by  many  stockholders  whom  he  did  not  see,  and  when  he 
recognized  the  fact  that  the  stockholders  would  not  feel 
the  slight  injury  due  to  a  small  dishonest  gain  on  his  part, 
this  personal  sanction  was  greatly  weakened.  Close 
supervision,  time  clocks,  cash  registers,  specially  devised 
systems  of  accounting,  and  other  methods  have  been 
adopted  to  remedy  this  difficulty ;  but,  even  under  these 
improved  conditions,  many  persons  do  not  have  the 
equipment  of  ideals  necessary  to  make  them  do  right. 
As  relations  in  government  became  more  impersonal, 
because  the  authority  was  more  centralized  and  because 
the  population  had  increased,  moral  sanctions  due  to 
personal  relationship  were  weakened.  Changed  condi- 


324  The  Principles  of  Education 

tions  of  life  due  to  the  growth  of  large  cities  lessened  the 
moral  influence  of  the  home,  and  changed  religious  be- 
liefs weakened  temporarily  the  religious  sanctions  in  the 
experience  of  many  people.  Such  institutional  changes, 
together  with  the  development  of  higher  standards  of 
right  living,  have  given  emphasis  to  the  need  of  moral 
training  in  the  schools. 

IV 

In  the  wider  aim  of  education  as  social  efficiency,  we  find  the  re- 
conciliation of  various  traditional  one-sided  statements  of  the  aim 
of  education.  Some  of  these  are  that  education  should  lead  to 
ideals,  knowledge,  discipline,  culture,  individual  development, 
harmonious  development  of  all  the  powers  of  the  individual,  good 
citizenship,  and  ability  to  secure  the  material  necessities  of  life. 

When  educators  recognize  an  important  demand  which 
changes  in  institutional  life  at  some  particular  time  make 
upon  the  school,  the  satisfaction  of  this  demand  becomes 
for  the  time  being  an  aim  for  educational  endeavor. 
Although  this  aim  marks  the  change  needed  for  social 
efficiency  in  a  particular  situation,  it  may  assume  the 
importance  of  the  sole  aim  of  education.  In  this  way, 
various  traditional  statements  of  the  aim  of  education 
have  arisen.  As  Professor  Dewey  says : 

For  the  statement  of  aim  is  a  matter  of  emphasis  at  a  given  time. 
And  we  do  not  emphasize  things  which  do  not  require  emphasis  — 
that  is,  such  things  as  are  taking  care  of  themselves  fairly  well.  We 
tend  rather  to  frame  our  statement  on  the  basis  of  the  defects  and 
needs  of  the  contemporary  situation ;  we  take  for  granted,  without 
explicit  statement  which  would  be  of  no  use,  whatever  is  right  or 
approximately  so.  We  frame  our  explicit  aims  in  terms  of  some 
alteration  to  be  brought  about.  It  is,  then,  no  paradox  requiring 
explanation  that  a  given  epoch  or  generation  tends  to  emphasize  in 
its  conscious  projections  just  the  things  which  it  has  least  of  in  actual 


The  Educational  Process  325 

fact.  A  time  of  domination  by  authority  will  call  out  as  response 
the  desirability  of  great  individual  freedom ;  one  of  disorganized 
individual  activities  the  need  of  social  control  as  an  educational 
aim.1 

Some  of  the  various  traditional  statements  of  the  aim 
of  education  are  that  it  should  lead  to  ideals,  knowledge, 
discipline,  culture,  individual  development,  harmonious 
development  of  all  the  powers  of  the  individual,  good 
citizenship,  and  ability  to  secure  the  material  necessities 
of  life.  Because  each  such  aim  calls  attention  to  some 
needed  change  in  a  particular  social  situation  and  not  to 
the  complete  function  of  education,  it  becomes  inade- 
quate and  misleading  when  new  social  situations  arise 
calling  for  new  modifications  in  the  work  of  the  school. 
As  partial  aims  of  education,  they  are  included  in  the 
wider  aim,  giving  to  it  a  richer  meaning  and  finding  in  it 
their  own  reconciliation.  A  review  of  several  of  these 
aims  will  reveal  these  truths  more  clearly. 

In  early  Athens,  the  chief  aim  of  education  in  the 
school  was  to  develop  patriotic  and  religious  ideals,  to 
make  the  young  "  love  the  things  that  ought  to  be  loved 
and  hate  the  things  that  ought  to  be  hated."  The  main 
social  obligations  of  free  men  were  domestic,  religious, 
civic,  and  military.  Industrial  work  was  turned  over 
largely  to  slaves.  Youths  learned  how  to  meet  these 
obligations  by  participation  in  social  life  other  than  that 
of  the  school.  Civic  practices,  for  example,  were  learned 
by  visiting  law  courts  and  public  meetings ;  military 
technique  was  acquired  by  service  in  the  army.  This 
institutional  training  made  them  familiar  with  how  to  do 
the  things  demanded  by  social  life,  but  it  did  not  develop 
in  them  the  ideals  necessary  to  insure  the  doing  of  these 

1  Dewey,  John,  Democracy  and  Education,  p.  130. 


326  The  Principles  of  Education 

things.  Social  efficiency,  as  we  have  learned,  requires 
more  than  a  mere  knowledge  of  means  of  control  that 
serve  social  ends,  it  requires  also  ideals  that  lead  men  to 
seek  these  ends.  When  the  school  in  early  Athens  was 
called  upon  to  supplement  the  training  given  by  the  other 
institutions,  its  chief  work  became,  therefore,  to  instill 
patriotic  and  religious  ideals  into  the  minds  of  the  young. 
For  this  reason,  literature  and  music  were  the  main  sub- 
jects taught  in  the  didascaleum.  This  educational  aim 
would  be  very  inadequate  for  the  school  in  modern  times, 
when  the  activities  of  the  industrial,  political,  and  other 
forms  of  social  institutions  have  become  so  very  complex 
that  these  institutions,  so  far  as  their  educative  influence 
is  concerned,  fail  not  only  to  develop  the  ideals  which  they 
serve,  but  also  to  give  control  of  the  methods  used  in 
attaining  these  ideals. 

At  a  later  period  in  Athenian  education,  knowledge  was 
emphasized  in  school  practice  as  the  chief  aim  of  educa- 
tion. Human  welfare  demanded  the  reorganization  of 
social  life.  Institutions  were  degenerating;  society  was 
disintegrating;  individualism  was  rife.  Regulation  de- 
vised by  reason  was  needed  to  save  men  from  the  injurious 
results  of  individual  caprice.  Systems  of  philosophy, 
therefore,  arose  to  answer  the  question,  How  should  a 
man  live  in  order  to  get  the  most  out  of  life?  The  insti- 
tutions of  the  time  could  not  give  such  guidance;  they 
had  failed  for  the  very  lack  of  ijt.  The  teaching  of  ideas 
that  should  regulate  life  was  turned  over,  therefore,  to 
the  school  as  supplementary  to  other  institutions.  The 
government  required  young  men  of  the  ephebic  corps  to 
study  in  the  University  of  Athens,  where  knowledge  was 
stressed.  It  is  true  that  the  reorganization  of  institutions 
in  accordance  with  this  new  knowledge  was  not  realized 


The  Educational  Process  327 

until  the  day  of  Roman  supremacy,  but  the  first  step 
from  the  injurious  results  of  individualism  to  a  new  social 
order  was  the  development  and  dissemination  of  knowl- 
edge universally  true  to  take  the  place  of  conflicting 
opinions.  This  is  what  Socrates,  Plato,  and  other  philoso- 
phers sought.  Social  welfare  demanded  it.  After  these 
general  truths  had  guided  in  the  reorganization  of  institu- 
tions, it  became  the  duty  of  the  school  to  assist  in  pre- 
paring men  to  meet  new  social  demands  which  could  not 
be  satisfied  by  mere  abstract  ideas.  When  this  was 
recognized,  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  for  its  own  sake  as 
the  chief  aim  of  the  school  was  stigmatized  as  unpractical. 
When  the  chief  emphasis  is  given  to  the  regulative 
influence  of  social  authority,  the  aim  of  education  appears 
as  discipline.  All  education  is  disciplinary,  because,  by 
the  use  of  social  patterns,  it  regulates  the  development  of 
the  individual  in  the  interest  of  social  demands.  Dis- 
cipline is  emphasized  as  an  aim  of  education  when  tradi- 
tion prolongs  educational  practices  which  social  changes 
have  made  less  useful,  as  in  the  case  of  the  requiring  of 
Latin  after  a  wealth  of  literature  and  science  had  been 
written  in  the  vernacular.  As  new  conditions  cause 
individuals  to  chafe  under  antiquated  regulation,  the 
disciplinary  character  of  this  regulation  becomes  con- 
spicuous. When,  for  example,  social  changes  made  in- 
dividuals dissatisfied  with  a  strongly  ascetic  training,  the 
fault  was  attributed  to  individual  nature,  and  discipline 
became  an  educational  aim.  It  was  believed  that  the  child 
had  the  "  old  Adam  "  in  him  and  that  his  evil  nature 
could  be  changed  into  good  only  through  discipline. 
After  scholasticism  had  gone  to  seed,  the  fault  of  being 
illogical  was  attributed  to  the  individual  and  the  need  of 
logical  discipline  emphasized.  More  recent  instances 


328  The  Principles  of  Education 

may  be  found  in  the  undue  emphasis  sometimes  given  to 
the  formal  study  of  language  and  mathematics.  If  the  aim 
of  education  is  restricted  to  discipline,  social  progress  is 
checked,  because  the  individual  is  subjected  to  an  estab- 
lished order  continued  by  force  of  tradition. 

In  education  organized  for  a  leisure  class,  culture  ap- 
peared to  be  the  aim.  All  education  is  cultural  in  the 
sense  that  it  enriches  the  nature  of  the  individual  by 
transferring  to  him  a  social  inheritance.  As  an  his- 
torical aim  of  education,  the  meaning  of  the  term  culture 
has  been  narrowed,  however,  so  that  it  includes  only 
those  refinements  which  are  not  necessary  for  the  work- 
a-day  world,  but  which  distinguish  a  leisure  class  regarded 
as  superior  to  the  common  man.  When  the  term  culture 
is  used  properly  to  mean  that  which  is  added  to  the 
original  nature  of  the  individual,  it  is  too  indefinite  to  be 
useful  as  the  aim  of  education.  Since  an  individual  can- 
not acquire  all  the  cultural  experience  of  the  race,  a 
useful  aim  must  mark  some  forms  of  development  as  pref- 
erable to  others.  In  realizing  this  more  definite  aim,  the 
most  valuable  culture  just  as  the  most  valuable  dis- 
cipline is  gained  as  a  by-product.  Culture  in  the  narrow 
conventional  sense  tends  to  dissociate  knowledge  and 
appreciation  from  everyday  practical  activities,  a  con- 
dition in  which  true  meanings  and  values  decay.1 

When  new  conditions  make  it  evident  that  antiquated 
social  regulations  held  over  from  earlier  times  as  mere 
tradition  are  interfering  with  human  welfare,  individual 
development  is  stressed  as  the  aim  of  education.  When  a 
change  from  customary  practices  is  demanded,  the  re- 
sponsibility for  making  this  change  falls  naturally  to  the 
rationalized  work  of  the  school.  A  conspicuous  example 

1  See  p.  145. 


The  Educational  Process  329 

of  this  aim  is  found  in  Rousseau's  £mile.  Because  some 
antiquated  social  regulation  was  injurious,  Rousseau 
assumed  that  all  social  regulation  was  injurious.  This 
compelled  him  to  seek  educational  guidance  in  the  nature 
of  the  individual  alone.  Individual  development  as  the 
aim  of  education  was  valuable  in  the  peculiar  conditions 
under  which  it  arose,  for  it  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  man  is  greater  than  institutions,  that  institutions 
should  be  in  the  service  of  human  development,  and  that 
education  should  conform  to,  rather  than  be  imposed 
upon,  the  nature  of  the  individual.  When  society  is  not 
on  the  verge  of  revolution,  individual  development  is, 
however,  an  inadequate  aim,  because  it  furnishes  no 
criterion  for  selecting  the  best  lines  of  development. 
There  must  be  such  selection,  because  the  kinds  of  char- 
acter that  the  child  may  build  vary  greatly  in  value.  Indi- 
vidual tendencies,  which  appear  in  the  form  of  interests, 
are  very  unreliable  guides  in  this  matter;  a  person  may 
be  interested  in  doing  evil  as  well  as  in  doing  good.  The 
fact  that  activities  which  best  develop  the  individual 
must  be  interesting  to  him  does  not  mean  that  all  acts 
which  interest  him  promote  his  best  development.  Seek- 
ing educational  guidance  in  the  individual  nature  alone 
may  mean  indulging  the  child  upon  his  own  level  without 
directing  him  to  that  which  is  more  worth  while. 

The  theory  of  individual  development  advocated  by 
Rousseau  was  mainly  negative;  it  condemned  arbitrary 
and  injurious  social  regulation.  When  later  thinkers 
attempted  to  construct  an  educational  theory  based  upon 
the  nature  of  the  individual,  they  stated  the  aim  of  edu- 
cation as  the  harmonious  development  of  all  the  powers  of  the 
individual.  Opposed  to  traditional  restrictions,  they  be- 
lieved that  education  was  for  the  sake  of  humanity, 


330  The  Principles  of  Education 

which  was  supposed  to  be  revealed  in  the  nature  of  each 
individual.  Although  individual  interests  differed,  all 
men  appeared  to  have  in  common  certain  powers,  or 
faculties,  such  as  sense  perception,  memory,  imagination, 
and  reasoning.  Assuming  that  these  general  faculties 
could  be  developed  by  limited  specific  forms  of  exercise, 
they  were  enabled  by  this  false  doctrine  of  formal  dis- 
cipline to  make  a  plausible  constructive  theory.  Although , 
so  far  as  the  science  of  psychology  is  concerned,  the 
"faculty  psychology,"  which  this  doctrine  assumes,  is 
now  a  matter  of  the  past,  it  still  has  a  strong  hold  upon 
the  popular  mind.  One  can  easily  be  misled  by  analogy 
to  imagine  that  general  powers  of  the  mind,  like  the 
muscles  of  the  body,  can  be  strengthened  through  specific 
exercise,  especially  since  the  forgetting  of  the  details  of 
the  subject  matter  studied  does  not  seem  to  impair  the 
mental  ability  gained  through  study.  The  most  serious 
weakness  of  this  analogy  is  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  not 
composed  of  "general  faculties."  Such  general  faculties 
exist  only  as  abstract  ideas  derived  from  the  kinds  of  work 
for  the  performance  of  which  the  specific  abilities  of  the 
mind  may  be  organized ;  they  are  not  realities  in  the  make- 
up of  the  mind.  As  Professor  Dewey  says  with  regard  to 
the  definition  we  are  considering  of  the  aim  of  education : 

If  this  definition  be  taken  independently  of  social  relationship  we 
have  no  way  of  telling  what  is  meant  by  any  one  of  the  terms  em- 
ployed. We  do  not  know  what  power  is ;  we  do  not  know  what  de- 
velopment is ;  we  do  not  know  what  harmony  is.  A  power  is  a  power 
only  with  reference  to  the  use  to  which  it  is  put,  the  function  it  has 

to  serve We  need  to  know  the  social  situations  in  which  the 

individual  will  have  to  use  ability  to  observe,  recollect,  imagine,  and 
reason,  in  order  to  have  any  way  of  telling  what  a  training  of  mental 
powers  actually  means.1 

1  Dewey,  John,  Moral  Principles  in  Education,  pp.  12-13. 


The  Educational  Process  331 

Since  the  powers  of  the  individual  are  manifold  and  specific 
rather  than  few  and  general,  and  since  the  nature  of  these 
powers  is  revealed  only  in  what  they  lead  to  in  social  life, 
this  aim,  which  centers  attention  upon  the  individual,  was 
useful  in  educational  reconstruction  only  under  peculiar 
social  conditions  in  which  individual  nature  was  neglected. 
With  the  growth  of  democratic  government  in  modern 
times,  the  need  of  loyalty  of  the  individual  to  the  state, 
intelligence  in  voting  upon  political  issues,  and  efficiency 
in  political  office,  caused  good  citizenship  to  be  stressed  as 
the  aim  of  education.  Thomas  Jefferson  wrote  to  George 
Washington :  "  It  is  an  axiom  in  my  mind  that  our  lib- 
erty can  never  be  safe  but  in  the  hands  of  the  people  them- 
selves, and  that,  too,  of  the  people  with  a  certain  degree 
of  instruction.  This  is  the  business  of  the  state  to  effect 
and  on  a  general  plan."  Later  George  Washington  him- 
self sanctioned  this  idea  in  a  message  to  Congress  when 
he  said  :  "  Knowledge  is  in  every  country  the  surest  basis 
of  public  happiness.  In  one  in  which  the  measures  of 
government  receive  their  impression  so  immediately  as  in 
ours  from  the  sense  of  the  community,  it  is  proportion- 
ately essential."  These  statements  were  made  in  the  day 
of  the  pioneer,  when  most  forms  of  institutional  life  were 
comparatively  simple.  The  more  intricate  problems  of 
government  made  it  a  matter  of  serious  importance  that 
the  people  upon  whom  final  judgment  in  political  affairs 
rested  should  have  a  better  preparation  than  that  which 
came  more  or  less  incidentally  from  mere  participation  in 
social  life.  It  became  the  duty  of  the  school,  therefore, 
to  prepare  for  citizenship.  However,  as  institutions  other 
than  the  state  grew  more  complex  and  needed  the  aid  of 
the  school  to  prepare  for  them,  good  citizenship  became 
too  narrow  for  the  aim  of  education. 


332  The  Principles  of  Education 

The  skill  required  for  success  in  the  modern  industrial 
life  has  placed  so  much  emphasis  upon  the  need  of  prepara- 
tion for  making  a  living  that  many  persons  have  been  led 
to  regard  economic  efficiency  as  the  chief  aim  of  educa- 
tion. Thus  we  have  what  is  called  the  bread  and  butter 
aim.  It  is  true  that  the  social  needs  developed  by  the 
new  industrialism  put  important  obligations  upon  the 
school,  since  the  individual  can  no  longer  acquire  the  neces- 
sary training  by  mere  participation  in  industrial  activi- 
ties. The  fact  that  the  bread  and  butter  aim  is  only  a 
temporary  recognition  of  important  social  changes  be- 
comes evident  as  soon  as  attention  is  called  to  the  de- 
mands which  institutions  other  than  the  industries  are 
making  upon  the  school. 

There  is  a  tendency  to  enlarge  the  meaning  of  the  one- 
sided aims  when  changing  social  conditions  reveal  their 
inadequacy.  The  aim  of  citizenship,  for  example,  has 
been  conceived  by  some  to  include  preparation  for  life 
in  all  institutions.  Since  citizenship  has  specific  refer- 
ence to  the  state  as  a  political  organization,  the  use  of  the 
term  with  this  larger  meaning  is  liable  to  be  misleading 
by  calling  attention  to  the  needs  of  one  institution  more 
than  to  the  needs  of  others.  If  knowledge,  morality, 
personal  development,  economic  efficiency,  or  any  other 
aim  is  meant  to  include  efficiency  in  all  institutional 
activities,  i.e.  social  efficiency  in  the  widest  sense,  no 
fault  can  be  found  with  the  aim,  but  it  should  be  expressed 
in  terms  that  ordinarily  stand  for  just  what  is  meant  and 
are  not  likely  to  mislead  by  stressing  one  part  of  the 
meaning  and  vaguely  implying  the  rest. 


The  Educational  Process  333 


V 

The  growing  complexity  of  institutional  life,  which  requires  the 
school  to  supplement  the  educational  work  of  all  other  institutions, 
and  also  the  scientific  study  of  education  have,  in  recent  times, 
emphasized  social  efficiency  as  the  aim  of  education. 

The  rapidly  increasing  complexity  of  institutions  and 
the  scientific  study  of  education  have,  in  recent  times, 
emphasized  social  efficiency  as  the  aim  of  education. 
The  marvelous  advance  in  manufacturing  and  commerce 
through  the  use  of  scientific  methods  places  increasingly 
difficult  demands  upon  individual  workers.  The  increas- 
ing scope  of  religious  activities  and  the  higher  standards 
of  home  life  have  a  similar  result.  Democratic  govern- 
ment places  ever  greater  responsibilities  upon  the  indi- 
vidual citizens  as  the  corporate  interests  of  cities  grow  in 
complexity,  as  economic,  moral,  sanitary,  and  other  forms 
of  governmental  regulation  become  more  intricate,  and 
as  international  relations  become  more  far-reaching  and 
complicated.  All  institutions  must  now  appeal  to  the 
school  for  aid,  because  efficient  participation  in  them 
requires  much  greater  training  than  their  educational 
influence  can  provide.  This  condition  has  led  men  to 
recognize  the  aim  of  education  as  efficiency  in  all  forms 
of  institutional  life.  The  growing  responsibilities  of  the 
school  have,  moreover,  led  educators  to  seek  the  aid  of 
science  in  solving  their  problems.  The  scientific  study  of 
human  nature  points  conclusively  to  social  efficiency  as  the 
aim  of  education.  This  fact  will  be  explained  later.1 

1  See  pp.  345-346. 


334  The  Principles  of  Education 

VI 

t  Social  efficiency  as  the  aim  of  education  neither  interferes  with 
social  growth  by  fixing  present  practices  nor  dwarfs  individual 
personality  by  social  regulation. 

If  the  aim  of  the  school  is  to  prepare  individuals  to 
meet  the  social  demands,  does  not  the  school  tend  to  fix 
present  practices  and  thus  interfere  with  social  growth? 
On  the  contrary,  it  promotes  social  development. 
Through  history  and  the  fine  arts,  it  shows  the  intrinsic 
values  of  practices  and  thus  dispels  the  fog  of  formal 
tradition,  which  is  most  potent  in  keeping  civilization 
on  a  dead  level.  An  understanding  of  the  purpose  of  a 
practice  gives  the  only  possible  criterion  for  improving  it ; 
one  means  is  better  than  another  only  because  it  realizes 
the  purpose  more  effectively.  Also  by  training  individ- 
uals in  the  latest  scientific  means  of  control,  the  school 
gives  the  best  possible  preparation  for  finding  still  more 
effective  methods.  Social  life  demands  not  merely  the 
acquiring  of  purposes  and  means  of  control  already  de- 
fined by  social  patterns;  it  demands  also  progress  in 
developing  new  purposes  and  new  methods.  The  school 
gives  the  basis  from  which  this  advance  is  made,  and  also 
the  methods  whereby  improvement  may  be  attained. 
Historians  and  artists,  scientists  and  inventors,  workers 
in  every  field  who  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  insti- 
tutions, are  prepared  by  education  to  do  their  work. 

Does  not  social  efficiency  as  the  aim  of  education 
require  that  individual  personality  be  dwarfed  by  social 
regulation?  On  the  contrary,  this  aim  promotes  the  de- 
velopment of  individual  personality.  The  advance  of 
civilization  means  larger  opportunities  for  personal  devel- 
opment. The  highest  efficiency  requires  not  a  mere  com- 


The  Educational  Process  335 

pliance  with  the  formal  demands  of  group  life,  but  an 
appreciation  and  intelligent  cooperation  with  others  in 
realizing  values  which  each  individual  feels  to  be  worth 
while  as  a  better  condition  of  the  self,  and  which  he  seeks 
not  in  compliance  with  an  external  social  command,  but 
in  willing  submission  to  his  own  inner  appreciations  of 
worth.  He  finds  the  highest  authority  for  social  demands 
not  without,  but  within  himself.  As  Mackenzie  says 
regarding  education,  in  discussing  one  of  its  important 
services :  "  It  is  designed  to  suggest  the  relations  of  par- 
ticular employments,  not  merely  to  the  whole  with  which 
they  are  immediately  connected,  but  to  the  system  of  life 
whose  ends  all  particular  employments  subserve.  It  is 
intended,  in  short,  to  stimulate  that  intelligent  appre- 
ciation of  purposes  which  makes  almost  the  meanest 
employment  interesting,  and  thus  at  the  same  time  to 
incite  that  spirit  of  service  which  makes  almost  the 
humblest  action  '  fine.'  "l  In  realizing  his  purposes,  the 
individual  would  be  helpless  without  social  guidance  in 
control.  Social  efficiency  prepares  the  individual,  fur- 
thermore, for  originality  in  development,  because  it  pre- 
pares him  to  assist  in  social  advance  and  to  adapt  himself 
to  changing  conditions  of  life. 

VII 

The  school  cannot  through  education  remake  institutions  in 
accordance  with  Home  ideal  of  a  perfect  society,  hut  is  limited  in 
ita  teachings  to  the  highest  social  development  of  the  time. 

Does  not  the  purpose  of  education  as  defined  limit 
the  school  to  preparing  individuals  for  participation  in 
an  imperfect  society,  whereas  the  school  should  use  its 

1  Mackenzie,  J.  S.,  An  Introduction  to  Social  Philosophy,  p.  418. 


336  The  Principles  of  Education 

educative  influence  to  remake  social  institutions  in  ac- 
cordance with  some  ideal  of  a  perfect  society?  Perfection 
cannot  be  attained  in  a  day ;  the  improving  of  institutions 
is  a  slow  and  never  ending  process.  History,  the  fine 
arts,  philosophy,  ethics,  economics,  jurisprudence,  politi- 
cal science,  sociology,  together  with  the  physical  and 
biological  sciences,  are  at  work  in  each  institution  con- 
tributing towards  its  improvement.  The  school  is  limited 
to  transmitting  purposes  and  means  of  control  that  have 
already  been  developed,  tried,  and  found  valuable;  it 
cannot  go  beyond  the  best  social  conditions  of  the  time, 
however  imperfect  they  may  be.  Guiding  individuals 
to  the  best  that  has  been  attained,  it  prepares  them  to 
contribute  to  social  progress  by  taking  steps  in  advance, 
but  the  school  itself  does  not  make  directly  these  con- 
tributions. The  socialized  individual  in  whose  develop- 
ment the  school  was  a  factor,  and  not  the  school,  is  respon- 
sible for  creating  those  higher  purposes  and  more  effective 
means  of  control  that  mark  the  pathway  towards  the 
millennium.  If  this  is  done  by  men  connected  with  the 
school,  it  is  done  not  in  the  process  of  educating,  but  in 
research  and  artistic  creation. 


VIII 

The  educative  work  of  all  institutions  should  be  rationalized. 
In  rationalizing  the  work  of  the  school,  the  most  important  prob- 
lems are  those  of  selecting  and  organizing  the  curriculum  and  of 
finding  the  methods  of  teaching.  These  two  problems  are  closely 
related,  one  emphasizing  the  content  of  the  subject  matter  and 
the  other  emphasizing  the  form  in  which  this  content  is  presented. 

Having  found  the  aim  of  education,  let  us  now  consider 
the  means  for  realizing  this  aim.  That  the  purpose  of 
education  is  to  increase  efficiency  is  patent  in  institutions 


The  Educational  Process  337 

other  than  the  school ;  but,  since  education  here  is  only 
incidental,  the  means  for  realizing  this  aim  are  usually 
not  rationalized  with  a  view  to  making  them  as  effective 
as  possible.  Little  provision  is  made  to  vitalize  the 
activities  of  the  worker  by  developing  in  him  strong 
appreciation  of  the  intrinsic  social  value  of  what  he  does ; 
the  practical  difficulties  he  meets,  and,  consequently,  the 
truths  he  acquires  in  overcoming  them,  appear  in  acci- 
dental order  rather  than  in  an  order  that  would  enable 
him  to  acquire  this  knowledge  most  economically;  the 
assistance  of  others  in  teaching  him  is  seldom  guided  by 
an  adequate  understanding  of  the  process  through  which 
individuals  acquire  means  of  control. 

So  far  as  an  institution  must  educate  for  the  sake  of 
attaining  its  essential  purpose,  this  education,  just  as 
truly  as  any  other  means  used  for  attaining  the  purpose  of 
the  institution,  should  be  rationalized  in  order  to  make  it 
as  effective  as  possible.  This  is  true  with  regard  to  all 
institutions,  —  the  home,  the  industries,  the  state,  and 
the  church,  as  well  as  the  school.  The  educational  work 
done  by  the  other  institutions  is  no  less  important,  so  far 
as  it  goes,  than  the  educational  work  of  the  school,  and 
should,  therefore,  be  done  intelligently.  Numerous  in- 
stances of  the  recognition  of  this  truth  may  be  found. 
Some  of  the  larger  factories  and  department  stores  employ 
persons  whose  duty  it  is  to  improve  the  abilities  of  the 
employees;  magazines  for  mothers  have  departments  of 
education  as  well  as  of  household  arts ;  the  church  has  long 
made  use  of  the  Sunday  school. 

Since  the  main  purpose  of  the  school  is  to  educate,  its 
activities  have  been  rationally  organized,  to  a  greater  or 
less  degree,  with  a  view  to  this  purpose.  This  rational 
organization  is  true  especially  of  the  formal  work  of  the 


338  The  Principles  of  Education 

classroom.  The  educational  possibilities  of  many  other 
activities  of  the  school  have  been  comparatively  neg- 
lected. Discipline,  sanitary  regulations,  games  for  recre- 
ation, athletics,  dramatics,  social  meetings,  the  reading  of 
library  books  for  the  enjoyment  of  leisure  time,  entertain- 
ments, celebrations,  activities  of  literary,  musical,  and 
handicraft  clubs,  —  indeed,  all  activities  of  the  school 
should  be  capitalized  for  education,  if  the  school  is  to 
realize  to  the  fullest  extent  the  purpose  which  called  it 
into  being.  When  the  possible  educational  influence  of 
activities  not  included  in  the  formal  work  of  the  class- 
room is  recognized,  the  wider  service  which  the  school 
can  render  not  only  to  the  pupils  enrolled  but  also  to  the 
community  in  general  becomes  at  once  apparent. 

Since  the  aim  of  the  school  is  to  supplement  the  educa- 
tional influence  of  the  other  institutions  in  making  the 
individual  socially  efficient,  the  first  problem  that  appears 
logically  in  realizing  this  aim  is  to  find  what  purposes  and 
means  of  control  should  be  given  by  the  school.  A  study 
of  the  social  conditions  of  the  time  is  the  first  step  in 
answering  this  problem.  Sparta,  endangered  by  slaves 
within  and  foes  without,  required  that  the  youths  receive 
special  training  to  develop  in  them  ideals  of  patriotism 
and  skill  in  warfare.  When  in  the  Roman  state  the 
welfare  of  society  demanded  a  class  of  individuals  wise  in 
leadership  and  strong  in  persuasion,  schools  of  grammar 
and  rhetoric  were  provided  to  meet  this  need.  In  the 
early  Benedictine  monasteries,  where  social  regulation 
required  that  men  read  and  study  the  Scriptures,  and 
participate  in  religious  worship,  which  included  among 
other  things  singing  and  observing  holy  days,  it  was 
necessary  for  the  school  to  teach  reading,  writing,  the 
Scriptures,  music,  and  enough  astronomy  and  mathe- 


The  Educational  Process  339 

matics  to  determine  the  calendar.  In  the  age  of  chivalry, 
social  life  demanded  that  knights  serve  lord,  lady,  and 
church,  and  have  some  innocent  employment  for  leisure 
hours.  The  character  of  the  special  training,  which  in- 
cluded such  activities  as  serving  tables,  jousting,  and 
playing  chess,  was  determined  by  these  demands.  At  the 
time  of  the  Protestant  Reformation,  the  school  was  given 
the  responsibility  of  training  youths  in  religion  together 
with  reading  and  writing  as  necessary  accompaniments 
of  this.  In  the  modern  democratic  and  industrial  age, 
all  forms  of  institutional  life  require  supplementary  aid 
from  the  school. 

The  selection  of  the  purposes  and  the  means  of  control 
which  the  school  undertakes  to  develop  has  been  guided, 
for  the  most  part,  by  mere  rule  of  thumb.  Under  simpler 
social  conditions,  this  method  sufficed,  but  now  that  the 
demands  of  institutional  life  have  become  very  intricate 
and  subtle,  the  school  cannot  meet  its  obligations  with- 
out a  thoroughly  rationalized  investigation  of  the  respon- 
sibilities which  social  welfare  places  upon  it. 

The  purposes  and  means  of  control  which  society  leaves 
to  the  school  to  develop  constitute  the  curriculum  when 
they  are  organized  with  reference  to  the  various  kinds  of 
potential  abilities  and  various  degrees  of  immaturity  of 
those  to  be  educated.  The  highest  efficiency  requires 
specialization  in  addition  to  certain  abilities  which  all 
must  acquire  in  common.  Because  of  the  highly  devel- 
oped division  of  labor  in  social  life,  groups  of  individuals 
must  be  trained  in  special  lines  of  activity  for  which  they 
are  best  fitted.  It  would  be  wasteful  of  human  energy, 
moreover,  to  attempt  to  develop  in  the  individual  ad- 
vanced purposes  and  means  of  control  in  those  years  of 
his  life  when,  on  account  of  his  immaturity,  he  could 


340  The  Principles  of  Education 

acquire  them  only  with  great  difficulty,  if  at  all.  During 
this  period  of  infancy,  the  child  must  be  dependent  upon 
others  for  protection  and  support  where  he  is  deficient  in 
meeting  social  demands. 

The  purposes  and  means  of  control  included  in  the 
curriculum  are  objective  and  tangible  only  when  they  are 
embodied  in  some  material  form  such  as  physical  activi- 
ties, science,  literature,  and  history.  These  forms,  as  we 
have  learned,  are  patterns  which  guide  individuals  to  new 
knowledge  and  new  appreciation.  Many  of  them  are 
fashioned,  however,  to  guide  only  highly  developed  indi- 
viduals. The  sciences  are  logically  organized  and  the 
fine  arts  are  often  based  upon  values  which  are  not  appre- 
ciated by  the  immature  individual.  Both  may  be  un- 
suited  for  these  reasons  to  guide  directly  the  development 
of  the  immature  pupil.  Their  use  is  to  mark  the  pur- 
poses and  means  of  control  which  the  individual  should 
have  after  he  has  been  subjected  to  the  guidance  of  the 
school ;  they  show  the  possibilities  of  individual  develop- 
ment. Just  as  mature  plants  reveal  the  value  and  sig- 
nificance of  the  seeds  from  which  they  developed,  so  the 
purposes  and  means  of  control  selected  for  the  curriculum 
reveal  the  value  and  significance  of  various  tendencies  of 
the  immature  individual,  since  these  tendencies  may  in 
time  develop  into  them. 

Since  the  curriculum  is  selected  primarily  with  ref- 
erence to  the  kinds  of  purposes  and  means  of  control 
required  to  meet  social  demands  rather  than  with  refer- 
ence to  the  forms  in  which  these  appear  as  patterns  for 
guiding  directly  the  development  of  the  individual,  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  selecting  the  curriculum  does 
not  meet  all  difficulties  which  the  school  must  overcome 
in  realizing  the  aim  of  education.  As  soon  as  the  course 


The  Educational  Process  341 

of  study  has  been  selected,  there  appears  the  problem  of 
translating  it  into  forms  suited  to  guide  the  varied  and 
immature  experience  of  the  pupils.  The  more  immature 
the  pupils  are,  the  more  prominent  is  this  problem.  It 
may  be  decided  that  the  highest  social  efficiency  requires 
an  appreciation  of  the  value  of  following  the  Lord  as 
represented  by  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm.  This  psalm,  as 
we  have  found,1  is  a  pattern  for  guiding  individuals  to  ac- 
quire an  appreciation  of  this  value.  It  was  written,  how- 
ever, to  guide  mature  people  who  lived  a  pastoral  life,  who 
developed  under  conditions  quite  different  from  those  of 
modern  times.  It  presupposes  appreciations  which  they 
had,  but  which  a  child  under  conditions  of  modern  life 
does  not  have.  Before  he  can  profit  by  this  literary 
pattern,  he  must  not  merely  understand  the  meaning  of 
the  words,  but  must  feel  an  appreciation  for  the  good 
shepherd,  green  pastures,  still  waters,  and  other  values 
which  the  poem  is  intended  to  call  to  mind.  An  appre- 
ciation of  these  values  must  be  developed  out  of  apprecia- 
tions he  already  has  before  the  poem  can  even  begin  to 
guide  his  experience.  In  science,  the  laws  of  sound,  heat, 
and  light  are  stated  in  logical  form  suited  to  the  mature 
mind ;  they  are  meaningless  to  the  pupil  until  on  the 
basis  of  his  fund  of  acquired  experience  he  has  been  guided 
to  a  knowledge  of  aerial,  molecular,  and  ethereal  vibra- 
tions, and  of  other  things  an  understanding  of  which  the 
logical  statement  of  these  laws  presupposes.  This  prob- 
lem is  made  all  the  more  difficult  by  the  fact  that  pupils, 
even  those  of  the  same  age  and  opportunities,  vary  greatly 
in  the  basis  of  experience  which  must  be  developed  so 
that  the  patterns  selected  in  the  course  of  study  can  be 
effective.  This  difficulty  makes  necessary  the  teacher,  who 
i  See  pp.  219-221. 


342  The  Principles  of  Education 

not  only  must  have  the  experience  represented  by  the 
curriculum,  but  also  must  know  the  methods  of  teaching  in 
order  to  guide  the  pupil  to  acquire  this  experience.  These 
methods  rest  upon  laws,  or  principles,  in  accordance  with 
which  the  individual  acquires  new  purposes  and  new 
means  of  control.  Only  by  conforming  to  these  laws  can 
the  teacher  guide  the  pupil  to  realize  in  his  experience  the 
purposes  and  means  of  control  which  the  curriculum  has 
marked  as  essential  to  social  efficiency. 

While  the  complex  problem  of  the  school  may  be  simplified 
by  dividing  it  into  the  two  problems  of  what  should  be  in- 
cluded in  the  curriculum  and  what  methods  should  be 
used  in  teaching,  the  curriculum  and  the  methods  should  not 
be  considered  as  separate  in  reality.  They  are  two  aspects 
of  the  same  thing.  In  the  one  case  the  content  of  the  sub- 
ject matter  is  emphasized  and  in  the  other  the  form  in 
which  this  content  is  presented  is  emphasized.  The  cur- 
riculum is  always  embodied  in  the  form  of  social  patterns 
for  purposes  and  means  of  control,  and  the  methods  of 
teaching  are  always  concerned  with  developing  these  pur- 
poses and  means  of  control.  As  Professor  Dewey  says : 

The  idea  that  mind  and  the  world  of  things  and  persons  are  two 
separate  and  independent  realms  .  .  .  carries  with  it  the  conclusion  that 
method  and  subject  matter  of  instruction  are  separate  affairs.  Subject 
matter  then  becomes  a  ready-made  systematized  classification  of  the 
facts  and  principles  of  the  world  of  nature  and  man.  Method  then  has 
for  its  province  a  consideration  of  the  ways  in  which  this  antecedent 
subject  matter  may  be  best  presented  to  and  impressed  upon  the 
mind;  or,  a  consideration  of  the  ways  in  which  the  mind  may  be 
externally  brought  to  bear  upon  the  matter  so  as  to  facilitate  its 
acquisition  and  possession.  .  .  .  Method  means  that  arrangement 
of  subject  matter  which  makes  it  most  effective  in  use.  Never  is 
method  something  outside  of  the  material.1 

1  Dewey,  John,  Democracy  and  Education,  pp.  193-194. 


The  Educational  Process  343 


IX 

The  problems  of  the  school  must  ever  be  solved  anew ;  for,  if  the 
school  is  not  plastic  to  change,  its  practices  eventually  lose  connec- 
tion with  the  ever  changing  social  order,  upon  which  their  sig- 
nificance and  value  depend. 

The  problems  of  the  school  must  ever  be  solved  anew  ; 
for  the  school  must  keep  pace  with  social  development. 
(1)  When  other  institutions  develop  so  as  to  require 
further  preparation  on  the  part  of  the  individuals  who 
participate  in  them,  but  do  not  increase  in  educational 
influence,  the  obligations  of  the  school  are  enlarged. 
New  lines  of  specialization  in  the  work  of  all  institutions 
illustrate  this  fact.  (2)  Changes  in  the  educational  work 
of  other  institutions  modify  the  obligations  of  the  school, 
as  when  the  disappearance  of  the  apprenticeship  system 
in  industries  increased  the  obligation  of  the  school  to  give 
industrial  training.  (3)  The  school  itself  like  other  insti- 
tutions changes  from  time  to  time  as  better  technique 
for  realizing  its  fundamental  aim  is  developed.  The 
improvement  of  scientific  methods  of  investigation  in  the 
field  of  education  makes  possible  better  and  better  solu- 
tions of  the  problems  of  what  should  be  in  the  curriculum 
and  how  it  should  be  taught.  The  school  has  thus  a 
development  peculiar  to  itself. 

If  the  school  is  not  plastic  to  change,  its  practices 
eventually  become  antiquated.  Practices  once  useful  are 
then  continued  under  social  conditions  with  which  they 
have  no  useful  connection.  No  longer  in  the  service  of 
social  life,  they  become  mere  school  activities.  They  are 
ends  in  themselves,  because  they  have  no  further  sig- 
nificance. This  condition  affects  both  curriculum  and 
methods  of  teaching,  since  the  two  are  inseparable.  At 


344  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  time  of  disintegration  in  the  ancient  Athenian  state, 
social  welfare  required  the  reconstruction  of  institutions 
on  a  rational  basis.  The  teaching  of  philosophic  theories, 
which  arose  in  answer  to  this  need,  soon  became  the  chief 
work  of  schools  founded  by  philosophers.  Later,  when 
pure  theory  had  satisfied  the  social  demand  which  called  it 
into  being  and  new  social  needs  called  for  a  more  immedi- 
ately practical  education,  the  purely  theoretical  curriculum, 
continued  by  force  of  tradition,  became  an  end  in  itself,  a 
mere  school  requirement.  It  ceased  to  be  a  means  for 
adequately  preparing  men  to  participate  in  the  changed 
social  life.  Theory  became  thus  separated  from  practice. 
To  recall  another  familiar  instance,  Latin  at  the  time  of 
the  Italian  Renaissance  was  introduced  into  the  school  as 
a  means  of  access  to  the  knowledge  considered  to  be  most 
worth  while.  After  a  wealth  of  books  had  appeared  in 
modern  tongues  and  Latin  was  no  longer  all-important  as 
a  means  of  learning,  it  still,  through  force  of  tradition,- 
retained  its  former  place  in  the  curriculum.  To  the  degree 
that  the  need  of  it  in  preparation  for  social  action  de- 
creased, the  study  of  Latin  became  an  end  in  itself,  a 
mere  school  activity.  Likewise,  when  scholasticism  lost 
its  social  importance,  it  became  a  mere  school  practice,  and 
when  industrial  democracy  demanded  new  forms  of  educa- 
tion, a  curriculum  designed  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  a  leisure 
aristocratic  class  lost  its  vital  connection  with  life  outside 
the  school. 

The  school  finds  its  highest  salvation  only  when  it  loses 
itself  in  the  service  of  other  institutions.  Activities  that 
have  no  significance  beyond  the  school  are  void  of  educa- 
tional value  and  foreign  to  its  purpose.  Since  the  school 
was  called  into  being  to  supplement  the  educational  work 
of  other  institutions  in  preparing  individuals  for  efficient 


The  Educational  Process  345 

participation  in  them,  the  purposes  and  means  of  control 
embodied  in  the  curriculum  should  be  those  vital  in  the  life 
of  other  institutions.  The  essential  guide  for  methods  of 
teaching,  also,  is  found  in  the  nature  of  institutional  activi- 
ties. "  The  only  way  to  prepare  for  social  life  is  to  engage 
in  social  life."1  In  order  to  appreciate  the  values  of  pur- 
poses, the  individual  must  engage  in  activities  in  the 
service  of  them ;  in  order  to  understand  the  real  meanings 
of  things,  he  must  use  them  in  a  normal  way.  In  solving 
the  problems  of  what  should  constitute  the  curriculum 
and  of  how  the  subject  matter  selected  should  be  taught, 
the  school  must  look  for  guidance  to  the  processes  of  life 
in  other  institutions,  which  alone  give  to  the  school  its 
true  meaning  and  value. 

X 

In  explaining  how  education  selects  and  transmits  to  immature 
organisms  forms  of  adjustment  developed  in  group  life,  natural 
science  supports  the  conclusions  given  above  with  regard  to  the 
aim  of  education,  the  relation  of  the  school  to  other  institutions, 
and  the  fundamental  importance  of  the  problems  of  the  curriculum 
and  of  the  methods  of  teaching. 

Let  us  now  find  whether  natural  science  supports  the 
conclusions  we  have  reached  with  regard  to  the  nature 
of  the  educational  process. 

We  have  found  from  the  materialistic  point  of  view 
that  the  educative  process  unites  the  individual  and 
social  processes.2  The  human  organism  is  born  with  an 
incomplete  nervous  system.  Reactions  such  as  breathing 
and  swallowing,  which  are  necessary  for  life,  are  fully 
provided  for;  but  the  great  majority  of  useful  reactions 
are  acquired  after  birth  as  the  result  of  the  direct  influence 

1  Dewey,  John,  Moral  Principles  in  Education,  p.  14.       *  Pp.  43-45. 


346  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  other  organisms  or  of  the  changes  which  these  organ- 
isms have  made  in  the  environment.  In  this  way,  each 
organism  profits  by  the  forms  of  reaction  acquired  by  the 
race  in  many  generations  of  progressive  adjustment  to 
environment.  These  acquired  reactions  serve  to  make 
the  individual  socially  efficient,  because  they  are  forms  of 
adjustment  developed  in  group  life,  in  which  division  of 
activities  among  various  organisms  makes  the  group  the 
unit  for  adjustment. 

The  educative  process  selects  forms  of  adjustment, 
which  appear  on  the  mental  side  as  purposes  and  means 
of  control,  and  adapts  these  to  immature  organisms. 
Forms  of  adjustment  must  be  selected,  because  the  main- 
tenance of  group  life  from  generation  to  generation  de- 
pends upon  each  organism's  acquiring  the  special  set  of 
reactions  that  constitute  the  part  it  takes  in  group  adjust- 
ment, and  also  because  human  evolution  depends  upon 
the  transmission  of  the  best  reactions  developed  by  the 
group  and  the  elimination  of  the  inferior  reactions.  The 
forms  of  adjustment  selected  are  acquired  by  the  indi- 
vidual organism  only  when  adapted  to  its  nature,  for  the 
development  of  new  nerve  connections  depends  upon  those 
already  made  and  takes  place  only  in  accordance  with 
certain  laws. 

All  larger  organizations  of  group  habits  which  corre- 
spond to  institutions  educate.  A  factory  selects  from  all 
possible  reactions  those  which  are  most  effective  in  pro- 
ducing some  commodity.  Through  interaction  with  the 
peculiar  environment  in  the  factory,  including  the  equip- 
ment and  the  organisms  that  have  acquired  the  necessary 
adjustments,  the  beginner  is  guided  to  appropriate  reac- 
tions. The  factory  that  fails  to  do  its  part  either  in 
selecting  reactions  or  in  transmitting  them  to  the  work- 


The  Educational  Process  347 

men  goes  to  the  wall  in  the  competitive  struggle.  What 
is  true  of  this  form  of  industrial  life  is  true  of  all  institu- 
tions. When  institutional  forms  of  adjustment  became 
so  complex  that  all  could  not  be  transmitted  by  the  insti- 
tution, the  progress  of  adjustment  was  checked  until  group 
activities  which  did  transmit  them  were  developed.  This 
step  was  the  next  essential  in  evolution.  These  group 
activities  which  supplement  the  educational  work  of  other 
institutions  constitute  the  school. 

In  the  fact  that  the  function  of  education  in  all  institu- 
tions is  to  promote  group  adjustment,  which  improves 
through  a  gradual  process  of  variation  and  natural  selec- 
tion, and  which  involves  development  of  both  the  group 
as  a  unit  and  of  the  individual  organisms  within  the  group, 
we  find  natural  science  supporting  our  conclusions  that 
social  efficiency  as  the  widest  aim  of  education  includes  all 
other  valid  aims,  that  the  aim  of  social  efficiency  provides 
for  both  social  growth  and  personal  development,  and  that 
the  school  cannot  quickly  perfect  society. 

Since  the  elimination  of  useless  activities  in  the  process 
of  education  and  the  effective  organization  of  useful  ones 
result  in  better  adjustment,  and  since  this  elimination 
and  organization  appear  on  the  side  of  consciousness  as  a 
process  of  rationalization,  natural  science  supports  our 
conclusion  that  the  educative  work  of  all  institutions 
should  be  rationalized.  In  this  process  of  rationalization, 
the  problems  of  selecting  the  curriculum  and  of  devising 
methods  of  teaching  are  fundamental,  because  they  are 
the  mental  accompaniments  of  checks  in  the  essential 
educational  reactions  of  selecting  forms  of  adjustment  and 
of  adapting  them  to  individual  organisms.  Because  of 
the  supplementary  relation  of  the  school  to  other  group 
activities,  which  are  continually  changing,  effective  ad- 


348  The  Principles  of  Education 

justment  requires  that  the  forms  of  adjustment  selected 
and  adapted  to  the  immature  organisms  be  modified  from 
time  to  time.  This  means  on  the  mental  side  that  prob- 
lems of  the  school  must  ever  be  solved  anew. 

REFERENCES 

MUNSTERBERG,  H.,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  1910,  pp.  64-70. 
(Gives  a  brief  and  clear  discussion  of  the  aims  of  education.) 

BUTLER,  N.  M.,  The  Meaning  of  Education,  1905,  pp.  3-34.  (Gives  a 
general  discussion  of  what  education  means.) 

MOORE,  E.  C.,  What  is  Education?  1915,  pp.  170-194.  (Gives  a  dis- 
cussion of  learning  by  and  for  doing.) 

BETTS,  G.  H.,  Social  Principles  of  Education,  1913,  pp.  55-93.  (Dis- 
cusses clearly  the  educational  significance  of  institutions.) 

BOLTON,  F.  E.,  Principles  of  Education,  1911,  pp.  1-7.  (Points  out  the 
educational  influence  of  various  institutions.) 

RUEDIGER,  W.  C.,  The  Principles  of  Education,  1910,  pp.  244-258. 
(Discusses  the  social  agencies  that  educate.) 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  23-39.  (Discusses 
the  function  of  the  school.) 

MACVANNEL,  J.  A.,  Outline  of  a  Course  in  the  Philosophy  of  Education, 
1912,  pp.  176-181.  (Discusses  the  school  as  a  social  institution.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  The  School  and  Society,  1915,  pp.  3-28.  (Considers  the 
school  from  the  social  point  of  view.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  Democracy  and  Education,  1916,  pp.  117-121.  (Explains 
the  nature  of  an  educational  aim.  Valuable  especially  for  ad- 
vanced students.) 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  40-65.  (Discusses 
the  various  aims  of  education  and  gives  support  to  social 
efficiency  as  the  aim.) 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  Educational  Values,  1911,  pp.  107-116.  (Criticizes 
objections  to  the  social  aim  of  education.) 

STRAYER,  G.  D.,  A  Brief  Course  in  the  Teaching  Process,  1911,  pp. 
1-10.  (Gives  a  brief  and  clear  discussion  of  the  aim  of  educa- 
tion.) 

RUEDIGER,  W.  C.,  The  Principles  of  Education,  1910,  pp.  38-85. 
(Discusses  the  aims  of  education.) 


The  Educational  Process  349 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Explain  the  following:    "When  we  hear  it  sometimes  said, 
'All  education  must  start  with  the  child,'  we  must  add,  'Yes,  and 
lead  to  human  civilization ; '  and  when  we  hear  it  said,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  all  education  must  start  from  the  traditional  past,  we  must 
add,  'Yes,  and  be  adapted  to  the  child.'"  —  Nicholas  Murray  Butler. 

2.  Name  five  things  you  have  learned  through  the  influence  of 
each  of  the  following  institutions  respectively :  the  home,  the  church, 
the  state. 

3.  What  new  responsibility  has  the  great  division  of  labor  in  recent 
years  placed  upon  the  school? 

4.  What  are  the  educational  functions  of  the  home  and  the  church 
respectively  ? 

5.  Under  what  conditions  is  the  church  justified  in  using  its 
resources  to  support  colleges  ? 

6.  What  is  the  nature  of  educational  value? 

7.  Why  must  we  know  the  aim  of  education  before  we  can  deter- 
mine what  the  curriculum  and  the  methods  of  teaching  should  be  ? 

8.  Explain  how  you  would   determine  whether   a  high  school 
graduate  is  socially  efficient. 

9.  Ask  five  persons  in  various  kinds  of  employment  what  they 
consider  to  be  the  value  of  an  education  and  compare  the  answers  given 
with  the  aims  of  education  discussed  in  this  chapter. 

10.  Is  the  fact  that  a  subject  is  interesting  to  the  pupils  sufficient 
justification  for  including  it  in  the  school  curriculum?     Explain. 

11.  Criticize  the  statement  that  the  function  of  education  is  to 
give  general  ideas. 

12.  State  and  criticize  the  doctrine  of  formal  discipline. 

13.  What  justification  is  there  for  the  following:     (a)  making  a 
common  school  education  compulsory,    (6)  using  the  taxes  collected 
from  the  people  in  the  more  wealthy  districts  towards  the  support  of 
schools  in  poorer  districts,  (c)  appropriating  public  funds  to  provide 
free  textbooks  for  pupils  in  the  public  schools,  (d)  expending  for  the 
education  of  students  in  a  state  university  part  of  the  taxes  collected 
from  parents  financially  unable  to  send  their  own  sons  and  daughters 
to  the  university? 

14.  How  are  the  following  related:    subject  matter,  curriculum, 
methods  of  teaching,  learning? 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  PRINCIPLES  UNDERLYING  THE  MAKING  OF 
THE   CURRICULUM 

Making  the  curriculum  intelligently  requires  that  we  begin 
with  the  immature  equipment  of  purposes  and  means  of  control 
with  which  the  child  comes  to  school,  allow  for  those  which  other 
institutions  normally  give  him,  and  then  find  what  subject 
matter  will  best  guide  him,  from  stage  to  stage  of  his  develop- 
ment, in  acquiring  the  purposes  and  means  of  control  necessary 
for  efficient  participation  in  social  life.  In  order  to  do  this,  we 
must  find  (1)  what  constitutes  social  efficiency,  (2)  what  edu- 
cation the  individual  receives  from  institutions  other  than  the 
school,  (3)  what  is  the  nature  of  the  immature  experience  to  be 
guided  by  social  patterns,  and  (4)  what  is  the  nature  of  each 
unit  of  subject  matter  available  for  guiding  this  experience. 

I 

The  problem  of  making  the  curriculum  may  be  simplified  by 
»  separating  it  into  the  four  problems  noted  above.  The  final  test 
of  the  accuracy  with  which  the  curriculum  has  been  made  is 
found  in  the  social  efficiency  of  those  who  have  been  educated  under 
its  guidance,  provided  the  methods  of  teaching  are  not  at  fault. 

The  problem  of  making  the  curriculum  for  the  school  is 
that  of  selecting  and  organizing  social  patterns  which,  in 
supplementing  the  educational  work  of  other  institutions, 
point  out  the  most  economical  steps  in  development  from 
the  meager  and  crude  purposes  and  means  of  control  which 
guide  the  activities  of  the  child  to  those  necessary  for 
efficient  participation  in  social  life.  As  Professor  Dewey 

350 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          351 

says  with  regard  to  the  subject  matter  which  constitutes 
the  curriculum : 

Abandon  the  notion  of  subject  matter  as  something  fixed  and  ready- 
made  in  itself,  outside  the  child's  experience ;  cease  thinking  of  the 
child's  experience  as  also  something  hard  and  fast;  see  it  as  some- 
thing fluent,  embryonic,  vital ;  and  we  realize  that  the  child  and  the 
curriculum  are  simply  two  limits  which  define  a  single  process.  Just 
as  two  points  define  a  straight  line,  so  the  present  standpoint  of  the 
child  and  the  facts  and  truths  of  studies  define  instruction.  It  is 
continuous  reconstruction,  moving  from  the  child's  present  experience 
out  into  that  represented  by  the  organized  bodies  of  truth  that  we  call 
studies.1 

The  first  step  in  solving  the  complex  problem  of  making 
the  curriculum  is  to  separate  it  into  the  simpler  problems 
which  it  includes.  These  simpler  problems  can  then  be 
considered  one  at  a  time.  The  most  fundamental  guide  in 
choosing  patterns  is  a  knowledge  of  what  is  to  be  made. 
This  is  as  true  in  the  choosing  of  patterns  to  develop  a 
human  being  as  it  is  true  in  the  choosing  of  patterns  to 
make  a  dress,  construct  a  machine,  or  build  a  house. 
Since  the  curriculum  is  selected  as  a  guide  in  making 
individuals  socially  efficient,  we  must  know  (1)  what  con- 
stitutes social  efficiency.  Since  the  school  supplements  the 
educational  work  of  other  institutions  and  need  not,  there- 
fore, undertake  to  do  what  may  safely  be  left  to  them,  we 
must  know  (2)  what  education  the  individual  receives  from 
other  institutions.  By  subtracting  from  the  social  demands 
upon  the  individual  those  which  are  satisfied  through 
training  in  other  institutions,  we  can  find  those  for  the 
satisfaction  of  which  the  school  is  responsible.  We  must 
find  next  (3)  what  is  the  nature  of  the  immature  experience 
to  which  the  social  patterns  are  to  be  applied.  This  imma- 

1  Dewey,  John,  The  Child  and  the  Curriculum,  p.  16. 


352  The  Principles  of  Education 

ture  experience  is  the  "  material  "  with  which  the  school 
must  work  in  education.  If  the  patterns  do  not  fit  it, 
they  are  useless.  Before  any  pattern  can  be  chosen  intel- 
ligently, we  must  know  (4)  what  is  the  nature  of  the  pattern 
itself;  for  each  pattern  of  subject  matter  is  a  special  form 
of  guidance  from  purposes  and  means  already  acquired  to 
new  ones  based  upon  them. 

When  these  problems  have  been  solved,  we  are  ready 
to  make  an  intelligent  choice  of  patterns,  or  subject  matter, 
for  the  school  curriculum.  Beginning  with  the  immature 
equipment  of  purposes  and  means  of  control  with  which 
the  child  comes  to  school,  and  allowing  for  those  which 
other  institutions  will  normally  give  to  him,  we  can  find 
what  subject  matter  will  guide  him  most  effectively,  from 
stage  to  stage  of  his  development,  in  acquiring  the  pur- 
poses and  the  means  of  control  necessary  for  his  efficient 
participation  in  social  life. 

In  finding  the  details  of  the  curriculum,  we  must  ever 
be  guided  by  this  question :  What  must  the  school  pre- 
pare the  individual  to  do  in  each  of  the  kinds  of  activity 
normally  required  of  him  in  the  social  life  ?  It  is  clearly 
evident  that,  if  the  school  is  to  prepare  the  pupil  to  be  a 
carpenter,  we  must,  in  making  the  curriculum,  find  through 
trade  analysis  the  details  of  the  work  which  a  carpenter 
is  normally  required  to  do,  such  as  casing  a  window, 
fitting  and  hanging  a  door,  and  mitering  a  base-board. 
Likewise,  we  must  find  through  analysis  the  details  of 
all  the  kinds  of  activities  for  which  the  school  is  to  pre- 
pare the  pupil,  including  the  various  wider  social  activi- 
ties, such  as  those  required  of  a  citizen.  Then  the  cur- 
riculum should  be  so  made  that  the  purposes  which  the 
pupil  needs  to  appreciate  and  the  processes  which  he 
needs  intelligently  to  control  in  order  to  do  these  things 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          353 

most  efficiently  are  developed  in  his  experience  through 
the  use  of  subject  matter  adapted  to  his  experience  and 
related  to  projects  which  he  willingly  undertakes  •  as 
meaningful  and  worth  while.  A  curriculum  of  this 
nature  provides  the  pupil  with  activities  that  are  signifi- 
cant and  valuable  from  his  own  point  of  view,  and  at  the 
same  time  prepares  him  for  greater  service  from  the 
point  of  view  of  society.  The  appropriate  subject 
matter,  as  we  have  learned,1  not  only  is  a  guide  to  the 
true  appreciation  and  the  intelligent  control  of  present 
practices,  but  leads  also  to  the  development  of  new 
purposes  and  of  new  means  of  control  which  promote 
social  development. 

Much  subject  matter  that  is  essential  to  social  action 
cannot  be  used  with  advantage  until  the  pupil  has  had 
years  of  development.  In  the  meantime,  he  must  be 
protected  and  cared  for  in  so  far  as,  because  of  imma- 
turity, he  lacks  self-dependence.  For  years  he  must  be 
fed,  clothed,  and  sheltered ;  and  he  must  also  be  safe- 
guarded by  laws  and  regulations  in  the  making  of  which 
he  has  no  voice. 

The  final  test  of  the  accuracy  with  which  the  problem 
of  the  curriculum  has  been  solved  is  found  in  the  social 
efficiency  of  those  educated  under  the  guidance  of  the  cur- 
riculum ;  for  the  test  of  any  means  is  found  in  its  effec- 
tiveness in  securing  the  end  for  which  it  was  devised. 
Whatever  secures  this  end  more  fully  and  with  greater 
economy  of  time  and  energy  is  an  improvement.  It  is 
true  that  the  curriculum  is  not  the  only  means  used  in 
realizing  the  aim  of  education.  Inefficiency  of  the  grad- 
uates of  a  school  or  relatively  slow  development  of  its 
pupils  may  be  due  not  to  a  faulty  curriculum,  but  to 

1  P.  334. 


354  The  Principles  of  Education 

faulty  methods  of  teaching.  If  the  school  does  not  real- 
ize the  purpose  for  which  it  was  established  and  realize 
this  purpose  economically,  the  curriculum  is,  however, 
one  of  the  factors  which  must  be  critically  examined  in 
locating  the  fault.  Social  demands  may  have  been  mis- 
understood ;  institutions  other  than  the  school  may  have 
been  depended  upon  for  guidance  which  they  did  not 
give ;  the  subject  matter  may  not  have  been  used  at  the 
most  opportune  time  in  the  developing  experience  of  the 
pupil ;  the  kinds  of  guidance  normally  given  by  various 
patterns,  or  units  of  subject  matter,  may  have  been  mis- 
judged. If  there  is  some  fault  in  the  school,  these  are  the 
matters  with  respect  to  which  the  curriculum  should  be 
critically  examined  in  order  to  find  whether  the  fault  lies 
in  it. 

The  complexity  of  the  problem  makes  improving  the 
curriculum  a  slow  process.  In  order  to  make  genuine 
progress,  the  present  curriculum,  which  is  the  outcome  of 
much  social  experience,  should  be  changed  only  when  the 
value  of  the  modification  is  clearly  demonstrated  in  the 
light  of  the  principles  presented  in  this  chapter. 

In  solving  the  four  simpler  problems  into  which  the 
complex  problem  of  the  curriculum  has  been  divided,  we 
must  depend  upon  opinion  hi  so  far  as  science,  on  account 
of  its  youth,  has  not  made  investigations  and  arrived  at 
accurate  conclusions.  Opinion  is  hypothesis  not  ade- 
quately tested;  it  is  the  forerunner  of  science,  needing 
only  to  stand  accurate  and  conclusive  tests  in  order  to 
be  converted  into  scientific  truth.  In  the  absence  of 
scientific  conclusions,  opinion  is  the  best  guide  available. 
Step  by  step,  in  a  slow  but  sure  progress,  science  is,  how- 
ever, replacing  opinion  by  its  more  reliable  conclusions. 
To  the  extent  that  this  is  done  in  the  field  of  education, 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          355 

the  problem  of  the  curriculum  will  be  more  accurately 
solved. 

The  analysis  made  of  the  complex  problem  of  the  cur- 
riculum is  a  necessary  step  in  the  forming  of  better  judg- 
ments of  opinion;  because  the  simpler  the  problem,  the 
easier  it  is  to  form  an  accurate  opinion  of  the  solution. 
This  analysis  sets,  furthermore,  the  problems  for  science 
to  solve  with  its  accurate  methods,  for  the  first  step  in 
scientific  investigation  is  to  find  the  simplest  problems 
into  which  the  complex  one  can  be  divided.  The  situa- 
tion here  is  analogous  to  that  of  the  fabled  bundle  of 
sticks  which  were  broken  more  easily  one  at  a  time  than 
all  together. 

Each  of  the  four  fundamental  problems  that  must  be 
solved  in  making  intelligently  the  curriculum  may,  in 
turn,  be  simplified  through  further  analysis  so  that  it  can 
be  solved  with  greater  ease  and  accuracy. 

II 

The  problem  of  finding  what  constitutes  social  efficiency  may  be 
simplified  through  subdivision  by  finding  what  purposes  and  means 
of  control  are  required  for  efficient  participation  in  each  of  the  five 
great  institutional  elements  of  social  life.  Subject  matter  selected 
in  the  service  of  demands  which  these  institutions  make  upon  all  in- 
dividuals in  common  should  constitute  the  required  courses  in  the 
curriculum  ;  subject  matter  selected  in  the  service  of  various  insti- 
tutional demands  which  division  of  labor  makes  upon  different 
groups  of  individuals  only,  should  constitute  the  elective  courses  in 
the  curriculum. 

In  finding  what  society  requires  of  the  individual  for 
effective  participation  in  social  action,  we  must  distin- 
guish between  what  social  action  itself  requires  and  what 
traditional  and  arbitrary  popular  beliefs  hold  these  re- 
quirements to  be.  At  one  time,  popular  opinion  required 


356  The  Principles  of  Education 

that  the  school  teach  the  subtle  speculations  of  scholas- 
ticism. A  man  who  could  "  define  "  and  "  debate  "  was 
considered  educated.  The  scholastic  curriculum  did  not, 
however,  provide  for  many  of  the  most  serious  needs  of 
life,  such  as  relief  from  poverty  and  injustice,  which  were 
widely  prevalent.  Popular  opinion  demanded  later  that 
the  school  stress  knowledge  of  Latin  forms,  and  of  more 
or  less  useless  historical  and  literary  facts.  No  argument 
is  needed  to  show  that  this  demand  was  artificial.  The 
history  of  civilization  tells  of  the  frequent  sacrifice  of  real 
social  needs  to  false  popular  opinion  of  what  the  curricu- 
lum should  contain.  Even  now  we  are  by  no  means  free 
from  this,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  undue  emphasis  often 
given  to  the  study  of  formal  grammar  and  arithmetic. 
We  cannot  rely  upon  the  popular  demands  to  reveal  the 
genuine  social  needs,  however  strong  the  social  influences 
enforcing  these  demands  may  be.  Only  by  a  direct,  pains- 
taking, and  unprejudiced  study  of  what  the  very  nature 
of  our  social  life  requires  for  securing  the  highest  welfare 
of  human  beings  can  we  find  the  social  needs  which  should 
be  provided  for  in  the  curriculum. 

Systematic  study  of  the  needs  of  social  life  must  seek 
first  to  simplify  the  problems  involved  by  reducing  social 
life  to  its  elements.  These  elements  of  society,  as  explained 
in  the  chapter  on  social  development,  are  institutions, 
which  may  be  classified  as  the  home,  the  industries,  the 
state,  the  church,  and  the  school.  The  social  demands 
are  made  up  of  what  is  needed  for  efficient  participation  in 
each  of  these  institutional  elements  of  society.  If  such 
analysis  of  social  life  is  not  made,  attention  given  to  one 
institution  may  obscure  the  claims  of  others.  This  was 
the  case  when  the  Reformation  centered  attention  upon 
religious  education,  when  the  needs  of  democratic  govern- 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          357 

ment  emphasized  education  for  citizenship,  and  when 
industrial  needs  made  vocational  training  prominent. 

The  kind  of  analysis  required  to  select  intelligently  the 
curriculum  may  be  found  in  Herbert  Spencer's  essay 
entitled  What  Knowledge  Is  of  Most  Worth?  He  says: 

How  to  live?  —  that  is  the  essential  question  for  us.  Not  how  to 
live  in  the  mere  material  sense  only,  but  in  the  widest  sense.  The 
general  problem  which  comprehends  every  special  problem  is  —  the 
right  ruling  of  conduct  in  all  directions  under  all  circumstances.  In 
what  way  to  treat  the  body ;  in  what  way  to  treat  the  mind ;  in  what 
way  to  manage  our  affairs;  in  what  way  to  bring  up  a  family;  in 
what  way  to  behave  as  a  citizen ;  in  what  way  to  utilize  all  those 
sources  of  happiness  which  nature  supplies  —  how  to  use  all  our 
faculties  to  the  greatest  advantage  of  ourselves  and  others  —  how  to 
live  completely?  And  this  being  the  great  thing  needful  for  us  to 
learn,  is,  by  consequence,  the  great  thing  which  education  has  to  teach. 
To  prepare  us  for  complete  living  is  the  function  which  education  has 
to  discharge ;  and  the  only  rational  mode  of  judging  of  any  educational 
course  is,  to  judge  in  what  degree  it  discharges  such  function. 

This  test,  never  used  in  its  entirety,  but  rarely  even  partially  used, 
and  used  then  in  a  vague,  half  conscious  way,  has  to  be  applied  con- 
sciously, methodically,  and  throughout  all  cases.  It  behooves  us  to 
set  before  ourselves,  and  ever  to  keep  clearly  in  view,  complete  living 
as  the  end  to  be  achieved  ;  so  that  in  bringing  up  our  children  we  may 
choose  subjects  and  methods  of  instruction,  with  deliberate  reference 
to  this  end.  Not  only  ought  we  to  cease  from  the  mere  unthinking 
adoption  of  the  current  fashion  in  education,  which  has  no  better 
warrant  than  any  other  fashion  ;  but  we  must  also  rise  above  that  rude, 
empirical  style  of  judging  displayed  by  those  more  intelligent  people 
who  do  bestow  some  care  in  overseeing  the  cultivation  of  their  chil- 
dren's minds.  It  must  not  suffice  simply  to  think  that  such  or  such 
information  will  be  useful  in  after  life,  or  that  this  kind  of  knowledge  is 
of  more  practical  value  than  that ;  but  we  must  seek  out  some  process 
of  estimating  their  respective  values,  so  that  as  far  as  possible  we  may 
positively  know  which  are  most  deserving  of  attention. 

Doubtless  the  task  is  difficult  —  perhaps  never  to  be  more  than 
approximately  achieved.  But,  considering  the  vastness  of  the  in- 
terests at  stake,  its  difficulty  is  no  reason  for  pusillanimously  passing 


358  The  Principles  of  Education 

it  by ;  but  rather  for  devoting  every  energy  to  its  mastery.  And  if 
we  only  proceed  systematically,  we  may  very  soon  get  at  results  of 
no  small  moment. 

Our  first  step  must  obviously  be  to  classify,  in  the  order  of  their 
importance,  the  leading  kinds  of  activity  which  constitute  human  life. 
They  may  be  naturally  arranged  into :  —  1.  Those  activities  which 
directly  minister  to  self-preservation ;  2.  Those  activities  which,  by 
securing  the  necessaries  of  life,  indirectly  minister  to  self-preservation ; 
3.  Those  activities  which  have  for  their  end  the  rearing  and  discipline 
of  offspring;  4.  Those  activities  which  are  involved  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  proper  social  and  political  relations ;  5.  Those  miscellaneous 
activities  which  make  up  the  leisure  part  of  life,  devoted  to  the  grati- 
fication of  the  tastes  and  feelings.1 

In  classifying  the  activities  for  which  the  individual 
should  be  prepared,  Spencer  has  grouped  them  practically 
according  to  the  institutional  elements  of  society.  "  Those 
activities  which,  by  securing  the  necessaries  of  life,  indi- 
rectly minister  to  self-preservation  "  belong  to  the  indus- 
tries ;  "  those  activities  which  have  for  their  end  the 
rearing  and  discipline  of  offspring  "  belong  to  the  home ; 
"  those  activities  which  are  involved  in  the  maintenance 
of  proper  social  and  political  relations  "  belong  to  the 
state.  The  two  additional  classes  of  activities  enumer- 
ated by  Spencer  are  in  the  service  of  all  institutions. 
This  is  clearly  evident  in  the  case  of  "  those  activities 
which  directly  minister  to  self-preservation."  Since  the 
body  is  the  "  instrument  "  through  which  man  acts,  its 
preservation  is  in  the  interest  of  all  that  he  does.  "  Those 
miscellaneous  activities  which  make  up  the  leisure  part  of 
life,  devoted  to  the  gratification  of  the  tastes  and  feel- 
ings," develop  ideals  which  guide  in  all  institutional  life ; 
for  music,  poetry,  painting,  etc.,  to  the  enjoyment  of  which 

1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Education:  Intellectual,  Moral  and  Physical, 
1890,  pp.  14-16. 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          359 

Spencer  here  refers,  are  valuable  not  primarily  because 
they  give  refined  enjoyment,  but  because  they  develop 
purposes.1  As  Spencer's  essay  is  written  in  the  interest 
of  the  school,  the  only  institution  that  waits  for  recogni- 
tion by  him  is  the  church.  Although  he  does  not  refer 
to  religion  in  his  enumeration  of  the  five  "  leading  kinds 
of  activity  which  constitute  human  life,"  he  says  later : 
"  Lastly  we  have  to  assert  —  and  the  assertion  will,  we 
doubt  not,  cause  extreme  surprise  —  that  the  discipline 
of  science  is  superior  to  that  of  our  ordinary  education, 
because  of  the  religious  culture  that  it  gives."  And  again : 
"  Devotion  to  science  is  tacit  worship  —  a  tacit  recogni- 
tion of  the  worth  of  the  things  studied ;  and  by  implica- 
tion of  their  Cause.  It  is  not  mere  lip-homage,  but  an 
homage  expressed  in  actions  —  not  a  mere  professed  re- 
spect, but  a  respect  proved  by  the  sacrifice  of  time,  thought 
and  labor." 2 

In  analyzing  social  needs,  Professor  Dewey  classifies 
them  according  to  institutions,  recognizing  the  school, 
the  state,  the  home,  and  the  industries.  He  says : 

We  must  take  the  child  as  a  member  of  society  in  the  broadest 
sense,  and  demand  for  and  from  the  schools  whatever  is  necessary 
to  enable  the  child  intelligently  to  recognize  all  his  social  relations 
and  take  his  part  in  sustaining  them.  .  .  . 

The  child  is  to  be  not  only  a  voter  and  a  subject  of  law ;  he  is  also 
to  be  a  member  of  a  family,  himself  in  turn  responsible,  in  all  probabil- 
ity, for  rearing  and  training  of  future  children,  thereby  maintaining  the 
continuity  of  society.  He  is  to  be  a  worker,  engaged  in  some  occu- 
pation which  will  be  of  use  to  society,  and  which  will  maintain  his 
own  independence  and  self-respect.  He  is  to  be  a  member  of  some 
particular  neighborhood  and  community,  and  must  contribute  to  the 

'  See  pp.  185-188. 

'Spencer,  Herbert,  Education:  Inttlkctual,  Moral  and  Physical, 
1890,  pp.  76,  77. 


360  The  Principles  of  Education 

values  of  life,  and  to  the  decencies  and  graces  of  civilization  wherever 
he  is.1 

In  the  United  States,  where  religious  education  is  pro- 
vided by  the  church,  religious  needs,  to  which  Professor 
Dewey  does  not  specifically  refer  in  this  quotation,  are 
usually  not  included  among  those  which  the  public  school 
is  to  meet. 

If,  as  Professor  Dewey  says,  "  Apart  from  participation 
in  social  life,  the  school  has  no  moral  end  or  aim,"2  which 
is  another  way  of  saying  that  the  purpose  of  the  school 
is  to  make  individuals  socially  efficient,  institutions  as 
the  elements  of  social  life  must  be  the  basis  for  the  classi- 
fication of  social  needs.  Social  life  is  life  in  institutions. 

Social  demands  are  of  two  kinds,  general  and  special. 
The  general  demands  are  those  made  by  all  institutions 
upon  all  individuals ;  the  special  are  those  made  upon  only 
various  groups  of  individuals,  because  of  division  of  labor. 
Social  efficiency  requires  of  all  persons  knowledge  and  ap- 
preciation of  the  common  duties  of  the  home,  the  state, 
the  industries,  the  church,  and  the  school ;  for  no  one  can 
escape  responsibilities  belonging  to  these  factors  of  social 
life.  The  requirements  for  all  persons  in  common  range 
from  turning  properly  on  public  thoroughfares  to  avoid 
collision  with  other  persons,  to  the  sentiment  of  patriot- 
ism and  the  recognition  of  a  world  purpose.  The  special 
demands  are  determined  by  the  particular  kind  of  work 
which,  in  the  division  of  labor,  the  individual  undertakes. 
Some  may  be  statesmen,  clergymen,  mechanics,  mer- 
chants, or  teachers ;  others  may  be  housekeepers,  artists, 
farmers,  doctors,  or  lawyers.  Within  each  of  these  and 
other  fields  of  specialization,  there  is,  furthermore,  a  com- 

1  Dewey,  John,  Moral  Principles  in  Education,  pp.  8-10. 
8  Opus  cit.,  p.  11. 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          361 

plicated  division  of  labor  requiring  still  more  limited 
specialization. 

No  absolute  distinction  exists  between  these  general 
and  special  demands;  one  merges  into  the  other.  The 
interrelation  between  them  is  as  complex  as  the  social 
organization  itself,  so  that  only  the  wider  differences  can 
be  recognized.  To  the  extent  that  the  school  is  respon- 
sible for  education,  it  must,  however,  define  these  differ- 
ences as  accurately  as  possible,  in  order  to  indicate  in  the 
curriculum  what  subject  matter  should  be  required  of  all 
and  what  subject  matter  should  be  open  to  election  by 
special  groups. 

As  a  plan  of  required  and  elective  work,  the  curriculum 
may  be  likened  to  a  map  of  social  life,  in  so  far  as  the  school 
is  responsible  for  education;  for  it  shows  the  road  over 
which  all  persons  should  travel  in  common  and  the  special 
branch  roads  which,  under  the  social  division  of  work, 
particular  groups  may  take  with  advantage.  The  begin- 
nings of  the  branch  roads  are  not  limited  to  the  end  of  the 
common  road,  but  appear  along  the  way.  For  the  most 
part,  pupils  take  only  a  common  course  until  near  the  end 
of  the  elementary  school  work,  where  such  branches  of 
specialized  study  as  domestic  science  and  manual  arts 
may  begin.  In  the  high  school  and  the  college,  the  com- 
mon road  is  continued  with  increasing  provision  for  side- 
excursions  in  specialization  until  the  professional  schools 
are  reached,  where  groups  separate  into  different  lines  of 
work  such  as  agriculture,  civil,  mechanical,  electrical,  and 
chemical  engineering,  law,  medicine,  theology,  education, 
journalism,  and  business  administration.  The  college  of 
arts  and  sciences  exercises  the  function  of  a  professional 
school  in  the  case  of  those  who  advance  beyond  a  general 
training  to  specialization  for  constructive  work  in  the 


362  The  Principles  of  Education 

pure  sciences,  history,  and  the  fine  arts.  Social  welfare 
requires  that,  in  the  division  of  labor,  constructive  workers 
be  prepared  in  these  fields.  Each  of  these  divisions  of 
work  represented  by  higher  institutions  of  learning  in- 
cludes narrower  lines  of  specialization,  which  increase  in 
number  with  the  growing  complexity  of  social  life. 


Ill 

Whatever  education  institutions  other  than  the  school  give  inci- 
dentally while  serving  in  the  best  manner  the  several  purposes  for 
which  they  have  been  established,  belongs  respectively  to  these  in- 
stitutions, provided  that  they  give  this  education  not  less  economi- 
cally and  effectively  than  the  school  can  give  it ;  whatever  needed 
education  other  institutions  cannot  give  under  these  limitations 
belongs  to  the  school.  A  rational  selection  of  the  school  curriculum 
requires  a  comprehensive  application  of  this  principle. 

Since  the  function  of  the  school  is  to  supplement  the 
educational  work  of  other  institutions,  the  next  problem 
in  the  selection  of  the  curriculum  is  to  find  what  educa- 
tion is  given  by  these  other  institutions ;  for  it  is  necessary 
to  subtract  this  from  the  total  education  needed  in  order 
to  find  what  is  left  for  the  school  to  do.  In  the  home  and 
in  contact  with  industrial,  political,  and  religious  activities, 
the  individual  acquires  a  large  part  of  his  education.  He 
learns  a  language,  becomes  acquainted  with  many  rights 
and  duties,  assists  in  various  kinds  of  industrial  work, 
buys  and  sells,  observes  methods  of  political  government, 
participates  in  religious  activities.  Institutions  other 
than  the  school  even  deliberately  promote  education,  as 
in  the  case  of  parental  instruction  in  the  home,  appren- 
ticeship training  in  the  industries,  and  Sunday  school 
teaching  in  the  church.  This  education  is,  however, 
largely  incidental,  uneconomical,  and  varying;  but,  pari 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          363 

passu  with  the  rationalized  development  of  the  school, 
it  tends  to  become  more  definitely  organized  and  effective. 
Whether  any  particular  kind  of  education  should  be 
left  to  other  institutions  or  provided  by  the  school  curricu- 
lum, does  not  depend  upon  capricious  changes  in  other 
institutions,  but  upon  a  definite  logical  principle.  The 
fact  that  the  work  of  the  school  is  supplementary  to  other 
institutions  does  not  make  it  subservient  to  them.  It  is 
subservient  only  to  the  command  of  the  highest  social 
welfare,  which  is  the  same  authority  that  commands  them. 
Since  all  institutions  exist  for  the  sake  of  promoting  the 
highest  social  welfare,  they  should  cooperate  to  do  this 
in  the  most  efficient  way.  Each  institution,  therefore, 
should  do  with  singleness  of  purpose  the  special  work  for 
which  it  was  established  in  the  social  order.  Whatever 
education  other  institutions  give  incidentally  while  serv- 
ing in  the  best  manner  the  several  purposes  for  which  they 
have  been  established,  belongs  respectively  to  these  insti- 
tutions, provided  that  they  give  this  education  not  less 
economically  and  efficiently  than  the  school  can  give  it. 
Whatever  education  is  needed  but  cannot  be  given  under 
these  limitations  belongs  to  the  school.  When  the  ap- 
prenticeship system  contributed  to  the  most  economical 
production  of  commodities,  the  education  given  inciden- 
tally by  it  belonged  to  the  industries;  when,  with  the 
introduction  of  machinery  and  of  minute  division  of  labor, 
the  apprenticeship  system  could  not  be  used  advan- 
tageously in  production,  the  responsibility  for  industrial 
education  was  transferred  to  the  school.  When  the  New 
England  town  meeting  in  early  colonial  days  provided  for 
civic  needs,  and,  at  the  same  time,  without  being  turned 
aside  from  this  purpose,  gave  individuals  an  appreciation 
of  the  ideals  and  an  understanding  of  the  methods  of 


364  The  Principles  of  Education 

government,  such  training  belonged  to  this  political  insti- 
tution ;  when  the  government  became  highly  complex  and 
representative,  so  that  it  could  no  longer  give  this  educa- 
tion economically,  the  responsibility  of  training  for  the 
duties  of  citizenship  rested  upon  the  school.  A  rational 
selection  of  the  school  curriculum  requires  a  comprehen- 
sive application  of  this  principle. 

IV 

The  nature  of  the  pupil's  experience  must  be  studied  in  order  to 
determine  the  successive  stages  of  his  development  which  the  cur- 
riculum should  mark,  and  also  to  determine  what  electives  are  best 
suited  to  prepare  him  to  fill,  in  the  social  order,  the  place  for  which 
he  is  best  adapted  by  natural  endowment. 

When  the  requirements  for  social  efficiency  have  been 
found  and  those  provided  for  by  other  institutions  have 
been  subtracted  from  them,  the  remainder  define  the 
scope  of  the  school ;  they  reveal  what  the  outcome  of  school 
education  should  be,  what  purposes  and  means  of  control 
the  pupils  must  acquire  in  school  in  order  to  take  their 
places  in  social  life.  A  knowledge  of  the  outcome  is  not, 
however,  an  adequate  guide  for  the  work  of  the  school. 
A  map  useful  for  a  motor  trip  to  a  far-distant  city  must 
show  not  only  the  city  and  the  general  direction  in  which 
it  lies ;  it  must  show  also  the  road  from  town  to  town  on  the 
way.  The  journey  from  childhood  to  maturity,  for  which 
the  curriculum  serves  as  a  map  is  a  long  one,  requiring 
even  years  for  its  completion,  and  the  byways  are  innu- 
merable. 

The  curriculum,  as  a  map  of  the  road  over  which  the 
pupil  should  be  taken  by  the  school,  must  show  not  only 
what  social  efficiency  requires  of  the  adult,  but  also  what 
should  be  the  intermediate  stages  in  the  pupil's  progress. 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         365 

These  stages  depend,  in  each  instance,  upon  the  nature 
of  the  child's  mind.  He  acquires  new  purposes  when 
strongly  appreciated  values  are  transferred  from  ends  to 
means  which  serve  these  ends ;  he  acquires  new  means  of 
control  from  old  ones  under  the  guidance  of  analogy.1 
If  the  stages  indicated  by  the  curriculum  are  so  far  apart 
that  these  intimate  connections  necessary  for  developing 
appreciation  and  knowledge  are  not  provided,  the  pupil 
acquires  only  symbols  void  of  true  significance. 

A  study  of  individual  pupils  not  only  reveals  the  con- 
nected stages  necessary  for  the  curriculum,  but  also  shows 
which  of  the  branch  roads  required  by  the  division  of 
labor  should  be  included  in  the  curriculum  for  various 
groups  of  pupils.  Individuals  develop  best  in  those  lines 
of  useful  social  activity  in  which  they  have  the  strongest 
interests.  These  feelings  of  worth,  which  differ  in  various 
individuals,  primarily  on  account  of  differences  in  natural 
endowment,  are  the  dynamics  of  life.  As  Professor 
Hanus  says,  "  Real  interest  will  always  be  accompanied 
by  capacity  for  a  subject,  and  may  usually  be  recognized 
by  persistent,  independent,  and  successful  pursuit  of  a 
subject ;  for  the  pupil's  spontaneous  activity  and  achieve- 
ment will  always  be  along  the  lines  of  his  preferences."2 
The  individual  interests  should  always  be  balanced 
against  the  social  needs ;  those  that  do  not  lead  to  useful 
activity  have  no  authority  as  guides  in  selecting  the  cur- 
riculum. 

»  See  Chs.  IV  and  V. 

1  Hanus,  Paul  II.,  Educational  Aims  and  Educational  Values,  p.  8. 


366  The  Principles  of  Education 


V 

In  the  case  of  each  unit  of  subject  matter  available  for  the  curricu- 
lum, we  must  know  (1)  the  basis  of  experience  necessary  for  this 
pattern  to  do  its  work,  (2)  the  new  experience  to  which  this  pattern 
leads,  and  (3)  the  effectiveness  with  which  it  guides  from  the  one 
to  the  other. 

In  addition  to  finding  the  social  demands  for  which  the 
school  should  provide  in  supplementing  the  education 
received  from  other  institutions,  and  in  addition  also  to 
finding  the  nature  of  the  individual  experience  which  the 
school  should  develop,  we  must  find  the  nature  of  each 
pattern,  or  unit  of  subject  matter,  that  may  be  used  in 
guiding  the  pupil  to  acquire  the  purposes  and  means  of 
control  which  lie  in  the  direction  of  social  efficiency. 

A  unit  of  subject  matter  marks  the  pathway  from  one 
stage  of  experience  to  another;  it  has  both  a  terminus  a 
quo  and  a  terminus  ad  quern.  In  making  new  purposes, 
the  fine  arts  transfer  halos  of  value  from  purposes  already 
acquired;  in  making  new  means  of  control,  the  sciences 
lead  from  the  known  to  the  unknown  through  analogies 
based  upon  means  of  control  already  in  the  experience  of 
the  individual.1  We  must  know  the  basis  of  acquired 
experience  necessary  for  the  pattern  to  do  its  work,  in 
order  to  find  whether  it  will  function  in  the  experience  of 
the  pupil;  we  must  know  the  new  experience  to  which, 
under  proper  conditions,  the  pattern  leads,  in  order  to 
find  its  social  value ;  we  must  know  the  effectiveness  with 
which  it  guides  from  the  one  to  the  other,  in  order  to  de- 
termine whether  it  should  be  preferred  to  other  patterns 
fashioned  to  do  the  same  work.  These  three  facts  we 
must  know,  because  the  curriculum  should  contain  only 

1  This  is  explained  in  detail  in  Chs.  VIII  and  IX. 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         367 

those  units  of  subject  matter  which,  from  stage  to  stage 
of  the  pupil's  development,  are  the  best  guides  to  the 
highest  social  efficiency. 

VI 

Some  thinkers  have  made  the  mistake  of  attempting  to  select  the 
curriculum  with  reference  only  to  the  nature  of  the  pupil  or  with 
reference  only  to  the  subject  matter,  neither  of  which  is  a  reliable 
guide  in  itself.  In  such  cases,  the  choice  is  really  made  under 
the  guidance  of  prejudice,  which  masquerades  in  the  clothes  of  child 
nature  or  of  subject  matter  and  thereby  escapes  the  critical  ex- 
amination necessary  to  purge  it  of  error. 

The  analysis  given  above  reveals  two  factors  controlled 
by  the  school  in  developing  those  forms  of  social  efficiency 
for  which  other  institutions  make  it  responsible.  They 
are  the  nature  of  the  pupil  and  subject  matter.  The 
former  is  the  "  material  "  with  which  the  school  must  work 
and  the  latter  consists  of  patterns  which  may  be  used  in 
refashioning  this  material.  In  the  selection  of  the  cur- 
riculum, these  factors  have  no  final  significance  or  value 
in  themselves,  but  derive  significance  and  value  from  the 
aim  which  the  school  seeks  to  realize. 

Some  thinkers  have,  however,  made  the  mistake  of 
attempting  to  select  the  curriculum  with  reference  only  to 
the  nature  of  the  child  or  with  reference  only  to  subject 
matter.  They  have  believed  falsely  that  their  selection 
depended  only  upon  one  or  the  other  of  these,  when,  in 
reality,  it  depended  upon  the  insidious  influence  of  tradi- 
tion. Traditional  prejudices  intimately  associated  with 
the  nature  of  the  child  or  with  the  subject  matter  seem  in 
time  to  be  inherent  characteristics  of  these  despite  the 
fact  that  they  are  foreign.  When  traditional  prejudices 
become  thus  disguised  as  inherent  characteristics  of  child 


368  The  Principles  of  Education 

nature  or  of  subject  matter,  their  authority  is  not  ques- 
tioned, but  blindly  accepted.  Tradition  not  purged  of 
error  by  critical  examination  is  liable  to  be  misleading. 

Of  those  who  look  to  the  nature  of  the  child  for  guid- 
ance, some  confine  attention  to  the  child's  interests  and 
others  confine  attention  to  formal  aspects  of  his  mind, 
which  are  known  as  "  faculties."  The  first  group  is  rep- 
resented by  Rousseau,  who  believed  that  just  as  appetite 
guides  to  what  one  should  eat,  so  interest  guides  to  what 
one  should  study.  The  second  group  consists  of  those 
who  believe  that  the  child's  mind  is  composed  of  "  facul- 
ties "  such  as  observation,  memory,  and  reason,  and  that 
any  subject  matter  which  exercises  these  faculties,  irre- 
spective of  its  particular  content,  is  valuable  in  developing 
them.  These  views  have  been  criticized  in  the  discussion 
of  individual  development  and  of  the  harmonious  develop- 
ment of  all  the  powers  of  the  individual,  as  aims  of  educa- 
tion.1 It  is  necessary  to  repeat  here  only  the  fact  that  the 
child  may  be  interested  in  evil  as  well  as  in  good,  and  the 
fact  that  his  mind  is  not  composed  of  "  faculties."  Moral 
literature  is  not  chosen  for  the  curriculum  because  it  is 
more  interesting  than  immoral  literature ;  arithmetic  and 
grammar  are  not  chosen  because  they  better  train  the 
"  faculties  "  than  do  mechanical  puzzles  and  card  games. 
These  truths  would  be  clearly  apparent  if  bias  in  favor 
of  moral  literature  did  not  masquerade  in  the  clothes  of 
interest,  and  bias  in  favor  of  arithmetic  and  grammar  did 
not  masquerade  in  the  clothes  of  formal  training. 

Those  who  look  to  the  nature  of  subject  matter  for 
guidance  in  selecting  the  curriculum  are  inclined  to 
regard  knowledge  and  appreciation  as  ends  in  themselves. 
They  seek  a  basis  for  preference  in  the  structure  rather 

1  Pp.  328-330. 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          369 

than  in  the  function  of  subject  matter ;  or,  in  other  words, 
in  formal  aspects  of  the  subject  matter  rather  than  in  its 
usefulness  for  social  action.  Specific  instances  of  this 
view  will  make  clear  the  fact  that,  in  selecting  the  curric- 
ulum, guidance  apparently  found  in  subject  matter  is 
really  due  to  the  insidious  influence  of  a  traditional  bias 
that  is  so  intimately  associated  with  the  subject  matter 
as  to  appear  to  be  an  essential  characteristic  of  it. 

One  of  the  oldest  instances  of  this  view  is  found  in 
Plato's  Republic.  In  the  first  half  of  the  Republic,  Plato 
selects  subject  matter  with  reference  to  social  action.  He 
eliminates  from  the  traditional  elementary  curriculum  of 
his  time  the  subject  matter  that  would  develop  ideals  con- 
flicting with  the  highest  welfare  of  the  state.  Near  the 
middle  of  the  Republic,  however,  he  transfers  emphasis 
from  social  action  to  subject  matter.  In  selecting  the  cur- 
riculum for  higher  education,  Plato  stresses  the  value  of 
knowledge  for  its  own  sake.  His  choice  of  subject  matter 
is  based  here  upon  its  degree  of  abstractness,  the  more 
abstract  subject  matter  appearing  to  him  to  represent 
knowledge  of  higher  worth.  This  leads  him  to  regard  pure 
mathematics  and  dialectic  as  of  the  highest  importance. 
Abstraction  is  not  in  itself  a  synonym  for  worth,  but  ap- 
peared so  to  him,  because  he  had  acquired  a  bias  in  favor 
of  philosophic  thought,  which  is  deductive  in  form  and 
abstract  in  nature.  Not  the  inherent  characteristics  of 
subject  matter  itself  but  a  bias  due  to  tradition  led  him, 
therefore,  to  regard  pure  mathematics  and  dialectic  as 
the  subject  matter  of  most  worth. 

A  modern  example  of  the  dependence  upon  character- 
istics of  subject  matter  for  guidance  in  selecting  the 
curriculum  is  found  in  Harris's  Psychologic  Foundations 
of  Education.  Harris  accepts  all  subject  matter  which 


370  The  Principles  of  Education 

tradition  has  marked  as  appropriate  for  the  school.  This 
subject  matter  is  so  comprehensive  that  any  one  student 
can  acquire  only  a  small  part  of  it.  He  attempts  to  over- 
come this  difficulty  by  dividing  subject  matter  on  the 
basis  of  its  own  characteristics  into  five  coordinate  groups, 
and  by  advising  that  the  curriculum  for  each  pupil  should 
include  at  all  times  some  subject  matter  representative  of 
each  group.  He  says : 

The  studies  of  the  school  fall  naturally  into  these  five  coordinate 
groups :  first,  mathematics  and  physics ;  second,  biology,  including 
chiefly  the  plant  and  the  animal ;  third,  literature  and  art,  including 
chiefly  the  study  of  literary  works  of  art ;  fourth,  grammar  and  the 
technical  and  scientific  study  of  language,  leading  to  such  branches 
as  logic  and  psychology ;  fifth,  history  and  the  study  of  sociological, 
political,  and  social  institutions.  Each  one  of  these  groups  should 
be  represented  in  the  curriculum  of  the  schools  at  all  times  by  some 
topic  suited  to  the  age  and  previous  training  of  the  pupil.1 

A  similar  method  of  selecting  studies  is  often  used  in  sec- 
ondary and  higher  schools  before  the  period  of  specializa- 
tion begins.  The  student  is  required  to  do  some  work 
in  each  of  a  variety  of  fields,  so  that  his  experience  may 
be  broadened  and,  at  the  same  time,  opportunity  may  be 
given  him  to  find  the  line  of  specialization  best  suited  to 
his  interests. 

The  method  used  by  Harris  abandons  the  selection  to 
the  preferences  which  tradition  has  intimately  associated 
with  the  various  forms  of  subject  matter.  The  studies 
which  tradition  has  marked  as  appropriate  for  education 
are  accepted  bodily  without  critical  review.  When  they 
have  been  divided  into  groups  according  to  formal  differ- 
ences, the  requirement  that  merely  some  studies  from  each 
group  be  pursued  abandons  selection  again  to  traditional 

1  Harris,  W.  T.,  Psychologic  Foundations  of  Education,  p.  323. 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         371 

bias.  There  is  no  guidance  for  choice  within  the  groups, 
except  that  the  "  topic  "  should  be  "  suited  to  the  age  and 
previous  training  of  the  pupil."  This  provision  is  only 
another  way  of  saying  that  the  pupil  should  not  study 
topics  which  he  cannot  understand  or  appreciate.  But 
the  vast  number  of  topics  he  can  understand  or  appre- 
ciate, are  left  on  the  same  level  of  importance  until  bias 
due  to  tradition  steps  in  to  determine  the  choice.  Harris 
merely  simplifies  the  exercise  of  this  bias  by  placing  before 
it  at  the  same  time  for  its  judgment  only  one  fifth  of  the 
topics  which  the  pupil  can  understand  or  appreciate  in 
the  whole  field  of  traditional  learning.  The  fundamental 
error  of  this  method  becomes  apparent  as  soon  as  the 
facts  are  recognized  that  the  primary  function  of  the 
school  is  not  to  teach  subject  matter,  but  to  prepare  for 
social  action,  and  that  subject  matter  should,  therefore, 
be  selected  with  reference  to  the  social  action  which  it 
serves. 

VII 

The  principles  presented  in  this  chapter  for  selecting  the  curriculum 
provide  for  (1)  genuine  interest  in  subject  matter,  (2)  normal 
effort,  (3)  effective  drill,  (4)  the  significant  organization  of  experi- 
ence, (5)  the  true  differentiation  of  required  and  elective  work, 
(6)  the  highest  practical  efficiency,  (7)  the  richest  culture,  (S)  the 
most  profitable  use  of  the  time  devoted  to  sch<x>l  work  by  pupils 
who  leave  school  l>eforc  having  completed  the  curriculum,  (9)  the 
preparation  for  lx>th  life  and  higher  education  by  the  same  work, 

(10)  the   liest   standards   for   selecting   the   more  efficient   pupils, 

(11)  the  simplification  of  the  curriculum,  and  (12)   the  elimination 
of  breaks  between  schools  of    different   rank   in   the  educational 
hierarchy. 

The  simplest  way  to  obviate  the  faults  of  the  traditional 
curricula  is  to  select  and  organize  studies  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  that  have  been  presented  in  this 


372  The  Principles  of  Education 

chapter.  When  attempts  are  made  to  remedy  these  faults 
directly,  there  is  danger  of  treating  mere  symptoms 
instead  of  the  real  difficulties.  Such  instances  of  the 
treating  of  mere  symptoms  are  found  in  the  attempt  to 
make  ill-selected  subject  matter  interesting  by  "  sugar 
coating,"  and  in  the  attempt  to  compel  the  pupil  for  the 
sake  of  discipline  to  study  useless  problems.  In  such 
cases,  the  principles  presented  in  this  chapter  point 
clearly  to  the  seat  of  the  difficulty  and  indicate  what 
remedy  is  needed. 

'  How  some  of  the  more  conspicuous  faults  of  the  tradi- 
tional curricula  are  obviated  by  selecting  subject  matter 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  presented  in  this  chapter 
will  now  be  considered.  Such  selection  provides  for  (1)  gen- 
uine interest  hi  subject  matter,  (2)  normal  effort,  (3)  effect- 
ive drill,  (4)  the  significant  organization  of  experience, 

(5)  the  true  differentiation  of  required  and  elective  work, 

(6)  the  highest  practical  efficiency,  (7)  the  richest  culture, 
(8)  the  most  profitable  use  of  time  devoted  to  school  work 
by  pupils  who  leave  school  before  having  completed  the 
curriculum,    (9)   the  preparation  both  for  life  and  for 
higher  education  by  the  same  work,  (10)  the  best  stand- 
ards for  selecting  the  more  efficient  pupils,  (11)  the  sim- 
plification of  the  curriculum,  and  (12)  the  elimination  of 
breaks  between  the  schools  of  different  rank  in  the  educa- 
tional hierarchy.     The  absence  of  these  characteristics 
marks  some  of  the  most  conspicuous  faults  of  the  tradi- 
tional curricula.     Let  us  now  see  how  these  character- 
istics are  provided  when  the  curriculum  is  selected  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  presented  in  this  chapter. 

(1)  The  curriculum  is  genuinely  interesting  to  the  pupil. 
The  principle  that  the  social  patterns  forming  the  cur- 
riculum should  be  fitted  to  the  immature  experience  of 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          373 

the  pupil  requires  that  the  ideal-giving  subject  matter 
appeal  to  purposes  he  already  strongly  appreciates  and 
that  control-giving  subject  matter  overcome  difficulties 
which  lie  in  the  way  of  ends  he  desires  to  realize.  School 
life  is  thus  normal  living  for  the  pupil.  The  application 
of  this  principle  insures  interest,  because  interest  is  an 
essential  characteristic  of  purpose,  and  is  carried  over  to 
the  means  of  control  which  serve  in  realizing  the  purpose. 
The  principle  that  new  purposes  and  means  of  control 
when  developed  should  promote  social  efficiency  requires 
that  the  interest  be  genuine.  Spurious,  or  extrinsic, 
interests,  including  those  which  result  from  "  sugar- 
coated  "  subject  matter,  accompany  the  development  of 
purposes  and  means  of  control  that  are  abnormal  and, 
therefore,  ineffectual  guides  for  action.1 

(2)  The  curriculum  secures  normal  effort;  it  neither 
justifies  the  stigma  of  "  soft  pedagogics  "  by  indulging 
undisciplined  interests,  nor  includes  tasks  that  have  no 
significance.     It  provides  the  subject  matter  necessary  to 
develop  such  ideals  as  duty,  diligence,  industry,  and  per- 
sistence, which  are  necessary  to  overcome  sporadic  in- 
terests that  cause  effort  by  interfering  with  useful  study. 
Only  those  conditions  of  effort  to  which  the  individual  is 
subjected  in  the  valuable  activities  of  the  wider  social  life 
are  necessary  in  education.     This  fact  precludes  tasks 
that  are  mere  tasks,  because  the  effort  involved  in  them 
has  no  valuable  significance,  and  is,  therefore,  superfluous 
and  abnormal. 

(3)  Adequate   provision    is    made    for   effective   drill. 
Social  efficiency  requires  that  the  pupil  fix  in  memory  such 
things  as  the  multiplication  table  and  spelling.     Since 
the  curriculum  should  be  adapted  to  successive  stages  in  the 

1  See  pp.  133-137. 


374  The  Principles  of  Education 

child's  developing  experience,  this  drill  does  not  take  place 
until  other  subject  matter  has  developed  the  pupil's  experi- 
ence to  a  stage  where  he  feels  the  need  for  it.  Drill  is  a 
means  of  control  which,  like  any  other  means  of  control,  is 
normally  acquired  and  used  in  the  service  of  some  purpose 
that  gives  it  true  significance.  The  pupil  must  first  recog- 
nize that  desired  ends  which  arithmetic  problems  normally 
serve  can  be  attained  more  accurately  and  easily  by  fixing 
the  multiplication  table  in  his  memory  than  by  using 
addition  or  consulting  printed  tables ;  he  must  first  recog- 
nize that  writing  which  he  desires  to  do  can  be  controlled 
more  easily  by  memorizing  spelling  than  by  continually 
consulting  a  dictionary  or  calling  upon  others  for  assist- 
ance. The  problem  in  these  cases  is  to  find  the  best  means 
for  fixing  in  memory  the  multiplication  table  and  spelling. 
When  the  pupil  has,  under  social  guidance,  found  the  best 
method  of  memorizing,  the  next  step  is  to  use  it.  Drill  is 
abnormal  unless  the  pupil  is  thus  actuated  by  a  purpose 
which  gives  true  and  valuable  significance  to  it. 

(4)  The  organization  of  subject  matter  is  adapted  to  the 
pupil's  stage  of  development.  "  Logically "  organized 
subject  matter  is  introduced  only  when  the  pupil  feels 
the  need  for  it.  This  need  arises  when  the  means  of  con- 
trol acquired  by  the  pupil  become  so  manifold  that  he  can 
use  them  more  effectively  when  they  are  organized  in 
groups  according  to  similarities  in  their  natures.  The 
pupil  first  acquires  facts  in  the  interest  of  such  concrete 
purposes  as  making  or  extinguishing  a  fire,  growing  plants 
in  his  garden,  ventilating  a  room,  repairing  a  door-bell, 
speaking  and  writing  intelligibly.  These  purposes  not 
only  give  meanings  to  the  facts,  but  also  serve  as  the  bases 
for  organizing  them,  so  long  as  the  facts  do  not  become  too 
manifold.  At  this  stage  of  his  development,  the  pupil 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          375 

cannot  grasp  the  true  significance  of  subject  matter  organ- 
ized according  to  the  logic  of  science,  because  he  neither 
appreciates  the  purpose  nor  understands  the  method  of 
science.  Under  the  guidance  of  such  subject  matter,  he 
fails  to  acquire  for  facts  even  those  practical  meanings  and 
useful  organizations  suited  to  his  immature  experience. 
The  subject  matter  appears  to  him,  therefore,  to  consist 
of  only  vaguely  significant  and  arbitrarily  classified  facts 
that  should  be  committed  to  memory.  This  fault  does 
not  exist  when  the  curriculum  is  adapted  to  the  stage  of 
development  attained  by  the  pupil,  because,  when  the  cur- 
riculum is  so  adapted,  the  subject  matter  is  not  logically 
organized  until  the  pupil  feels  the  need  for  such  organiza- 
tion and  understands  its  significance. 

(5)  The  curriculum  makes  a  true  distinction  between  the 
required  and  the  elective  courses,  serving  social  efficiency 
with  due  provision  for  individual  differences.  The  re- 
quired subject  matter  is  that  needed  by  people  in  general 
for  participation  in  the  various  institutions ;  the  elective 
subject  matter  is  that  needed  by  various  classes  of  indi- 
viduals for  special  lines  of  activity  differentiated  in  the 
social  division  of  labor.  The  election  of  subject  matter 
which  promotes  efficiency  in  these  special  lines  of  activity, 
depends  upon  the  dominant  interests  of  the  individual 
concerned.  As  Professor  Hanus  says :  "  Real  interest 
will  always  be  accompanied  by  capacity  for  a  subject,  and 
may  usually  be  recognized  by  persistent,  independent,  and 
successful  pursuit  of  a  subject ;  for  the  pupil's  spontaneous 
activity  and  achievement  will  always  be  along  the  lines 
of  his  preferences.  Independent  pursuit  does  not  mean 
without  the  teacher's  guidance,  but  it  does  mean  without 
the  teacher's  constant  urping  or  assistance."1  Abundant 

1  Hanus,  Paul  II.,  Educational  Aims  and  Educational  Values,  p.  8. 


376  The  Principles  of  Education 

opportunity  for  awakening  these  interests  is  provided  in 
the  diversified  training  of  required  subject  matter,  which 
gives  the  basis  for  specialization. 

(6)  The  curriculum  provides  for  the  highest  practical 
efficiency  rather  than  for  mere  "  book  learning."     Subject 
matter  is  normally  a  guide  for  action,  not  an  end  in  itself. 
"  Bookishness  "  means  that  the  pupil  does  not  receive  the 
guidance  for  which  the  subject  matter  is  intended,  but 
merely  retains  in  memory  and  repeats  on  occasion  words 
that  are  useless  to  him,  because  the  purposes  and  means 
of  control  they  symbolize  have  not  been  truly  developed 
in  his  experience. 

(7)  The  curriculum  provides  for  the  richest  culture. 
The  value  of  experience  depends  upon  its  practical  conse- 
quences.    Ideals  and  ideas  that  guide  best  the  complex 
activities  of  social  life  constitute  the  richest  culture  for 
which  the  curriculum  can  provide.     When  the  individual 
has  acquired  appreciation  of  the  higher  and  more  remote 
purposes  that  give  halos  to  even  the  common  activities  of 
life,  when  he  has  acquired  the  true  meanings  of  activities 
by  relating  them  to  these  purposes,  the  world  built  in  his 
experience  includes  the  richest  values  and  the  deepest 
meanings.    This  culture  is  very  different  from  the  cul- 
ture, falsely  so  called,  which  is  born  of  sentimentality  and 
snobbery,  and  which  has  no  use  save  as  a  traditional 
badge  of  distinction. 

(8)  Pupils  who  leave  school  before  having  completed 
the  curriculum,  as  well  as  those  who  do  complete  it,  make 
the  most  profitable  use  of  the  time  they  devote  to  school  work. 
This  is  true  because  the  subject  matter  for  each  stage  of 
the  pupil's  development  is  selected  with  reference  to  the 
most  important  social  demands  upon  him.     Because  of 
the  fact  that  many  pupils  withdraw  after  only  a  few  years 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         377 

of  school  work,  this  characteristic  of  the  curriculum  is  of 
great  importance. 

(9)  The  curriculum  makes  no  essential  difference  be- 
tween preparing  for  higher  education  and  preparing  for  life. 
The  lower  and  the  higher  education  serve  the  same  end  and 
differ  only  because  they  guide  the  experience  of  the  indi- 
vidual at  different  stages  in  his  development.     To  the 
extent  that  the  college  forces  upon  the  secondary  school 
subject  matter  significant  only  as  preparatory  for  the  work 
of  a  higher  institution  of  learning,  the  college  defeats  its 
own  purpose.     If  the  pupil  does  not  understand  and  appre- 
ciate the  vital  significance  of  his  school  work,  he  acquires 
abnormal  meanings  and  appreciations  of  value,  which 
make  an  inadequate  basis  for  the  higher  training  of  the 
college.     It  is  better  that  the  candidate  for  admission  to 
college  come  with  a  strong  initiative  and  a  wholesome 
understanding  of  the  simpler  practical  affairs  of  life. 

(10)  The  curriculum  makes  it  possible  for  the  school  to 
exercise  properly  its  important  function  of  selecting  the  more 
efficient  pupils  for  its  stamp  of  approval.     Under  present 
conditions,  the  pupils  whom  the  school  most  honors  are 
not  necessarily  those  most  capable  of  attaining  the  highest 
success  beyond  the  school.     This  is  the  case  when  the  cur- 
riculum fails  to  give  the  guidance  intended  because  it 
does  not  fit  the  experience  of  the  pupil,  or  when  a  large 
part  of  the  subject  matter  is  of  comparatively  little  prac- 
tical value.     Tests  used  to  measure  the  abilities  of  pupils 
often  do  not  reveal  these  faults  of  the  traditional  curric- 
ulum, because  they  measure  only  the  ability  to   memo- 
rize more  or  less  significant  symbols.     The  only  reliable 
evidence  of  the  possession  of  ideals  and  ideas  is  found  in 
the  control  they  exercise  over  the  pupil's  activities. 

(11)  The  curriculum  is  not  overcrowded  with  subject 


378  The  Principles  of  Education 

matter.  The  chief  causes  of  an  overcrowded  curriculum 
are  (a)  the  retention  of  comparatively  useless  subject 
matter  through  force  of  custom,  and  (6)  the  use  of  logi- 
cal classifications  that  are  not  psychological  for  the  pupil, 
(a)  In  the  selection  of  the  traditional  curriculum  there 
has  been  a  strong  tendency,  we  have  learned,  merely  to 
add,  from  time  to  time,  subject  matter  necessary  to 
meet  new  social  situations,  without  eliminating  that 
which  has  become  obsolete.  The  principles  presented  in 
this  chapter  provide  for  eliminating  subject  matter  that 
no  longer  serves  social  needs.  (6)  Logical  classification 
has  tended  to  divide  the  curriculum  into  more  or  less 
isolated  parts  in  the  lower  stages  of  school  work.  It  has, 
for  example,  led  pupils  to  acquire  the  "  tools  "  of  knowl- 
edge —  reading,  writing,  and  arithmetic  —  in  isolation 
by  means  of  otherwise  useless  "  exercises "  invented 
especially  for  this  purpose.  If  these  "  tools  "  are  acquired 
in  the  service  of  intrinsically  worthful  subject  matter, 
such  as  literature,  history,  nature  study,  and  geography, 
the  intrinsically  useless  "  exercises  "  drop  out  and  the 
subject  matter  through  correlation  is  thus  simplified. 
Logical  organization  in  the  lower  stages  of  school  work 
not  only  tends  to  isolate  various  fields  of  subject  matter, 
but  also  sets  up  within  these  fields  classifications  that  are 
an  encumbrance,  because  they  have  no  significance  for  the 
pupil,  and  that  carry  with  them  ideas  selected  for  the 
sake  of  logical  interest  rather  than  of  practical  utility. 
In  the  early  stages  of  grammatical  study,  the  pupil  finds 
principles  organized  logically  with  relation  one  to  another, 
although  he  normally  feels  the  need  of  relating  them 
only  to  his  language.  He  finds  also  the  finer  distinctions 
of  mood  which  are  called  for  by  logical  analysis,  but  which 
satisfy  no  felt  need  at  his  stage  of  development.  The 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum          379 

fact  that  the  curriculum  should  fit  the  experience  of  the 
pupil  requires  the  introduction  of  logical  classifications 
only  when  the  pupil  has  reached  an  advanced  stage  of 
experience  in  which  he  has  need  of  them.  This  require- 
ment means  close  correlation  throughout  the  curriculum 
and  the  elimination  of  logical  distinctions  that  are  not 
vital  to  the  pupil,  both  of  which  tend  to  prevent  the  cur- 
riculum from  being  overcrowded  with  subject  matter. 

(12)  There  are  no  breaks  between  the  work  of  schools  of 
different  rank  in  the  educational  hierarchy.  Different  his- 
torical origins  of  elementary  schools,  secondary  schools, 
and  universities,  are  responsible  for  breaks  between  the 
work  of  these  classes  of  schools.  Democracy  has  not 
completely  united  these  institutions  into  one  system. 
Since  there  are  no  breaks  in  the  development  of  the  indi- 
vidual, institutions  of  different  rank  should  present  a 
continuous  curriculum.  The  parts  of  the  curriculum 
which  tradition  has  assigned  to  schools  of  different  rank 
should,  indeed,  be  subject  to  change,  from  time  to  time, 
in  the  interest  of  a  more  efficient  educational  system,  in 
which  a  convenient  and  economical  distribution  of  schools 
is  an  important  consideration.  The  recent  development 
of  junior  high  schools  and  junior  colleges  is  an  example  of 
such  changes. 


380  The  Principles  of  Education 


VIII 

The  problems  which  must  be  solved  in  selecting  the  curriculum 
from  the  materialistic  point  of  view  are :  (1)  What  reactions  are 
necessary  for  cooperation  in  each  of  the  systems  of  group  habits? 
(2)  What  reactions  do  systems  of  group  habits  other  than  the  school 
develop  in  immature  organisms  not  less  effectively  than  the  school 
can  develop  them  ?  (3)  What  is  the  nature  of  the  native  and  of  the 
acquired  reactions  of  the  immature  organism?  (4)  What  is  the 
nature  of  each  type  of  environment  available  to  cause  the  develop- 
ment of  the  immature  organism's  reactions?  These  correspond 
to  the  four  problems  given  in  teleological  terms  at  the  beginning 
of  this  chapter.  Natural  science  supports  the  conclusions  we  have 
reached  with  regard  to  (1)  the  final  test  of  the  accuracy  with 
which  the  curriculum  has  been  selected,  (2)  the  mistaken  ideas 
of  the  basis  upon  which  the  selection  should  be  made,  and  (3)  the 
valuable  characteristics  of  the  curriculum  selected  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  presented  in  this  chapter. 

Does  the  materialistic  explanation  of  the  principles 
underlying  the  making  of  the  curriculum  support  the 
statement  we  have  made  of  these  principles  from  the 
teleological  point  of  view? 

In  the  terms  of  natural  science,  the  function  of  the 
school  is  to  supplement  the  influence  of  group  habits, 
otherwise  known  as  institutions,  in  modifying  the  reac- 
tions of  immature  organisms  in  such  manner  that  these 
organisms  react  more  effectively  with  others  in  coopera- 
tive adjustment  to  environment.  In  order  to  select, 
under  the  guidance  of  this  truth,  the  types  of  reactions 
which  the  curriculum  should  provide,  we  must  answer 
each  of  the  following  questions :  (1)  What  reactions  are 
necessary  for  cooperation  in  each  of  the  systems  of  group 
habits?  In  teleological  terms,  this  means  that  we  must 
find  what  purposes  and  what  means  of  control  are  needed 
for  efficient  participation  in  the  life  of  each  social  insti- 
tution. (2)  What  reactions  do  systems  of  group  habits 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         381 

other  than  the  school  develop  in  the  immature  organism 
not  less  effectively  than  the  school  can  develop  them? 
This  means  teleologically  that  we  must  find  what  edu- 
cation is  given  by  institutions  other  than  the  school. 
(3)  What  is  the  nature  of  the  native  and  of  the  acquired 
reactions  of  the  immature  organism?  It  is  necessary  to 
know  this  because  new  reactions  are  made  through  the 
modification  of  old  ones,  and  also  because  different  organ- 
isms are  adapted  by  nature  to  play  different  parts  in 
group  adjustment.  This  means  teleologically  that  we 
must  find  what  is  the  nature  of  the  pupil's  native  and 
acquired  purposes  and  means  of  control  so  that  we  can 
select  subject  matter  that  is  adapted  to  them.  (4)  What 
is  the  nature  of  each  type  of  environment  available  to 
cause  the  development  of  the  immature  organism's  reac- 
tions? The  answer  to  this  question  requires  an  inves- 
tigation of  the  basis  of  native  and  acquired  reactions 
which  each  type  of  environment  is  suited  to  modify,  the 
new  reaction  which  it  develops  through  this  modification, 
and  its  comparative  effectiveness  in  developing  this  new 
reaction.  This  means  teleologically  that  we  must  know 
with  reference  to  each  available  unit  of  subject  matter 
the  purposes  and  means  of  control  which  its  normal 
functioning  requires  as  a  basis,  the  new  purposes  or  means 
of  control  to  which  it  leads,  and  the  comparative  economy 
and  effectiveness  with  which  it  leads  from  the  one  to  the 
other. 

In  the  light  of  the  answers  to  these  questions,  we  can 
begin  with  the  immature  equipment  of  reactions  with 
which  the  child  comes  to  school,  allow  for  those  which 
other  group  habits  develop  in  the  child,  and  then  find 
what  types  of  environment  will  most  economically  and 
effectively  cause  it  to  acquire,  from  stage  to  stage  of  its 


382  The  Principles  of  Education 

development,  forms  of  response  necessary  for  effective 
cooperation  in  group  adjustment.  This  is  the  natural 
science  way  of  saying  that  we  can  begin  with  the  immature 
equipment  of  purposes  and  means  of  control  with  which 
the  child  comes  to  school,  allow  for  those  which  other 
institutions  normally  give  him,  and  then  find  what  subject 
matter  will  best  guide  him,  from  stage  to  stage  of  his 
development,  in  acquiring  the  purposes  and  means  of  con- 
trol necessary  for  efficient  participation  in  the  institutions 
which  make  up  social  life. 

Provided  the  methods  of  teaching  are  not  at  fault,  the 
final  test  of  the  accuracy  with  which  the  curriculum  has 
been  made  is  found,  according  to  natural  science,  in  the 
effectiveness  with  which  the  reactions  developed  under 
the  influence  of  the  curriculum  promote  the  cooperative 
adjustment  of  human  organisms  to  the  environment. 
This  fact  means  that,  provided  the  methods  of  teaching 
are  not  at  fault,  the  final  test  of  the  accuracy  with  which 
the  curriculum  has  been  made  is  found  in  the  social 
efficiency  of  those  who  have  been  educated  under  its 
guidance. 

Natural  science  shows  convincingly  that  it  is  a  mistake 
to  depend  upon  either  the  nature  of  the  child  alone  or 
upon  the  nature  of  the  subject  matter  alone  as  a  guide 
for  making  the  curriculum.  The  development  of  the 
immature  organism,  on  the  one  hand,  depends  upon  an 
inheritance  of  acquired  characteristics  transmitted  during 
infancy  through  interaction  with  the  group.  The  instinc- 
tive tendencies  with  which  the  organism  is  endowed  by 
nature  may  be  the  basis  of  acquiring  all  sorts  of  reac- 
tions, many  of  which  are  useless.  The  reactions  which, 
transmitted  by  the  group,  constitute  the  development 
of  the  immature  organism,  are  selected  as  the  result  of 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         383 

their  effectiveness  in  adjustment  through  a  long  process  of 
group  activity ;  their  usefulness  is  revealed  primarily  not 
by  the  tendencies  of  the  immature  organism,  but  by  the 
achievements  of  the  mature  organisms  of  the  group. 
Subject  matter,  on  the  other  hand,  corresponds  to  types 
of  environment  which  induce  certain  forms  of  reaction. 
The  usefulness  of  these  types  of  environment  is  obviously 
not  revealed  by  a  study  of  their  structure  exclusively, 
but  by  an  investigation  of  the  effectiveness  with  which  the 
reactions  developed  under  their  influence  adjust  the  organ- 
ism to  its  environment  as  it  cooperates  with  the  group. 

In  showing  from  the  materialistic  point  of  view  that  the 
curriculum  made  with  reference  to  the  principles  pre- 
sented in  this  chapter  has  valuable  characteristics,  such 
as  providing  for  genuine  interest,  normal  effort,  effective 
drill,  and  the  significant  organization  of  experience,  it  is 
necessary  only  to  mention  the  equivalents  of  these  in 
terms  of  natural  science.  (1)  The  curriculum  is  genuinely 
interesting,  because,  by  being  suited  to  the  nature  of  the 
child,  it  calls  forth  and  modifies  strong  instincts  and 
habits,  and  thus  reduces  to  a  minimum  conflicting  re- 
sponses, the  parallel  of  the  feeling  of  effort,  which  are  accen- 
tuated when  the  selected  environment  of  the  school  does  not 
fit  the  nature  of  the  child.  (2)  It  secures  normal  effort, 
because  the  types  of  environment  it  provides  for  the 
school  correspond  to  the  normal  environment  outside  the 
school.  Whatever  conflicts  of  responses  occur  under  such 
conditions  are  conflicts  which  must  be  overcome  before 
the  organism  can  be  adapted  to  the  wider  environment 
beyond  the  school.  There  are  no  mere  school  situations 
devised  to  avoid  conflicts  on  the  one  hand,  or  to  induce 
them  on  the  other.  (3)  Adequate  provision  is  made  for 
effective  drill,  which  is  called  forth  only  when  it  must  be- 


384  The  Principles  of  Education 

come  a  part  of  some  reaction  for  the  successful  comple- 
tion of  the  adjustment  in  which  the  reaction  is  checked. 
An  adjustment  which  requires  rapid  counting  may  be 
blocked  until  drill  on  the  multiplication  table  modifies 
the  reaction  in  such  manner  that  it  overcomes  the  obstruc- 
tion. (4)  The  organization  of  subject  matter  is  adapted 
to  the  pupil's  stage  of  development,  because  the  curric- 
ulum provides  for  the  organization  of  responses  only  to 
the  extent  that  this  modifies  his  reactions  in  such  manner 
as  to  make  adjustment  more  effective.  (5)  The  true 
basis  for  the  distinction  between  the  required  and  the 
elective  courses  in  the  curriculum  is  found  in  the  difference 
between  reactions  which  best  promote  group  adjustment 
when  acquired  by  all  organisms  in  common  and  those 
which  best  promote  group  adjustment  when  divided 
among  various  classes  of  organisms  that  are  equipped  by 
nature  so  that  they  acquire  more  economically  and  effect- 
ively one  or  another  of  these  special  kinds  of  reaction. 
(6)  The  fact  that  the  curriculum  provides  for  the  best 
adjustment  to  environment  means  that  it  provides  for 
the  highest  practical  efficiency.  Mere  "  book  learning  " 
is  a  parallel  of  changes  which  books  make  in  the  central 
nervous  system  and  which  do  not  find  expression  in 
definite  and  useful  forms  of  adjustment.  (7)  Since 
culture  is  the  parallel  of  the  development  of  the  nervous 
system  through  the  acquiring  of  new  reactions,  the  richest 
culture  is  provided  for,  because  the  richest  development 
of  the  nervous  system  is  that  which  leads  to  the  best  ad- 
justment to  environment.  (8)  Those  who  leave  school 
before  completing  the  curriculum,  as  well  as  those  who  do 
complete  it,  make  the  most  profitable  use  of  the  time  they 
devote  to  school  work,  because  the  curriculum  develops  the 
most  useful  adjustments  in  the  order  in  which  they  can  be 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         385 

acquired  most  economically.  (9)  The  fact  that  each 
new  reaction  acquired  under  the  influence  of  the  curric- 
ulum both  gives  a  better  immediate  adjustment  and 
serves  as  a  basis  for  acquiring  still  further  forms  of  adjust- 
ment, marks  as  artificial  the  distinction  between  prepara- 
tion for  college  and  preparation  for  life.  (10)  The  curric- 
ulum makes  it  possible  for  the  school  to  exercise  properly 
its  function  of  selecting  the  more  efficient  pupils,  since 
this  selection  can  be  made  only  upon  the  basis  of  acquired 
reactions  that  are  effective  in  adjustment.  (11)  The 
curriculum  is  simplified  through  the  elimination  of  situa- 
tions which  call  forth  reactions  that  do  not  directly  pro- 
mote better  adjustment  in  the  world  beyond  the  school. 
This  elimination  prevents  the  overcrowded  condition 
found  in  the  traditional  curriculum.  (12)  There  are  no 
breaks  between  the  work  of  the  schools  of  different  rank 
in  the  educational  hierarchy,  because  there  are  no  breaks 
in  the  development  of  the  nervous  system,  in  which  new 
reactions  are  developed  through  modification  of  those 
already  acquired. 

REFERENCES 

MtJNSTERBERG,  H.,  Psychology  and  the  Teacher,  1910,  pp.  253-270. 
(Discusses  the  fundamental  considerations  valuable  in  the  selec- 
tion of  the  curriculum.) 

BETTS,  G.  H.,  Social  Principles  of  Education,  1913,  pp.  231-290. 
(Gives  a  general  discussion  of  the  nature  and  function  of  the 
curriculum.) 

MACVANNEL,  J.  A.,  Outline  of  a  Course  in  (he  Philosophy  of  Education, 
1912,  pp.  185-193.  (Gives  a  condensed  statement  of  the  prob- 
lems of  the  curriculum  and  of  the  bases  for  the  selection  of  school 
studies.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  Moral  Principles  in  F^ducation,  1909,  pp.  31-44.  (Dis- 
cusses the  social  nature  of  the  curriculum.) 


386  The  Principles  of  Education 

RUEDIGER,  W.  C.,  The  Principles  of  Education,  1910,  pp.  167-185. 
(Gives  a  general  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  curriculum  and 
of  the  criteria  for  selecting  it.) 

RAYMONT,  T.,  The  Principles  of  Education,  1904,  pp.  89-118.  (Criti- 
cizes the  idea  of  formal  discipline  as  a  basis  for  selecting  the  cur- 
riculum, and  holds  that  a  rationally  conceived  curriculum  must 
be  the  resultant  of  the  nature  of  the  child  and  of  the  require- 
ments of  the  community.) 

KLAPPER,  P.,  Principles  of  Educational  Practice,  1912,  pp.  91-150. 
(Discusses  the  relation  between  the  child  and  the  curriculum, 
and  the  social  organization  and  content  of  the  curriculum.) 

CHARTERS,  W.  W.,  Methods  of  Teaching,  1912,  pp.  107-117.  (Dis- 
cusses with  reference  to  the  high  school  course  of  study  the  factors 
in  the  selection  of  subject  matter  and  the  details  of  the  selection, 
and  gives  a  tentative  list  of  required  subjects.) 

HANUS,  P.,  Educational  Aims  and  Educational  Values,  1908,  pp.  3-20. 
(Discusses  the  relative  values  of  subject  matter.  Compare  the 
terms  "purposes"  and  "means  of  control"  with  the  terms  "in- 
centives "  and  "  power  "  used  in  this  reference.) 

SPENCER,  H.,  Education;  Intellectual,  Moral  and  Physical,  1890,  Ch.  I. 
(Gives  a  brief  in  support  of  science  as  the  knowledge  of  most 
worth.) 

MOORE,  E.  C.,  What  is  Education?  1915,  pp.  59-103.  (Criticizes  the 
doctrine  of  general  discipline.) 

BAGLEY,  W.  C.,  The  Educative  Process,  1907,  pp.  203-217.  (Discusses 
the  doctrine  of  formal  discipline.) 

STRAYER,  G.  D.,  A  Brief  Course  in  the  Teaching  Process,  1911,  pp.  232- 
246.  (Discusses  the  relation  of  the  teacher  to  the  course  of 
study.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  The  Child  and  the  Curriculum,  1902,  pp.  7-10.  (Discusses 
the  relation  between  the  child  and  the  curriculum.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Sometimes  boys  who  make  low  records  in  their  school  work 
become  very  successful  members  of  society  after  they  have  left 
school.     How  would  you  explain  this  fact? 

2.  A  prominent  educator  has  said :    "I  am  profoundly  convinced 


The  Making  of  the  Curriculum         387 

that  the  greatest  educational  need  of  our  time,  in  higher  and  lower 
schools  alike,  is  a  fuller  appreciation  on  the  part  of  the  teachers  of 
what  human  institutions  really  mean  and  what  tremendous  moral 
issues  and  principles  they  involve."  Do  you  agree  with  this  state- 
ment? Give  reasons  for  your  agreement  or  disagreement. 

3.  What  is  the  function  in  a  democracy  of  each  of  the  following : 
the  elementary  school,  the  secondary  school,  the  junior  high  school, 
the  senior  high  school,  the  normal  school,  the  junior  college,  the 
college,  the  university? 

4.  What  serious  tendency  to  error  should  be  guarded  against  in  the 
making  of  secondary  school  curricula  with  a  view  especially  to  voca- 
tional training? 

5.  What  changes  do  you  wish  had  been  made  in  the  curriculum 
you  pursued  in  the  elementary  school  ?     In  the  secondary  school  ? 

6.  In  the  secondary  school  you  attended,  point  out  some  of  the 
recent  changes  that  have  been  made  to  meet  new  social  conditions. 

7.  In  the  secondary  school  you  attended,  what  should  have  been 
the  required  subjects  and  what  should  have  been  the  elective  sub- 
jects?   Why? 

8.  What  should  be  taken  into  consideration  in  determining  col- 
lege entrance  requirements  ? 

9.  a.  What  is  the  chief  cause  of  the  break  students  often  find  in 
their  educational  experience  when  they  go  from  a  secondary  school 
to  a  college?     b.  Is  this  a  fault  in  our  educational  system ?    Explain. 

10.  What  are  some  of  the  more  important  requirements  of  the 
work  of  a  teacher  for  which  the  curriculum  of  a  professional  school 
for  the  training  of  teachers  should  make  provision  ? 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  PRINCIPLES  UNDERLYING  THE 
METHODS  OF  TEACHING 

The  function  of  teaching  is  to  supplement  the  guiding  influence 
of  the  subject  matter  included  in  the  curriculum.  There  are 
two  general  types  of  teaching,  —  that  which  guides  the  pupil 
in  acquiring  new  purposes  and  that  which  guides  him  in  acquir- 
ing new  means  of  control.  The  teacher  should  know  the  steps 
in  each  type  of  teaching  in  order  to  find  exactly  what  assistance 
is  needed  when  the  pupil  meets  some  difficulty  in  learning. 
In  the  teaching  of  purpose-giving  subject  matter,  the  steps  are 
to  make  the  pupil  (1)  feel  the  value  of  some  purpose,  (2)  asso- 
ciate with  this  purpose  a  means  for  realizing  it,  and  (3)  use  the 
means  either  actually  or  imaginatively  in  attaining  the  purpose. 
In  the  teaching  of  control  subject  matter,  the  steps  are  to  make 
the  pupil  (1)  try  to  attain  some  purpose  in  the  realizing  of  which 
he  meets  a  difficulty  that  can  be  overcome  by  the  new  means  of 
control  about  to  be  presented,  (2)  locate  the  difficulty  by  making 
and  testing  hypotheses,  (3)  solve  in  a  similar  way  the  problem 
arising  from  this  difficulty,  and  (4)  use  the  solution  in  attaining 
his  original  purpose.  Important  perversions  of  the  methods  of 
teaching  are  (1)  the  use  of  extrinsic  motivation,  (2)  "telling," 
(3)  the  over-emphasis  of  memory  work,  and  (4)  the  confusion  of 
appreciation  and  control  lessons. 


Teaching  is  required  in  order  to  give  the  detailed  guidance  neces- 
sary for  effectively  connecting  the  subject  matter  of  the  curriculum 
with  the  experience  of  the  pupil.  There  are  two  types  of  teach- 
ing, —  that  which  guides  the  pupil  in  acquiring  new  purposes  and 
that  which  guides  him  in  acquiring  new  means  of  control.  The 
teacher  should  know  the  steps  in  each  type  of  teaching  in  order 
to  find  exactly  what  assistance  is  needed  when  the  pupil  meets 
some  difficulty  in  learning. 

388 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  389 

The  function  of  teaching  is  to  supplement  the  guiding 
influence  of  the  subject  matter  included  in  the  curriculum. 
Pupils  who  may  be  regarded  as  in  practically  the  same 
stage  of  development  vary  greatly  in  the  appreciation 
and  the  knowledge  upon  which  new  purposes  and  new 
means  of  control  can  be  based;  they  vary  greatly  also 
in  their  susceptibility  to  guidance.  The  subject  matter 
included  in  the  curriculum  cannot  provide  for  all  these 
individual  differences.  Indeed,  until  the  individual  is 
actually  engaged  in  studying  the  subject  matter,  the  de- 
tails of  the  assistance  which  he  needs  may  not  be  known. 
Teaching  is  required,  consequently,  to  give  the  detailed 
guidance  necessary  for  effectively  connecting  the  subject 
matter  of  the  curriculum  with  the  experience  of  the  pupil. 
The  greater  the  misfit  between  the  subject  matter  included 
in  the  curriculum  and  the  experience  of  the  pupil,  the 
more  is  the  work  of  the  teacher  necessary. 

Since  teaching  is  "  causing  the  pupil  to  learn,"  and 
since  this  can  be  done  only  by  making  the  methods  of 
teaching  conform  to  the  process  through  which  the  pupil 
acquires  (1)  new  purposes  and  (2)  new  means  of  control, 
there  must  be  two  general  types  of  teaching.  Writers  on 
methods  of  teaching  have  differentiated  a  number  of  types 
of  lessons,  such  as  inductive,  deductive,  study,  drill, 
review,  recitation,  lecture,  and  appreciation  lessons.1  All 
of  these  may,  however,  be  classified  under  the  two  main 
types  mentioned ;  their  functions  are  to  give  either  new 
purposes  or  better  control.  The  appreciation  lesson  is  to 
give  a  new  appreciation  of  value,  or,  in  other  words,  a 
new  purpose ;  the  inductive,  deductive,  and  drill  lessons 
are  primarily  to  give  better  control ;  the  study,  review, 

1  See  Strayer,  G.  D.,  A  Brief  Course  in  the  Teaching  Process,  pp. 
41-112. 


390  The  Principles  of  Education 

recitation,  and  lecture  lessons  may  belong  to  either  class, 
according  to  the  function  of  the  subject  matter  used.  In 
each  of  these  cases,  the  attention  of  the  pupil  is  centered 
upon  defining  and  solving  problems  or  upon  intimately 
associating  some  means  with  a  strongly  appreciated  end 
so  that  the  means  receives  value  from  its  intimate  asso- 
ciation with  the  end. 

The  subdivision  of  the  two  main  classes  of  lessons  into 
various  types  is  useful,  since  it  shows  the  different  kinds  of 
situations  in  which  the  principles  for  teaching  apprecia- 
tion or  the  principles  for  teaching  control  may  be  used. 
In  the  inductive  lesson  the  pupil  acquires  a  general  idea 
for  control  on  the  basis  of  particulars;  in  the  deductive 
lesson  he  discovers  how  to  apply  a  general  idea  to  the 
control  of  some  particular  situation ;  in  the  drill  lesson  he 
attains  skill  in  some  activity ;  in  the  review  lesson  he  learns 
more  effectually,  usually  through  better  organization, 
subject  matter  with  which  he  has  some  familiarity ;  in  the 
recitation  lesson  he  gains  appreciation  or  control  through 
class  instruction;  and  in  the  study  lesson  he  acquires 
better  appreciation  or  control  through  private  study. 

A  knowledge  of  the  steps  through  which  the  pupil 
acquires  new  purposes  and  new  means  of  control  is  useful 
to  the  teacher  in  determining  the  exact  difficulty  when 
the  learning  process  does  not  proceed  effectively.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  teacher  emphasize  each  of  these 
steps.  Indeed,  so  long  as  the  pupil  learns  economically 
by  himself  the  teacher  is  not  needed.  When,  however,  the 
pupil  does  need  assistance,  the  teacher  should  know  the 
steps  in  the  process  of  learning  so  that  he  can  put  his 
finger  on  the  difficulty  and  know  what  to  do  in  order  to 
overcome  it.  An  analogy  may  be  found  in  the  running 
of  an  automobile.  So  long  as  the  mechanism  of  the 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  391 

automobile  runs  effectively,  no  interference  with  it  is 
necessary ;  but  if  the  mechanism  does  not  run  effectively, 
one  must  understand  the  steps  in  the  transmission  of 
power  from  the  gasoline  tank  to  the  wheels  in  order  to 
locate  and  to  overcome  the  difficulty. 

II 

In  the  teaching  of  history,  which  is  purpose-giving  subject  matter, 
the  steps  are  to  make  the  pupil  (1)  appreciate  the  purpose  which 
induced  people  of  the  past  to  devise  the  institutional  practice  he  ia 
studying  historically,  (2)  associate  with  this  purpose  the  practice  aa 
a  means  devised  for  attaining  it,  and  (3)  accept  in  imagination  the 
practice  as  serving  the  purpose. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  teaching  of  history  in  the  light 
of  the  steps  through  which  an  individual  acquires  new 
purposes.  These  steps,  as  we  have  learned,  are  (1)  a 
feeling  of  the  value  of  some  purpose,  (2)  the  associating 
with  this  purpose  of  some  means  for  its  realization,  and 
(3)  the  use  of  this  means  in  realizing  the  purpose.1 

(1)  The  purposes  which  the  pupil  should  appreciate 
in  the  study  of  history  are  those  that  led  people  in  the 
past  to  devise  the  various  institutional  practices  into 
which  history  gives  an  insight.  There  must,  of  course, 
be  some  purpose  which  leads  the  pupil  to  turn  from  his 
present  activity,  whatever  it  may  be,  to  the  study  of  his- 
tory. This  may  be  a  desire  to  get  a  better  appreciation  of 
a  specific  practice  or  of  a  system  of  practices  in  govern- 
ment, religion,  education,  or  some  other  human  activity. 
It  may  be  a  desire  to  enjoy  an  hour  of  reading  or  to  fulfill 
some  requirement  in  professional  training.  The  motive 
mentioned  first  is  the  best,  because  it  leads  the  pupil  to 
understand  the  true  function  of  his  study.  These  motives, 

1  See  Ch.  IV. 


392  The  Principles  of  Education 

however,  are  soon  combined  with  a  sympathetic  apprecia- 
tion of  the  aims  that  guided  the  activities  of  the  men 
whose  history  he  is  studying.  If  history  is  uninteresting 
to  the  pupil  when  it  is  neither  too  elementary  nor  too 
advanced  for  him,  the  subject  matter  is  either  badly 
written  or  poorly  taught.  It  should  enable  him  to  relive 
the  most  exciting  events  in  the  drama  of  life,  events  which 
have  involved  important  changes  in  social  practices  and 
which  for  that  reason  must  have  been  accompanied  by 
strong  purposes  and  anxious  thought.  When  the  pupil 
stands  with  the  embattled  New  England  farmers  in  their 
struggle  for  democracy,  he  may  forget  that  he  began  this 
study  in  order  to  acquire  a  truer  appreciation  of  present 
democratic  practices.  If  his  appreciation  of  those  pur- 
poses which  guided  the  development  of  our  political 
practices  is  strong  enough  to  drive  the  present  from  his 
consciousness,  we  can  rest  assured  that  when  he  has 
traced  the  historical  movements  up  to  the  present,  the 
activities  of  to-day  will  return  to  his  consciousness  enriched 
by  the  significance  and  the  value  with  which  these  older 
purposes  have  endowed  them. 

The  fact  that  the  best  motive  for  studying  history  is 
to  get  a  better  appreciative  understanding  of  present 
practices  does  not  mean  that  the  course  of  history  should 
be  traced  backwards  from  present  practices.  This  pro- 
cedure would  be  as  abnormal  as  that  of  reading  a  story  or 
a  drama  backwards.  Later  purposes  and  problems  get 
their  value  and  meaning  from  those  which  have  gone 
before  just  as  truly  in  the  case  of  society  as  in  the  case  of 
an  individual. 

Although  the  motive  which  has  led  the  pupil  to  open 
his  book  of  history  may  linger  in  the  background  to 
strengthen  and  guide  his  interest  in  the  subject  matter, 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  393 

the  first  step  peculiar  to  the  teaching  of  history  is  that  of 
leading  the  pupil  to  appreciate  the  purpose  which  has 
called  forth  a  new  social  practice.  If  the  study  of  classical 
Latin  at  the  time  of  the  Italian  Renaissance  is  the  new 
practice  to  be  considered,  the  pupil  who  is  familiar  with 
the  formal  practices  before  that  time  should  be  led  to 
have  a  vivid  appreciation  of  the  new  ideals,  —  political, 
industrial,  commercial,  etc.,  —  that  conflicted  with  the 
authority  of  old  traditions,  made  these  old  traditions  un- 
satisfactory, and  precipitated  a  period  of  individualism 
in  which  men's  attention  was  centered  anew  upon  the 
values  of  human  life.  In  order  to  appreciate  this  situa- 
tion, the  pupil  must  feel  the  values  of  the  new  ideals  which 
conflicted  with  the  old.  If  he  does  not  feel  these  values, 
the  words  which  he  uses  to  describe  the  situation  lack 
true  significance  for  him.  In  order  to  assist  the  pupil 
to  acquire  this  appreciative  understanding  of  the  situa- 
tion, the  teacher  is  justified  in  appealing  to  the  pupil's 
own  experiences,  which,  indeed,  are  the  only  material  at 
the  teacher's  disposal  for  creating  the  situation  in  the 
pupil's  imagination.  Analogies  are  useful  here.  The 
pupil  has  experienced  new  values  in  conflict  with  old  ones. 
The  teacher  as  an  artist  may  use  this  and  other  experi- 
ences in  assisting  the  pupil  to  rebuild  in  imagination  the 
purpose  which  led  to  the  introduction  of  the  study  of 
classical  Latin  at  the  time  of  the  Italian  Renaissance. 
Mere  generalizations  which  do  not  appeal  to  the  pupil's 
feeling  of  value  are  cheap  substitutes  for  the  definite 
appreciations  which  should  be  given  in  this  first  step  in 
the  teaching  of  history. 

(2)  When  the  pupil  has  acquired  an  appreciation  of  the 
purpose  which  called  forth  a  new  social  practice,  he  should 
be  led  to  associate  with  this  purpose  the  new  practice  as 


394  The  Principles  of  Education 

a  means  devised  for  attaining  it.  When  the  pupil  has 
appreciated  the  Renaissance  purpose  of  making  the  most 
out  of  human  life,  for  example,  he  should  next  understand 
how  classical  literature  provided  the  means  which  men  of 
the  time  felt  was  necessary  for  guiding  them  to  realize 
this  purpose.  This  literature  records  the  best  experience 
of  highly  civilized  peoples  who  for  generations  struggled 
to  realize  an  ideal  similar  to  that  which  Italians  under  the 
influence  of  the  Renaissance  were  eager  to  realize.  Some 
brief  representative  selections  from  this  literature  would 
be  useful  here  to  enable  the  pupil  to  understand  how  it 
met  the  needs  of  these  Italians.  The  pupil  cannot  relive 
the  historical  situation,  and  thereby  understand  and 
appreciate  its  significance,  without  some  insight  into  this 
literature.  It  is  one  thing  to  tell  the  pupil  that  at  the 
time  of  the  Renaissance  the  classics  helped  Italians  to 
attain  their  purpose;  it  is  another  thing  to  cause  the 
pupil  to  feel  the  desire  of  those  who  participated  in  the 
Renaissance  movement  and  to  understand  through  some 
knowledge  of  the  content  of  the  classical  literature  used 
how  this  literature  helped  to  satisfy  their  desire.  The 
pupil  must  reenact  in  imagination  the  essential  parts  of 
the  drama  of  the  past,  if  history  is  to  become  a  genuine 
part  of  his  experience. 

(3)  So  long  as  the  pupil  is  dealing  with  the  past,  the 
third  step,  —  that  is,  using  the  means  in  realizing  the 
purpose,  —  must  of  necessity  be  merely  a  fiat  of  the  will 
which  accepts  the  means  as  in  the  service  of  the  purpose. 

Society  never  reaches  the  end  of  its  purposes.  Chang- 
ing conditions  bring  new  appreciations  of  value.  In 
studying  the  historical  change  from  emphasis  upon  the 
content  of  the  classics  to  emphasis  upon  the  linguistic 
forms,  the  pupil  should  be  led  to  appreciate  the  purposes 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  395 

which,  in  turn,  were  responsible  for  this  change.  Later, 
as  he  reaches  in  his  study  the  apparent  enrichment  that 
comes  to  this  formalism  when  it  is  regarded  as  a  means 
of  formal  discipline,  he  should  be  led  to  appreciate  the 
value  of  mental  power  as  it  was  then  understood,  in  com- 
parison with  the  value  of  any  specific  content  of  facts. 
At  that  time  the  facts  one  might  learn  appeared  compara- 
tively narrow  and  limited  in  application  and  not  at  all 
certain  to  be  those  needed  later  to  guide  one's  activity, 
but  mental  power  was  evidently  useful  in  the  guiding  of 
activity  in  all  situations.  Facts  could  be  acquired 
readily  when  needed,  but  mental  power  could  be  devel- 
oped only  by  a  long  process  of  training.  To  those  who 
believed  in  formal  discipline  it  appeared  that  the  formal 
study  of  language  would  develop  this  mental  power. 
Although  later  thinkers  have  proved  the  doctrine  of 
formal  discipline  to  be  erroneous,  the  student  of  the  his- 
tory of  education  should  appreciate  how  it  appeared  to 
the  people  of  the  period  he  is  studying. 

If  the  pupil  does  not  know  that  the  doctrine  of  formal 
discipline  is  erroneous,  the  teacher  may  prevent  the  fixing 
of  this  false  idea  by  remarking  incidentally  that  later 
scientists  found  the  doctrine  of  formal  discipline  untrue ; 
but  the  detailed  study  of  the  scientific  refutation  of  this 
doctrine  as  it  appeared  later  in  the  development  of  edu- 
cational thought  would,  if  introduced  in  the  study  of  the 
time  when  the  doctrine  first  appeared  historically,  spoil 
the  pupil's  historical  perspective.  In  the  study  of  the 
history  of  education,  the  pupil  should  not  take  up  this 
refutation  until  he  has  reached  the  period  in  historical  de- 
velopment when  it  appeared. 

The  general  steps  that  have  been  illustrated  above  are 
essential  to  the  teaching  of  any  historical  change,  whether 


396  The  Principles  of  Education 

in  politics,  industry,  education,  religion,  or  in  any  other 
department  of  social  activity.  It  may  be  a  change  in  a 
written  creed,  the  establishment  of  a  protective  tariff,  a 
new  practice  in  educational  administration,  the  introduc- 
tion of  a  new  subject  into  a  school  curriculum,  or  the 
passing  of  a  law.  If  the  pupil  does  not  have  an  apprecia- 
tion of  the  value  of  the  purposes  which  people  living  at  the 
time  felt  when  they  introduced  the  new  practice,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  teacher  to  help  him  build  up  this  appreciation ; 
if  he  does  not  have  an  understanding  of  how  the  new  prac- 
tice was  devised  in  the  service  of  this  purpose,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  teacher  to  help  him  get  this  understanding. 

Even  in  the  case  of  minor  social  practices,  the  pupil 
should  be  led  to  appreciate  the  ends  which  they  served. 
In  studying  the  use  of  rivalry  as  a  motive  in  Jesuit  educa- 
tion, for  example,  the  pupil  should  be  led  to  appreciate 
the  purpose  of  overcoming  the  monotony  of  short  lessons 
and  many  reviews  in  a  subject  matter  not  well  suited  to 
the  interests  of  youths.  He  should  be  led  to  appreciate 
also  that  the  Jesuit  purpose  of  maintaining  kindly  rela- 
tions with  the  pupils  forbade  the  use  of  the  fear  of  pun- 
ishment as  a  motive  for  study. 

The  use  of  the  means  in  realizing  the  purpose  must, 
we  have  said,  be  only  a  fiat  of  the  will  which  accepts  the 
new  practice  as  a  means  to  the  appreciated  purpose. 
When,  however,  the  web  of  historical  connections  be- 
tween the  changing  purposes  and  the  changing  practices 
devised  to  realize  them  has  been  woven  up  to  the  present 
time  in  the  pupil's  experience,  he  recognizes  in  present- 
day  social  practices  values  that  directly  affect  his  practical 
action.  So  far  as  possible,  the  school  should  offer  oppor- 
tunity for  the  pupil  to  engage  in  social  activities  for  the 
sake  of  these  values. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  397 

Many  teachers  now  believe  that  the  pupil  should  learn 
history  by  solving  problems.  The  principles  of  teaching 
given  are  entirely  consistent  with  this  belief.  Without 
problems  the  pupil  does  not  think  in  his  study.  The 
steps  which  we  have  outlined  make  adequate  provision  for 
thinking  and  are  intended  to  show  what  kinds  of  problems, 
subsidiary  to  these  steps,  the  pupil  should  undertake  to 
solve.  His  problems  should  assist  him  in  acquiring  the 
experience  called  for  by  the  essential  steps  in  the  study  of 
history.  These  steps,  to  repeat,  are  (1)  to  appreciate  the 
purpose  which  induced  people  of  the  past  to  devise  the  in- 
stitutional practice  he  is  studying  historically,  (2)  to  as- 
sociate with  this  purpose  the  practice  as  a  means  devised 
for  attaining  it,  and  (3)  to  accept  in  imagination  the  prac- 
tice as  serving  the  purpose.  The  pupil  is  not  studying 
history  if  his  problems  are  to  find  what  lessons  people  of 
the  present  may  learn  from  the  experiences  of  earlier  gen- 
erations or  to  estimate  the  values  of  earlier  practices  in 
the  light  of  scientific  conclusions  of  the  present.  If  these 
are  his  problems,  he  has  turned  from  the  study  of  history 
to  the  study  of  science,  the  function  of  which  is  not  to  give 
appreciative  insight  into  present  practices,  but  to  perfect 
our  present  practices  when  their  aims  have  been  intelli- 
gently appreciated. 

Ill 

In  the  teaching  of  literature  and  of  the  other  fine  arts,  the  stops, 
which  correspond  to  thone  in  the  teaching  <>f  history,  are  to  make 
the  pupil  (1)  appreciate  through  analysis  and  synthesis  the  value 
presented  in  the  work  of  art,  (2)  associate  with  this  appreciated 
value  the  means  of  realizing  it,  and  (3)  use  the  moans  in  attaining 
the  value. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  teaching  of  literature  and  of 
the  other  fine  arts  in  the  light  of  the  three  steps  through 


398  The  Principles  of  Education 

which  a  new  purpose  is  developed.  These  steps  are  num- 
bered as  they  appear  in  the  discussion. 

(1)  The  purposes  which  the  pupil  should  appreciate 
in  the  normal  study  of  literature  are  those  presented  by 
the  literary  selections  which  he  studies.  As  in  the  case 
of  the  study  of  history,  there  must  be  some  purpose  which 
leads  the  pupil  to  turn  from  his  present  activity,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  to  the  study  of  a  literary  selection.  This 
purpose  may  be  to  improve  his  appreciations  of  worth,  to 
secure  pleasure,  to  enrich  his  topics  for  conversation, 
to  fulfill  the  requirements  for  graduation  from  school,  to 
secure  approval  by  his  teacher,  or  to  attain  some  other 
object  which  he  feels  worth  while.  The  desire  to  use 
literature  for  the  sake  of  improving  one's  appreciations 
of  worth  is  the  best  motive,  because  it  is  based  upon  a  true 
understanding  of  the  function  of  literature.  However, 
as  the  pupil  lives  in  imagination  through  the  experiences 
presented,  the  motive  which  turned  his  attention  to  lit- 
erary study  is,  under  normal  conditions,  soon  lost  in  a 
sympathetic  appreciation  of  the  values  included  in  the 
work  of  literary  art. 

The  appreciation  of  the  values  presented  in  a  work  of 
literary  art  is  secured  through  analysis  and  synthesis. 
Just  as  many  colors  may  be  blended  in  a  painting  to  give 
the  unitary  effect  of  a  glorious  sunset,  so  various  values,  as 
we  have  learned,  may  be  combined  in  a  literary  selection 
to  give  a  unitary  appreciation  in  the  experience  of  the 
reader.  If  the  pupil  does  not  strongly  appreciate  the 
values  represented  by  the  imagery  in  a  work  of  literary 
art  and  is  not  strongly  sensitive  to  the  more  direct  appeal 
made  by  the  beauty  of  form,  the  teacher  should  have  him 
study  each  value  separately  to  develop  his  appreciation 
of  it.  In  other  words,  there  should  be  an  analysis  of  the 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  399 

literary  selection  into  the  particular  values  which  it  pre- 
sents. After  feelings  of  worth  have  thus  been  developed 
separately,  they  should  be  combined  into  a  unitary  appre- 
ciation. This  synthesis  comes  through  experiencing  the 
literary  selection  as  a  whole.  Let  us  now  consider  illus- 
trations of  the  use  of  analysis  and  synthesis  as  the  means 
of  securing  the  appreciation  of  worth,  which  is  the  first 
essential  step  in  the  teaching  of  literature. 

The  Twenty-Third  Psalm  normally  presents  a  number 
of  particular  values,  such  as  those  of  the  good  shepherd, 
the  still  waters,  the  green  pastures,  and  the  protection 
against  enemies,  while  the  rhythmic  form  of  the  poem 
makes  a  direct  appeal  to  feeling.  The  experience  of  a 
pupil  in  modern  times  is  so  different  from  that  of  the  prim- 
itive people  for  whom  this  poem  was  written  that  for  him 
the  images  presented  probably  do  not  carry  with  them 
strong  feelings  of  worth.  He  has  not  acquired  strong 
purposes  to  attain  the  things  which  were  of  paramount 
importance  hi  the  life  of  a  pastoral  people.  If  he  does  not 
appreciate  these  values,  the  teacher  should  lead  him  to 
analyze  the  psalm  into  the  particular  images  presented 
and  to  study  each  separately.  In  accordance  with  the 
law  which  controls  the  development  of  new  purposes,  the 
teacher  can  then  develop  a  feeling  of  value  for  the  good 
shepherd,  the  still  waters,  the  green  pastures,  and  the 
protection  against  enemies,  by  presenting  each  of  these  as 
a  means  of  realizing  purposes  for  which  the  pupil  has 
acquired  appreciation.  The  teacher  should  lead  the 
pupil  to  build  through  constructive  imagination  concrete 
imagery  of  the  precarious  life  of  a  pastoral  people  that 
would  enable  him  in  a  measure  to  relive  the  experiences 
which  caused  them  to  appreciate  strongly  the  images 
presented  in  the  psalm.  For  example,  the  pupil,  drawing 


400  The  Principles  of  Education 

upon  his  own  limited  experience,  can  in  imagination  follow 
the  shepherd  and  the  sheep  through  the  hot  and  dusty 
fields  to  the  deep  well  of  cool  water,  which  receives  value 
from  the  important  purpose  it  serves.  Verbal  descrip- 
tions, pictures,  and  stories  of  pastoral  life  are  useful  in 
helping  the  pupil's  imagination.  When  due  appreciation 
has  been  acquired  for  each  of  the  images  presented  in  the 
psalm,  further  appreciation  may  be  developed  through 
the  direct  appeal  of  the  rhythmic  music  of  the  poetry, 
which,  if  necessary,  may  be  given  special  attention.  The 
psalm  taken  as  a  whole  unites  these  appreciations  of 
worth.  Oral  reading  is  an  important  help  in  this  synthesis. 
Let  us  consider  next  the  teaching  of  Browning's  poem 
entitled  Cleon.  Browning  represents  Cleon  as  having 
the  richest  blessings  the  world  can  give,  and  uses  image 
after  image  to  create  an  appreciation  of  these  blessings. 
He  says : 

The  master  of  thy  galley  still  unlades 
Gift  after  gift ;  they  block  my  court  at  last 
And  pile  themselves  along  its  portico 
Royal  with  sunset,  like  a  thought  of  thee. 

Appreciation  of  the  value  of  the  gifts  is  increased  by  the 
poetic  description  of  them.  Nature  as  well  as  the  king 
has  been  generous  with  Cleon,  who  says : 

I  have  not  chanted  verse  like  Homer,  no  — 

Nor  swept  string  like  Terpander,  no  —  nor  carved 

And  painted  men  like  Phidias  and  his  friend : 

I  am  not  great  as  they  are,  point  by  point. 

But  I  have  entered  into  sympathy 

With  these  four,  running  these  into  one  soul, 

Who,  separate,  ignored  each  other's  arts. 

Say,  is  it  nothing  that  I  know  them  all  ? 

The  wild  flower  was  the  larger ;  I  have  dashed 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  401 

Rose-blood  upon  its  petals,  pricked  its  cup's 
Honey  with  wine,  and  driven  its  seed  to  fruit, 
And  show  a  better  flower  if  not  so  large : 
I  stand  myself.     Refer  this  to  the  gods 
Whose  gift  alone  it  is !  which,  shall  I  dare 
(All  pride  apart),  upon  the  absurd  pretext 
That  such  a  gift  by  chance  lay  in  my  hand, 
Discourse  of  lightly  or  depreciate  ? 

Although  Cleon  has  all  these  blessings,  both  material  and 
spiritual,  he  longs  for  a  personal  immortality  compared 
with  which  these  blessings  amount  to  nothing.  This 
desire  is  expressed  in  the  words : 

I  dare  at  times  imagine  to  my  need 
Some  future  state  revealed  to  us  by  Zeus, 
Unlimited  in  capability 
For  joy,  as  this  is  in  desire  for  joy, 
—  To  seek  which,  the  joy-hunger  forces  us : 
That,  stung  by  straitness  of  our  life,  made  strait 
On  purpose  to  make  prized  the  life  at  large  — 
Freed  by  the  throbbing  impulse  we  call  death, 
We  burst  there  as  the  worm  into  the  fly, 
Who,  while  a  worm  still,  wants  his  wings.     But  no ! 
Zeus  has  not  yet  revealed  it ;  and  alas, 
He  must  have  done  so,  were  it  possible ! 

If  the  poem  does  not  excite  appropriate  feelings  on 
the  part  of  the  pupil,  the  teacher  should  lead  him  to 
analyze  it  into  the  various  images  presented  and  to 
acquire  an  appreciation  of  each  image.  The  pupil 
should  in  imagination  see  vividly  the  rich  gifts  along  the 
portico  royal  with  sunset;  he  should  appreciate  the 
significance  of  Homer,  Terpandcr,  and  Phidias ;  he 
should  feel  Cleon's  despair  despite  worldly  blessings, 
when,  confronted  only  by  death  and  oblivion,  he  longs 
for  "  some  future  state  .  .  .  unlimited  in  capability  for 


402  The  Principles  of  Education 

joy,  as  this  is  in  desire  for  joy."  History  and  mythology 
may  be  used  to  advantage  in  aiding  the  pupil  to  acquire 
the  appreciations  called  for  by  the  poem.  The  various 
feelings  of  worth  aroused  by  this  poem  should  not,  how- 
ever, remain  separate;  they  should  be  united  in  such 
manner  as  to  make  a  composite  feeling  of  the  worth  of 
personal  immortality.  When  the  pupil  has  acquired 
appreciations  of  the  particular  values  presented,  these 
appreciations  should  be  united  into  one  feeling  of  worth 
through  the  intimate  connections  which  the  poem  as  a 
whole  establishes  among  them. 

(2)  In  accordance  with  the  law  which  controls  the 
making  of  new  purposes,  we  find  that  the  second  step  in 
the  teaching  of  literature  is  to  bring  the  appreciated  value 
into  intimate  association  with  the  means  of  realizing  it, 
so  that  the  value  may  be  transferred  from  the  end  to  the 
means.  The  Twenty-Third  Psalm  brings  the  end  and  the 
means  together  in  a  way  so  simple  and  direct  that  the 
pupil  would  probably  take  this  step  without  the  assistance 
of  the  teacher.  The  pupil  should  readily  see  that  following 
the  Lord  as  the  sheep  follow  the  shepherd  is  the  means  of 
attaining  the  values  called  to  mind  by  the  psalm.  The 
combined  appreciations  which  the  pupil  has  for  the  shep- 
herd, the  green  pastures,  the  still  waters,  and  the  pro- 
tection against  enemies  may  now  be  transferred  to 
following  the  Lord,  which,  having  received  this  transferred 
value,  itself  becomes  a  purpose.  If  the  pupil  does  not  see 
the  analogy  between  the  sheep  following  the  shepherd 
and  the  person  following  the  Lord,  his  attention  should  be 
called  to  ways  in  which  he  might  follow  the  Lord  by  doing 
what  the  Lord  would  have  him  do  in  following  religious 
precepts.  But  in  the  case  of  the  poem  by  Browning, 
since  it  is  merely  suggested  that  Christianity  is  the  means 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  403 

to  the  value  for  which  Cleon  longed,1  the  pupil  may  need 
the  assistance  of  the  teacher  in  associating  the  means  with 
the  end.  If  such  assistance  is  needed,  the  teacher  should 
lead  the  pupil  to  make  the  association  by  suggestion 
rather  than  by  telling  him  directly.  In  so  far  as  the  pupil 
himself  discovers  the  connection  between  the  means  and 
the  end,  the  effect  is  more  vivid  and  lasting.  In  Tenny- 
son's Flower  in  the  Crannied  Wall  the  pupil  should  be  led 
to  recognize  the  little  flower  as  a  means  of  revealing  the 
mysteries  of  the  nature  of  God  and  man ;  if  the  individual 
could  only  understand  the  flower,  he  could  read  in  it  the 
secret  of  the  universe. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  second  step  follow  the 
first  in  time ;  the  two  may  be  taken  at  the  same  time,  in 
which  case  the  second  step  is  distinguished  from  the  first 
logically  rather  than  chronologically.  In  the  Twenty- 
Third  Psalm,  following  the  Lord  is  represented  as  the 
means  for  the  attainment  of  each  value  in  turn  when  this 
value  is  called  to  mind.  The  synthesis  of  values  which 
combine  to  make  the  reader  desire  to  follow  the  Lord  as 
the  sheep  follow  the  shepherd  takes  place  normally  while 
the  means  is  being  associated  with  an  end  in  each  new 
image  called  to  mind.  In  Cleon,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
unitary  appreciation  is  developed  before  Christianity  is 
suggested  as  the  means  of  realizing  it. 

(3)  In  accordance  with  the  law  which  controls  the 
making  of  new  purposes,  the  third  step  in  the  teaching  of 
literature  is  to  provide  opportunity  for  the  pupil  to  use 
the  means  in  realizing  the  end.  The  simplest  action  that 
the  pupil  can  take  in  this  direction  is  to  acknowledge  the 
truth  of  the  relationship  between  the  means  and  the  end 

1  This  suggestion  is  made  by  the  incidental  reference  to  St.  Paul  in 
the  last  stanza,  which  is  quoted  on  page  222. 


404  The  Principles  of  Education 

represented  by  the  work  under  discussion.  This  action 
tends  to  transfer  the  value  from  the  end  to  the  means  and 
thus  to  make  a  new  ideal  which  may  function  when  the 
opportunity  is  offered.  The  new  ideal  is  more  likely  to  be 
fixed  in  the  experience  of  the  pupil,  however,  if  the 
teacher  provides  opportunities  for  a  fuller  action  in 
acquiring  the  appreciated  value.  Under  the  inspiration 
of  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm,  the  pupil  may  be  led  to  do 
some  good  act  which  may  be  interpreted  as  following  the 
Lord ;  under  the  inspiration  of  the  poem  Clean,  he  may  be 
led  to  do  something  for  the  sake  of  the  Christian  religion ; 
under  the  inspiration  of  Tennyson's  poem  Flower  in  the 
Crannied  Wall,  he  may  be  led  to  give  some  unaccustomed 
attention  to  a  flower.  If  the  pupil  does  not  act  in  some 
way  under  the  guidance  of  the  literary  selection  studied, 
the  appreciation  aroused  in  him  becomes  mere  vapid  senti- 
mentality, which  is  worse  than  useless,  because  it  dulls  his 
sensitiveness  to  the  influence  of  other  literary  selections. 

The  essential  steps  in  the  teaching  of  the  other  fine  arts 
are  the  same  as  those  in  the  teaching  of  literature.  (1) 
The  teacher  should  lead  the  pupil  to  analyze  the  work  of 
art  into  the  various  elements  through  which  it  excites 
appreciation1  and  should  assist  him  to  appreciate  strongly 
each  of  these  elements.  He  should  lead  the  pupil  also 
to  make  a  synthesis  of  the  appreciations  thus  developed 
for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  unitary  feeling  of  value. 
In  the  study  of  Turner's  painting,  The  Slave  Ship,2  the 
teacher  should  guide  the  attention  of  the  pupil  to  such 
elements  as  the  dismantled  ship,  the  manacled  human 
beings  struggling  in  the  stormy  waves,  the  sun  about  to 
give  the  tragedy  over  to  the  darkness  of  night.  As  the 
pupil  through  constructive  imagination  brings  the  impli- 
1  See  pp.  227-236.  2  See  pp.  230-231. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  405 

cations  of  each  to  consciousness,  his  appreciations  are 
strengthened.  When,  later,  he  studies  the  painting  as  a 
whole,  these  feelings  become  united  into  a  single  appre- 
ciation. In  assisting  the  pupil  to  study  the  Laocoon 
Group1  the  teacher,  allowing  the  pupil  as  much  initiative 
as  possible,  should  guide  him  to  study  such  elements  as 
the  beauty  of  form  and  the  strength  of  body  of  Laocoon 
and  his  sons,  the  physical  suffering  of  the  helpless  victims 
of  the  serpents,  and  the  father's  grief  over  the  terrible 
death  which  he  has  brought  upon  his  innocent  offspring. 
Consideration  of  the  statue  as  a  whole  will  then  unite  the 
feelings  incited  by  a  study  of  the  elements.  To  increase 
the  pupil's  appreciation  of  a  musical  composition,  the 
teacher  should  direct  his  attention  to  such  elements  as  the 
chief  theme,  its  development  and  relation  to  secondary 
themes,  the  flow  of  melody  throughout  the  piece,  and  the 
harmonic  structure  of  the  composition.  In  order  to  in- 
crease the  pupil's  appreciation  in  this  study,  the  teacher 
may  use  tones  and  combinations  of  tones  for  which  the 
pupil  has  acquired  appreciation ;  he  may  use  also  imagery 
that  carries  with  it  in  the  experience  of  the  pupil  feelings 
similar  to  those  which  the  music  should  excite.  A  syn- 
thesis of  the  feelings  developed  through  a  study  of  the 
elements  is  made  when  the  selection  is  heard  as  a  whole. 

(2)  As  the  second  step,  in  the  case  of  Turner's  The  Slave 
Ship,  the  teacher  should  guide  the  pupil  to  recognize  a 
causal  connection  between  slavery  and  the  horrible  scene 
of  the  slave  ship  so  that  the  pupil  may  feel  through  a 
transfer  of  negative  value  an  aversion  to  slavery.  In  the 
case  of  the  Laocoon  Group,  he  should  lead  the  pupil  to 
recognize  that  Laocoon's  defiance  of  a  supernatural  power 
led  to  the  suffering  represented  by  the  statue.  In  the 
1  See  pp.  228-229. 


406  The  Principles  of  Education 

case  of  a  musical  composition,  he  should  direct  the  pupil's 
attention  to  whatever,  as  a  means  to  the  value  presented 
by  the  music,  should  have  this  value  transferred  to  it. 
That  to  which  this  value  should  be  transferred  may  be 
such  a  thing  as  an  idea  suggested  by  a  symphony  or  pre- 
sented by  the  words  sung  to  music,  some  act  of  religious 
worship,  the  home  circle,  or  some  patriotic  undertaking. 

(3)  The  third  step  in  the  teaching  of  the  other  fine 
arts,  as  in  the  teaching  of  literature,  may  be  only  to  guide 
the  pupil  to  have  a  will  attitude  acknowledging  the 
relation  of  the  means  to  the  end,  or  it  may  be  to  lead 
the  pupil  to  some  further  action  under  the  influence  of 
the  work  of  art. 

It  is  commonly  recognized  that,  other  things  being 
equal,  a  person  who  has  a  strong  appreciation  of  a  work 
of  literature  or  other  fine  art  is  able  to  teach  it  better  than 
a  person  who  does  not  have  so  strong  an  appreciation  of 
it.  A  person  who  is  guided  to  a  new  purpose  by  a  work 
of  art  must  have  strongly  experienced  the  essential  steps 
necessary  to  acquire  this  new  appreciation.  He  may, 
therefore,  be  guided  by  his  own  experience  so  to  empha- 
size for  the  pupil  these  same  steps  that  the  pupil  gets 
a  similar  purpose.  When,  however,  feeling  is  guided 
by  a  rational  insight  into  the  process  by  which  a  work  of 
art  can  guide  the  pupil  to  a  new  ideal,  the  teacher  has  a 
more  definite  aid  to  accuracy  and  effectiveness  than  mere 
feeling;  he  knows  precisely  what  steps  the  pupil  must 
take  in  order  to  get  a  new  value,  and  is,  therefore,  not 
likely  to  make  omissions  or  to  give  emphasis  to  non- 
essentials.  Appreciation,  then,  accompanied  by  rational 
insight  into  the  process  through  which  this  appreciation 
is  developed  is  a  more  definite  guide  in  teaching  than 
feeling  alone. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  407 

IV 

In  the  teaching  of  history  and  of  the  fine  arts,  the  methods  that 
should  be  used  in  the  study,  the  review,  and  the  examination 
lessons  depend  upon  the  steps  in  teaching  explained  in  the  two 
preceding  sections. 

We  have  thus  far  considered  the  teaching  of  history  and 
of  the  fine  arts  when  the  teacher  is  with  the  pupil  through- 
out the  work.  Let  us  now  apply  the  principles  for  teach- 
ing new  purposes  to  the  study  lesson,  in  which  the  work  is 
done  in  private,  and  to  the  review  and  the  examination 
lessons. 

In  assigning  the  study  lesson,  the  teacher  must  antici- 
pate the  difficulties  of  the  pupil  and  give  him  the  guidance 
necessary  to  overcome  them.  In  the  case  of  history, 
study  should  consist  of  reading  plus  thinking.  The 
reading  matter  is  easily  available  in  the  textbooks; 
the  pupil  needs  the  teacher's  guidance  merely  with  regard 
to  what  he  should  think  about  in  connection  with  his 
reading.  Should  he  try  merely  to  understand  the  sen- 
tences of  the  book  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  given? 
Should  he  try  to  remember  the  facts  as  they  are  presented 
in  the  book?  Should  he  make  an  outline  of  the  important 
topics  and  commit  this  outline  to  memory?  Since  study 
is  self-teaching  and  since  history  is  purpose-giving  subject 
matter,  the  principles  which  control  the  making  of  new 
purposes  should  indicate  to  the  teacher  that  about  which 
the  pupil  should  think.  If  the  subsidiary  problems  thus 
indicated  are  difficult,  the  teacher  should  give  the  pupil 
the  guidance  he  needs  in  order  to  solve  them.  The 
amount  of  assistance  necessary  in  the  assignment  of 
the  lesson  decreases  as  the  pupil  gains  the  ability  to 
direct  his  own  study,  or,  in  other  words,  to  teach  himself. 

The  assignment  should  give  the  pupil  a  definite  motive 


408  The  Principles  of  Education 

for  further  study  and  also  a  knowledge  of  the  method  he 
should  use  in  order  to  get  the  results  intended.  In 
making  the  assignment  the  teacher  should  be  guided  by 
the  same  principles  that  guide  him  in  the  recitation  lesson 
described  above.  The  only  difference  is  that  his  guidance 
must  be  given  before  the  pupil  begins  to  study  and  not 
from  step  to  step  in  the  progress  of  the  study. 

Let  us  consider,  for  example,  what  the  teacher  should  do 
in  assigning  a  lesson  through  the  study  of  which  the 
pupil  is  to  acquire  an  appreciation  of  the  new  educational 
purpose  responsible  for  the  important  changes  in  educa- 
tion in  Massachusetts  from  1835  to  1860.  The  main 
problem  for  the  pupil  to  consider  in  his  study  in  this 
case  would  be  why  the  people  became  dissatisfied  with  the 
traditional  educational  practices  and.  sought  to  change 
them.  As  the  people  became  dissatisfied  with  the  tradi- 
tional education  because  they  had  a  new  educational 
purpose,  the  pupil  in  answering  the  question  adequately 
should  be  led  to  acquire  an  appreciation  of  this  new  pur- 
pose. The  statement  of  this  one  problem  may  be  all 
that  is  necessary  to  guide  the  private  study  of  an  advanced 
student.  In  the  case  of  a  less  advanced  pupil  where 
further  guidance  is  necessary,  the  teacher  may  assist  the 
pupil  to  imagine  the  educational  situation  in  Massa- 
chusetts. He  may  call  the  pupil's  attention  to  the 
religious  purpose  which  was  responsible  in  a  large  measure 
for  the  educational  practices  of  the  time  and  to  the 
weakening  of  this  purpose  by  toleration,  the  rise  of  various 
creeds,  and  the  tendency  to  transfer  the  burden  of  religious 
education  from  the  school  to  the  home  and  the  church. 
He  may  call  the  pupil's  attention  also  to  the  rise  of  the 
district  school  system,  and  to  other  matters  which  would 
help  him  to  appreciate  the  educational  situation  with 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  409 

which  the  new  purpose  made  the  people  dissatisfied.  If 
still  more  specific  guidance  is  needed,  the  teacher  may 
ask  the  pupil  to  find  why  the  growth  of  the  democratic 
government  since  the  American  Revolution,  the  growth  of 
cities  with  manufacturing  interests  fostered  by  the  tariff 
of  1816,  and  the  acquaintance  with  the  changes  which 
the  Pestalozzian  movement  brought  about  in  Prussian 
education  would  make  the  people  dissatisfied  with  their 
schools.  When  hi  solving  these  problems  the  pupil  is 
led  to  appreciate  the  new  political  and  industrial  pur- 
poses and  to  see  how  the  people  recognized  that  the 
school  should  serve  these  new  ideals,  he  can  then  appre- 
ciate practical  efficiency  as  a  new  educational  purpose. 
The  appreciation  of  the  end  is  transferred  to  the  means 
as  both  are  associated  in  the  mind  of  the  pupil.  This 
appreciation  may  be  made  more  definite  in  the  light  of 
the  criticisms  which  those  still  interested  in  religious 
education  and  in  classical  education  made  of  the  new 
educational  tendencies. 

A  lesson  assignment  to  find  the  new  purpose  which  was 
responsible  for  changes  in  political,  industrial,  religious, 
or  other  social  practices  may  be  made  in  the  same  way. 
The  pupil  should  be  given  the  problems  of  finding  what 
caused  dissatisfaction  with  the  old  practice,  and  what 
influences  established  the  new  purpose.  In  solving  these 
subsidiary  problems  through  private  study,  he  is  guided 
through  the  steps  necessary  to  give  him  an  appreciation 
of  the  new  purpose. 

If  the  main  aim  of  the  lesson  assigned  is  for  the  pupil 
to  learn  the  new  practices  introduced  at  any  particular 
time,  the  teacher  should  in  the  assignment  call  the  atten- 
tion of  the  pupil  to  the  new  social  purpose  in  the  interest 
of  which  these  new  practices  were  devised,  and  leave 


410  The  Principles  of  Education 

with  the  pupil  as  a  guide  to  his  study  the  question : 
How  in  the  judgment  of  the  people  of  the  time  did  the  new 
practices  serve  this  purpose?  If  further  direction  is 
needed  by  the  pupil,  the  teacher  may  lead  him  to  under- 
stand the  difficulties  in  which  the  people  found  them- 
selves and  then  ask  the  question :  What  means  did  the 
people  devise  to  overcome  each  of  these  difficulties  ?  Each 
means  devised,  if  adopted,  would  be  a  new  social  practice. 
If  the  new  lesson  is  to  find  the  new  social  practices  intro- 
duced into  education  at  the  time  of  the  revival  of  educa- 
tion in  Massachusetts  from  1835  to  1860,  the  first  step 
in  the  assignment  would  be  to  make  the  pupil  strongly 
appreciate  the  new  educational  purpose  as  presented 
above,  and  at  the  same  time  understand  the  traditional 
educational  situation.  His  problem  in  study  would  then 
be  to  find  how  the  new  practices  were  devised  to  serve 
the  new  educational  purpose.  If  further  direction  is 
necessary,  his  attention  could  be  called  to  some  of  the 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  making  educational  practices 
serve  the  new  purpose  of  social  efficiency.  Such  needs 
as  better  teachers,  better  equipment,  better  supervision, 
and  better  administration,  should  be  discovered  by  the 
pupil  under  the  direction  of  the  teacher.  Then  the  pupil 
is  prepared  to  find  in  his  study  how  normal  schools  were 
established  for  the  better  training  of  teachers,  how  a  state 
school  fund  was  secured  and  local  taxation  for  school 
purposes  stimulated,  how  a  state  board  of  education 
was  established,  and  how  steps  were  taken  to  abolish 
the  inefficient  district  system  in  the  interest  of  a  more 
centralized  administration.  The  pupil  may  be  guided 
in  a  similar  manner  to  appreciate  the  changes  in  any 
institutional  practices,  —  political,  religious,  industrial, 
or  domestic,  as  well  as  educational. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  411 

The  steps  in  the  making  of  a  new  purpose,  which  we 
found  at  the  basis  of  method  in  the  teaching  of  history, 
should  be  the  guides  in  the  review  and  the  examination 
lesson. 

The  main  purpose  of  the  review  lesson  in  history  is  to 
organize  the  pupil's  historical  experience  which  has  been 
developed  through  detailed  study.  The  basis  of  this 
organization  should  be  the  more  comprehensive  pur- 
poses which  have  led  to  changes  in  social  practice.  This 
organization  should  be  kept  intact  from  detailed  lesson 
to  detailed  lesson  by  connecting  the  particular  period 
studied  with  the  general  movements  which  have  preceded 
it.  In  this  way  the  details  will  appear  in  relation  to  a 
comprehensive  organization  of  such  general  movements 
as  the  Italian  Renaissance,  the  Protestant  Reformation, 
and  the  movements  towards  political  and  industrial 
democracy.  Subdivisions  of  these  should  also  be  made 
on  the  basis  of  purposes.  For  example,  the  Protestant 
Reformation,  which  emphasized  the  value  of  intelligent 
faith  for  salvation,  logically  led  to  the  movements  for 
universal,  vernacular,  and  compulsory  education,  which 
in  turn  became  the  ends  to  be  attained.  In  Germany  it 
led  to  the  ideal  of  state  education  and  in  England  to  the 
purpose  of  education  under  the  direction  of  church 
societies,  etc.  If  the  pupil  has  learned  through  detailed 
analysis  all  the  particular  movements,  the  various  minor 
purposes  involved,  and  the  changes  in  practice  to  which 
they  led,  his  whole  experience  of  the  general  movement 
is  unified  through  review. 

To  determine  directly  by  examination  whether  the 
pupil's  study  of  history  has  brought  the  results  for  which 
historical  study  is  normally  intended,  is  difficult,  because 
these  results  are  appreciations  of  value.  \Ve  can,  how- 


412  The  Principles  of  Education 

ever,  easily  test  these  results  indirectly  by  finding  through 
examination  whether  the  pupil  has  acquired  a  true  insight 
into  the  relation  between  the  historical  purposes  and  the 
historical  practices  which  would  give  him  an  appreciative 
understanding  of  the  present  social  activities.  One 
direct  test  of  the  pupil's  appreciative  understanding  of 
an  historical  situation  is  to  have  him  make  judgments 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  people  of  the  period  studied. 
In  the  history  of  education,  this  can  be  done  by  such 
questions  as  the  following:  What  is  the  most  important 
criticism  that  Johann  Sturm  would  have  made  of  Vittorino 
da  Feltre's  school  at  Mantua,  and  why  would  he  have  made 
this  criticism?  What  is  the  main  adverse  criticism  which 
Herbert  Spencer  would  have  made  of  the  method  advo- 
cated by  Rousseau  for  determining  the  curriculum? 
What  reply  would  those  under  the  influence  of  traditional 
educational  practices  at  some  particular  time  have  made 
to  the  criticisms  of  some  particular  educational  reformer 
who  advocated  changes  in  their  educational  practices? 

If  the  pupil  answers  such  questions  correctly  and  with- 
out assistance  when  they  are  put  before  him  for  the  first 
time,  he  probably  has  an  appreciative  insight  into  the 
educational  situations  involved  in  the  questions.  More- 
over, it  is  economical  to  test  the  pupil's  insight  into  two 
situations  by  one  question  and  answer.  Proper  examina- 
tions not  only  test  the  pupil's  accomplishment,  but  also 
educate  him  by  strengthening  and  making  definite  his 
historical  experience. 

A  work  of  literary  art  should  normally  make  an  imme- 
diate appeal  to  the  experience  of  those  who  read  it.  A 
poem  may,  however,  strike  unresponsive  cords  in  the 
experience  of  many  persons,  for  individuals  vary  greatly 
in  the  feelings  of  value  which  the  images  of  the  poem  call 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  413 

forth.  The  images  of  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm  were  un- 
doubtedly accompanied  by  strong  feelings  born  of  experi- 
ence on  the  part  of  those  who,  like  David,  lived  a  pastoral 
life,  but  these  images  may  arouse  only  a  weak  response 
in  the  experience  of  persons  living  under  modern  condi- 
tions. The  poem  Cleon  would  make  an  immediate  appeal 
to  a  person  with  the  rich  experience  of  Browning,  but  the 
immature  pupil  may  have  to  acquire  a  variety  of  new 
experiences  before  he  can  appreciate  the  values  which  the 
imagery  of  the  poem  would  normally  call  forth.  When  a 
work  of  literary  art  does  not  make  an  immediate  appeal 
to  the  experience  of  the  reader,  study  is  necessary  to 
furnish  him  with  an  appreciation  of  the  values  which  the 
images  should  call  forth.  This  fact  points  to  the  char- 
acter of  the  problems  necessary  for  a  study  lesson  in 
literature.  These  problems,  which  should  always  be  sub- 
sidiary to  the  main  steps  in  the  teaching  of  literature, 
should  lead  the  pupil  to  acquire  the  experience  which  will 
enable  him  to  feel  the  values  that  the  work  of  literary  art 
should  normally  call  forth.  In  his  book  The  Teaching  of 
Poetry  in  the  High  School,  Professor  A.  H.  R.  Fairchild 
says: 

The  study  of  a  poem,  unless  the  poem  be  of  the  very  simplest  kind, 
should  always  begin  in  class ;  if,  in  beginning  a  poem,  an  assignment 
for  home  study  is  made  at  all,  it  should  be  in  material  bearing  upon 
the  poem  and  essential  to  understanding  it,  not  a  part  of  the  poem 
itself. 

The  reason  for  this  plan  becomes  apparent  on  a  moment's  reflec- 
tion. The  study  of  poetry  in  the  high  school  implies  that  the  poem 
in  hand  represents  some  thought,  feeling,  or  action  that  is  an  ideal 
for  the  pupil.  To  the  teacher  this  ideal  may  be  very  simple,  very 
elementary,  perhaps  long  since  attained ;  but  for  the  pupil  it  repre- 
sents something  relatively  new  or  as  yet  unattained  in  experience. 
Required  to  make  his  own  start  in  beginning  the  study  of  a  poem, 


414  The  Principles  of  Education 

lacking  the  inspiration  of  the  teacher  and  the  stimulus  of  the  class, 
blocked  frequently  by  unfamiliar  allusions  and  confused  imagery, 
the  pupil  easily  becomes  discouraged  and  turns  from  his  task  in  weari- 
ness and  defeat.  On  the  morrow  he  does  not  know  his  "lesson." 
The  teacher  works  in  vain  against  a  dogged  opposition ;  and  the 
finest  pedagogical  efforts  toward  stirring  interest  and  awakening 
enthusiasm  fall  dead.  The  pupil  is  right,  the  teacher  wrong.  The 
pupil's  lack  of  interest,  his  opposition,  even  his  dislike  for  poetry 
are  the  natural  and  almost  inevitable  result  of  a  vicious  method. 
What  the  pupil  usually  lacks  is  the  necessary  imagery  or  information 
to  make  the  poem  intelligible  to  him.  Without  this  "apperception 
mass,"  as  the  psychologists  call  it,  any  poem  must  be  largely  mis- 
understood, if  indeed  it  does  not  appear  to  be  veritable  rubbish.1 

When  the  teacher  has  secured  motivation  for  the  study 
of  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm,  problems  assigned  to  direct 
the  pupil's  private  study  should  lead  the  pupil  to  an 
appreciative  understanding  of  the  life  of  a  pastoral  people. 
The  answers  to  these  problems  may  be  found  in  assigned 
readings.  Similarly  when  the  teacher  has  secured  motiva- 
tion for  the  study  of  the  poem  Cleon,  he  should  assign 
problems  which  will  guide  the  pupil  to  appreciate  the 
various  values  which  the  poem  presents.  What  these 
values  are  in  the  case  both  of  the  Twenty-Third  Psalm 
and  of  Cleon  has  been  explained  in  the  section  regarding 
the  teaching  of  literature.  There  may  be  other  problems 
intended  to  lead  the  pupil  through  the  other  steps  which 
he  must  take  in  order  to  profit  by  the  literary  production ; 
but  these  steps  are  so  subtle,  so  difficult  to  anticipate, 
that  it  is  ordinarily  better  to  leave  them  until  the  pupil 
has  made  the  preliminary  study  discussed  above  and  the 
teacher  is  present  to  follow  the  pupil's  experience  from 
detail  to  detail  and  to  give  him  the  necessary  direction 
when  in  this  way  it  is  found  to  be  needed. 

1  Pp.  71-72. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  415 

The  study  lesson  in  the  other  fine  arts  is  analogous  to 
that  in  literature.  The  problems  given  to  direct  the 
pupil's  study  should  be  those  necessary  to  bring  his 
experience  to  the  stage  at  which  the  work  of  art  will  make 
a  direct  appeal  to  his  feeling.  In  the  case  of  the  Laocoon 
Group,  such  questions  should  be  asked  as  will  call  the 
attention  of  the  pupil  to  the  story  the  culmination  of 
which  the  statue  represents,  and  to  those  details  of  the 
statue  which  make  a  strong  appeal  to  feeling.  In  the 
study  of  Turner's  The  Slave  Ship,  questions  should  be 
asked  which  will  lead  the  pupil  to  understand  the  nature 
of  slavery  and  to  appreciate  the  significant  details  of  the 
painting.  As  in  the  case  of  literature,  the  problems  as- 
signed to  guide  the  pupil's  study  should  always  be  sub- 
sidiary to  the  main  steps  in  the  development  of  a  new 
purpose. 

In  a  review  lesson  covering  various  works  of  fine  art, 
care  should  be  taken  that  the  unity  of  each  is  not  lost  in 
details.  While  the  pupil  may  refresh  his  experience  of 
some  of  the  details,  the  main  emphasis  should  be  given 
to  impressing  upon  him  the  unitary  value  which  each  work 
of  art  presents. 

It  is  difficult  by  examination  to  obtain  evidence  of 
feelings  of  value,  which,  as  in  the  case  of  literature,  are 
the  normal  result  of  the  study  of  the  other  fine  arts.  One 
way  of  testing  the  result  is  to  find  whether  the  pupil  has 
passed  through  the  steps  necessary  to  attain  it.  This 
indirect  method  is  to  question  him  with  regard  to  the 
steps  which  we  have  emphasized  as  necessary  for  teach- 
ing the  work  of  art.  A  more  direct  way  of  finding  the 
result  is  to  have  the  pupil  make  judgments  of  value  on 
the  basis  of  the  new  appreciation  of  worth  which  the 
study  of  the  work  of  art  has  given  him.  In  the  light 


416  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  such  study,  he  may  be  asked  to  pass  judgment  upon 
some  type  of  character  or  to  compare  the  values  of 
specific  acts. 

V 

In  the  teaching  of  control  subject  matter,  the  steps  are  to  make 
the  pupil  (1)  try  to  attain  some  purpose  in  the  realizing  of  which 
he  meets  a  difficulty  that  can  be  overcome  by  the  new  means  of 
control  about  to  be  presented,  (2)  locate  the  difficulty  by  making 
and  testing  hypotheses,  (3)  solve  in  a  similar  way  the  problem 
arising  from  this  difficulty,  and  (4)  use  the  solution  in  attaining 
his  original  purpose.  In  the  second  and  third  steps,  which  are  the 
most  difficult  ones,  the  teacher  should  guide  the  pupil  from  the 
known  to  the  unknown  by  calling  his  attention  to  familiar  facts 
which  through  analogy  suggest  the  proper  hypotheses  and  to  those 
which  test  the  truth  of  the  hypotheses  made  by  the  pupil. 

In  order  to  find  how  a  new  means  of  control  should  be 
taught  to  the  pupil,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  recall  the 
essential  steps  in  the  complete  thought  process  through 
which  a  new  means  of  control  is  made.  These  steps 
are  (1)  feeling  a  difficulty  in  the  realization  of  a  purpose, 
(2)  defining  the  problem  by  making  hypotheses  based 
upon  analogy  and  testing  them  either  in  thought  or  in 
action,  (3)  solving  the  problem  through  making  hypoth- 
eses based  on  analogy  and  testing  them  either  in  thought 
or  in  action,  and  (4)  using  the  means  thus  found  in  realiz- 
ing the  original  purpose.1  In  the  light  of  our  discussion  of 
these  steps,  let  us  now  find  the  essentials  in  teaching  a 
means  of  control. 

(1)  The  first  step  in  teaching  a  control  lesson  is  to  lead 
the  pupil  to  try  to  attain  some  purpose  in  the  realizing  of 
which  he  will  meet  a  difficulty  that  can  be  overcome  by 
the  new  means  of  control  about  to  be  presented.  This 
step  is  commonly  called  motivation,  a  word  derived  from 

i  See  Ch.  V. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  417 

the  Latin  verb  movere,  meaning  to  move.  In  this  step  the 
pupil  moves  towards  the  realization  of  some  end  he  has  in 
view. 

The  purpose  used  in  motivation  must  have  two  char- 
acteristics :  (a)  it  must  be  one  for  the  value  of  which  the 
pupil  has  already  developed  an  appreciation,  and  (6)  it 
must  be  one  in  the  realizing  of  which  the  pupil  meets  some 
difficulty  that  may  be  overcome  by  the  means  of  control 
about  to  be  taught.  The  purpose  cannot  function  in  the 
pupil's  experience  as  a  motive,  it  cannot  be  a  purpose  for 
him,  unless  he  appreciates  its  value.  Since  the  meaning 
of  a  thing  is  its  use,1  he  cannot  understand  the  new 
means  of  control  which  is  to  be  taught  unless  he  sees 
its  use  in  overcoming  some  difficulty  in  the  attaining 
of  a  purpose. 

Since  the  meaning  of  a  thing  is  its  use,  the  motive,  in 
order  to  develop  a  normal  meaning,  should  be  one  in  the 
service  of  which  the  new  means  of  control  is  normally 
used.  The  motive,  in  other  words,  should  give  the 
pupil  an  intrinsic  rather  than  an  extrinsic  interest  in  the 
new  means  of  control.2  Not  only  does  extrinsic  interest 
lead,  as  we  have  learned,  to  abnormal  meanings,  but  it 
does  not  make  the  pupil  responsive  to  situations  in  the 
social  life  beyond  the  school,  because  it  does  not  cause 
him  to  associate  with  the  means  of  control  he  has  acquired 
in  school  the  purposes  normally  calling  for  them  in  the 
wider  social  life.  He  cannot  hear  the  voice  of  these 
purposes,  because,  while  under  the  guidance  of  abnormal 
motives  in  school,  he  has  not  been  taught  to  recognize  it. 

The  teacher  can  usually  secure  extrinsic  interest  more 

•See  pp.  114-115. 

*  For  an  explanation  of  the  difference  between  intrinsic  and  ex- 
trinsic interest,  see  pp.  133-137. 


418  The  Principles  of  Education 

easily  than  he  can  secure  intrinsic  interest.  In  order  to 
find  motives  that  give  intrinsic  interest,  he  must  have  an 
insight  into  the  social  purposes  upon  which  the  meanings 
of  the  things  depend,  and  he  must  also  discover  which  of 
these  purposes  the  pupil  appreciates.  The  dullest  school- 
master can  use  extrinsic  motives,  such  as  the  pupil's 
desire  to  escape  punishment  or  to  secure  an  arbitrary 
reward;  no  great  ability  is  required  to  find  that  every 
pupil  responds  to  these  motives.  Consequently,  fear  of 
punishment  was  long  used  as  a  motive  for  learning,  as  is 
evident  by  the  fact  that  the  symbol  of  schoolmasters 
in  the  days  of  most  inefficient  teaching  was  a  book  and  a 
bundle  of  switches. 

Since  the  purposes  which  give  motivation  to  the  means 
of  control  included  hi  the  curriculum  are  those  for  the 
realizing  of  which  these  means  of  control  are  normally 
used,  the  way  to  determine  what  purposes  should  be  used 
for  school  motives  is  to  look  into  the  world  beyond  the 
school  and  to  find  what  purposes  are  served  there  by  these 
means  of  control.  Let  us  consider  the  application  of 
this  principle. 

In  many  schools  the  motivation  for  reading  aloud  is 
extrinsic.  The  pupils  are  provided  with  copies  of  the 
same  reading  book.  The  teacher  tells  the  class  to  turn  to 
a  certain  page  and  calls  upon  William  to  read  the  first 
paragraph.  William's  motive  for  reading  under  these 
circumstances  is  to  gain  the  approval  of  the  teacher 
and  to  avoid  the  punishment  which  would  result  from  a 
refusal  to  comply  with  the  command  of  the  teacher,  or  it 
may  be  that  obeying  such  commands  has,  through  school 
experience,  become  for  him  an  end  in  itself.  After  William 
has  read  a  paragraph,  the  teacher  asks  the  other  pupils 
to  point  out  William's  mistakes.  Hands  are  raised  and 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  419 

fingers  are  snapped  by  pupils  eager  to  tell  the  teacher 
that  William  mispronounced  a  word,  neglected  to  pause 
at  a  period,  failed  to  raise  his  voice  at  an  interrogation 
point,  etc.  The  pupils'  motives  here  are  to  obey  the 
teacher,  to  secure  her  approval,  to  show  by  criticizing 
William's  reading  that  they  are  superior  to  him.  The 
teacher  next  asks  Sarah  to  show  whether  she  can  read  the 
paragraph  better  than  did  William.  Sarah,  standing  in 
the  middle  of  the  aisle  with  heels  together  and  head 
erect,  tries  to  excel  her  classmate.  Sarah's  motive  is  to 
excel  in  competition,  a  motive  which  in  schoolroom 
practice  has  been  second  only  to  that  of  avoiding  punish- 
ment. 

If  we  apply  the  principle  given  above  for  determining 
what  motives  should  be  used,  the  extrinsic  nature  of  the 
motives  in  the  illustration  becomes  apparent.  Looking 
into  the  world  beyond  the  school  for  an  example  of 
reading  aloud  under  normal  conditions,  do  we  find  that  a 
farmer  subscribes  for  as  many  copies  of  the  rural  news- 
paper as  there  are  members  of  his  family,  and  then,  when 
the  family  has  gathered  about  the  fireplace  at  the  end  of 
the  day,  that  he  gives  to  each  member  of  his  family  a  copy 
of  the  paper,  commands  all  to  turn  to  a  certain  page,  and 
orders  one  of  his  sons  to  read  the  first  paragraph  of  the 
editorials?  Does  he  then  ask  the  other  members  of  the 
family  to  point  out  the  mistakes  made  by  the  son,  and 
later  require  one  of  his  daughters  to  try  to  read  the  first 
paragraph  of  the  editorials  better  than  did  her  brother? 
As  is  evident  from  this  illustration,  the  normal  motive 
for  reading  is  to  give  pleasure  or  information  to  other 
persons;  it  is  not  to  attain  the  purposes  represented  in 
the  schoolroom  situation  given  above.  The  normal 
motive  for  pointing  out  and  correcting  mistakes  is  to 


420  The  Principles  of  Education 

enable  the  reader  to  interest  or  to  inform  others  as 
effectively  as  possible.  With  such  a  motive,  the  pupil 
welcomes  criticism  and  tries  to  profit  by  it,  and  the  pupils 
who  criticize  do  so  in  the  spirit  of  social  cooperation 
rather  than  in  that  of  individual  competition. 

Let  us  apply  to  the  school  spelling  lesson  the  principle 
for  determining  what  motives  should  be  used.  The 
spelling  lesson  is  often  given  in  connection  with  the  reading 
lesson.  After  the  pupils  have  attempted  to  memorize  a 
list  of  words  because  the  teacher  has  told  them  to  do  so, 
they  write  these  words  at  the  teacher's  dictation.  The 
teacher  then  indicates  the  mistakes  in  spelling  and 
records  the  grades  made  by  the  pupils.  The  motivation 
throughout  such  an  exercise  is  artificial  and  extrinsic. 
In  life  beyond  the  school  the  desire  to  spell  correctly 
arises  ordinarily  in  connection  with  writing,  as  in  the 
case  of  writing  a  letter,  rather  than  with  reading,  unless 
perchance  one  is  reading  proof.  A  person  normally 
desires  to  spell,  not  because  some  one  has  commanded  him 
to  do  so,  but  because  he  is  not  certain  about  the  spelling 
of  a  word  and  wishes  to  become  certain  about  it.  Full 
intrinsic  motivation  would  therefore  require  that  the 
spelling  experience  arise  out  of  the  writing  of  something 
otherwise  worth  while.  Even  when  a  list  of  words  is 
memorized  and  written  from  dictation,  as  in  the  illus- 
tration given  above,  the  desire  to  become  certain  about 
the  spelling  of  words  can  be  secured  if  the  teacher,  instead 
of  correcting  the  mistakes  on  the  paper,  indicates  only 
that  there  is  a  certain  number  of  misspelled  words  which 
the  pupil  should  correct.  The  pupil  will  then  look  through 
the  list  until  he  comes  to  a  word  concerning  the  spelling 
of  which  he  is  not  certain.  In  order  to  become  certain 
with  regard  to  the  spelling  of  this  word,  he  will  then  use 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  421 

some  means  of  control,  such  as  rules  for  spelling.  To  the 
extent  that  this  motivation  is  intrinsic,  he  will  become 
sensitive  to  uncertainty  about  the  spelling  of  words  and, 
in  seeking  certainty,  will  improve  his  spelling  even  after 
his  school  training  is  over. 

Under  the  guidance  of  the  principle  for  determining 
what  motives  should  be  used,  we  can  easily  see  that  read- 
ing, spelling,  and  arithmetic  should  get  much  of  their 
motivation  in  the  school  as  tools  for  doing  other  work  that 
is  more  directly  in  the  service  of  social  values.  Literature, 
history,  geography,  manual  arts,  all  furnish  opportunities 
for  the  use  of  these  tools.  In  the  case  of  a  younger  pupil, 
play  affords  intrinsic  motivation  by  leading  the  child 
to  use  subject  matter  in  normal  ways.  He  may,  for 
example,  learn  arithmetic,  spelling,  etc.,  in  playing  games 
felt  to  be  worth  while  in  themselves,  or  in  imitating  adults 
at  storekeeping  or  housekeeping. 

This  incidental  teaching  of  reading,  writing,  and  arith- 
metic does  not  mean  that  drill  should  be  precluded.  The 
pupil  must  drill  in  order  to  become  skilled  in  the  use  of 
these  tools,  if  his  purpose  is  to  be  realized.  Interest  in 
control  becomes  intrinsic  when  the  pupil  seeks  control 
for  the  sake  of  improving  his  ability  to  attain  other 
values  that  are  normally  sought.  He  feels  that  he  cannot 
play  the  game  satisfactorily  or  do  some  valuable  kind  of 
work  unless  he  has  acquired  the  proficiency  afforded  by 
drill.  He  does  not  drill  because  the  teacher  commands 
him  to  do  this,  but  because  activities  of  social  value  com- 
mand him. 

Motivation  is  the  most  critical  step  in  the  teaching 
of  a  control  lesson,  because  it  determines  the  nature  of  the 
pupil's  self-realization,  or  development,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  school ;  what  his  motive  is  that  will  the  pupil 


422  The  Principles  of  Education 

be  also,  if  the  means  of  control  are  available.  In  this 
step  the  school  finds  its  highest  salvation  only  when  it 
loses  itself  in  the  service  of  normal  social  values.  The 
pupil  should  be  trained  to  follow  the  guidance  of  normal 
purposes  which  arise  from  the  situations  that  are  not 
peculiar  to  the  school  but  belong  to  the  wider  social  life. 
If  the  school  creates  situations  peculiar  to  itself  in  which 
the  authority  of  the  teacher  is  substituted  for  the  pur- 
poses of  social  life,  the  training  received  therein  fails  to 
make  the  pupil  efficient,  because,  not  being  taught  to 
recognize  and  follow  these  purposes,  he  is  without  guide 
when  the  teacher  no  longer  directs  him. 

(2)  The  second  step  in  teaching  a  control  lesson  is 
leading  the  pupil  to  locate  the  difficulty;  or,  in  other 
words,  to  define  the  problem.  This  should  be  done  by 
making  hypotheses  on  the  basis  of  the  analogy  between 
this  difficulty  and  some  other  which  the  pupil  has  located 
in  a  similar  situation,  and  by  testing  these  hypotheses 
either  in  thought  or  in  action,  or  in  both  thought  and 
action.  In  the  case  of  reading  aloud,  for  example,  the 
pupil  may  feel  a  difficulty  in  attaining  his  normal  pur- 
pose, ft  he  finds  that  his  hearers  have  not  been  interested 
in  his  reading.  His  desire  to  give  entertainment  or 
information  is  thwarted  by  some  obstacle.  In  order  to 
realize  his  purpose  he  must  first  find  out  definitely  what 
this  difficulty  is.  He  begins  to  make  hypotheses  under 
the  guidance  of  analogous  situations  with  which  he  is 
familiar.  As  a  listener  he  has  found  his  own  interest 
lagging  when  the  reader  spoke  too  rapidly  or  too  slowly, 
when  his  voice  was  too  loud  or  too  soft,  when  his  enun- 
ciation was  indistinct.  Has  he  himself  committed  one  of 
these  faults?  This  question  can  be  answered  by  testing 
his  reading  with  respect  to  the  various  faults  mentioned. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  423 

He  may  remember  that  he  has  been  reading  loudly  and 
thus  at  once  dispense  with  the  hypothesis  that  he  may 
not  have  made  himself  heard.  In  class  work  other  pupils 
may  help  him  in  this  process  of  making  and  testing  hy- 
potheses by  offering  in  the  spirit  of  cooperation  criticisms 
of  the  reading  which  may  occur  to  them. 

The  difficulty  in  defining  the  problem  is,  as  has  been 
learned,  in  making  the  hypothesis.  The  teacher  should 
assist  the  pupil  here  if  it  is  necessary.  The  assistance 
should  not,  however,  be  given  by  telling  him  directly  what 
the  fault  is,  but  by  suggesting  to  him  the  analogous 
situations  which  will  lead  him  to  make  an  hypothesis 
defining  the  difficulty.  In  making  this  suggestion,  the 
teacher  may  call  the  pupil's  attention  to  situations  in 
which  the  pupil  as  listener  experienced  and  defined  a 
similar  difficulty  when  another  pupil  was  reading.  When 
the  pupil  finds  the  nature  of  the  difficulty,  his  problem 
is  to  overcome  it  in  his  own  reading. 

The  presentation  through  suggestion  of  the  hypothesis 
which  locates  the  difficulty  is  well  illustrated  by  the  way 
in  which  a  teacher  conducted  an  English  composition 
lesson  designed  to  give  the  pupils  an  understanding  of  the 
fundamental  image  in  description.  A  boy  was  reading 
before  the  class  a  description  which  he  had  written.  His 
essay  did  not  attain  its  object  because  the  hearers  could 
not  form  a  mental  image  of  that  which  he  had  attempted 
to  describe.  In  trying  to  assist  the  writer  to  locate  his 
difficulty,  the  other  pupils  could  go  no  further  than  to  say 
that  the  description  was  confusing.  The  teacher  then 
offered  assistance  by  exposing  for  only  a  moment  the 
picture  of  a  building  and  by  asking  the  members  of  the 
class  to  tell  what  they  saw.  They  could  give  only  the 
general  form  of  the  building  without  details.  When 


424  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  teacher  suggested  that  there  was  some  similarity 
between  forming  a  mental  image  through  seeing  a  picture 
and  forming  a  mental  image  through  hearing  a  descrip- 
tion, the  pupils  on  the  basis  of  this  analogy  easily  made 
the  hypothesis  that  perhaps  the  description  should  give 
a  general  view  first  and  the  details  later.  This  hypothesis 
was  tested,  it  may  be  added,  by  applying  it  to  the  boy's 
description.  In  this  case  the  hypothesis  appeared  to  be 
correct  as  the  description  was  found  to  give  no  general 
view  but  to  present  only  details.  The  truth  of  the  hypoth- 
esis was  still  further  tested  when  at  the  suggestion  of  the 
teacher  the  pupils  examined  some  of  Hawthorne's  descrip- 
tions and  found  that  this  effective  writer  gave  a  general 
view  at  the  beginning  of  each  description.  The  teacher 
then  told  the  class  that  the  technical  name  for  the  general 
view  is  fundamental  image.  The  pupil's  next  problem  was 
how  to  present  a  fundamental  image  of  the  object  which 
he  was  attempting  to  describe. 

(3)  The  third  step  in  teaching  a  control  lesson  is  to 
lead  the  pupil  to  solve  the  problem.  This  should  be  done 
by  making  hypotheses  on  the  basis  of  the  analogy  of  the 
problem  with  some  other  similar  problem  a  solution  for 
which  the  pupil  knows,  and  by  testing  these  hypotheses 
in  thought  or  in  action,  or  in  both  thought  and  action. 
As  the  hypothesis  is  based  on  analogy,  the  teacher  can 
save  much  time  and  useless  thought  on  the  part  of  the 
pupil  by  suggesting  the  basis  of  the  hypothesis  in  the 
previous  experience  of  the  pupil.  Then  the  latter  can 
make  the  leap  from  the  known  to  the  unknown.  Unless 
the  pupil  does  proceed  from  the  known  to  the  unknown 
on  the  basis  of  analogy,  he  cannot  acquire  the  new  truth 
which  the  lesson  is  intended  to  teach  him.  He  may  com- 
mit to  memory  and  repeat  words  which  symbolize  the 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  425 

new  meaning,  but  he  does  not  understand  the  new  meaning 
itself.  If  the  problem  is  to  find  why  an  apple  drops  from 
the  tree  to  the  ground,  the  teacher  may  call  the  attention 
of  the  pupil  to  the  phenomenon  of  a  piece  of  iron  being 
attracted  to  a  magnet.  Through  analogy  the  pupil 
can  then  make  the  hypothesis  that  perhaps  the  earth 
attracts  the  apple  as  the  magnet  attracts  the  piece  of  iron. 
If  the  problem  is  to  find  why  the  moon  does  not  fall  to 
the  earth,  the  teacher  may  suggest  the  phenomenon  of 
the  pull  which  one  feels  when  one  swings  in  a  circle  a  stone 
attached  to  a  string.  The  pupil  then  makes  the  hypoth- 
esis that  perhaps  the  circular  motion  of  the  moon  about 
the  earth  may  cause  a  pulling  away  that  counteracts 
the  force  of  the  attraction  between  the  two.  If  the 
problem  is  to  find  what  causes  evolution,  the  pupil's 
attention  may  be  called  to  selective  breeding  in  the  case 
of  animals  and  to  the  fact  that  competition  for  food  and 
other  forms  of  the  struggle  for  existence  act  as  selective 
factors  in  the  case  of  living  things.  The  pupil  is  then 
ready  to  make  the  hypothesis  that  perhaps  these  natural 
selective  forces  eliminate  the  unfit  and  leave  the  fit  to 
transmit  their  traits  to  offspring.  If  the  problem  is  to 
get  a  general  notion  of  the  nature  of  an  adverb,  the  pupil 
may  find  a  suitable  analogy  if  his  attention  is  called  to 
the  nature  of  the  adjective,  which  the  adverb  resembles 
in  function  as  a  modifying  part  of  speech.  The  pupil  then 
makes  the  hypothesis  that  the  adverb  is  like  the  adjective 
except  that  it  modifies  a  different  class  of  words.  Good  ex- 
amples of  the  solving  of  religious  problems  on  the  basis  of 
analogy  may  be  found  in  the  parables  given  in  the  Bible. 
When  the  pupil  has  formed  an  hypothesis,  the  teacher 
may  assist  him  in  testing  it  by  calling  attention  to  that 
which  will  invalidate  a  false  hypothesis  or  sustain  a  true 


426  The  Principles  of  Education 

one.  It  is  much  better  for  the  teacher  to  assist  the  pupil 
in  this  way  to  test  his  own  hypothesis  than  merely  to 
tell  him  that  his  answer  to  the  problem  is  correct  or  in- 
correct. When  the  teacher  is  expected  arbitrarily  to  in- 
trude himself  upon  the  situation  by  saying  that  the  answer 
is  correct  or  incorrect,  the  pupil's  problem  is  changed 
from  the  normal  one  of  finding  what  will  overcome  the 
difficulty  that  has  been  defined  in  the  second  step  to  the 
artificial  problem  of  guessing  what  the  teacher  has  in 
mind.  The  suggestion  of  facts  that  invalidate  the  hy- 
potheses offered  by  the  one  who  is  learning  is  an  essential 
feature  of  the  Socratic  method  of  teaching.  Socrates 
believed  that  men  differ  in  opinion  because  they  have 
seen  only  different  parts  of  the  truth  and  that  men  who 
see  all  sides  of  the  truth  will  agree.  When  any  one 
responded  to  his  questioning  with  a  false  statement, 
Socrates  would  call  his  attention  to  some  other  aspect  of 
the  matter  inconsistent  with  the  answer.  In  this  way  he 
led  his  pupils  to  test  their  hypotheses,  and  so  secured 
stronger  convictions  on  their  part  than  he  could  have 
secured  by  merely  telling  them  whether  in  his  judgment 
the  answers  were  true  or  false. 

(4)  The  fourth  step  is  the  use  of  the  solution  in  attain- 
ing the  end  for  the  sake  of  which  the  pupil  located  and 
defined  his  problem.  When  the  pupil  has  found  how  to 
overcome  some  defect  in  his  reading,  he  should  make  use 
of  this  knowledge  to  attain  his  original  purpose;  when 
he  has  found  how  to  correct  his  spelling,  he  should  spell 
the  words  properly ;  when  he  has  found  how  to  improve 
his  essay  by  using  a  fundamental  image,  he  should  use 
this  knowledge  in  rewriting  the  essay ;  when  he  has  found 
how  to  overcome  through  drill  some  failure  in  arithmetical 
processes,  he  should  devote  himself  to  drill,  and  so  on. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  427 

It  will  be  noticed  that  in  the  illustrations  no  one  lesson 
is  carried  through  all  four  steps.  In  this  connection  it 
should  be  remembered  that  the  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  the  steps  is  for  the  sake  of  helping  the  pupil  where  his 
learning  process  meets  with  some  check.1  In  some  lessons 
the  chief  difficulty  is  with  motivation;  in  others,  with 
defining  the  problem;  in  others,  with  solving  the  prob- 
lem ;  and  in  others,  with  using  the  solution.  In  the  case 
of  drill,  strong  motivation  is  needed;  if  the  pupil  has 
had  previous  experience  in  drill,  he  needs  no  further 
guidance.  In  the  case  of  the  teaching  of  the  fundamental 
image,  the  chief  difficulty  was  with  defining  the  problem. 
When  the  pupil  found  that  his  essay  was  at  fault  because 
he  did  not  use  a  fundamental  image,  he  could  probably 
solve,  without  the  assistance  of  the  teacher,  the  problem 
of  what  sort  of  fundamental  image  he  should  give  in  his 
essay.  The  chief  difficulty  in  teaching  the  nature  of 
gravitation  is  to  solve  the  problem.  If  the  motivation 
is  strong,  the  use  of  the  solution  in  attaining  the  purpose 
will  naturally  follow.  The  chief  function  of  the  teacher 
here  is  to  simplify  the  situation  by  precluding  difficulties 
that  would  confuse  the  pupil  with  further  problems  be- 
fore he  has  realized  his  purpose.  When,  for  example,  the 
object  of  the  lesson  is  to  teach  the  use  of  the  fundamental 
image,  the  teacher  should  not  permit  criticisms  of  various 
faults  in  the  pupil's  essay  such  as  lack  of  unity  in  para- 
graphs, awkward  forms  of  expression,  loose  sentences,  etc. 
The  way  should  be  open  for  overcoming  a  single  difficulty 
at  a  time. 

1  See  p.  390. 


428  The  Principles  of  Education 

VI 

In  the  teaching  of  control  subject  matter,  the  methods  that  should 
be  used  in  the  study,  the  review,  and  the  examination  lessons 
depend  upon  the  steps  in  teaching  explained  in  the  preceding 
section. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  study,  review,  and  examination 
lessons  in  the  teaching  of  control  subject  matter. 

Since  in  the  study  lesson  the  pupil  for  the  time  being 
directs  his  own  learning,  the  teacher  must  anticipate  the 
difficulties  which  the  pupil  will  meet  and,  in  assigning  the 
lesson,  give  whatever  assistance  is  necessary  to  enable 
him  to  overcome  them.  The  less  able  the  pupil  is  to 
guide  his  own  study,  the  more  definite  and  detailed  the 
directions  given  in  the  assignment  must  be.  When  the 
pupil  understands  clearly  how  to  study  the  lesson,  he 
saves  time  and  energy  and  is  not  so  liable  to  meet  with 
discouragement. 

The  first  step  in  assigning  a  study  lesson  is  to  give 
the  pupil  an  intrinsic  motive  for  study.  This  step  may 
be  supplemented  by  suggestions  as  to  how  he  should  con- 
duct his  study,  in  order  that  he  may  find  the  problem 
which  the  lesson  undertakes  to  solve  and  the  solution 
afforded  for  this  problem.  If  more  detailed  guidance  is 
necessary,  the  teacher  may  call  the  pupil's  attention  to 
whatever  is  necessary  to  assist  him  in  private  study  to 
solve  the  problem,  including  references  to  books  that  will 
give  the  pupil  assistance  in  his  work. 

The  pupil  should  be  taught  how  to  study  books  and  ar- 
ticles with  the  greatest  economy  and  profit,  since  these 
usually  are  the  guides  upon  which  the  pupil  must  de- 
pend for  learning  when  the  teacher  is  not  with  him.  In 
order  properly  to  present  control  subject  matter,  a  book 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  429 

should  set  and  solve  some  problem.  This  problem  is  often 
expressed  in  the  title  of  the  book  as,  for  example,  Pro- 
fessor Dewey's  How  We  Think,  Professor  Moore's  What 
is  Education?  Professor  McMurry's  How  to  Study,  and 
Spencer's  What  Knowledge  is  of  Most  Worth?  Often  the 
title  of  a  book  or  article  merely  implies  a  problem.  Spen- 
cer's essay  entitled  Moral  Education  undertakes  to  solve 
the  problem,  What  is  the  nature  of  moral  education? 
Professor  Dewey's  Interest  in  Relation  to  Training  of  the 
Will  undertakes  to  solve  the  problem,  What  is  the  relation 
of  interest  to  the  training  of  the  will?  Professor  Char- 
ters' The  Teaching  of  the  Common  Branches  undertakes 
to  solve  the  problem,  How  should  the  common  branches 
be  taught?  In  examining  a  book  or  an  article,  the  pupil 
should  first  find  what  is  the  main  problem  considered. 
If  this  problem  is  such  that  the  content  promises  to  solve 
one  of  his  own  problems,  the  book  or  article  becomes  in- 
trinsically interesting  to  him. 

The  author  of  a  book  must  divide  his  main  problem 
into  minor  problems  in  presenting  the  solution  of  it.  To 
each  of  the  more  important  of  these  minor  problems  a 
chapter  may  be  devoted.  In  the  second  chapter  of  his 
book  How  to  Study,  Professor  McMurry,  recognizing  that 
study  involves  thinking,  analyzes  the  complete  process 
of  study  into  the  following  factors :  the  finding  of  specific 
purposes,  the  supplementing  of  thought,  the  organization 
of  facts  collected,  the  judging  of  the  worth  of  statements, 
memorizing,  the  using  of  ideas,  the  tentative  attitude, 
and  provision  for  individuality.  One  by  one  the  sub- 
sequent chapters  deal  respectively  with  how  each  of  these 
factors  is  related  to  study.  Professor  Dewey  simplifies 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  what  is  the  relation  of 
interest  to  the  training  of  the  will  by  considering  what 


430  The  Principles  of  Education 

educational  theory,  psychology,  and  philosophy  have  to 
say  about  it,  and  then  what  conclusions  should  be  made 
in  the  light  of  this  information.  A  book  which  does  not 
indicate  directly  or  indirectly  the  relation  of  the  problems 
of  the  several  chapters  to  the  main  problem  lacks  unity 
and  is  in  that  respect  poorly  written.  The  problem  of 
the  chapter  may  in  turn  be  simplified  by  subdividing  it 
into  the  minor  problems  that  are  solved  in  the  sections  or 
paragraphs. 

The  answer  to  the  minor  problem  which  a  chapter  or 
paragraph  undertakes  to  solve  is  the  key  sentence.  This 
answer  is  the  essential  point  of  the  chapter  or  paragraph. 
The  relation  of  the  minor  problems  to  the  larger  ones  and 
of  these  to  the  main  problem  of  the  book  or  article  reveals 
the  relation  of  the  essential  points  one  to  another.  The 
problem  of  the  preceding  paragraph,  for  example,  is,  How 
does  an  author  present  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  his 
book?  The  answer  is  the  key  sentence,  "  The  author  of 
a  book  must,  in  presenting  the  solution  of  his  main 
problem,  divide  the  latter  into  minor  problems."  The 
rest  of  the  paragraph  makes  the  meaning  of  this  key 
sentence  more  explicit  by  showing  that  the  chapters 
and  paragraphs  constitute  the  solutions  of  the  minor 
problems. 

In  the  case  of  control  subject  matter,  the  review  lesson 
should  give  especial  emphasis  to  the  organization  of  the 
truths  that  have  been  studied.  These  truths  are  prop- 
erly related  through  the  relation  of  the  problems  which 
they  solve.  A  course  or  the  subdivision  of  a  course  over 
which  the  review  lesson  extends  has  its  main  problem,  to 
which  the  main  truth  of  the  course  or  of  the  subdivision 
is  an  answer.  In  the  process  of  the  solution  this  main 
problem  has  been  subdivided  into  minor  problems,  and 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  431 

these  in  turn  have  been  still  further  subdivided.  In  this 
interrelation  of  problems  we  have  the  connections  which 
hold  the  truths  in  their  proper  relationship,  —  not  only 
those  truths  which  are  the  solutions  to  the  larger  prob- 
lems, but  also  those  which  are  the  solutions  of  the  simplest 
problems  into  which  the  larger  ones  have  been  subdivided. 
If  the  pupil  reviews  facts  only  as  independent  truths  or 
if  he  organizes  them  in  some  arbitrary  way,  he  fails  to 
grasp  the  truths  in  that  normal  organization  which  is  not 
only  the  most  useful  way  for  holding  them  in  mind  ready 
for  application,  but  also  the  most  economical  way  for 
understanding  and  retaining  them. 

In  the  examination  lesson,  the  most  effective  way  for 
testing  whether  a  pupil  has  acquired  a  means  of  control 
is  to  put  him  hi  a  situation  which  calls  for  the  use  of  it. 
This  method  furnishes  an  adequate  test  of  the  pupil's 
knowledge,  because  the  meaning  of  a  thing  is  its  use. 
If  the  pupil  is  asked  merely  to  reproduce  statements  of 
the  truths  which  he  has  learned,  he  may  reproduce 
remembered  symbols  the  full  meanings  of  which  he  does 
not  understand  even  though  he  gives  remembered  illustra- 
tions of  them ;  but  when  he  applies  the  truths  in  situations 
that  normally  call  for  their  use,  the  memory  of  symbols 
cannot  take  the  place  of  the  understanding  of  meanings. 
This  fact  is  generally  recognized  in  the  case  of  mathe- 
matics, where  the  pupil  is  required  to  use  in  the  solving 
of  problems  the  truths  learned ;  it  should  be  recognized 
in  the  case  of  all  kinds  of  control  subject  matter.  An 
examination  lesson  of  this  kind  is  a  valuable  educational 
exercise  as  well  as  a  test  of  the  pupil's  ability ;  every 
time  a  pupil  uses  a  means  of  control,  he  acquires  a  more 
effective  grasp  of  it. 


432  The  Principles  of  Education 

VII 

Important  perversions  of  teaching  are  (1)  the  use  of  extrinsic 
motivation,  which  gives  abnormal  meanings;  (2)  telling,  which 
is  liable  to  neglect  important  steps  in  teaching;  (3)  the  over- 
emphasis of  memory  work,  which  interferes  with  the  acquiring  of 
purposes  and  ideas ;  and  (4)  the  confusion  of  appreciation  and 
control  lessons,  which  results  in  the  use  of  a  type  of  method  not 
adapted  to  the  subject  matter. 

Important  perversions  of  the  methods  of  teaching  are 
(1)  the  use  of  extrinsic  motivation,  (2)  telling,  (3)  the 
overemphasis  of  memory  work,  and  (4)  the  confusion  of 
appreciation  and  control  lessons. 

(1)  We  have  considered  the  nature  and  disadvantages 
of  extrinsic  motivation.1    Although  in  the  degree  that 
extrinsic  motivation  is  used  the  pupil  acquires  perverted 
meanings,  the  use  of  extrinsic  motivation  is  sometimes 
necessary,  because  under  present  educational  limitations 
the  teacher  may  not  be  able  to  devise  situations  that  will 
appeal  wholly  to  intrinsic  motives.     The  teacher  should 
make  it  a  rule,  however,  to  use  the  most  intrinsic  motiva- 
tion possible  under  the  circumstances. 

(2)  Telling  is  liable  to  leave  missing  links  in  the  pro- 
cess of  learning.     In  the  case  of  purpose-giving  subject 
matter,  the  teacher  is  often  tempted  to  tell  about  the 
values  presented  instead  of  putting  the  pupil  in  the  situa- 
tion where  he  feels  these  values.    When  this  is  done, 
the  link  which  should  connect  the  values  intended  to  be 
presented  with  the  pupil's  acquired  appreciations  that 
would  enable  him  to  feel  them,  is  missing.     The  teacher 
is  tempted  to  tell  also  the  connection  between  the  value 
which  the  pupil  should  appreciate  and  the  new  means 
to  which  this  value  should  be  transferred,  as  when  in 
literary  study  he  repeats  the  moral  of  a  work  of  lit- 

1  See  pp.  133-137. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  433 

erary  art.  When  this  is  done,  the  rational  attitude  in- 
volved in  listening  to  a  statement  of  a  moral  does  not 
enable  the  pupil  to  make  the  transfer  of  value  to  the 
new  means  which  is  intended  to  receive  it.  He  does  not 
even  feel  the  value.  He  may  learn  the  words  of  the 
teacher  and  be  able  to  talk  about  the  subject  matter, 
but  he  has  not  acquired  the  new  appreciation  for  which 
this  subject  matter  is  normally  a  guide.  When  with  the 
assistance  of  the  teacher  the  pupil  himself  goes  through 
the  process  for  making  new  purposes  or  that  for  making 
new  ideas,  his  difficulties  reveal  exactly  what  the  teacher 
should  do  in  assisting  him,  but  when  the  pupil  is  told, 
there  may  be  gaps  in  the  learning  process  which  the  teacher 
can  hardly  discover. 

In  the  case  of  control  subject  matter,  one  important 
link  which  telling  often  neglects  is  that  which  connects 
the  known  with  the  unknown.  Telling  may  not  provide 
for  the  analogies  which  connect  previous  experience  with 
the  hypotheses  that  locate  and  solve  the  problem.  To  the 
extent  that  the  pupil  does  not  reach  an  hypothesis 
through  its  analogy  with  some  known  fact,  he  fails  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  this  hypothesis.  After  the 
teacher  has  told  him,  he  may  repeat  the  words  that 
symbolize  it ;  but  he  has  not  necessarily  acquired  a  true 
understanding  of  the  meaning  of  these  words. 

Another  link  needed  which  telling  is  liable  to  neglect  is 
that  which  connects  the  hypotheses  with  the  facts  that 
should  be  used  in  testing  them.  If,  instead  of  calling  the 
pupil's  attention  to  the  facts  that  test  his  answer  to  the 
problem,  the  teacher  tells  him  that  the  answer  is  right  or 
wrong,  the  pupil  tests  it  by  the  teacher's  acceptance  or 
rejection  rather  than  by  the  facts  that  should  be  used  to 
test  it. 


434  The  Principles  of  Education 

If  the  teacher  merely  tells  facts  without  even  presenting 
a  problem  to  the  pupil,  he  neglects  giving  intrinsic 
motivation  and  affording  opportunity  for  the  pupil  to 
use  the  new  truth  presented. 

(3)  When  a  pupil  feels  strong  values  and  associates 
with  them  means  for  their  realization  or  when  he  expe- 
riences problems  and  solves  them,  memory  is  a  by-product 
of  the  process  of  learning.     The  best  way  to  memorize  a 
selection  of  literature,  for  example,  is  to  read  it  with 
understanding    and    appreciation.1    The    best    way    to 
memorize   control   subject   matter   is   through   forming 
and  solving  problems.     In  view  of  this  fact,  the  teacher 
need  not  make  the  pupil  try  to  memorize.     If  the  pupil 
tries  to  memorize,  he  is  concerned  with  the  difficulty  of 
memorizing  rather  than  with  the  difficulty  of  controlling 
some  value  for  the  sake  of  which  the  subject  matter  should 
be   used.    The   attention   upon   memorizing,   therefore, 
diverts  attention  from  that  which  gives  true  value  and 
meaning  to  what  the  pupil  is  learning. 

(4)  A  failure  to  understand  the  differences  between 
purpose-giving  subject  matter  and  control-giving  subject 
matter  sometimes  leads  the  teacher  to  apply  the  wrong 
method  to  the  teaching  of  one  or  the  other.     The  writer 
once  heard  an  astronomy  lecture  in  which  the  teacher, 
using    the    steps    necessary    to    develop    appreciations, 
presented  the  scientific  material  as  though  it  were  poetry. 
He  aroused  feelings  of  worth  by  calling  attention  to  the 
immensity,  harmony,  and  beauty  of  the  universe,  and 
then  with  this  appreciated  value  associated  God  as  the 
Author  of  it  all.     This  led  to  the  transfer  of  the  feeling 
of  value  aroused  to  the  idea  of  God.     The  class  was  left 
with  a  vague  understanding  suffused  with  emotion.    The 

1  See  Pyle,  W.  H.,  The  Outlines  of  Educational  Psychology,  p.  193. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  435 

scientific  subject  matter,  which  was  devised  to  give  an 
understanding  of  the  relations  of  the  heavenly  bodies, 
did  not  function  properly  in  this  class,  because  the  proper 
method  was  not  used.  If  the  teacher  desired  to  give  a 
greater  appreciation  of  the  Author  of  the  Universe,  he 
should  have  taken  for  his  lesson  some  work  of  literary  art 
formed  by  a  genius  for  this  very  purpose.  He  might 
have  taken  for  his  subject,  "  The  heavens  declare  the 
glory  of  God  ;  and  the  firmament  sheweth  his  handiwork," 
and  used  the  Nineteenth  Psalm  as  the  subject  matter  for 
the  lesson.  Since  this  psalm  was  fashioned  by  a  literary 
genius  for  the  very  purpose  of  giving  a  new  appreciation 
of  God,  it  would  have  given  better  results  so  far  as  the 
appreciation  is  concerned.  A  modern  textbook  on  astron- 
omy is  written  from  the  scientific  point  of  view  as  an 
instrument  for  giving  knowledge  rather  than  appre- 
ciation. The  waste  of  energy  when  control  subject  matter 
is  taught  as  purpose-giving  subject  matter  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  subject  matter  is  not  used  in  the  way  it  is 
fashioned  to  be  used. 

At  another  time  the  writer  heard  a  teacher  of  literature 
murder  a  literary  selection  by  grammatical  and  rhetorical 
dissection.  Instead  of  developing  appreciations  of  value, 
she  kept  the  attention  of  the  class  on  scientific  problems, 
thus  teaching  the  purpose-giving  subject  matter  as  though 
it  were  control-giving  subject  matter.  In  assigning  the 
advance  lesson  at  the  close  of  the  recitation,  the  teacher, 
smiling  with  sweet  confusion,  said,  "  To-morrow,  boys 
and  girls,  we  shall  take  the  life  of  Carlyle."  They  un- 
doubtedly did ! 

A  work  of  literature  is  written  to  give  its  readers  a 
new  purpose;  it  is  not  written  to  give  new  control. 
When  this  teacher  by  the  use  of  the  wrong  method 


436  The  Principles  of  Education 

transformed  the  appreciation  lesson  into  a  control  lesson, 
she  not  only  deprived  the  pupils  of  the  result  which  the 
work  of  literature  was  intended  to  secure,  but  also 
attempted  to  teach  grammar  and  rhetoric  by  means  of  a 
selection  which,  not  being  intended  for  that  purpose, 
did  not  effectively  present  this  material.  In  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  poem,  grammatical  and  rhetorical  facts  were 
presented  in  a  haphazard  way  and  could  not  therefore  be 
learned  economically  by  the  pupils. 

VIII 

Natural  science,  which  explains  teaching  as  controlling  the  en- 
vironment in  such  manner  as  to  facilitate  the  making  of  nervous 
connections  in  the  brain  of  the  pupil ,  supports  our  conclusion  that 
there  are  two  general  types  of  teaching,  —  that  which  guides  the 
pupil  in  acquiring  new  purposes  and  that  which  guides  him  in 
acquiring  new  means  of  control.  It  supports  also  our  conclusions 
with  regard  to  the  essential  steps  in  each  of  these  types  of  teaching 
and  with  regard  to  the  use  of  extrinsic  motivation,  telling,  the 
overemphasis  of  memory  work,  and  the  confusion  of  appreciation 
and  control  lessons  as  perversions  of  the  methods  of  teaching. 

According  to  natural  science,  teaching  is  controlling  the 
environment  in  such  manner  as  to  facilitate  the  making 
of  nervous  connections  in  the  brain  of  the  pupil.  Teach- 
ing is  necessary,  because,  on  account  of  differences  in  the 
nervous  organisms  of  the  pupils,  the  textbooks  and  other 
forms  of  environment  provided  for  by  the  curriculum  do 
not  always  give  all  of  the  stimuli  necessary  to  form  the 
new  brain  connections.  Wherever  the  environment  pro- 
vided for  by  the  curriculum  does  not  give  the  stimuli 
necessary  to  make  the  appropriate  changes  in  the  nervous 
system  of  the  pupil,  the  teacher  should  modify  the  environ- 
ment to  the  extent  necessary  to  produce  these  changes. 

The  main  types  of  lessons  from  the  point  of  view  of 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  437 

natural  science  correspond  to  the  appreciation  and  the 
control  lessons  described  above.  One  type  of  lesson  is 
that  which  intimately  connects  brain  paths  already  estab- 
lished with  fundamental  systems  of  reactions;  the  other 
is  that  which  establishes  new  brain  paths.  In  one  case 
a  new  purpose  is  developed ;  in  the  other,  a  new  means 
of  control.1 

For  teaching  an  appreciation  lesson,  the  function  of 
which,  according  to  the  materialistic  point  of  view,  is 
intimately  to  connect  previously  acquired  brain  paths 
with  fundamental  systems  of  reactions,  natural  science 
presents  three  steps,  which  correspond  to  the  three  steps 
into  which  the  process  has  been  analyzed  from  the  teleo- 
logical  point  of  view. 

(1)  The  environment  must  be  modified  in  such  manner 
that  it  will  give  the  stimuli  necessary  to  cause  the  funda- 
mental systems  of  reactions  to  function  in  the  pupil's 
organism.  These  fundamental  systems  of  reactions,  such 
as  those  which  form  the  physical  parallels  of  aversion  to 
suffering  and  death  and  of  attraction  to  that  which  is 
loved,  are  usually  strongly  instinctive.  If  more  than  one 
system  of  reactions  involving  aversion  begin  to  function 
through  appropriate  stimuli,  the  resulting  tendency  to 
aversion  is  strengthened ;  if  more  than  one  system  of 
reactions  involving  attraction  begin  to  function,  the 
resulting  tendency  to  attraction  is  strengthened.  The 
teacher  may  assist  in  calling  forth  each  system  separately 
and  then  let  the  organism  unite  them.  This  is  the  physical 
counterpart  of  the  development  of  strong  feelings  of  value 
through  analysis  and  synthesis  in  teaching  purpose- 
giving  subject  matter.  In  the  case  of  the  Twenty-Third 

1  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  these  processes,  see  pp.  92-98  and  121- 
127. 


438  The  Principles  of  Education 

Psalm,  for  example,  the  fundamental  responses  to  the 
stimuli  of  green  pastures,  still  waters,  protection  against 
enemies,  etc.,  may  be  called  forth  individually.  If  the 
responses  in  the  case  of  the  pupil  are  not  as  strong  as  they 
should  be,  the  teacher  must  modify  the  environment  so 
that  the  stimuli  will  call  forth  the  appropriate  strong 
responses.  These  various  responses,  after  having  been 
excited  by  appropriate  stimuli,  may  be  combined  as  a 
single  reaction  to  the  complex  stimuli  from  the  environ- 
ment. 

(2)  The  next  step  is  to  make  the  reaction  channel  of 
following  the  Lord,  for  example,  an  integral  part  of  these 
open  channels  by  connecting  it  with  them.     This  is  the 
physical  counterpart  of  associating  with  the  value  pre- 
sented some  means  for  its  realization. 

(3)  The  environment  must  be  modified  so  as  to  cause 
the  reaction  of  following  the  Lord  to  function  in  connec- 
tion with  the  more  fundamental  reactions  such  as  those 
towards  green  pastures,  still  waters,  protection  against 
enemies,  and  other  stimuli  presented  by  the  psalm  as  a 
part  of  the  environment.     This  is  the  physical  counter- 
part of  using  the  new  means  in  realizing  the  appreciated 
value. 

In  teaching  a  control  lesson,  (1)  the  first  step  on  the 
mechanical  side  is  to  modify  the  environment  so  that 
stimuli  will  call  forth  a  response  and  at  the  same  time  will 
check  this  response  in  its  functioning.  Appropriate  stim- 
uli may  call  forth  the  reaction  of  reading ;  but,  if  the  read- 
ing is  defective,  the  reactions  of  other  organisms  affected 
by  the  reading  excite  in  the  pupil  responses  which  inter- 
fere with  the  reading.  This  step  corresponds  to  the 
teleological  step  of  developing  a  motive  which  involves 
the  pupil  in  some  difficulty. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  439 

(2)  Reactions  must  now  be  directed  towards  the  several 
parts  of  the  situation  until  checked  more  specifically  by 
the  disturbing  factor.     This  factor  constitutes  a  part  of 
the  situation  for  which  no  adequate  response  has  been 
acquired.     The  teacher  may  assist  here  by  modifying  the 
environment  so  as  to  give  the  stimuli  necessary  to  make 
the  pupil  react  to  the  specific  obstruction.     Such  assist- 
ance may  be  afforded  by  giving  stimuli  which  on  other 
occasions  have  brought  approximately  the  reaction  needed. 
This  tends  to  open  a  channel  of  response  that  is  adapted 
to  the  situation.     In  the  case  of  a  reading  lesson,  the 
teacher  may  imitate  the  pupil's  fault,  thus  opening  a 
channel  of  response  on  the  part  of  the  pupil  that  will 
function  in  directing  his  reaction  against  the  difficulty  in 
his  own  reading.     If  the  pupil,  for  example,  reads  in  a 
monotone,  the  teacher,  by  himself  reading  in  a  monotone, 
may  start  in  the  pupil  a  reaction  that  will  point  to  this 
fault.     This  step  corresponds  to  the  teleological  step  of 
defining  the  problem  through  hypotheses  and  testing  the 
hypotheses  in  thought  or  in  action.     Incipient  reactions 
appear  on  the  side  of  consciousness  as  hypotheses.     They 
are  tested  by  action  when  they  are  fully  carried  out,  and 
by  thought  when  they  are  measured  only  by  the  imme- 
diate effects  they  produce  in  the  nervous  system  before 
overt  response  appears. 

(3)  The  response  should  then  be  turned  towards  over- 
coming the  check.     The  teacher  can  do  this  by  modifying 
the  stimuli  so  as  to  open  the  channel  to  the  response  which 
will  overcome  the  obstruction.     In  the  study  of  gravi- 
tation, the  pupil  may  be  made  to  react  as  desired  towards 
the  stimuli  of  an  apple  falling  to  earth,  if  the  teacher  first 
opens  the  appropriate  channel  by  having  him  react  towards 
the  stimuli  of  a  piece  of  iron  attracted  by  a  magnet.    This 


440  The  Principles  of  Education 

step  corresponds  to  solving  the  problem  by  hypothesis 
tested  in  thought  or  in  action,  or  in  both.  The  incipient 
reactions  which  have  been  directed  to  the  point  of  diffi- 
culty are  the  counterparts  of  hypotheses  and  of  the  testing 
of  hypotheses  in  the  solving  of  a  problem.  The  hypoth- 
esis is  tested  in  thought,  if  it  is  tested  by  the  immediate 
effects  produced  in  the  nervous  system  before  an  overt 
response  appears.  In  testing  the  hypothesis,  the  teacher 
modifies  the  environment  so  as  to  give  stimuli  that  will 
inhibit  or  strengthen  the  incipient  reaction  of  the  pupil 
at  the  point  of  obstruction. 

(4)  The  checked  reaction  must  be  completed  through 
the  new  pathway  of  response  developed  by  the  situation. 
This  corresponds  to  using  the  means  of  control  in  attain- 
ing the  purpose.  The  teacher  may  assist  here  by  removing 
obstructions  that  would  present  difficulties  complicating 
the  reaction  unnecessarily,  and  thus  enable  the  pupil  to 
overcome  one  difficulty  at  a  time. 

The  evidence  of  natural  science  supports  in  a  convincing 
way  our  conclusions  with  regard  to  extrinsic  motivation, 
telling,  undue  emphasis  upon  memory  work,  and  the  con- 
fusion of  appreciation  and  control  lessons. 

In  the  terms  of  natural  science,  extrinsic  motivation 
means  the  development  of  reactions  in  response  to  stimuli 
not  normally  producing  these  reactions.  In  the  case  of 
extrinsic  interest  in  reading  explained  above,  the  pupil 
responded  to  the  stimuli  of  the  teacher's  voice  instead  of 
to  the  stimuli  of  other  human  organisms  that  would  in 
turn  react  favorably  to  his  reading.  Training  under  such 
abnormal  situations  fails  to  make  the  pupil  responsive,  in 
the  absence  of  the  teacher,  to  the  situation  that  normally 
brings  the  response  of  reading.  In  the  degree  that  the 
situation  is  abnormal,  the  response  is  abnormal;  and  in 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  441 

the  degree  that  the  response  is  abnormal,  the  meaning 
which  parallels  it  is  perverted. 

Natural  science  shows  that  memorizing,  which  is  the 
parallel  of  fixing  reactions  in  the  nervous  system,  should 
ordinarily  be  a  by-product  in  education.  It  explains  that 
reactions  are  fixed  normally  in  the  nervous  system  merely 
by  being  performed.  To  the  extent  that  the  individual 
does  anything  else  than  perform  the  reaction  he  is,  of 
course,  fixing  the  modified  form  of  the  reaction,  which  may 
be  so  different  from  the  normal  reaction  as  not  to  retain 
any  of  its  essential  characteristics.  This  is  true  when  the 
organism  reacts  by  reproducing  symbols  instead  of  by 
performing  reactions  for  which  these  symbols  stand.  If 
the  individual  does  not  perform  the  reactions  for  which 
the  symbols  stand,  he  fails  to  acquire  the  true  meanings  of 
these  symbols  because  the  meaning  of  a  thing  symbolized 
parallels  the  reaction  to  it. 

In  telling,  the  teacher  undertakes  to  develop  connec- 
tions in  the  nervous  system  of  the  pupil  through  the 
stimuli  of  words  without  direct  evidence  of  just  what 
guidance  is  needed  for  the  development  of  the  nervous 
system.  If  the  pupil  is  stimulated  to  begin  the  reaction 
necessary  to  make  the  new  connections  which  he  should 
acquire,  the  teacher  can  discover  what  guidance  is  neces- 
sary by  noting  where  the  process  of  acquiring  the  new  con- 
nections breaks  down.  The  pupil  must  have  assistance 
to  overcome  these  difficulties,  but  he  needs  no  other 
assistance  than  this.  When,  by  the  stimuli  of  words,  the 
teacher  undertakes  to  guide  the  development  of  nerve 
connections  without  knowing  the  breaks  in  the  pupil's 
process  of  acquiring  new  connections,  he  is  liable  to  omit 
important  directions  which  the  pupil  should  have.  If 
these  directions  are  omitted,  the  pupil  does  not  acquire 


442  The  Principles  of  Education 

the  proper  nerve  connections  and  consequently  does  not 
get  the  proper  appreciations  and  meanings. 

According  to  natural  science,  the  teacher  who  confuses 
appreciation  with  control  subject  matter  uses  environ- 
mental conditions  provided  by  the  curriculum  in  an  abnor- 
mal way  and  therefore  does  not  get  the  satisfactory  results 
that  can  be  secured  when  they  are  used  normally.1  His- 
tory and  the  fine  arts  are  effective  guides  for  modifying 
the  pupil's  nervous  system  in  such  manner  that  particular 
responses  are  connected  with  fundamental  systems  of 
reactions ;  but,  if  the  teacher  uses  this  subject  matter  to 
develop  new  reactions,  the  results  are  unsatisfactory, 
because  the  subject  matter  is  not  fashioned  as  a  guide 
for  developing  new  reactions.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
sciences  are  effective  guides  for  modifying  the  pupil's 
nervous  system  in  such  a  manner  that  new  reactions  are 
acquired ;  but  if  this  subject  matter  is  used  by  the  teacher 
to  connect  responses  with  fundamental  systems  of  reac- 
tions, he  uses  it  as  a  means  of  doing  that  for  which  it  is 
not  well  adapted.  The  teacher  obviously  gets  better 
results  by  using  the  subject  matter  to  do  that  for  which 
it  is  especially  adapted. 

REFERENCES 

MOORE,  E.  C.,  What  is  Education?  1915,  pp.  195-257.  (Discusses 
the  place  of  method  in  education  and  also  learning  by  problem 
getting.) 

DEWEY,  J.,  Democracy  and  Education,  1916,  pp.  193-211.  (Presents 
the  essentials  of  method.  Valuable  especially  for  advanced 
students.) 

CHARTERS,  W.  W.,  Methods  of  Teaching,  1912.  (Gives  a  clear 
explanation  of  methods  of  teaching  from  the  functional  stand- 
point. See  table  of  contents  for  the  topics  discussed.) 

1  Cf.  pp.  195-196. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  443 

STRAYER,  G.  D.,  A  Brief  Course  in  the  Teaching  Process,  1911.  (Dif- 
ferentiates various  types  of  lessons  and  discusses  separately 
each  type.  See  table  of  contents  for  the  topics  discussed.) 

FAIRCHILD,  A.  H.  R.,  The  Teaching  of  Poetry  in  the  High  School, 
1914,  pp.  22-69.  (Gives  a  revised  and  edited  transcription  of  a 
stenographic  record  of  the  teaching  of  Browning's  poem  Andrea 
del  Sarto  to  a  class  of  high  school  pupils.  The  other  chapters 
in  this  book  also  are  stimulating  and  enlightening.) 

HAYWARD,  F.  H.,  The  Lesson  in  Appreciation,  1915.  (Gives  valuable 
information  regarding  the  teaching  of  appreciation  of  literature, 
music,  and  art.) 

SPENCER,  H.,  Education,  Ch.  III.  (Gives  an  utilitarian  discussion  of 
moral  education.) 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Is  it  desirable  that  an  elementary  school  teacher  know  the 
home  life  of  her  pupils?    Why? 

2.  Make  a  lesson  plan  for  teaching  some  particular  lesson  in 
history. 

3.  a.  What  in  your  judgment  are  the  most  common  defects  in 
Sunday  school  teaching?     6.  What  suggestions  would  you  make  for 
overcoming  these  defects? 

4.  Why  is  it  important  that  a  teacher  enjoy  a  poem  or  other  work 
of  art  he  is  teaching  to  a  class? 

5.  If  a  teacher  believes  that  appreciation  is  an  end  in  itself  and 
not  related  to  action,  what  is  the  most  serious  error  he  is  liable  to 
make  in  teaching  poetry? 

6.  Should  the  teacher  tell  the  class  directly  the  moral  of  a  story? 
Explain. 

7.  Make  a  lesson  plan  for  the  teaching  of  some  poem  and  indicate 
in  the  plan  the  essential  steps  in  the  teaching  of  purpose-giving 
subject  matter. 

8.  Make  a  lesson  plan  for  the  teaching  of  some  picture  and  indi- 
cate in  the  plan  the  essential  steps  in  the  teaching  of  purpose-giving 
subject  matter. 

9.  A  teacher  required  his  pupils  to  commit  to  mrmory  the  more 
important  rules  for  punctuation  and  then  dictated  to  them  a  number 


444  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  sentences  to  be  punctuated  in  accordance  with  these  rules.     Criti- 
cize his  method  of  teaching. 

10.  What  should  be  the  relation  between  classroom  work  and 
laboratory  work  in  the  teaching  of  some  physical  or  biological  science? 

11.  What  is  probably  the  main  defect  in  the  teaching  of  control 
subject  matter,  if  the  pupils  seldom  ask  questions? 

12.  What  fault  would  you  find  in  a  lesson  assignment  that  indi- 
cates merely  what  pages  the  pupil  should  read  in  the  textbook? 

13.  In  assigning  collateral  reading,  is  it  better  for  the  teacher  to 
ask  the  pupil  to  make  an  outline  of  what  he  reads  or  to  report  the 
important  ideas  in  the  reading  that  are  new  to  him?    Explain. 

14.  Would  it  be  advisable  for  a  teacher  in  assigning  a  review 
lesson  of  miscellaneous  problems  in  arithmetic  to  tell  the  pupils  the 
rule  involved  in  the  solution  of  each  of  the  problems?     Explain. 

15.  How  would  you  develop  in  children  the  ability  to  think  for 
themselves? 

16.  How  would  you  answer  the  objection  that,  in  view  of  the 
amount  of  work  to  be  covered  in  a  course,  it  would  take  too  much 
time  to  give  the  pupil  a  motive  for  each  lesson,  and  to  lead  him  to 
make  and  test  hypotheses  in  defining  and  solving  his  problems? 

17.  Mention  some  high  school  subject   you  have  studied  with 
intrinsic  interest  predominating  and  some  high  school  subject  you 
have  studied  with  extrinsic  interest  predominating.     Which  subject 
did  you  the  more  good?    Why? 

18.  What  are  the  relative  values  of  competition  and  cooperation 
as  motives  for  study  ? 

19.  a.  What  is  meant  by  socializing  classroom  instruction?    b. 
How  could  the  methods  in  some  school  with  which  you  are  acquainted 
be  more  fully  socialized  ? 

20.  Make  a  lesson  plan  for  the  teaching  of  some  scientific  truth 
and  indicate  in  the  plan  the  essential  steps  in  the  teaching  of  control 
subject  matter. 

21.  Explain  the  function  of  the  subject  matter  you  are  preparing 
to  teach  and  state  the  methods  you  should  use  to  make  it  function 
normally  in  the  experience  of  the  pupils. 

22.  Select  a  chapter  from  some  textbook  in  science  and  tell  what 
is  the  problem  of  the  chapter  and  what  is  the  problem  of  each  section 
and  paragraph. 


The  Methods  of  Teaching  445 

23.  a.  How  did  you  study  Chapter  XII  in  this  book?    6.  Criti- 
cize your  method  of  study  in  the  light  of  Chapter  XIII. 

24.  In  what  particulars  do  you  believe  that  you  can  improve 
your  methods  of  study? 

25.  What  evidence  can  you  give  that  you  are  able  to  study  more 
independently  now  than  you  were  two  years  ago? 

26.  Do  you  believe  that  the  students  who  rank  highest  in  daily 
work  in  a  high  school  or  college  course  should  be  excused  from  ex- 
aminations?    Give  reasons  for  your  answer. 

27.  Compare  the  analysis  of  the  learning  process  given  in  this 
chapter  with  the  analysis  of  study  given  in  How  to  Study  and  Teaching 
How  to  Study,  by  F.  M.  McMurry,  pp.  15-23. 

28.  Why  is  the  lecture  method  not  suited  to  high  school  pupils? 

29.  How  should  the  methods  of  teaching  in  a  secondary  school 
differ  from  those  adapted  to  university  students? 

30.  How  should  the  methods  of  teaching  in  an  elementary  school 
differ  from  those  adapted  to  high  school  pupils? 


CHAPTER  XIV 
EDUCATIONAL   DEVELOPMENT 

The  problem  of  this  chapter  is  to  find  the  general  nature  of 
the  development  of  education  as  a  rationalized  endeavor.  In 
the  rationalization  of  education,  the  following  subjects  have 
arisen:  History  of  Education,  School  Administration,  Super- 
vision of  Instruction,  School  Hygiene,  Theory  of  Teaching, 
Educational  Psychology,  Principles  of  Education,  and  Philos- 
ophy of  Education.  The  function  of  each  of  these  subjects  and 
the  relation  of  each  to  the  other  fields  of  educational  investiga- 
tion should  be  definitely  recognized.  The  progress  of  education 
is  as  unending  as  human  development. 

I 

The  problem  of  this  chapter  is  to  find  the  general  nature  of  the 
development  of  education  as  a  rationalized  endeavor.  This  de- 
velopment has  resulted  primarily  from  efforts  to  overcome  through 
education  difficulties  in  the  social  order.  The  development  of 
education,  like  that  of  other  forms  of  institutional  activity,  has 
been  irregular. 

Educational  activities,  like  all  other  social  processes, 
develop  through  becoming  rationalized.  Difficulties  in 
educational  procedure  are  ever  being  discovered  and 
overcome  by  careful  thought.  For  the  most  part  this 
thinking  has  been  based  upon  mere  opinion;  but,  with 
the  application  of  scientific  methods  to  the  study  of 
education,  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  facts  concerned 
has  greatly  increased  the  accuracy  of  the  results  attained 
in  the  solution  of  educational  problems.  A  detailed 
statement  of  the  development  of  education  as  a  rational- 

446 


Educational  Development  447 

ized  endeavor  would  constitute  the  history  of  education, 
which  deals  with  the  new  educational  purposes  that 
have  arisen  from  time  to  time  and  with  the  changes  in 
practice  that  have  been  made  in  the  service  of  these 
purposes.  Our  problem  from  the  standpoint  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  education  is  to  find  the  general  nature  of  this 
development  rather  than  the  concrete  details  which  com- 
prise it.  Since  the  educational  process  is  essentially  the 
same  whether  it  appears  in  the  school  or  in  other  institu- 
tions, where  it  is  of  secondary  importance,  our  study  of 
the  development  of  education  through  rationalization 
may  be  limited  to  the  work  of  the  school,  with  which  most 
of  the  study  of  education  has  concerned  itself. 

Men  have,  for  the  most  part,  defined  the  ideals  and  the 
methods  of  education  when  they  have  undertaken  to  use 
it  for  the  sake  of  overcoming  difficulties  in  the  social  order. 
When,  for  example,  deep-set  difficulties  in  the  social  order 
led  to  the  problem  of  how  a  man  should  live  in  order  to 
get  the  most  out  of  life,  Plato  defined  the  educational  ideal 
as  knowledge,  and  gave  an  outline  of  the  curriculum  and 
the  method  which  he  believed  would  lead  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  this  ideal.  In  answer  to  the  conflict  between  indi- 
vidual interests  and  traditional  social  restrictions,  Rous- 
seau explained  the  ideal  of  education  as  individual 
development,  and  presented  a  scheme  whereby  he  be- 
lieved this  ideal  could  be  attained.  When  a  difficulty 
arose  because  the  practical  demands  of  rapidly  developing 
science  conflicted  with  the  traditional  humanistic  cur- 
riculum, Herbert  Spencer  devised  important  educational 
doctrine  in  attempting  to  solve  the  problem  of  what 
knowledge  is  of  most  worth.  When  a  body  of  educational 
doctrine  arising  from  various  sources  had  been  generally 
accepted,  conflicts  arose  within  the  theory  of  education 


448  The  Principles  of  Education 

itself.  In  reconciling  such  conflicts  between  the  doc- 
trines of  interest  and  effort  and  between  theories  regarding 
the  child  and  the  curriculum,  Professor  Dewey  made 
valuable  contributions  towards  rationalizing  education. 
In  recent  years  much  attention  has  been  given  to  diffi- 
culties arising  within  the  technique  of  education;  and 
valuable  results,  due  largely  to  the  use  of  scientific 
methods  in  locating  these  difficulties  and  in  devising 
means  for  overcoming  them,  have  been  attained. 

The  development  of  education  has  been  irregular. 
Like  other  forms  of  institutional  activity,  it  has  passed 
through  periods  of  development  gradual,  arrested,  and 
revolutionary.  Illustrations  of  this  fact  are  given  in  the 
chapter  on  social  development.1 

II 

In  the  rationalization  of  education,  the  History  of  Education 
prevents  formalism  and  opens  the  way  for  scientific  improvement  of 
educational  practices,  School  Administration  solves  the  problems 
arising  from  the  complex  school  organization,  Supervision  of  In- 
struction presents  the  methods  that  should  be  used  in  improving 
and  coordinating  the  teaching  in  the  schools,  School  Hygiene 
deals  with  health  problems  peculiar  to  school  conditions,  the 
Theory  of  Teaching  reveals  the  methods  by  which  the  learning 
process  can  be  controlled,  Educational  Psychology  presents  from 
the  educational  point  of  view  an  objective  scientific  study  of  human 
nature,  the  Principles  of  Education  afford  general  guidance  in  edu- 
cational thought  and  practice  by  revealing  the  fundamental 
ideas  which  should  regulate  educational  procedure,  and  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Education  unifies  the  whole  field  of  educational  endeavor. 

When,  because  of  the  growing  complexity  of  educa- 
tional practice,  those  engaged  in  educational  work  felt 
the  need  of  guidance,  they  sought  the  History  of  Educa- 
tion in  order  to  profit  by  the  experience  of  the  past,  in 
1  See  pp.  290-305. 


Educational  Development  449 

which  many  thinkers  had  dealt  with  educational  problems. 
Since  educational  classics  were  directly  concerned  with 
solving  important  educational  problems  and  were  easily 
accessible,  these  writings  occupied  the  most  prominent 
place  in  the  History  of  Education.  The  appearance  of 
new  difficulties,  —  for  later  situations  are  different  from 
those  that  have  gone  before,  —  and  the  development  of 
scientific  methods  of  investigation,  led  later  educational 
thinkers  to  attempt  to  solve  educational  problems  by  a 
direct  study  of  the  facts  themselves  instead  of  depending 
upon  the  experience  of  the  past.  As  new  scientific  sub- 
ject matter  dealing  with  educational  practice  was  in  this 
way  worked  out,  the  History  of  Education  was  not  so 
much  depended  upon  for  guidance  in  educational  control, 
because  the  greater  value  of  the  results  of  modern  scientific 
investigations  was  easily  recognized.  A  modern  scientific 
treatment  of  the  methods  of  teaching  is  a  better  guide  for 
school  practice  than  the  theories  of  teaching  advocated 
by  Rousseau,  Pestalozzi,  and  Herbart,  or  accounts  of 
the  methods  used  by  old-time  schoolmasters.  A  modern 
standard  work  on  school  administration  is  more  useful 
as  a  guide  in  organizing  schools  than  is  Comenius's  Great 
Didactic  or  accounts  of  school  systems  in  past  genera- 
tions. Having  been  relieved  of  the  responsibility  of 
giving  scientific  guidance, for  which  it  is  not  well  adapted, 
the  History  of  Education  is  now  free  to  do  the  peculiar 
work  in  which  it  excels  all  other  studies  of  education,  - 
the  work  of  revealing  the  purposes  which  underlie  educa- 
tional practices.  It  thus  prevents  formalism  and  opens 
the  way  for  the  scientific  improvement  of  these  practices.1 
When  the  independent  one-room  school  gave  way  to 
city,  county,  and  state  educational  systems,  the  problems 
1  See  discussion  of  the  function  of  history,  pp.  202-204. 


450  The  Principles  of  Education 

of  administration  became  correspondingly  complex.  The 
solutions  of  these  problems  formed  the  subject  matter  of 
the  study  of  School  Administration,  which  includes  such 
problems  as  those  connected  with  the  educational  activi- 
ties of  national  and  state  governments ;  the  management 
of  city,  county,  and  district  school  systems ;  the  manage- 
ment of  evening  and  continuation  schools ;  the  construc- 
tion of  schoolhouses ;  the  selection  of  the  course  of  study ; 
the  provision  of  textbooks  and  school  supplies;  the  su- 
pervision of  instruction ;  the  education  of  subnormal  and 
supernormal  children ;  the  regulation  of  attendance ; 
the  control  of  the  morals  of  pupils ;  the  administration  of 
vocational  and  physical  education ;  the  grading  and  pro- 
motion of  pupils;  the  financing  of  schools;  and  the 
preparing  of  school  records  and  reports. 

The  Supervision  of  Instruction,  which  has  to  do  with 
improving  and  coordinating  the  teaching  in  the  schools, 
was  done  in  the  early  days  by  laymen,  who  had  no  special 
training  for  this  work.  When,  as  schools  became  more 
highly  developed,  persons  trained  in  education  were 
needed  for  this  work,  it  was  transferred  from  laymen  to 
the  administrative  officers  of  the  schools.  In  the  larger 
school  systems,  the  work  of  supervising  the  instruction 
has  become  so  extensive  that  it  is  assigned  to  officers  who 
are  specialists  in  this  field.  It  is  further  organized  by 
the  special  supervision  of  the  instruction  in  such  subjects 
as  music,  drawing,  penmanship,  and  manual  arts  by 
persons  specially  trained  for  this  work.  The  importance 
of  supervision  of  instruction  as  a  subject  of  study  is  such 
that  it  may  be  considered  not  only  as  one  of  the  sub- 
divisions of  Educational  Administration,  but  as  a  subject 
requiring  special  treatment  coordinate  with  that  of  School 
Administration. 


Educational  Development  451 

Some  of  the  problems  which  come  before  the  supervisor 
of  instruction  are  how  to  articulate  the  kindergarten,  the 
elementary,  and  the  high  schools ;  how  to  organize  eco- 
nomically the  work  for  each  grade  of  school ;  how  by 
measuring  results  and  otherwise,  to  determine  the  abili- 
ties of  teachers,  so  that  each  teacher  who  is  retained  in 
the  service  can  be  assigned  the  work  he  is  able  to  do  most 
effectively;  how  to  lead  the  teachers  to  secure  social 
rather  than  individualistic  motives  on  the  part  of  the 
pupils;  and  how  to  lead  them  to  develop  the  pupils' 
interest,  initiative,  and  industry. 

Health  problems  arising  from  indoor  life,  the  grouping 
of  many  children  in  one  building,  close  application  to 
books,  the  use  of  the  smaller  muscles  in  handwork,  the 
unusual  demand  for  inhibition,  and  other  conditions 
peculiar  to  the  school  have  led  to  the  development  of 
School  Hygiene  as  important  subject  matter. 

When  men  began  to  look  upon  the  work  of  education 
not  merely  as  disciplining  the  child  by  replacing  his  fickle 
interests  and  illogical  thinking  with  the  serious  interests 
and  logical  thinking  of  the  adult,  but  as  guiding  the 
growth  of  the  child's  experience  in  his  development  from 
infancy  to  maturity,  the  problems  that  gave  rise  to  the 
Theory  of  Teaching  became  manifest.  When  motivation 
was  secured  largely  by  reward  and  punishment,  and 
when  learning  was  largely  a  matter  of  rote  memorizing, 
men  did  not  recognize  the  important  problems  of  teach- 
ing; but  when  they  began  to  understand  that  teaching 
is  controlling  the  development  of  a  very  intricate  child 
nature,  they  did  recognize  these  teaching  problems,  which 
at  once  began  to  multiply.  The  Theory  of  Teaching  now 
deals  with  both  general  and  special  methods,  the  one 
comprising  the  fundamental  forms  of  procedure  which 


452  The  Principles  of  Education 

apply  to  all  teaching  and  the  other  dealing  with  the 
application  of  these  to  special  kinds  of  subject  matter, 
such  as  history,  language,  mathematics,  biology,  and 
physics.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  methods  of  teach- 
ing are  the  forms  in  which  the  subject  matter  is  presented 
and  are  therefore  closely  dependent  upon  the  nature  of 
the  subject  matter,  the  need  for  the  study  of  special 
methods  is  important.  The  Theory  of  Teaching  deals 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  teacher  with  such  problems 
as  the  following:  What  is  the  function  of  teaching? 
What  is  the  nature  of  subject  matter?  What  is  the 
difference  between  the  logical  and  the  psychological 
organization  of  subject  matter?  What  is  the  function 
of  the  curriculum?  What  is  the  nature  of  the  pupil  the 
development  of  whom  should  be  guided  by  the  teacher? 
What  use  should  the  teacher  make  of  the  curriculum? 
What  is  the  difference  between  the  incidental  and  the 
systematic  teaching  of  subject  matter?  What  are  the 
natures  of  the  various  kinds  of  lessons?  How  should 
lesson  plans  be  made?  How  should  motivation  be 
secured?  How  should  lessons  be  assigned?  What  are 
the  best  forms  of  questioning?  How  should  the  class  be 
managed?  How  can  the  teacher  give  moral  training? 
What  are  the  influences  of  physical  conditions  upon  the 
work  of  the  pupils?  How  can  the  results  of  teaching  be 
measured  and  tested  ?  How  should  the  work  of  teachers 
be  supervised  ?  In  the  case  of  special  methods,  the  prob- 
lems of  teaching  arise  from  the  application  of  such  ques- 
tions as  these  to  the  teaching  of  particular  kinds  of 
subject  matter.  These  problems  have  to  do  with  the  func- 
tions of  history,  language,  biology,  and  of  other  particular 
subject  matter  to  be  taught ;  the  motives  by  which  the 
pupil  should  be  led  to  study  the  kind  of  subject  matter 


Educational  Development  453 

with  which  the  special  method  is  concerned ;  the  psycho- 
logical as  compared  with  the  logical  arrangement  of 
particular  lessons ;  etc. 

Hand  in  hand  with  the  Theory  of  Teaching,  Educational 
Psychology  has  developed.  Educational  thinkers  have 
found  that  not  mere  sympathetic  insight  into  child  nature 
produced  by  the  teacher's  imagining  himself  in  the  pupil's 
place,  but  an  objective,  scientific  study  of  child  nature  is 
the  only  basis  on  which  reliable  methods  of  teaching  can 
be  developed.  When  Herbart  recognized  this  fact,  he 
developed  a  psychology  as  the  basis  for  his  theory  of 
teaching.  He  found  it  necessary  to  devise  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  psychology  himself,  because  the  only 
generally  accepted  psychological  theory  of  his  time  was 
the  Aristotelian,  supporting  the  old  idea  of  education  as 
discipline  and  offering  no  satisfactory  explanation  of 
the  way  in  which  ideas  are  acquired.  Since  teaching  is 
"  causing  the  pupil  to  learn,"  the  scientific  analysis  of 
the  learning  process  is  the  first  step  in  determining  what 
should  be  the  nature  of  the  teaching  process.  Educational 
Psychology,  which  has  kept  pace  with  general  experi- 
mental psychology  in  its  development,  reveals  the  bearing 
of  the  facts  and  principles  of  psychology  upon  the  prob- 
lems of  teaching,  and  uses  psychological  methods  in 
solving  a  wide  variety  of  educational  problems.  It  pre- 
sents the  educational  implications  of  these  facts  and 
principles  regarding  such  matters  as  instincts  and  habits, 
memory,  attention,  thinking,  fatigue,  the  improvement 
of  mental  abilities  by  practice,  and  the  influence  of  the 
improvement  of  one  mental  function  upon  other  mental 
functions.  It  also  furnishes  a  scientific  technique  for 
measuring  abilities  and  establishing  norms. 

With  the  rapid  development  of  educational  thought, 


454  The  Principles  of  Education 

some  general  guide  was  needed  to  mark  the  essential 
nature  of  education  so  that  this  essential  nature  would 
not  be  lost  sight  of  in  a  confusion  of  details.  There  was 
need  of  principles  to  serve  as  general  standards  in  judging 
the  truth  or  falsity  of  educational  ideas  and  practices,  to 
provide  a  general  basis  for  organizing  ideas  of  the  details 
of  education,  and,  by  revealing  the  true  objectives  of 
educational  procedure,  to  indicate  the  problems  requiring 
solution.1  To  meet  this  need,  the  subject  matter  of  the 
Principles  of  Education  has  been  devised. 

The  Principles  of  Education  have  for  the  most  part 
been  stated  in  the  terminology  of  natural  science  and  have 
therefore  described  the  life  process  as  the  process  of 
adjustment  of  the  organism  to  the  environment.  In  some 
books  on  this  subject,  the  point  of  view  of  teleology  and 
that  of  natural  science  have  been  used  without  being  differ- 
entiated. This  lack  of  differentiation  is  liable  to  lead  to 
erroneous  ideas  resulting  from  a  confusion  of  the  personal 
subject  with  the  organism  and  of  the  objective  aspect  of 
experience  with  the  environment.  The  difference  between 
the  explanation  of  human  life  afforded  by  natural  science 
and  that  afforded  by  teleology,  and  the  danger  of  con- 
fusing these  explanations,  are  presented  in  previous 
chapters  of  this  book.2 

Some  of  the  important  questions  which  various  books 
on  the  Principles  of  Education  have  undertaken  to  answer 
are  as  follows :  What  are  the  educational  implications  of 
the  theory  of  evolution?  What  is  the  nature  of  social 
development?  What  is  the  relation  of  the  individual  to 
society  in  the  process  of  education?  What  is  the  aim 
of  education?  What  agencies  other  than  the  school 
educate?  What  is  the  function  of  the  school?  What 
1  See  pp.  1-5.  2  See  pp.  6-13  and  65-66. 


Educational  Development  455 

are  the  functions  of  elementary,  of  secondary,  and  of 
higher  education?  What  is  the  nature  of  educational 
value?  What  are  the  educational  values  of  the  sciences 
and  of  the  humanities?  What  is  the  difference  between 
liberal  and  vocational  education?  What  are  the  criteria 
for  selecting  the  curriculum  ?  What  are  the  psychological 
bases  of  teaching?  What  powers  and  capacities  should 
be  recognized  in  educational  procedure?  What  are  the 
conditions  of  individual  development?  To  what  extent 
does  the  improvement  of  one  faculty  through  use  affect 
the  improvement  of  other  faculties?  How  should  the 
school  be  organized  in  order  to  realize  most  effectively 
the  aim  of  education  ? 

A  number  of  conflicts  of  a  very  fundamental  nature 
have  arisen  in  the  field  of  educational  study.  The 
Philosophy  of  Education  is  the  court  of  final  appeal  in 
reconciling  these  conflicts,  and  accordingly  tends  to  unify 
the  whole  field  of  education.  The  Philosophy  of  Educa- 
tion carries  with  it  a  general  attitude  towards  all 
educational  endeavor,  because  it  deals  with  fundamental 
ideas,  or  plans  of  action,  that  are  concerned  with  this 
activity.  In  general,  the  Philosophy  of  Education  bears 
to  the  Principles  of  Education  a  relation  similar  to  that 
which  philosophy  bears  to  a  science.  Its  function  is  to 
make  a  systematic  inquiry  into  the  fundamental  nature  of 
the  presuppositions  upon  which  the  Principles  of  Educa- 
tion are  based.  As  MacVannel  says : 

The  aim  of  the  philosophy  of  education  may  be  variously  stated : 
(a)  to  discover  the  place  and  significance  of  education  in  human 
experience ;  (6)  to  furnish  a  systematic  interpretation  of  the  presup- 
positions and  results  of  educational  experience ;  (r )  to  furnish  a 
progressive  organization  of  the  principles  presupposed  and  ascer- 
tained by  the  sciences  in  their  relation  to  educational  experience ; 


456  The  Principles  of  Education 

(d)  to  trace  the  relations  of  education  to  the  other  activities  of 
civilization ;  (e)  to  determine  the  relation  of  the  educational  process 
to  the  process  of  reality ;  (/)  to  become  the  theory  of  the  nature  and 
development  of  educational  experience;  (g)  to  become  the  system 
or  organization  of  the  principles  of  education.1 

Some  of  the  more  important  problems  considered  in 
the  Philosophy  of  Education  are  as  follows :  What  is  the 
meaning  of  education  ?  Is  a  science  of  education  possible  ? 
What  are  the  factors  of  the  educational  process?  What 
important  implications  does  the  theory  of  evolution  have 
for  educational  theory?  What  are  the  nature  and  the 
meaning  of  environment?  What  is  the  difference  be- 
tween the  physical  and  the  social  environment?  What 
is  the  aim  of  education?  What  is  the  nature  of  educa- 
tional value?  What  is  the  relation  of  mind  to  body? 
What  is  the  nature  of  experience?  How  does  experience 
develop?  What  is  the  relation  of  knowledge  to  virtue? 
What  is  the  relation  of  theory  to  practice?  What  is  the 
nature  of  personality?  What  is  the  relation  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  society?  What  is  the  nature  of  human  institu- 
tions? What  is  the  relation  of  education  to  social  prog- 
ress? What  should  be  the  essential  characteristics  of 
education  in  a  democracy?  What  is  the  relation  of  sub- 
ject matter  to  method?  What  is  the  essential  problem 
of  the  methods  of  teaching?  What  are  the  relative  values 
of  interest  and  effort  in  learning?  What  is  the  essential 
problem  of  the  curriculum  ? 

The  lists  of  questions  here  given  as  examples  of  the 
characteristic  problems  with  which  various  divisions  of 
the  study  of  education  are  concerned  appear  not  to  be 
mutually  exclusive,  but  to  overlap.  To  a  considerable 

1  MacVannel,  J.  A.,  Outline  of  a  Course  in  the  Philosophy  of  Educa- 
tion, p.  16. 


Educational  Development  457 

extent  this  overlapping  is  only  apparent,  because  similar 
questions,  when  considered  from  different  points  of  view, 
involve  different  problems.  It  is  true,  however,  that  the 
various  fields  of  educational  study  have  not  been  clearly 
differentiated  by  investigators. 

Ill 

The  progress  of  education  requires  further  development  of  the 
History  of  Education,  Educational  Administration,  Theory  of 
Teaching,  and  the  like.  The  function  of  each  of  these  subjects 
and  the  relation  of  each  to  other  fields  of  educational  investiga- 
tion should  be  definitely  recognized.  The  progress  of  education 
is  as  unending  as  human  development. 

Whatever  general  advance  is  made  in  education  must 
be  made  as  the  result  of  further  rationalization  of  the 
educational  process.  Such  advance  requires  that  edu- 
cators know  more  definitely  what  they  are  trying  to  do 
and  devise  better  means  for  accomplishing  these  aims. 
In  this  process  of  rationalizing  educational  procedure,  the 
History  of  Education  reveals  the  purposes  underlying 
educational  practices;  Educational  Administration  deals 
with  the  many  problems  that  arise  from  the  complicated 
organization  of  educational  forces ;  Supervision  of  Instruc- 
tion presents  the  methods  that  should  be  used  in  improv- 
ing the  work  of  the  individual  teachers  and  in  securing 
more  effective  cooperation  among  the  various  teachers 
employed  in  the  same  school  system ;  School  Hygiene 
deals  with  health  problems  peculiar  to  the  school ;  the 
Theory  of  Teaching  shows  how  the  learning  process  of 
the  child  should  be  directed ;  Educational  Psychology 
finds  the  natural  endowments  of  human  beings  in  so  far 
as  these  endowments  may  be  used  in  education,  analyzes 
the  learning  process,  and  employs  the  technique  of  natural 


458  The  Principles  of  Education 

science  with  its  exact  measurements  and  mathematical 
methods  to  solve  many  other  related  educational  prob- 
lems; the  Principles  of  Education  give  general  guidance 
in  educational  thought  and  practice  by  revealing  the 
fundamental  ideas  which  should  regulate  educational 
procedure ;  the  Philosophy  of  Education  as  the  last  court 
of  appeal  in  solving  conflicts  in  educational  thought, 
unifies  the  whole  field  of  educational  endeavor.  This 
list  of  subjects  which  rationalize  educational  practice  is 
not  intended  to  be  exhaustive.  It  represents,  however, 
the  more  important  subdivisions  of  study  in  this  field  of 
human  activity. 

Sometimes  the  educational  subject  matter  here  men- 
tioned is  divided  into  cross  sections,  so  that  elementary, 
secondary,  and  higher  education  are  studied  separately. 
These  cross  sections  do  not  conflict  with  the  divisions  of 
educational  subject  matter  here  given,  because  elemen- 
tary, secondary,  and  higher  education  each  presents 
peculiar  problems  that  may  be  studied  from  the  point  of 
view  of  history,  administration,  teaching,  psychology,  and 
the  like.  These  cross  sections  are  an  advantage,  because, 
by  subdividing  the  field  of  education,  they  simplify  and 
more  clearly  define  its  problems. 

At  present  the  main  classes  of  educational  subject 
matter  overlap  to  a  considerable  extent.  Attention  was 
called  to  this  fact  in  the  preceding  section  in  the  case  of 
lists  of  questions  given  to  indicate  the  present  scopes  of 
various  divisions  of  the  study  of  education.  This  fact  is 
revealed,  moreover,  by  a  comparison  of  the  contents  of 
textbooks  and  of  syllabi  of  courses  dealing  ostensibly  with 
different  fields  of  educational  study.  The  overlapping  is 
due  to  the  failure  of  various  investigators  to  recognize 
the  limits  of  their  respective  fields,  largely  because  these 


Educational  Development  459 

fields  are  new  and  have  been  developed  to  a  considerable 
extent  independently  of  one  another. 

Educational  investigation  should  be  more  definitely 
organized.  Each  division  of  the  field,  such  as  the  History 
of  Education,  Theory  of  Teaching,  Educational  Psychol- 
ogy, and  the  Principles  of  Education,  should  have  a 
definitely  recognized  function  in  contributing  to  the 
rationalizing  of  educational  procedure  and  a  definitely 
recognized  relation  to  the  other  special  fields  of  educational 
investigation.  The  greatest  economy  and  efficiency  in 
educational  investigation  requires  that  each  worker  rec- 
ognize the  purpose  and  limitations  of  his  own  special 
field  and  that  he  cooperate  intelligently  with  other  in- 
vestigators in  different  fields. 

The  development  of  education  is  as  unending  as  human 
development,  of  which  we  have  found  it  to  be  one  of  the 
factors.  The  educational  problems  we  have  attempted 
to  outline  live  on,  but  the  particular  formulations  and 
solutions  of  these  problems  change  as  the  study  of  the 
individual  reveals  more  definitely  his  nature  and  as 
changing  civilization  sets  new  patterns  to  guide  the 
progress  of  the  human  spirit. 

REFERENCES 

RUEDIGER,  W.  C.,  The  Principles  of  Education,  1910,  pp.  1-19. 
(Discusses  the  teacher's  professional  curriculum.) 

HORNE,  H.  H.,  The  Philosophy  of  Education,  1905,  pp.  7-13.  (De- 
fines briefly  the  kinds  of  subject  matter  dealing  with  education.) 

STRAYER,  G.  D.,  A  Brief  Course  in  the  Teaching  Process,  1911,  pp. 
247-255.  (Discusses  the  measurement  of  results  in  education.) 


460  The  Principles  of  Education 

PROBLEMS 

1.  Make  a  list  of  the  more  important  educational  periodicals  and 
state  the  special  field  of  each  in  the  discussion  of  educational  problems. 

2.  Make  a  list  of  the  titles  and  authors  of  thirty  books  on  educa- 
tion, including  not  less  than  two  books  representative  of  each  of  the 
eight  special  fields  of  educational  study  defined  in  this  chapter,  and 
state  the  special  field  to  which  each  book  is  mainly  devoted. 


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INDEX 


Advertising,  77 

Aim  of  education,  various  statements 

of,  discussed,  324 
Analogy,  use  of,  102,  113 
Architecture,  231 
Aristotle,  27,  60 
Art,  see  fine  arts 
Athenians,  299 

Bagley,  W.  C.,  115,  121 
Baldwin,  J.  M.,  28,  44 
Book,  method  of  studying,  428 
Browning,  E.  B.,  148,  225 
Browning,  R..  208,  221,  400 
Bryant,  W.  C.,  225 
Burns,  R.,  226 

Cause,  245 :  final,  13 ;  physical,  or 
efficient,  6.  12.  149 

Character  building,  143 

Church,  function  of,  282  , 

Clean,  208,  221.  239,  400 

Com  to,  267 

Culture.  328.  376.  384 

Curriculum,  function  of,  339;  rela- 
tion to  teaching,  342 ;  making  of, 
Ch.  XII ;  problems  in  making  of, 
350.  380;  finding  details  of,  352; 
testing  accuracy  of,  353,  382  ;  when 
change  is  justifiable,  354  ;  opinion 
and  science  in  making  of,  354 ; 
analysis  of  social  needs  for,  355 ; 
required  and  elective  work.  3(M) ; 
errors  in  making  of.  3(57,  382  ;  char- 
acteristics of  well-made.  283.  372 

Davidson.  T..  146.  147.  151.  207 
Development,   larger  factors  in   hu- 
man,  Ch.   II ;    personal.   Ch.   VI ; 


social,   Ch.   X;    educational,   Ch. 

XIV 
Dewey,  J.,  324,  330,  342,  345,  351, 

359  448 

Dewey,  J.,  and  Tufts,  J.  H.,  86,  89 
Dickens.  Charles,  218 
Duty,  ideal  of,  140 

Education,  statements  of  aim  of,  dis- 
cussed, 324  ;  problems  of,  must  ever 
be  solved  anew,  343,  348 ;  subject 
matter  of,  should  be  better  or- 
ganized, 458 ;  see  also  educational 
factor  or  process 

Educational  development,  Ch.  XIV 
Educational  factor  or  process  in  hu- 
man development,  general  nature 
of,  38,  4 1 .  346 ;  analysis  of,  Ch.  XI 
Educational  psychology,  453 
Effort,  137,  141,  153,  373,  383 
Electives  in  curriculum,  360,  375.  384 
Elements,  scientific,  249 
End,  arc  purposes 
Ethical  i>oint  of  view,  12 
Ethical  theory,  evidence  of,  83 
Euripides,  224 

Examination  lesson,  407,  411,  415, 
431 

Factors  in  human  development,  the 

larger,  Ch.  II 
Faculty  psychology.  330 
Fairchild,  A.  H.  R..  413 
Fooling,  in  relation  to  i>urp< >.-.•.  60,  1 12 
Final  cause,  13 
Fine  arts,  function  of.  171.  179,  182. 

1U3;    compared  with  history.  ISM); 

differences  among.  201  ;   |>orvorsion 

of,  237,  241  ;    promote  social  de- 


466 


466 


Index 


velopment,  305,  311 ;  methods  of 
teaching,  397 

Fiske,  J.,  43 

Formal  discipline,  136,  330,  368 

Formalism,  167 

Freedom,  gained  through  social  de- 
velopment, 306,  312 

Froebel,  292 

General  science,  265 
Genius,  nature  of,  113 

Hamlet,  223,  240 

Hanus,  P.  H.,  365,  375 

Harris,  W.  T.,  369 

Hedonism,  84 

Herbart,  292 

History,  nature  and  function  of,  170, 
179,  182,  193,  198,  202,  238;  dis- 
tinguished from  fine  arts,  199,  240 ; 
common  faults  of,  209 ;  as  comple- 
ment of  sciences,  215;  promotes 
social  development,  305,  311; 
method  of  teaching,  391 

History  of  education,  448 

Hobhouse,  247 

Home,  function  of,  281 

Human  development,  larger  factors 
in,  Ch.  II ;  see  also  individual, 
social,  and  educational  factors  or 
processes 

Idea,  compared  with  means  of  con- 
trol, 51 

Idealism  l>s.  sciences,  17,  272,  276 

Idealistic  point  of  view,  12 

Ideals,  how  made,  71 ;  authority  of, 
80 ;  relation  to  effort,  140 ;  see  also 
purposes 

Individual,  social  nature  of,  27 ; 
variation  of  individuals,  31 ;  see 
also  individual  factor  or  process 

Individual  factor  or  process  in  human 
development,  conflict  with  social, 
25;  general  nature  of,  30,  41; 
neglect  of  by  Plato,  32  ;  analysis  of, 
Ch.  Ill;  factors  of,  51,  62 

Individualism,  condition  of,  297 

Industries,  function  of,  281 


Infancy,  meaning  of,  42 

Institutions,  functions  of,  280,  308; 
growth  of,  284,  290;  all  educate, 
320,  346 ;  educational  influence  of 
each  should  be  rationalized,  337, 
347 ;  how  far  each  should  educate, 
363 

Interest,  nature  of,  131,  152,  365; 
immediate  and  mediate,  131 ;  in- 
trinsic and  extrinsic,  133,  152 

Intuitionalism,  83,  89 

James,  W.,  113,  127,  140,  144,  154 

Laocoon  Group,  228,  405 

Laws,  scientific,  251 

Literature,  function  of,  171,  179,  193  ; 

nature  of,  216,  239;    methods  of 

teaching,  397,  437 ;    see  also  fine 

arts 
Logical  vs.  psychological  organization 

of  subject  matter,  257,  276 
Longfellow,  H.  W.,  225 

Mackenzie,  J.  S.,  335 
Marmery,  J.  V.,  262,  286 
Materialistic  point  of  view,  6 
Meaning,  114,  117,  118,  119,  126 
Means,  when  not  justified  by  end,  81 
Means  of  control,  compared  with  idea, 
51 ;    nature  of,  58,  64 ;   how  made, 
Ch.  V;    steps  in  making  of,   110, 
122 ;      scientific     method     reveals 
how  made,  111;   reason  predomi- 
nant in  making  of,  112;    difficult 
steps  in  making  of,  1 13  ;    teaching 
of,  416 ;   see  also  meaning 
Memorizing,  434,  441 
Methods    of    teaching,    function   of, 
340;     principles    underlying,    Ch. 
XIII;     types  of,   389,   347;    why 
knowledge  of,  useful,  390,  427,  436 ; 
history,  391 ;    literature,  397,  437 ; 
control  subject  matter,  416,  438; 
sciences,  416;  reading  and  spelling, 
418;   perversions  of,  432,  440;   see 
also  examination,  review,  and  study 
lessons 
Monroe,  P.,  173 


Index 


467 


Moral  sense  theory,  83,  89 
Moral  training,  need  of,  323 
Motivation,  416,  432,  440 
Motive,  see  purpose 
Moving  picture,  236 
Munsterberg.  H.,  88,  152,  245 
Music,  nature  of,  234 ;    teaching  of, 
406 

Natural  science,  point  of  view  of,  6, 13 
Nature  poetry,  224 

Object  and  subject,  not  factors  of  in- 
dividual process,  52,  65 
Olympic  Zeus,  statue  of,  227 
Opinion,  relation  to  science,  354 
Overcrowded  curriculum,  377,  385 

Painting,  nature  of,  230;  teaching 
appreciation  of,  404 

Pearson,  K.,  245,  253,  254,  270,  271 

Personal  development,  Ch.  VI,  334 

Philosophy  of  education,  455 

Physical  point  of  view,  6 

Plan  of  this  book,  19 ;  outline,  22 

Plato,  32,  304.  327,  309 

Poe,  E.  A.,  217 

Poetry,  see  literature 

Principles  of  education,  function  of, 
1,454;  source  of  faulty.  2  ;  need  of 
true,  3 ;  problem  of  organizing,  5, 
14  ;  method  of  organizing,  19 

Problem,  method  of  defining  and 
solving,  101 

Psychological  r«.  logical  organization 
of  subject  matter,  257.  276 

Psychophynical  parallelism,  9 

Purposes,  nature  of,  5ft.  M,  92 ;  how 
made.  Ch.  IV ;  steps  in  making  of, 
72,  76.  95;  original  and  derived, 
79,  96 ;  evidence  of  ethical  theory 
as  to  making  of,  S3 ;  feeling  pre- 
dominant in  making  of,  112: 
source  of  intercut.  131  ;  social 
patterns  for,  Ch.  VIII 

Reading,  teaching  of.  4\H 
Reason,   in   relation   to  purpose  and 
means  of  control,  59,  61.  112 


Religion,  function  of,  282 

Religious  sanction,  strengthens  good 

purposes,  74 
Required   work  in  curriculum,  360, 

375,  384 

Review  lesson,  407.  411,  415,  430 
Robinson,  J.  H.,  210,  214 
Rousseau,  J.  J.,  25,  36 

Santayana,  G.,  246 

School,  function  of,  281,  321.  347; 
relation  to  other  institutions,  321, 
347,  362;  all  activities  of,  should 
be  educative,  337  ;  scope  of  activi- 
ties of,  338 ;  work  of,  needs  greater 
rationalization,  339 ;  problems  of, 
must  ever  be  solved  anew,  343,  348 

School  administration,  450 

School  hygiene,  451 

Sciences,  vs.  idealism.  17,  272,  276; 
function  of,  174,  182,  189.  194.  243  ; 
giving  ideals  incidental,  180,  195; 
as  patterns  for  control,  Ch.  IX ; 
nature  of,  245,  273;  laws  of,  251, 
276 ;  physical  and  dialectic.  254  ; 
as  development  of  common  knowl- 
edge. 261 ;  pure  and  applied,  262; 
classification  of,  266 ;  do  not  reveal 
reality,  271,  276;  promote  social 
development,  305.  311;  relation  of 
opinion  to,  354  ;  methods  of  teach- 
ing, 416 

Scientific  method,  reveals  steps  in 
making  means  of  control,  111 

Sculpture,  nature  of.  227;  teaching 
appreciation  of,  405 

Self-realization,  aee  personal  develop- 
ment 

Sensations,  united  by  meaning.  118 

Sistint  Madonna,  230 

Slate  Ship,  The,  230.  404 

Social  contract  theory.  26 

Social  development,  nature  of.  Ch.  X  ; 
meaning  of,  2NJ.  307  ;  gradual.  1MM). 
309;  arrested,  295.  3O9;  revolu- 
tionary. 21  HI.  311;  promote*  j>er- 
sonal  freedom,  300.  312 

Social  efficiency .  as  aim  of  education, 
324.  333.  334.  347.  355 


468 


Index 


Social  factor  or  process  in  human  de- 
velopment, 25,  36,  41 ;  analysis  of, 
Ch.  VII 

Social  guidance,  163 

Social  patterns,  two  kinds  of,  162,  193 

Society,  regulation  by,  25 ;  social  con- 
tract theory  of,  26 ;  see  also  social 
factor  or  process 

Socratic  method  of  teaching,  426 

Spelling,  teaching  of,  420 

Spencer,  H.,  84,  183,  185,  252,  261, 
268,  299,  357 

State,  function  of,  282 

Study  lesson,  407,  412,  415,  428 

Subject  and  object,  not  factors  of 
individual  process,  52,  65 

Subject  matter,  two  kinds,  162,  193 ; 
how  related  to  methods  of  teaching, 
342;  nature  of  unit  of,  366;  in- 
adequate guide  for  making  curric- 
ulum, 368 

Supervision  of  instruction,  450 

Teaching,  function  of,  389,  436;  see 
also  methods  of  teaching  and  theory 
of  teaching 

Teleology,  point  of  view  of,  12 


Tennyson,  Alfred,  Lord,  224 
Theory   of    knowledge,    Kant's,    54 ; 

Locke's,  54 
Theory  of  teaching,  improvement  of, 

illustrated,  292 ;    function  of,  451 
Things,  as  bearers  of  purposes  and 

meanings,  119,  127,  146;    see  also 

means  of  control  and  meaning 
Thomson,  J.  A.,  264 
Thorndike,  E.  L.,  96,  126 
Tradition,  origin  and  nature  of,  167 
Twenty-Third  Psalm,  108,  219,  399, 

402,  437 

Utilitarianism,  83 

Value,  see  purpose 

Vices,  how  attitude  towards  develops, 

75 
Vocational  education,  332 

Welton,  J.,  247 

Word,  definition  of,  115;  nature  of, 
116,  166 

World,  as  record  of  personal  develop- 
ment, 147 

World  building,  146,  155 


22 


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